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Printed in Belgium Foreword 
Foreword 
The growing interest in this annual 
analysis of employment trends and 
strategies reflects not only the 
quality of the document, but the 
over-riding importance to the whole 
European project of systematically 
raising employment levels and re-
ducing unemployment. 
The last two European Councils, at 
Essen, then Cannes in June, have 
cemented that resolve in important 
ways, for Member States, for the 
European Commission and for the 
Union as a whole. 
As this report makes very clear, the 
labour market is changing fast in the 
Union, and across the developed 
world. New and more productive jobs 
are being created while old jobs are 
disappearing. There is a 10% turn-
over every year in the stock of jobs. 
So the speed of change is remark-
ably high. 
The skill requirements of the new 
jobs being created are higher than 
for those being lost, putting severe 
pressure on our education and train-
ing systems. But, in these systems, 
the speed of change is much less, 
capacity is too low, and adaptation to 
new conditions is slow. 
We have found ourselves in the Union 
with a two-speed, and dual, labour 
market, which manifests itself in 
severe problems for those who lose 
their jobs, much work slipping to-
wards the unregulated margins, and 
difficulties for expanding firms to get 
skilled labour. In the end, all of this 
leads to slower growth, continued 
pressure on public finances and grow-
ing exclusion from active society. 
We now have, following the two re-
cent Councils, a Union-wide process 
to gauge and improve employment 
performance. It is an inclusive pro-
cess. It brings together the Social 
Affairs and EcoFin Councils. It 
draws heavily on the committment 
of the Social Partners, as well as the 
involvement of other institutions. 
The key facets of the Essen conclu-
sions concern a stronger push on 
training, employment intensive 
growth, reducing employer cost ob-
stacles to recruitment, and stronger 
action to help those most affected by 
structural unemployment. Within 
this, the importance of renewed ac-
tion on small and medium 
enterprises, and local initiatives and 
capacity, is also stressed. 
This year's Employment in Europe 
report has been revamped to review 
trends, prospects and strategies in 
line with the five priorities agreed 
unanimously by the Council. 
The Council took a significant step at 
Essen by urging Member States to 
transpose the main Essen priorities 
and recommendations into national 
multi-annual programmes to be 
examined each year by the Heads of 
State in Council. The Essen process, 
drawing from the White Papers, 
gives us the bones of a new European 
employment strategy. 
The recent Cannes Council built on 
this by giving a new and important 
mandate to the Commission. It 
asked us to study the mutually rein-
forcing effect of the enhanced 
coordination of economic and struc-
tural policies. This mandate draws 
its power from the fact that the 
European Union, as an economic en-
tity, offers significantly more room 
for manoeuvre. More than this, it 
brings to the equation a particular 
added value that will make for the 
creation of lasting employment. 
The Single Market, developed to 
maximum potential, is the first 
building block of European wealth 
and job creation. Economic and mon-
etary union — the single currency — 
will be crucial to ensuring that this 
potential is realised, and it can offer 
the stability needed to do so. But if 
EMU is really to be the further loco-
motive of wealth and job creation for 
the citizens of Europe, it must be 
matched by an employment strategy 
which can give us the high quality, 
flexible, labour force we need for a 
productive working society. 
Without that we cannot realistically 
aspire to full employment — which 
must be put back at the top of the 
agenda. 
We have — in the mid-1990s — mass 
structural unemployment, which is 
less a buffer, or recruitment reserve, 
than a dualising of society. We have to 
recognise and respond to the fact that 
there has been a fundamental shift in 
the nature of the labour market. Un-
employment is becoming — under 
present systems — a permanent state, 
encased by a fundamental mis-match 
between skills, needs and incentives. 
It may be that full employment, 
defined as mainly for men, and 
largely in manufacturing, with 
people having more or less the same 
job for life, is gone. 
A return to a different kind of full 
employment will only be possible if 
we make as great an effort to develop 
a new employment strategy as we 
are now deploying towards economic 
and monetary union. We need a root 
and branch re-examination of our 
employment systems in Europe, in 
the interplay of taxation, welfare, 
training, regulation and other 
policies, and collective agreements. 
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Only through such an approach will 
a new European employment 
strategy emerge, which finds a new 
European way towards high levels of 
employment and low unemploy-
ment: the cement of an inclusive 
Europe. 
The structural changes we are now 
pursuing can offer this new way. 
They can enable us to reorganise our 
re-employment measures, to bring 
new skills to the unemployed, more 
positive relationships between work 
and welfare, and the capacity for 
workers and companies to access 
training systematically and flexibly. 
Recent Councils have pointed us 
firmly in these directions, and 
underlined the importance of 
equality of access and opportunity to 
achieving these objectives. The 
Councils stressed, particularly, con-
tinuous training as fundamental to 
long-run competitiveness, to produc-
tivity growth. But this needs 
investment in capacity on a par with 
the higher education revolution of 
the 1960s and '70s. 
They have also focused strongly on 
the challenge of sustaining and de-
veloping small and medium 
enterprise. It is from these com-
panies, if a fair wind is offered, that 
business wealth and jobs growth 
— with consequent reduction of pub-
lic deficits — will come. But it is 
bigger than that. 
We also need a broader, more soph-
isticated view of local development 
and local initiatives, of how the na-
tional and European levels can 
enable and nurture local econ-
omic development — whether 
indigenous growth through local de-
mand, or national or supranational 
sub-contraction opportunities. 
All these can be underpinned by re-
examining tax policies, and their 
impact on employment. On non-
wage labour costs we can make a 
great impact, not only on bringing 
unskilled people back into the labour 
market, particularly the long-term 
unemployed, by making them more 
attractive to employers, but in 
bringing unmet need — new entre-
preneurial and social activity — to 
the market. 
Done correctly, and informed by so-
cial justice, all this could help 
transform today's passive schemes 
of unemployment insurance into 
more active, more strategic, 
re-employment systems, allied to 
more positive and imaginative tax 
and welfare relationships. The costs 
of such an approach would be a small 
fraction of what we have been spend-
ing merely to extend unemployment 
benefits for those who have lost jobs. 
Again the European Council urged 
action to address long-term unem-
ployment, and, particularly, stressed 
the vital issue of engaging young 
people in active society. With youth 
unemployment double that of adults 
in Europe, we must find new ways to 
give young people their first step in 
the labour market, while at the same 
time avoiding the possibility of job 
substitution and consequent wage 
instability. 
The new Youthstart programme fo-
cuses on this issue. It requires, as do 
many of the initiatives now being 
pursued by the Union, the full 
weight of Social Partners' support to 
be effective. 
These are only examples, though 
important ones, of what a new employ-
ment strategy, aimed at eradicating 
the developing two speed and dual 
society Europe, would entail. 
It must be clearly focused on develo-
ping the labour force required to 
ensure that the jobs potential of the 
Single Market, and impending Econ-
omic and Monetary Union, are 
realised for consumers, investors, 
workers and society. Strong produc-
tive employment is not simply or 
simplistically a criterion for EMU, it 
is a prerequisite for a successful 
Economic and Monetary Union. 
We now have a unique opportunity 
to make real progress on these 
fronts, by utilising fully the positive 
economic climate which now exists. 
The recovery which began in mid-
1993 is now being transformed into 
robust economic growth, with 2.7% 
growth last year now projected to be 
3.1% this year and 2.9% in 1996, by 
which time real output in the Union 
will be almost 10% above the 1991 
level. 
This provides a window of oppor-
tunity to focus clearly on 
unemployment problems and em-
ployment potential. I believe we 
ignore this opportunity at our peril, 
particularly since we now have some 
of the building blocks to make the 
economic policy and labour market 
changes which can address the 
single greatest problem which preoc-
cupies all our people: jobs. 
This report will contribute greatly to 
our understanding of how our sys-
tems are working and not working. 
It has many important messages for 
policy — all based on fact, on ana-
lysis — which I hope will be fully 
utilised in developing our collective 
efforts, and building new policy and 
practice as we move towards the 
Madrid Council. It is only through 
such collective effort that we can 
build confidence, and meet the aspir-
ations of investors, consumers, 
workers and citizens for a produc-
tive, working European Union. 
Pádraig Flynn 
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Summary and conclusions: trends and strategies 
After three years of falling employ-
ment and rising unemployment 
throughout the European Union, the 
recovery in economic output which 
has spread to most parts since mid-
1993 has already begun to raise the 
rate of net job creation. In the 
majority of Member States, unem-
ployment rates have either 
stabilised or fallen slightly in the 
first part of 1995. The number out of 
work in the Union as a whole, how-
ever, still stands at over 18 million, 
almost 11% of the work force and, 
though the prospects over the next 
year or two are for some increase in 
the growth of employment, the num-
ber seems unlikely to decline very 
rapidly in the near future. 
Unemployment, therefore, remains 
the major economic — and social — 
problem confronting the Union. The 
means of achieving a higher rate of 
employment growth, sustained over 
a long enough period to bring the 
numbers out of work down to ac-
ceptable levels, will, therefore, be a 
primary issue of policy concern for 
some time to come. 
While countries in the Union face a 
common problem, however, its scale 
and characteristics vary a good deal 
between countries, and between 
regions within countries, as do the 
potential for generating increased 
rates of job creation and the appro-
priate policies to pursue. This 
diversity makes it essential to 
examine trends in each Member 
State individually if an insight is to 
be gained into the prospects for 
achieving higher levels of employ-
ment on a sustained — and 
sustainable -
a whole. 
■ basis in the Union as 
At the same time, the differing na-
ture of the unemployment problem 
and of the way in which it has been 
perceived has led to a range of 
policies being adopted to tackle the 
problem and, therefore, to a diver-
sity of experience in terms of the 
results achieved and the difficulties 
encountered in implementation. 
Such diverse experience poten-
tially represents a valuable pool of 
information for Member State gov-
ernments contemplating changes in 
policy in this area, enabling them to 
learn from what has happened else-
where. This potential, however, has 
so far not been fully realised. 
These two considerations underlie 
the request of the European Council 
at the Essen meeting in December 
1994 for the Commission, in cooper-
ation with the Member States, 
to review labour market develop-
ments in the various parts of the 
Union on an ongoing basis and the 
national policies being followed to 
address employment problems. This 
Report is intended to contribute to 
the process of building up a common 
pool of information by focusing on 
what has happened in the recent 
past to employment and unemploy-
ment in individual Member States 
and the measures which have been 
introduced in this area. As such it 
differs in some degree in terms of 
format from reports of previous 
years, though it retains the same 
emphasis on quantitative analysis 
of developments which is critical 
both for a better understanding of 
employment problems and the for-
mulation of more effective policies. 
A major focus is on the key policy 
areas which, building on the ana-
lysis in the Commission White 
Paper, Growth, Competitiveness, 
Employment, were identified in the 
conclusions of the Essen Council 
meeting as being of critical import-
ance for tackling the Union's 
employment problems. These are 
considered in turn below after 
reviewing recent employment 
developments across the Union. 
Outline of report 
In Part I of the Report, the latest 
labour market developments in 
each of the Member States of the 
Union are examined on the basis 
of the most timely statistical infor-
mation available, in order to review 
their performance in achieving 
employment objectives. Such objec-
tives, it should be emphasised, 
cannot be couched simply in terms 
of achieving a particular growth of 
employment or reduction in unem-
ployment. There are a number of 
other aspects which are no less im-
portant, such as the growth of 
employment relative to the demand 
for jobs, where jobs are expanding 
or declining, the changing terms 
and conditions of employment 
and the differential impact of job 
creation on different groups in the 
labour market. 
All of these aspects are examined 
in Part I so as to provide a basis 
for assessing the effectiveness of 
employment policy overall. The 
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intention is that this examination 
and the aspects identified as being 
of major importance for policy 
assessment should form the foun-
dation of an ongoing review of 
employment developments in the 
Member States. 
Part II examines specific measures 
of policy action aimed at tackling 
employment and unemployment 
problems introduced in the Member 
States in the recent past, focusing on 
the policies implemented in the 
areas for action identified by the 
Essen Council as being of key im-
portance. 
Part III contains a more detailed 
analysis of two specific issues singled 
out by the Council to be of particular 
importance, the first being the rela-
tionship between employment, 
systems of social protection and 
labour costs, the second the scope for 
job creation in activities relating to 
the protection of the environment. 
Recent changes 
in employment 
in the Union 
The recent recession had a severe 
impact on employment in most 
Member States. The numbers 
employed in the European Union as 
a whole declined by 4% in the three 
years 1991 to 1994, twice as much 
as any previous fall over a com-
parable period since the war. As a 
result, 6 million jobs — some 60% of 
the 10 million or so net increase in 
jobs generated during the record 
period of employment expansion 
between 1985 and 1990 — were 
effectively lost over this period. 
Around 800 thousand of these lost 
jobs were in two of the new Member 
States, Finland and Sweden, where 
the recession started earlier than 
elsewhere and where employment 
had already fallen by 350 thousand 
between 1990 and 1991, a fur-
ther million in the former East 
Germany. 
Older Member States also suffered 
similarly large job losses: Italy, a 
fall in employment of over 1.7 mil-
lion in the three years 1991 to 1994, 
the UK, one of almost 900 thousand 
— following a decline of almost the 
same size in the previous year — 
Spain, a fall of over 800 thousand 
and the former West Germany, one 
of almost 600 thousand. Three of 
the countries, Germany, Spain and 
the UK, which accounted for over 
60% of the increase in employment 
in the Union as a whole between 
1985 and 1990 (each experiencing a 
rise of around 2 million), were, 
therefore, responsible for much of 
the subsequent job loss. Although 
not all Member States suffered an 
absolute fall in employment, in 
none of them was the increase large 
enough to prevent unemployment 
from rising. 
A rough measure of the success of 
economies in providing jobs for 
their citizens is the ratio of employ-
ment to population of working age 
— the employment rate. Across the 
Union as a whole, the employment 
rate peaked at 62% in 1992 and fell 
to under 60% in 1994, after 8 years 
of continuous increase. This com-
pares with rates of 70% in the US 
and 78% in Japan (Graph 1). 
While the present expectation is 
for employment in the Union to 
increase in 1995 — by around 1% 
or so on average — this will com-
pensate only to a relatively small 
extent for the job losses suffered 
over the preceding three years and 
will serve to raise the employment 
rate at most only slightly in relation 
to the level in the US, let alone 
Japan. 
1 Employment rates, 1972-94 
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Recent changes 
in unemployment 
The widespread fall in employment 
led to a steep rise in unemployment 
in the Union. After falling to 772% 
in 1990 from a peak of just under 
10% in 1985, the average rate rose 
to a new peak of just over 11% in 
1994. By contrast in the US, unem-
ployment fell to under 6'A% in 1994 
and in Japan, it remained below 3% 
(Graph 2). 
The increase in unemployment was 
particularly pronounced in Finland 
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and Sweden, the rate rising from 
37,% to 187,% in the former, from 
under 2% to almost 10% in the 
latter, in both cases after many 
years of unemployment below the 
Union average. In the former East 
Germany, unemployment rose 
from under 11% in 1991 to almost 
16% in 1994. At the same time, in 
Spain, which had enjoyed a particu-
larly large fall in unemployment in 
the late 1980s, the rate rose from 
just over 16% to over 24%. 
Since the peak rate reached in the 
Spring of 1994, unemployment in 
the Union has come down, but only 
very slowly. At the latest monthly 
count (May 1995), the average rate 
was still almost 11%, only margi-
nally below the level a year earlier. 
Although growth of GDP in the 
Union seems to have resumed in 
mid-1993, this as yet has had a 
minimal impact on the numbers out 
of work. 
Only in five Member States, 
Denmark, Spain, the Netherlands, 
Finland and Sweden, did unem-
ployment (on a seasonally-adjusted 
basis) fall by more than 0.1% of the 
labour force, in the first five months 
of 1995. In the others, it either 
remained unchanged or increased, 
in Portugal, by as much as 0.6%. 
So far this slow and far from univer-
sal fall is very much in line with 
the experience in the previous 
period of recovery from the mid-
1980s on. Then it took three years 
after unemployment had reached 
its peak for the rate to begin to fall 
significantly. On that experience, it 
may not be until the middle of 1997 
that major reductions in unemploy-
ment occur. It is not inevitable that 
history should repeat itself, but 
present forecasts of employment 
growth in 1995 and 1996 are no 
higher than that experienced last 
time round. 
Employment of 
men and women 
A long-term trend in the Union has 
been for the number of men in em-
ployment to decline and for the 
number of women to increase. In 
the ten years before 1985, the num-
ber of men employed fell by 4%, 
while the number of women ex-
panded by 10%. In the years of high 
job growth at the end of the 1980s, 
the trend decline in male employ-
ment was halted and the number in 
work went up by 472%. Since 1990, 
however, the long-term trend has 
resumed and the number of men in 
employment has fallen markedly. 
While the employment of women 
has also fallen, the decline has been 
very much less. 
The main proximate cause of the 
increased employment of men in the 
late 1980s was the growth of jobs in 
industry where men account for 
75% of the work force. In the ten 
years before then, employment in 
industry fell significantly resulting 
in large scale job losses for men. 
Though the number of men em-
ployed in services increased, this 
was not enough to offset this fall 
coupled with the substantial de-
cline in agriculture. Between 1987 
and 1990, in the years of high net 
job creation, employment in indus-
try increased by 6% and the number 
of jobs in the sector filled by men by 
5%. As a result, the overall employ-
ment of men expanded, though still 
by only half as much as that of 
women, whose share of new jobs 
was more than their existing share 
of employment in both industry and 
services. 
In the period of recession between 
1990 and 1994, jobs in industry 
fell by substantially more than the 
rise over the preceding three years. 
As in the past, this hit men much 
more than women and in conse-
quence the number of men in work 
declined by 5%. During the same 
period, the number of women em-
ployed fell only marginally. Though 
servicejobs for women continued to 
expand over this period (by 172% a 
year, around four times the rate of 
growth of jobs for men in this sec-
tor), this was not sufficient, unlike 
in the past, to compensate for the 
reduction in jobs in industry and 
agriculture. Nevertheless, the pro-
portion of jobs in both industry and 
services filled by women as opposed 
to men increased at a faster pace 
during this period than in earlier 
years. 
This tendency was common to most 
Member States and in every case, 
women have increased their share 
of employment in services in recent 
years. As described below, an in-
creasing proportion of these jobs 
have been part-time rather than 
full-time. How far the growth in 
employment of women in services is 
a consequence of their much greater 
readiness to work part-time and 
how far, on the contrary, the 
increased importance of part-time 
working is itself a result of women 
wanting to work part-time — in 
other words, whether the main 
underlying factor is an increased 
demand for women or an increased 
demand for part-time workers — 
are questions which remain 
unanswered. However, it is signifi-
cant that the share of women in 
employment has increased every-
where, even in countries where 
part-time working is relatively 
unimportant. 
For men, given the long-term reduc-
tion of jobs in industry, which there 
is little reason to expect to be 
reversed, the answer is of some im-
portance and is a major issue 
underlying their job prospects in 
future years. 
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Unemployment of 
men and women 
Despite the larger job losses 
suffered by men, the rate of unem-
ployment among women remains 
higher (averaging around 1273%) 
than for men (averaging just over 
972%) reflecting divergent trends of 
men and women in the labour force, 
as described below. The only 
Member States where the reverse is 
the case are Finland, Sweden and 
the UK. Since the peak unem-
ployment rate in 1994, however, 
the rate for men has fallen slightly 
more than that for women. On past 
experience, this would be expected 
to continue to be the case for 
the next year or two as manufac-
turing output and jobs begin 
to recover and as increasing 
numbers of women are attracted 
back into the labour force by the 
prospect of employment oppor-
tunities. 
Employment and 
labour force growth 
The numbers in the labour force, 
which expanded by almost 1% a 
year in the second half of the 1980s 
as employment increased, con-
tracted during the recession years 
between 1990 and 1994. The lack of 
job opportunities seems to have 
persuaded a significant proportion 
of men in particular either to with-
draw from the labour force or to 
delay entry. At the same time, the 
upward trend in the proportion of 
working-age women looking to 
work, which had persisted at a rela-
tively high rate throughout the 
1980s slowed appreciably during 
these four years. These develop-
ments had a marked effect in 
preventing unemployment from 
rising even more than it did during 
this period. 
The fall in labour force participation 
which underlies this reversal of 
trend was especially marked among 
young people under 25. The reduc-
tion in the proportion of this age 
group joining the labour market, 
which occurred in all Member 
States apart from Greece and 
Luxembourg, was by itself respon-
sible for a reduction in the Union's 
work force of 3 million over this 
period, considerably more than 
in preceding years. Almost all of 
this decline in participation was 
mirrored in an increase in the pro-
portion remaining in education and 
training, which in most parts of the 
Union, rose at a higher rate than 
previously (as described further 
below). 
Participation also declined among 
older men of 55 and over, again at a 
higher rate than in earlier years, 
so reflecting an accelerating trend 
towards early retirement as men in 
this age group losing their jobs had 
increasing difficulties finding new 
ones. Between 1990 and 1994, the 
number of men in the labour force 
aged 55 and over fell in all Member 
States except Germany, Greece and 
Ireland, and only in the former was 
there any significant rise in num-
bers. 
More disturbingly perhaps, signifi-
cant numbers of men of prime 
working age, between 25 and 54 
also withdrew from the formal 
labour market. In all countries in 
the Union, participation of men in 
this age group declined, the fall 
being especially marked in Italy, 
Ireland and the UK. In total, this 
was responsible for reducing the 
Union's work force by almost 
1.2 million over this period. 
These developments had an import-
ant effect on unemployment during 
the recent recession. Between 1991 
and 1994, the effect of withdrawal 
from the labour force was dramatic. 
During this period, employment fell 
by 6 million and unemployment 
rose by 5 million; the labour force, 
therefore, declined by 1 million. 
Given the growth of working-age 
population and trends in rates of 
participation, the Union's labour 
force would have been expected to 
expand by some 4 million. In other 
words, without the increased with-
drawal of young people and men 
aged 25 and over, there would have 
been 5 million more people in the 
work force in 1994 than there ac-
tually were. 
These developments also have 
potentially important implications 
for labour force growth over the 
short and medium-term as the 
Union economy recovers and as 
the rate of net job creation in-
creases. On the experience of 
the 1980s, sizeable numbers of 
those who have been seemingly 
encouraged by the lack of employ-
ment opportunities to withdraw 
from, or not to enter, the labour 
market could be attracted into 
the work force as more jobs 
become available. If this occurs, 
then just as in the latter part of 
the 1980s, it could appreciably 
reduce the extent to which 
unemployment comes down as 
employment expands. If it occurs at 
a similar rate as between 1985 and 
1990, the employment growth 
which is now forecast for 1995 and 
1996 will have only a minor effect 
on the rate of unemployment. Thus 
between 1985 and 1990, the labour 
force expanded by almost 1% a year 
or only just below the employment 
growth now expected, implying the 
possibility of only a very small re-
duction in unemployment as 
measured. 
This is not to imply, of course, that 
such employment growth is not 
beneficial, still less that labour force 
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growth should be held down by 
some means. Rather it indicates the 
substantial numbers of people who 
do not appear in the unemployment 
figures but who, nevertheless, 
would like to work if jobs were avail-
able. 
Re-employment: a 
strategy for the Union 
Five key areas of policy were em-
phasised at the Essen Summit as 
being of major importance for tack-
ling the Union's employment 
problems: 
• improving employment oppor-
tunities for the labour force, by 
promoting investment in voca-
tional training. To that end a 
key role falls to the acquisition 
of vocational qualifications, 
particularly by young people. 
As many people as possible 
must receive initial and further 
training which enables them 
through life-long learning to 
adapt to changes brought about 
by technological progress, 
in order to reduce the risk of 
losing their employment; 
• increasing the employment in-
tensity of growth, in particular 
by: 
• a more flexible organisation 
of work, in a way which ful-
fils both the wishes of em-
ployees and the requirements 
of competition; 
• a wage policy which encour-
ages job-creating invest-
ments and in the present 
situation requires moderate 
wage agreements below in-
creases in productivity; 
• the promotion of initiatives, 
particularly at regional and 
local level, that create jobs 
which take account of new 
requirements, e.g. in the 
environmental and social-
service spheres; 
• reducing non-wage labour costs 
extensively enough to ensure 
that there is a noticeable effect 
on decisions concerning the 
taking on of employees and 
in particular of unqualified em-
ployees; 
• increasing the effectiveness of 
employment policy by avoiding 
practices which are detrimental 
to the readiness to work, and 
by moving from a passive to an 
active labour market policy. 
The individual incentive to 
continue seeking employment 
on the general labour market 
must remain. Particular ac-
count must be taken of this 
when working out income-
support measures. The need for, 
and efficiency of, the instru-
ments of labour market policy 
must be assessed at regular in-
tervals; 
• implementing particular 
measures necessary to help 
young people, especially school 
leavers who have virtually no 
qualifications, by offering them 
either employment or training. 
The fight against long-term 
unemployment must be a major 
aspect of labour market policy. 
Varying labour market policy 
measures are necessary accord-
ing to the very varied groups 
and requirements of the long-
term unemployed. Special 
attention should be paid to the 
difficult situation of unem-
ployed women and older 
employees. 
These points form the focus of the 
remainder of this Report. 
Point 1: Improving 
employment 
opportunities 
for the labour force 
Young people 
The significant reduction in partici-
pation in the labour force of young 
people under 25, as noted above, was 
associated with an equally large in-
crease in the proportion of those 
remaining in education and training 
rather than seeking employment. In 
some degree, this reflects the policy 
effort in all Member States to extend 
the provision of education and initial 
training for young people to improve 
their chances of both finding, and 
remaining in, work (see Part II, 
Section 1 for details of the policy 
followed in different parts of the 
Union and the measures introduced 
in recent years). 
This policy aim is inspired by two 
related features of the labour market 
in Member States which are becom-
ing increasingly pronounced. In the 
first place, unemployment rates 
among those with no educational or 
vocational training qualifications 
beyond basic secondary schooling 
are much higher than for those with 
such qualifications. In 1994 in the 
Union as a whole, 13% of those of 25 
and over in the labour force without 
any further qualification were un-
employed as compared with 9% of 
those with additional qualifications 
and less than 6'/,% of those with 
university degrees or the equivalent. 
Secondly, there is a strong long-term 
shift in the structure of jobs from less 
skilled to more skilled. The share of 
managerial, technical and profes-
sional jobs in total employment has 
increased progressively over time in 
all Member States and the upward 
trend shows no sign of abating. 
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The growth in the provision of edu-
cation and training opportunities 
for young people has led to almost 
70% of teenagers between 15 and 19 
in the Union being in full-time edu-
cation or training in 1994 as against 
only 60% in 1987. As a result, 95% 
of those in this age group who were 
classed as economically inactive 
were receiving further education or 
initial training. In most Member 
States, participation in education 
and training has increased in recent 
years at the same rate or faster than 
participation in the labour force has 
fallen. There are, however, excep-
tions. In Denmark, Ireland and 
the UK, especially after 1990, the 
rise in those remaining in the edu-
cation system was less than the 
proportion leaving the labour force. 
The relative numbers of those who 
were genuinely inactive (neither 
in the labour force nor receiving 
education or training), therefore, 
expanded. Though in Ireland and 
the UK, the increase was small, in 
Denmark, the proportion rose from 
under 2% of the teenage population 
to 8%. 
Moreover, it remains the case, des-
pite government efforts, that the 
proportion of teenagers who are, in 
this sense, fully inactive varies 
markedly across the Union. Despite 
tending to come down, it remains 
highest in the four Southern Mem-
ber States together with Denmark 
and the UK, at 5% of those in this 
age group. In the other Member 
States, by contrast, the figure is 
only around 2%. 
More disturbingly, only 72% of 
those aged 20 to 24 who were 
not economically active were in full-
time education or training. One 
in ten, therefore, were non-
participants in either the labour 
force or education. In Greece and 
Italy, the figure was around one in 
six, in the UK, one in eight as 
compared with less than one in 20 
in Denmark and the Netherlands. 
While the recent increase in the pro-
portion of young people remaining 
in education and training beyond 
basic schooling is in line with policy 
across the Union, it is open to ques-
tion how far, in practice, it mainly 
reflects a lack of job opportunities. 
To the extent that this is the case, 
participation in education beyond 
basic schooling may decline or 
rise at a slower rate in the near 
future as economic recovery occurs 
and more jobs become available. 
The scale of this possible change, 
however, differs between Member 




Women for the past 20 years or 
more have accounted for the entire 
growth of the Union's work force 
and are likely to continue to do so in 
future years. The future productive 
potential of the economies of Mem-
ber States, therefore, is linked to a 
major extent to the skill levels of 
women. In the light of this as well 
as for reasons of equity, it is import-
ant that women have equal access 
to education and initial training 
and to continuing training throug-
hout their working careers (for 
details of policy in Member States, 
see Part II, Section 1). 
Over the Union as a whole, the 
same relationship between the 
chances of being unemployed and 
educational attainment levels is as 
evident for women as for the work 
force as a whole, although unem-
ployment rates are still higher for 
women than for men with similar 
educational attainment levels. In 
1994, 1472% of women with 
no qualifications beyond basic 
schooling were unemployed, just 
over 772% of those with university 
degrees or the equivalent, while the 
comparable figures for men were 
12% and under 57,%. 
Education is, therefore, not suffi-
cient to overcome apparent 
discrimination, but it helps. Pros-
pects for women's employment in 
relatively low skilled activities such 
as sales and general services are, in 
fact, better than for men, but while 
growth in these areas may help to 
absorb the large numbers of women 
unemployed, whether openly or 
hidden, there is also a need to in-
crease the opportunities for women 
in middle and higher level jobs. 
There is a similar trend towards 
more jobs for women as for men 
being in the managerial, technical 
or professional category, requiring 
more extensive education and 
higher skill levels. Within this 
category, however, a much lower 
proportion of women than men are 
employed as managers (or legisla-
tors). In 1994, only 5% of women in 
employment were classified to this 
occupational group as opposed to 
872% of men, while just under 16% 
of women worked as technicians as 
against just under 12% of men and 
a slightly higher proportion of 
women than men were classed as 
professionals. 
Overall, therefore, proportion-
ately more women than men are 
employed in jobs likely to require 
relatively high levels of skills 
and qualifications. At the same 
time, more detailed study suggests 
that a much smaller proportion of 
these women than men work in 
private business as opposed to the 
public sector — in education, for 
example — and that, in general, 
their level of authority and respon-
sibility tends to be lower than that 
of men. 
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Nevertheless, in almost all coun-
tries in the Union, participation 
rates of women of 15 to 24 in educa-
tion and training are similar to 
those of men, though, in general, 
fewer study science, engineering 
and technology-related subjects. 
Equality in the acquisition of initial 
educational qualifications has, 
therefore, either already been 
achieved or is in process of so being. 
Equality for women in securing ac-
cess to jobs commensurate with 
their skill levels remains. Women 
who leave the labour market when 
they have children face particular 
problems when they return. The 
emphasis on life-long learning 
which has been called for could help 
insofar as it enabled women to up-
date and improve their skills, which 
implies that it is important for such 
learning opportunities to be avail-
able for those outside the labour 
market as well as those inside. 
The same is the case for active 
labour market measures which 
tend to concentrate, in some coun-
tries, on those registered as 
unemployed rather than on those 
who might not be registered but 
who are still interested in seeking 
work. Nevertheless, in several 
countries, eligibility for training 
and work experience programmes 
has been extended to women 
returners whether registered as un-
employed or not and in some cases 
special programmes targeted at 
women have been introduced. 
Much, however, remains to be done. 
Improving 
the effectiveness 
of training systems 
A common tendency in Member 
States has been to try to make train-
ing provision more responsive to 
local and individual needs. This has 
been associated with a widespread 
devolution of delivery to the re-
gional and local level, together with 
the increased involvement of the 
business community both to advise 
on the content of courses and to play 
a more active part in training itself. 
At the same time, there is a growing 
emphasis in many Member States 
on individuals taking a greater 
responsibility themselves for ident-
ifying and meeting their own 
training needs. Moreover, advant-
age has been widely taken of new 
technologies and more flexible 
forms of learning (using, for 
example, a variety of different 
media) in order to reduce learning 
time and improve access. 
Accelerating changes in technology 
and the intensification of interna-
tional competition have together 
increased the pace of structural 
change in the economy and the need 
for the work force to learn new 
skills. As a result, there is increas-
ing concern in Member States to 
ensure that the training provided is 
relevant to changing labour market 
requirements both through moni-
toring quality and through trying to 
forecast new demands. 
Towards 
life-long learning 
These same concerns have led to 
growing emphasis not only on the 
education and initial training of 
young people but also on the need 
for continuing training throughout 
an individual's working career. This 
is encouraged in some Member 
States through statutory entitle-
ment to training or study leave 
(in Belgium and Denmark, for 
example), in most through collec-
tive agreements between the social 
partners. In addition, financial in-
centives in the form of tax relief on 
expenditure are widely available, 
funded in part by levies on firms. 
Nevertheless, the evidence suggests 
that both access to continuing train-
ing and its focus are closely related 
to educational attainment levels, so 
that the least qualified and those 
most vulnerable to changing skill 
needs are the least likely to receive 
it. 
This seems also to be the case for 
those employed in small companies, 
which account for 70% of employ-
ment in the Union and which are 
the main source of new job creation, 
because of the relative lack of re-
sources, both human and financial, 
to provide adequate training. In a 
number of Member States, there-
fore, such workers are included in 
priority groups for publicly-funded 
provision. This illustrates the com-
mon tendency for life-long learning 
to be a shared responsibility be-
tween government, business and 
employers' organisations, trade 
unions and individuals. 
Point 2: Increasing 
the employment-
intensity of growth 
Output and employment 
growth in the Union 
Over time, the growth of employ-
ment in the Union has closely 
mirrored the growth of GDP. A rise 
in GDP growth has usually been fol-
lowed by an increase in employment 
some time later, the full effect taking 
a number of years to come through 
fully. Though the response of em-
ployment to a change in the growth 
rate varies between Member States, 
the relationship between the two at 
the Union level — and in most Mem-
ber States — has remained fairly 
constant over the past 15 years, 
with annual GDP growth in the 
Union as a whole exceeding annual 
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employment growth by around 2%, 
reflecting the underlying increase in 
labour productivity (or more pre-
cisely, output per person employed) 
(Graph 3, in which GDP growth is 
lagged 6 months to allow in some 
degree for the delayed response of 
employment to a change in output). 
In the latter part of the 1980s, during 
the period of high net job creation, 
labour productivity growth averaged 
slightly under 2% a year across the 
Union as a whole, lower than during 
earlier periods of economy recovery 
and helping to increase the numbers 
in work. In the four years between 
1990 and 1994, the rate of labour 
productivity growth was much the 
same. Employers, in other words, ap-
pear to have adjusted their work 
forces downwards in line with the 
depressed rate of output growth. 
This contrasts with the experience in 
the US and Japan. In the US, the 
growth of labour productivity has 
been consistently below the rate in 
the Union over the past 20 years, 
averaging only just over 72% a year. 
In Japan, where labour productivity 
in the 1980s grew by consistently 
more than in the Union at an aver-
age of over 3% a year, it declined in 
the years of recession between 1992 
3 Changes in GDP and employment, 1980-94 
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and 1994. While GDP remained 
virtually constant, the number in 
employment increased slightly and 
unemployment was held down. 
The difference in experience be-
tween Europe and these two 
countries was particularly marked 
for non-manufacturing sectors 
where most of the job growth 
occurred. In the US, especially, 
labour productivity growth in manu-
facturing — where a relatively high 
proportion of output is traded inter-
nationally and where accordingly 
the maintenance of competitiveness 
is of particular importance — was 
similar during the 1980s, at around 
3% a year, to the average in the 
European Union and fell only 
slightly in the recent recession. 
Growth of labour productivity in 
the Union in manufacturing during 
the recession was much the same as 
during the preceding period of 
upturn. In Japan, on the other hand, 
where labour productivity in manu-
facturing increased by more than 6% 
a year between 1987 and 1990, it fell 
substantially to only around 172% a 
year during the recession. 
By contrast, in non-manufacturing, 
labour productivity growth in the US 
has averaged under 7,% a year since 
1980, well below the annual average 
in the European Union of 172%. The 
employment-intensity of growth in 
these sectors where most of the out-
put is not traded internationally has, 
therefore, been considerably higher 
in the former than the latter. In 
Japan, as recession has hit, produc-
tivity growth has declined to zero or 
below, so maintaining levels of em-
ployment. 
The experience 
in Member States 
The evidence of the last 15 years is 
that a high rate of GDP growth is 
not a sufficient condition for main-
taining a high level of employment. 
On the other hand, no country in the 
Union has succeeded in this aim 
over this period without achieving a 
certain minimum rate of economic 
growth. In the second half of the 
1980s, no Member State increased 
employment by significantly more 
than 1% a year without average 
growth of around 3% a year or more. 
In the 1990s, few Member States 
have managed to achieve any ex-
pansion of employment at all. 
At the same time, there were signi-
ficant differences between 
countries in the employment-
intensity of the growth which was 
achieved or, in other words, in the 
rate of increase in labour productiv-
ity. According to the data used here, 
during the years of recession be-
tween 1990 and 1994, in Ireland, 
GDP growth of 4% a year was re-
quired to achieve any increase at all 
in employment, in Denmark, Spain, 
Italy and Sweden, 27,%, in Belgium, 
Germany, Finland and the UK, 
around 2%, while in Luxembourg 
and the Netherlands, employment 
rose at much the same rate as GDP. 
This picture of marked differences 
in productive growth in the 1990s is 
little altered if a different measure 
of employment — and productivity 
— is used instead. 
The means to increased 
employment-intensity 
All countries in the Union have 
confronted the dilemma that 
attempting to raise the employment-
intensity of growth may conflict with 
the equally important aim of trying 
to achieve high rates of productivity 
increase in order to maintain and 
improve competitiveness and 
thereby boost output growth and the 
rate of job creation. A possible way 
out of this dilemma is to focus efforts 
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to raise employment on sectors of the 
economy with traditionally high la-
bour intensity. 
In all three new Member States, 
labour productivity growth in 
manufacturing was much higher 
than in non-manufacturing during 
the period 1990 to 1994, as over the 
preceding five years. All three, 
therefore, succeeded in combining 
relatively high employment-
intensity of growth in the 
non-manufacturing sector with 
relatively high productivity growth 
in manufacturing. This was also 
the case in Luxembourg and the 
Netherlands, where despite labour 
productivity in the economy as a 
whole not increasing at all in the 
1990s, in manufacturing, growth 
of around 2% a year has been 
achieved. 
How far the differential rate of 
growth of productivity has been 
the result of a conscious employ-
ment policy in these Member States 
is hard to judge, but in these coun-
tries relatively high priority has 
been attached to maintaining 
high levels of employment and, as 
noted below, a number of measures 
have been taken to encourage more 
people to be employed at a given 
level of output. Though in Finland 
and Sweden, employment has fal-
len in the 1990s and unemployment 
has risen substantially, this has 
been in the context of a much deeper 
recession than in most other 
parts of the Union (GDP declined 
by 37,% in Sweden between 
1990 and 1994, by over 10% in 
Finland). 
The difficulty is that maintaining 
employment might raise the costs 
of production, which in turn has 
implications for an economy's com-
petitiveness. Moreover, even if the 
sectors concerned are not directly 
engaged in international trade they 
may, either directly or indirectly, 
supply the sectors which are in-
volved. Equally, a growing number 
of service activities are becoming 
internationally traded which fur-
ther narrows the scope for action, 
though in many of these sectors low 
costs per se tend not to be the main 
determinant of competitiveness. 
At the same time, the effect on pro-
duction costs in the traded-output 
sectors of higher than minimum 
costs in other parts of the economy 
will in many cases be very small. 
Moreover, the possible alternative 
of having large numbers of people 
out of work will also affect an econ-
omy's competitiveness, not only 
because of the costs of supporting 
them but also because of the social 
unrest and tension which is likely to 
be caused. 
A further approach, which is 
complementary rather than an 
alternative, is to seek to increase 
the number of people employed for 
a given level of labour input — in 
other words, to share the available 
work between more people by re-
ducing the average time that each 
person works. As noted below, a 
number of Member States have pur-
sued such a policy, if in some cases 
to a limited extent, though, as also 
noted, there are potential problems 
in trying to enforce working hours 
centrally. 
A key aspect of such an approach is 
to minimise the effect on production 
costs of more people being employed 
for a given level of output. This in-
volves trying to avoid any increase 
in the average cost per hour worked, 
which effectively means reducing 
wages per person employed. It may 
also involve encouraging the use of 
more labour in the production pro-
cess and less capital — in other 
words, a substitution of labour for 
capital which is the reverse of the 
prevailing tendency — and, there-
fore, to compensate for a reduction 
in labour productivity by a rise in 
capital productivity. The difficulty 
here is that in many sectors there 
may be only limited scope for sub-
stituting labour for capital without 
reducing overall productivity and 
raising production costs, though in 
the present state of knowledge, and 
the lack of any reliable way of 
measuring capital productivity, it is 
impossible to identify what that 
scope is. 
Nevertheless, the key to sustained 
employment growth in the long-
term is the expansion of highly 
productive, competitive sectors, 
which create jobs directly but even 
more importantly underpin em-
ployment creation in other sectors 
of the economy through the income 
they generate. 
Reduced working time 
as a means of increasing 
employment 
A widespread, though very gradual, 
trend is evident across the Union 
towards greater flexibility in work-
ing time arrangements. Though 
increased flexibility does not inevit-
ably lead to a reduction in average 
working-time and, therefore, to 
more people being employed for any 
given level of output, the trend has 
been accompanied by a growth of 
part-time working, a reduction in 
the standard full-time week and the 
introduction in a number of coun-
tries of career break options. 
Although in many Member States, 
working time is a matter for nego-
tiation between the social partners, 
there are a number of ways in which 
governments can influence develop-
ments, in particular by removing 
legislative or regulatory obstacles 
to a reduction in average hours 
worked (including, for example, 
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over part-time working and the 
rules governing entitlement to so-
cial security benefits), by setting an 
example in the public sector and by 
publicising the possibilities and 
potential benefits of people working 
less. 
While in a number of Member 
States, legislation has also been in-
troduced in this area, this has 
tended to take the form of trying to 
limit the maximum number of 
hours worked per day or per week 
primarily for health and safety rea-
sons rather than specifically to 
increase the number of people in 
work. In general, governments have 
recognised the potential effect on 
costs and efficiency in certain sec-
tors of seeking to impose reductions 
in working time centrally. In other 
words, there is widespread accept-
ance of the fact that the scope for 
reducing average hours worked dif-
fers between sectors as do the 
potential costs, or, in some cases, 
benefits. 
Though the precise impact on jobs 
is hard to estimate, average hours 
worked have tended to decline over 
the long-term in the Union and this 
has contributed to increasing or 
maintaining the total number of 
people in employment. Over the 
period of high employment growth 
between 1985 and 1990, average 
hours worked declined from just 
under 40 per week to 39. Almost all 
of this decline occurred in non-
manufacturing sectors, where 
average time worked fell by a full 
hour per week, so potentially ad-
ding 272% to the number of people 
with jobs (assuming no change in 
labour productivity). 
In the subsequent four years of re-
cession from 1990 to 1994, although 
average hours worked per week fell, 
the rate of reduction was less than in 
the preceding period. In manufac-
turing, they remained virtually un-
changed. In non-manufacturing, 
they declined by just over half an 
hour per week, so potentially adding 
a maximum of around 1'/..% to the 
numbers in employment (again 
given no change in labour productiv-
ity) and possibly helping to prevent 
even larger job losses during the re-
cession. In genera], however, there is 
little evidence that reductions in 
working time were a major factor in 
preserving jobs over this period or 
that the use of temporary short-time 
working to keep people in jobs was 
widespread. Indeed, in the depth of 
the recession in 1993, the average 
reduction in time worked across the 
Union as a whole because of slack 
working amounted to just three 
minutes a week. This is not to deny, 
however, that in some sectors in 
some countries, the effect might 
have been important. 
Indeed the reduction in average 
hours worked in the Union which 
has occurred conceals marked dif-
ferences between Member States. 
Between 1990 and 1994 — when 
depressed real income growth and 
uncertainties about future job pros-
pects may have made it more 
difficult to get agreement among 
workers for reduced working hours 
and when increased cost pressures 
may have reduced the willingness of 
employers to move in the same di-
rection — there were reductions in 
average hours worked per week in 
all Member States except Denmark 
and Greece where they increased 
slightly. However, the reduction 
overall amounted to more than 2% 
over this period in only two coun-
tries, Portugal and Ireland (where 
it was as much as 4%). In most 
countries, the limited decline which 
occurred was confined to non-
manufacturing sectors, where it 
was in large measure associated 
with an expansion of part-time 
working. 
The measures introduced 
Though the impact may have been 
limited across the Union as a whole, 
especially since 1990, efforts have 
been made in a number of Member 
States to reduce working-time as 
a means of expanding the numbers 
employed. In most cases, in the past 
these have been directed at in-
fluencing the outcome of collective 
agreements and in many countries, 
such as Denmark, Germany, 
France and Belgium, reductions in 
the normal working week were 
made in a number of sectors during 
the 1980s. 
Moreover, in some countries (eg 
France and Belgium), governments 
have encouraged employers to par-
ticipate in collectively agreed 
reductions in hours worked per em-
ployee, conditional on the creation 
of additional jobs, through the in-
centive of lower social charges on 
such jobs. 
There have also been a number 
of recent attempts to increase the 
flexibility of working time arrange-
ments in countries where these are 
subject to legislation, such as in 
Spain, Finland and Sweden. At the 
same time, in Austria, France, 
Germany, Italy, Portugal and 
Spain, short-time working was sub-
sidised during the recession in 
order to keep people in employment, 
though in none of these countries 
was the number of people affected 
large enough to have a significant 
effect on average working time 
overall. 
A policy with a longer-term focus, 
directed at reducing not hours per 
week but the amount of time worked 
over a person's lifetime (by rearrang-
ing when time is worked or by 
adopting a longer period than a 
month for reference — eg a year), has 
been introduced recently in a few 
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Member States, specifically, in 
Belgium, Denmark and Sweden and 
are being actively discussed in Fin-
land. In most countries, there has 
been increased focus of attention on 
part-time working. While in many 
cases basic conditions of employ-
ment may be not greatly inferior to 
those for full-time workers, it is, 
nevertheless, the case that part-time 
employees may be penalised in a 
number of ways, such as in terms of 
their career prospects or exercising 
their trade union rights. A wide-
spread aim, therefore, has been to 
make part-time employment more 
attractive, either through promoting 
its acceptance by employees and em-
ployers alike (as in the Netherlands 
over many years or in Germany more 
recently), or through incentives, 
such as reductions in social contribu-
tions or wage subsidies (as in France, 
Italy and Belgium) or through using 
employment in the public sector to 
promote part-time job creation (as in 
the Netherlands). 
In many cases, policy is directed at 
encouraging older employees to work 
part-time rather than full-time to 
free up jobs for younger people either 
through paying benefits to those who 
take up partial retirement or subsi-
dising wages (as in France, Belgium, 
Portugal — where it is linked to the 
older person training someone 
younger — Denmark, Sweden, 
Spain, Finland and Austria). 
Growth of 
part-time working 
This widespread emphasis on pro-
moting part-time employment is 
reflected in employment trends. One 
of the most marked features of la-
bour market developments over the 
past decade has been the growth of 
part-time working, especially during 
the recent recession when they seem 
to have provided a more flexible 
means for employers to adjust their 
work forces in line with demand. In 
a number of Member States, how-
ever, especially in the South of the 
Union, it remains comparatively 
rare. In Spain, Italy and Portugal, it 
still represents under 8% of employ-
ment and in Greece under 5%, in 
contrast to 21% in Denmark, 24% in 
the UK, 25% in Sweden and 3672% in 
the Netherlands. 
Over the growth period in the late 
1980s, 20% of the net additional jobs 
created in the Union were part-time. 
Women filled 95% of these and one 
third of the increased numbers of 
women entering employment during 
this period went into part-time work. 
In the Netherlands, the proportion 
was as high as 75% and, more signi-
ficantly, in Germany, where the 
importance of part-time was less 
than the Union average, 83%. In 
both these countries, moreover, part-
time jobs accounted for a relatively 
high share of the increased employ-
ment of men — 47% in the 
Netherlands and 23% in Germany. 
On the other hand, in Denmark, 
Sweden and the UK, where it was 
high, the proportion of women in em-
ployment in part-time jobs went 
down, as it did in Spain, Portugal 
and Luxembourg, where it was low. 
In the period of recession, 1990 to 
1994, the growth of part-time work-
ing was much more significant. 
Whereas the total numbers in em-
ployment fell, part-time jobs 
increased (Graph 4). Moreover, the 
rise was general across the Union. 
Except for Denmark and Sweden 
(where the fall was much less than 
for full-timers), all Member States 
experienced an expansion in the 
numbers in part-time employment. 
In 7 Member States, Belgium, 
Germany, Spain, France and the 
Netherlands, Italy and the UK, 
either all or almost all of the increase 
in jobs for women over this period 
were part-time, in the latter five 
countries, the number of women in 
full-time jobs falling. In Ireland and 
Portugal, growth of part-time jobs 
accounted for more than half the in-
crease in employment of women. 
Only in Denmark was there a fall in 
part-time working among women 
during these years. The fall, more-
over, has been substantial (from 38% 
to 28%) and has potentially import-
ant implications insofar as it 
signifies that growth of part-time 
working among women is not an ine-
vitable tendency as economies 
develop. (In Sweden also, the 
relative number of women in part-
time jobs is less than ten years ago.) 
It may be significant that in 
Denmark the reduction has been 
accompanied by a fall in what con-
stitutes normal full-time hours to 37 
hours a week — the lowest in the 
Union. 
Elsewhere, the growth of part-time 
working was of major importance in 
preventing the employment of 
women declining significantly over 
the recession period. However, the 
number of men working part-time 
also increased, while in all but 
Luxembourg, the Netherlands and 
Greece, the number of men in 
full-time work declined, in many 
4 Growth of fuU and part-time jobs, 1988-94 
% change 
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 
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cases substantially. This is a new 
phenomenon not evident in previous 
years. Whether it is related to the 
depressed level of economic activity 
or whether it marks the beginning of 
new trend towards part-time work-
ing among men as well as women 
will only become clear with time. 
The growth of part-time working 
raises a number of issues to do not 
only with reductions in working time 
and work-sharing, but also with the 
terms and conditions of employment 
attached to such jobs and the status 
of the people taking them up. From 
one perspective, part-time jobs are a 
means of enabling women especially 
but also some men to more easily 
reconcile family responsibilities with 
working careers — and the need to 
earn income — while at the same 
time enabling employers to organise 
their businesses more flexibly and to 
make more effective use of fixed 
capital and equipment (business 
premises as well as plant and ma-
chinery). From another perspective, 
they represent inferior jobs with 
limited career prospects which are 
taken up only because those con-
cerned have no alternative option. 
The Community Labour Force 
Survey throws some light on these 
issues. In 1994, two-thirds of all 
women working part-time were 
doing so because they did not want a 
full-time job, though only one-third 
of men. In the two countries where 
such jobs were most prevalent, how-
ever, the Netherlands and the UK, 
80% of women in part-time professed 
to not wanting a full-time job. At the 
same time, only one in seven women 
had taken up such a job because they 
had been unable to obtain a full-time 
one. 
Temporary jobs 
A third of the additional jobs which 
were created in the Union over the 
growth years 1987 to 1990 were 
temporary, or rather fixed-term, 
and 40% of the additional jobs for 
men. Three-quarters of these extra 
jobs, however, were in one country, 
Spain. Only in two other countries, 
France and Portugal, was the ex-
pansion of temporary working of 
any significance over this period. In 
the subsequent four years, only in 
the Netherlands was there any 
marked growth of temporary work-
ing, though there was also some 
expansion in Ireland, Spain and 
Italy. Overall, however, the propor-
tion of jobs that were fixed-term fell 
over this period. 
In 1994, only 10% of men and 12% 
of women in employment worked in 
temporary jobs. Only in Spain, 
where at 30% it was considerably 
higher than in the rest of the Union, 
Denmark and Finland (where it 
was just over 11%) was the propor-
tion of men employed in such jobs 
above 10%. For women, for whom 
fixed-term jobs were more preval-
ent, the share of such jobs in the 
total was over 10% in nine Member 
States — in Finland it was 14%, in 
the Netherlands 15% and in Spain 
as high as 37%. 
These figures, however, need to be 
interpreted with some caution. To a 
large extent, the variation in the 
importance of fixed-term contracts 
which exists across the Union 
reflects differences in labour 
market regulations and customary 
practices. In no sense are they an 
indicator of the instability or 
precariousness of employment. In 
most countries, employers have 
little need for recourse to temporary 
contracts to be able to adjust their 
work forces in line with orders. 
Indeed, fixed-term contracts of 
lengthy duration may pose more 
constraints on companies than 
normal contracts of employment. 
Thus both the substantial growth 
of temporary jobs in Spain during 
the latter part of the 1980s and 
the marked increase in France 
were symptoms of the particular 
employment legislation that pre-
vailed at the time. The marked 
reductions which occurred in 
Greece and Portugal during the 
early 1990s are equally products of 
a change in legislation reducing the 
incentive to businesses to employ 
people on a temporary basis. 
Changes in 
self-employment 
Most Member States have policies 
to encourage self-employment, 
both to help the unemployed find 
work and to stimulate the creation 
of small businesses so as to provide 
more employment opportunities 
and, in some cases, to strengthen 
the productive base of the economy, 
especially in new areas of activity. 
In all Member States, except Italy, 
Luxembourg, the Netherlands and 
Austria, the unemployed have been 
able, since the 1980s, to continue 
receiving unemployment benefits 
while starting up their own 
businesses. In many countries 
(Belgium, Germany, France, 
Ireland, Portugal and the UK), 
this kind of scheme was expanded 
during the recent recession as 
unemployment increased. 
In practice, however, despite in-
creased incentives, the importance 
of self-employment has not changed 
greatly in most parts of the Union 
over the past 10 years. In 1994,15% 
of those in employment in the Union 
were self-employed. In 1987, the 
figure was 16%. 
Over the Union as a whole, the 
share of self-employment in the 
total fell slightly in the growth 
period from 1987 to 1990. In the 
subsequent four years, it remained 
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almost unchanged. If, however, 
these figures are adjusted to ex-
clude agriculture, where over half of 
those employed are self-employed 
and which experienced a substan-
tial decline in employment 
throughout the period, a slightly 
different picture emerges. In the 
growth years, self-employment out-
side agriculture increased slightly 
in importance. In most Member 
States, the relative numbers of self-
employed either remained constant 
or rose a little; only in Spain was 
there any reduction and in Portugal 
and the UK there was a marked 
expansion, with a quarter of all the 
additional people becoming em-
ployed being self-employed. 
During the recession between 1990 
and 1994, the relative numbers of 
self-employed outside agriculture 
expanded in all but five Member 
States, though again the rise was 
in most cases comparatively small. 
In Belgium, Denmark, France and 
the UK, where there was a fall, 
this reversed the growth which 
had taken place in the growth 
period leaving the share of self-
employment in the total either the 
same as or lower than 7 years ear-
lier. 
While the share of self-employment 
in total employment in industry and 
services rose in the other Member 
States, only in four countries — 
Ireland, Portugal, Finland and 
Sweden, was the share more than 
one percentage point higher in 1994 
than in 1987. Though governments 
may have attempted to boost the 
rate of small business creation over 
time, especially during period of 
high and rising unemployment and, 
indeed achieved some success, this 
seems to have been largely offset by 
an increased rate of small business 
failure during such periods, which 




As noted above, an increase in the 
employment-intensity of growth 
needs to be accompanied by a re-
straint on real wage increases in 
order to keep down costs of produc-
tion and avoid higher labour costs 
squeezing profits. In other words, 
average real wages per person em-
ployed — or, more precisely, 
average real labour costs — need to 
increase by less than output (or 
value-added) per person employed 
to leave room for employers to be 
able to expand the size of their work 
forces without suffering lower 
profits and, therefore, having less 
finance for investment. 
Growth, therefore, needs to be 
underpinned by employment-
creating investment, which will 
both provide jobs directly and raise 
productive capacity so that growth 
is not brought prematurely to an 
end by inflationary pressure and 
the jobs created can be sustained in 
the longer-term. 
In the Union as a whole over the 
period of high employment growth, 
labour productivity grew by just 
under 2% a year as already noted. 
This was significantly higher than 
the rise in real labour costs (under 
172% a year), giving scope for a sig-
nificant expansion in investment 
and in the numbers employed 
(Graph 5). 
In 12 of the 15 Member States, la-
bour productivity growth also 
exceeded the rise in average labour 
costs. The three exceptions were 
Luxembourg, Sweden and the UK, 
where in some degree the growth of 
average labour costs imposed a 
squeeze on profits. This, moreover, 
was also the case in the US, where 
average labour costs over this 
period also rose by more than labour 
productivity. 
In the recession period from 1990 to 
1994, both labour productivity and 
labour costs rose at much the same 
rate as before, leaving similar scope 
for expanding the numbers in 
employment. Again this was accom-
panied by a rise in profits rather 
than increased numbers of jobs. In 
this period, however, six Member 
States experienced higher growth 
in real labour costs than labour pro-
ductivity — Luxembourg once 
more, Belgium, Denmark, the 
Netherlands, Austria and Portugal 
(though in the latter case, data 
problems make it hard to be sure). 
Real labour costs also grew faster 
than labour productivity in the US 
and Japan over this period despite 
the more employment-intensive 
pattern of growth that both 
achieved as compared with Europe. 
Job growth in 
new areas of activity 
Despite the recession, significant 
growth of employment has occurred 
in a number of service sectors in 
recent years, many of these meet-
ing new needs which have been 
5 Growth in labour productivity and real 
labour costs, 1985-94 
. Annual change(%) 
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The environment 
and employment 
Although there are no reliable figures for em-
ployment in environmental activities, estimates 
from the Community LFS suggest that almost 
172 million people, just over 1% of the total in 
work, were employed in sectors associated with 
environmental protection in the Union in 1994. 
Almost 500 thousand of these were in sewage 
and waste disposal, 250 thousand in the water 
industry and just over 90 thousand in recycling. 
The rest were in instrument engineering, only a 
small part of the output of which takes the form 
of measuring, control and filtering devices. 
Between 1985 and 1992, employment rose by 
over 3% a year in the Union, well over twice the 
rate in other sectors. The relative numbers em-
ployed were comparatively high in the UK, 
France and Germany in 1994 and much lower 
than the Union average in Greece and Portugal, 
though these countries apart there is no appar-
ent tendency for employment in these sectors to 
vary with the level of economic development. 
While sectors which are major sources of pollu-
tion are vulnerable to job losses as protection 
measures are strengthened, there is little evi-
dence that their international competitiveness 
is likely to be damaged as a result. Indeed, their 
position in world markets and prospects for 
long-term growth could be improved by early 
adaptation of processes of production and pro-
ducts to tougher environmental standards. 
There is also little evidence that employment 
levels or the rate of job creation will tend to 
suffer if more extensive environmental protec-
tion measures are implemented in the Union. 
Though there will inevitably be a shift of em-
ployment between sectors, which might in the 
short-term cause a temporary rise in unemploy-
ment, so long as aggregate demand and real 
income levels are maintained, the job losses in 
some sectors will tend to be compensated by job 
gains in others. This applies a fortiori to the 
proposed policy package combining the imposi-
tion across the Union of a C02/energy tax with 
reductions in employers' social contributions de-
signed to reduce the costs of employment. Model 
simulations indicate that such a package stands 
to achieve the 'double dividend' of reducing fossil 
fuel use and, therefore, environmental damage 
while increasing the numbers in employment 
(see Part III, Section 2 for details). 
stimulated by rising levels of real 
income per head and technological 
advance, such as business and 
computer-related services and tele-
communications, and leisure and 
recreational activities, and by grow-
ing social and environmental 
awareness, such as care for the 
elderly and infirm, improved sani-
tation and recycling. Growth of 
employment, however, has occurred 
in instrument engineering, partly 
boosted by environmental protec-
tion measures, but more generally 
reflecting the high level of interna-
tional competitiveness of the 
leading European manufacturers in 
this industry. Many of the activities 
where net job creation occurred 
during the recession involve the 
provision of collective goods or 
services and are, therefore, to a sig-
nificant extent either located in the 
public sector or funded by govern-
ment. At the same time, there is an 
increasing shift towards more pri-
vate sector involvement through 
private-public sector partnerships 
or contracting-out (privatisation). 
Moreover, a high proportion of the 
new jobs created were in small and 
medium-sized businesses, which 
account for some 70% of employ-
ment in the private sector and 
which have been responsible for an 
estimated 80% of private sector 
employment growth since the mid-
1980s. 
Nevertheless, the role of govern-
ment, whether central or local, 
remains critical to the future pros-
pects for employment growth. In 
environmental sectors, for example, 
which are the subject of a special 
analysis in the Report (Part III, Sec-
tion 2), the numbers employed over 
the past decade have expanded by 
around twice the rate of total em-
ployment in the Union, and seem 
set to continue rising at a similar 
rate, though much depends on 
future legislation and/or the 
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implementation of taxes and 
charges to stimulate the expansion 
of protective measures, such as fil-
tering emissions or disposing of 
waste effectively, and clean-up 




Employment stands also to be 
boosted by local development and 
employment initiatives. These are a 
means both of meeting local needs, 
which arise from improving stand-
ards of living or changing pattern of 
behaviour, and which have so far 
been inadequately catered for 
either by the private sector or by 
public authorities, and of increasing 
the rate of job creation. As noted 
above, personal and collective ser-
vices have been a major area of job 
growth even during the recession 
and offer the potential for even 
more significant expansion in the 
years ahead. 
The areas where the potential for 
meeting local needs could provide 
substantial numbers of new jobs — 
some 140-400 thousand a year 
according to macro-economic model 
simulations — include home 
help services, child care, new 
information and communication 
technologies, assistance to young 
people, better housing, security, 
local public transport services, 
revitalisation of urban areas, 
local shops, tourism, audio-visual 
services, local cultural development 
as well as waste management and 
the other environmental sectors 
noted above. These areas were 
identified in a recent Commission 
Communication (COM(95) 273, 
June 1995), which also suggested 
measures which Member States 
might take to encourage the devel-
opment of activities in these areas 
(including helping to overcome 
institutional and regulatory 
obstacles, financial barriers (such 
as high indirect labour costs) and 
training problems) as well as im-
provements in Structural Fund 
operations (see Box). 
Point 3: Reducing 
non-wage labour 
costs to stimulate 
job creation 
The high and persistent levels of un-
employment in the Union coupled 
with the observation that a large pro-
portion of the unemployed have 
relatively low levels of skills and 
qualifications, and, therefore, rela-
tively low levels of productivity, has 
focused attention on the cost of em-
ployment, particularly of those with 
low skills. Specifically, policy con-
cern has centred on the various 
factors in the Union which seem to 
set a floor to labour costs for such 
people and result in them being 
higher than their potential contribu-
tion to the value-added of a business 
in which they might be employed, so 
deterring their recruitment. Among 
these factors are: 
• institutional and other con-
straints on the geographical 
and occupational mobility of 
labour with scarce skills; 
• the influence of trade unions in 
maintaining wages at above the 
market clearing level; 
• social attitudes on what con-
stitute acceptable wages which 
can often be as powerful in set-
ting a floor as trade unions or 
minimum pay legislation; 
• social charges levied on em-
ployers which serve to add a 
fixed element to labour costs 
over and above wages actually 
paid to workers; 
• the interaction between the tax 
and social benefit system which 
may create disincentives for 
those out of work to take up 
jobs on low wages or deter 
movement between low paid 
jobs because of high marginal 
net deduction rates on low 
incomes. 
At the same time, in most Member 
States, concern about labour costs 
being too high at the lower end of 
the scale has been matched by an 
equal concern to preserve the pro-
tection of workers who are already 
low paid and who are vulnerable to 
potential exploitation. This in-
cludes a large number of women, 
who are the target of equal oppor-
tunity policies throughout the 
Union (the commitment to which 
was emphasised at the Essen Sum-
mit as noted above). A pure market 
solution involving the dismantling 
of institutional and legislative 
arrangements and fundamental 
changes in social attitudes has, 
therefore, been widely rejected. 
Attention has, therefore, been fo-
cused on ways of reducing labour 
costs to employers, to give them 
more incentive to create jobs, with-
out reducing the income received by 
those on low rates of pay. In conse-
quence, measures have been 
considered in many Member States 
for lowering the cost of employing 
young and/or low skilled people 
through reducing social charges — 
ie social security contributions. In a 
number of Member States, selective 
measures of this kind have been 
introduced in the past year or two 
(see Part II, Section 3 for details). 
Employers' statutory social security 
contributions vary significantly 
across the Union, from 29% of 
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labour costs in Italy, around 25% in 
Belgium, France and Spain, to 
around 10% in Ireland and the UK 
and under 5% in Denmark. In most 
Member States, moreover, they are 
the same proportion of labour costs 
at low earnings levels as at higher 
levels, in some cases more. Only in 
the UK are they significantly lower 
at very low rates of pay. 
They also tend to be much higher in 
the Union than in competitor econ-
omies. In the US, for example, 
statutory contributions amounted 
to under 10% of the cost of emplo-
ying someone on average earnings 
in 1993. However, non-statutory 
contributions, such as health insur-
ance costs tend to be higher than in 
Europe, so reducing the difference 
between the two, though for many 
on low pay in the US, employers 
may pay little or nothing of such 
costs, so giving rise to a wide gap 
between the costs of employment at 
the bottom end of the pay scale in 
the US and Europe. According to 
the latest Community Labour Cost 
Survey, in 1992, indirect labour 
costs (which include not only em-
ployers' statutory social security 
contributions, but also vocational 
training costs, contribution to pri-
vate insurance schemes and other 
charges — but exclude paid days 
not worked or bonuses) in industry 
varied from around 30% of the total 
costs of employment in Belgium, 
France, Italy and Sweden (where 
they were over 31%) to under 20% 
in Ireland and Luxembourg, 15% in 
the UK and under 4% in Denmark. 
In the US and Japan, they averaged 
around 22%, more than in these lat-
ter countries and similar to the level 
in Germany. 
Over the 1980s and up to 1992, at 
least, the level of indirect labour 
costs in relation to total labour costs 
remained much the same in most 
Member States. Only in Spain (up), 
Employment and the Structural Funds 
The Structural Funds have a budget of 189 million ECU, at 
1995 prices, for the period 1994 to 1999, play a significant role 
part in the pursuit of the Union's social and economic cohesion 
objectives. Their aim, through various instruments (includ-
ing, in particular, the Social Fund, the Regional Development 
Fund and the Cohesion Fund), is to encourage overall terri-
torial development which is vital for maintaining 
employment over the long-term, though they also help to 
combat youth and long-term unemployment as well as to 
assisting workers to adapt to industrial change. The further 
aim is to ensure coherence between the different instruments 
and agreed Community policy in a common programme of 
action directed at fulfilling the Essen Summit recommenda-
tions and the longer-term objective of improving 
competitiveness, growth and the prospects for employment. 
This need for coherence and a strengthening of partnership 
arrangements between all those concerned in their im-
plementation was reaffirmed in the recently-adopted 
Medium-term Social Action Programme. 
The creation and maintenance of jobs over the long-term is a 
key element underlying all programmes. Structural assist-
ance helps to support demand through adding to regional 
income while helping to finance investment in infrastructure, 
productive capacity, human resources and technological 
potential which strengthen the competitiveness of the 
regional economy. 
Increasing the job-creating effect of assistance 
As shown in Part I of the present Report, the employment-
intensity of economic growth in the Union is relatively weak 
as compared to other comparable countries. An important 
aim is to increase the effects of measures on employment 
whilst respecting the orientation of programmes already 
agreed for the 1994 to 1999 period, through: 
• improving the operation of regional and sectoral aid pro-
grammes and the employment content at the local level of 
infrastructure projects and aid to productive investment; 
• anticipating better technological change (especially 
information technology) in order to maximise its poten-
tial; 
• including the aim of increasing employment in all funding 
decisions, which means that development plans sub-
mitted by promoters should also include forecasts of 
labour and skill requirements; 
• exploiting more fully areas of job creation both traditional 
(such as local cultural activities and products) and new 
(personal, social and environmental services); 
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• encourage dynamic organisation of work and work-
ing time to help reconcile work with family life and 
redirect support from passive income maintenance 
to active employment policies to help cover the costs 
of transition (eg through employment subsidies) to 
new patterns of production; 
• achieve the right balance of support for investment 
in both fixed capital and human resources, which 
are both essential to development, structural 
adjustment and employment; 
• help develop business services and local know-how 
which are preconditions for the development and 
diffusion of new technologies and, therefore, for 
improving long-term competitiveness and growth. 
Helping people into work 
Increased competitiveness is not an end in itself, but 
needs to be accompanied by economic measures based 
more firmly on integrating, or reintegrating, people 
into the labour market and ensuring equality of oppor-
tunity. This involves coordinating income support with 
active measures (such as confidence building, work 
experience, help with literacy and numeracy, assist-
ance with health, housing, childcare and education as 
well as more traditional training and job search skills, 
combining them more effectively with those aimed at 
indigenous development and regeneration of deprived 
area and developing a genuine bottom-up approach to 
improving local capacity, involving all the interested 
parties. 
Proposed action 
The implementation of these priorities must, however, 
contain an explicit commitment to the principle of 
equal opportunities for women and men, including 
further action to reduce employment constraints on 
women and strengthening efforts in favour of those 
who are particularly disadvantaged (eg lone parents or 
members of ethnic minorities). 
The proposed measures and change in emphasis 
require systematic evaluation of how better to develop 
the potential of local development and employment 
initiatives and necessitate improved coherence 
between instruments and a strengthening of partner-
ship between those involved at all levels, including 
within national administrations. The Commission, 
therefore, proposes in the context of the December 1995 
European Council to establish territorial agreements 
on employment aimed at enlarging and deepening the 
partnership process. 
France and the Netherlands (down) 
did it change by more than 1 per-
centage point. 
The scale 
of the tax wedge 
Countries with relatively low levels 
of employers' contributions in the 
Union tend to have relatively high 
levels of taxes on wages and em-
ployees' contributions, reflecting 
the greater reliance on the latter to 
finance social expenditure. Never-
theless, significant differences in 
the total deduction from labour 
costs going to government or social 
security funds remain between 
Member States — largely between 
the lower tax, lower income coun-
tries in the South together with 
Luxembourg and the UK and the 
higher tax, higher income countries 
in the North. While total labour 
costs (ie the gross wage paid plus 
employers' social contributions and 
other indirect costs), affect the 
demand for labour on the part of 
employers and their willingness to 
create jobs, it is the take-home pay 
of employees (ie the gross wage net 
of taxes and other charges) which 
affect the latter's willingness to 
work and, therefore, the supply of 
labour. Consequently, attention 
needs to focus on both magnitudes 
when considering the job creation 
process and how this can be affected 
by policy. Although there is ongoing 
debate about these issues, there is 
broad agreement that employers' 
demand for labour will tend to be 
affected by changes in total labour 
costs, especially the demand for low 
skilled workers, and that changes in 
indirect labour costs will tend to 
affect the overall cost of labour to a 
greater extent than changes in 
other taxes, at least over the short-
term. In other words, what matters 
for policy is both the overall amount 
of deductions from labour costs — 
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ie the tax wedge — and the part of 
this which represents charges on 
employers. 
Analysis of the total deducted in 
social contributions and taxes in 
Member States in 1993 indicates 
that the overall government charge 
on the employment of a single 
worker with earnings of only half 
the average was as high as 40% of 
labour costs in five Member States 
(see Box and, for more details, Part 
III, Section 1). In five other Member 
States, on the other hand, it was 
under 30%. For workers with 
families, deductions were relatively 
low (under 20%) in most countries. 
By comparison, the deduction in the 
US for a single person on half aver-
age earnings was around 25%, 
lower than in most European coun-
tries, and for a couple with children, 
under 20%, in line with the Euro-
pean average. 
There are two dilemmas facing gov-
ernments in Europe seeking, 
through whatever means, to reduce 
labour costs at the bottom end of the 
scale without lowering take-home 
pay. The first is that any revenue 
foregone or additional expenditure 
incurred has to be recouped in other 
ways, and national governments 
6 Active and passive labour market 
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are at present considering alterna-
tive sources of revenue (eg taxes on 
the use of natural resources and 
energy). The second is that high 
marginal tax rates tend to result. 
This may mean that low-skilled 
workers get locked into very low 
paid jobs with little incentive to 
seek to earn more — or for em-
ployers to pay more (the so-called 
'poverty trap'). Moreover, high 
taxes on work combined with high 
benefits may mean that there is 
little net gain and so little incentive 
for being employed rather than un-
employed (the 'unemployment 
trap'). The only way of avoiding high 
marginal deduction rates is to have 
a less steeply graduated tax-cum-
benefit structure, but this serves to 
extend the range of such schemes to 
those further up the income scale, 
so increasing the budgetary cost. 
High marginal rates, in other 
words, tend to be a hard-to-avoid 
feature of policies targeted on either 
reducing the employment cost or 
raising the real income of those on 
very low pay levels. 
Point 4: Improving 
the effectiveness 
of labour market 
policies 
Most Member States have tried to 
shift the balance of labour market 
policies over time from passive in-
come support of the unemployed to 
active measures to attempt to get 
them into work — such as the provi-
sion of training, placement, job 
search assistance and counselling, 
and job subsidies (as described in 
Part II, Section 4). The substantially 
higher levels of unemployment 
which most have experienced since 
1990, however, combined with tight 
budget constraints, have in large 
measure frustrated these efforts. Of 
the total expenditure of around 3V2% 
of GDP devoted to labour market 
policies in the Union, 60% in 1993 
went on unemployment benefits and 
a further 10% or so on early retire-
ment pensions, leaving just over 30% 
for active measures — slightly more 
than 1% of GDP (Graph 6). 
Nevertheless for the majority of 
countries in the Union — the excep-
tions are Denmark, France, 
Ireland, Luxembourg, Sweden and 
the UK— this represented a higher 
proportion of GDP than in 1985 
adjusted for the change in unem-
ployment. At the same time, the 
scale of expenditure adjusted for 
differences in unemployment varies 
markedly between Member States, 
from 4% of GDP in 1993 in Austria 
and over 3% in Denmark and 
Sweden for each 5% of the work 
force unemployed to under 1% in 
Greece and Spain. In interpreting 
these figures, however, account 
needs to be taken of the activities of 
the private sector, especially as 
regards training and job placement, 
which are only included in the 
figures to the extent that they are 
supported by public transfers. 
Evaluating the effectiveness of 
the various elements of policy 
poses severe difficulties, not least 
because it is impossible to be sure 
what would have happened in 
the absence of the measure in ques-
tion and in part because of the 
problem of allowing for the adverse 
effects on people and organisations 
other than those assisted. Measures 
to subsidise jobs, in particular, have 
usually been found on evaluation to 
involve both high 'deadweight' loss 
(the former factor) and large dis-
placement effects (the latter factor), 
so that the net effect on unemploy-
ment overall has probably been 
small, though the redistribution of 
unemployment between people 
which is implied may, nevertheless, 
serve a useful purpose. 
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Average and marginal tax and contribution rates 
in the Member States 
The main features to emerge from the analysis of social contributions and taxes 
levied on wages of workers at various levels of earnings and with differing family 
circumstances across the Union are: 
• for a single person on the average earnings of a production worker in manufac-
turing, total deductions ranged from 55% of labour costs in Belgium to under 
40% in Greece, Spain, Portugal, Luxembourg and the UK as well as in the US; 
• although for a single person on only half average earnings, deduction rates 
were lower than at average earnings in all countries, they were, nevertheless, 
over 40% in five Member States — Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Italy and the 
Netherlands; by contrast, they were under 30% of labour costs in Spain, 
Ireland, Portugal and Luxembourg and under 25% in the UK, lower than in 
the US; 
• the average net rate of deduction for someone on half average earnings with a 
dependent spouse and two children was above 20% in only four Member States 
— Greece, Spain, Italy and the Netherlands — and if housing benefits are taken 
into account, the rate in the Netherlands is reduced to below 20%; in 
Luxembourg and the UK, because of in-work benefits, the net take-home pay 
was more than the cost of employment; 
• marginal rates of deduction from labour costs, which are key indicators of 
incentives, were as high as 66% in Belgium for a single worker on average 
earnings and around 60% in Ireland, Denmark and the Netherlands, but as 
low as 37% in Greece and 31% in Spain; in all other Member States, except in 
the UK and Portugal where they were around 40%, marginal rates were 50% 
or higher; 
• for a single worker on half average earnings, the marginal rate of deduction 
was as high as 60% in Belgium and 55% in Denmark and Italy; in Germany, 
France and the Netherlands, it was over 50%. Only in three countries, Greece, 
Spain and Portugal, was the rate under 40%; in the US, it was around 30%, 
similar to the rate in Greece, the lowest in the European Union; 
• in most Member States, the marginal rate of deduction for a worker on half 
average earnings with two children was lower or much the same as for a single 
person; in Italy, Luxembourg and the UK, however, it was higher, especially 
in the latter two, where the interplay of the tax and benefit system, designed 
to maintain the income of those at work at acceptable levels, produced marginal 
rates of close to 100% in Luxembourg and around 90% in the UK; in the US, if 
foods stamps are taken into account, the marginal rate was around 55%, higher 
than in most Union countries; 
• only in four Member States did the marginal deduction rate generally increase 
as earnings rose; in others, they were either higher at the bottom end of the 
earnings scale than at the top or reached their highest point in the middle 
income ranges and then declined or showed no clear pattern; in most parts of 
the Union, therefore, the combined tax and contribution system is far from 
being progressive. 
-25-Summary and conclusions: trends and strategies 
Despite questions about its effective-
ness, expenditure on employment 
subsidies rose in relation to GDP in 
the Union between 1985 and 1993, 
especially in Denmark, Germany, 
France, Finland and Sweden. 
On the other hand, employment 
services have generally been found 
to perform a valuable function in 
assisting the unemployed find work 
and have the merit of involving rela-
tively little cost in relation to other 
measures. Expenditure on these 
increased between 1985 and 1993 in 
all Member States, except Greece, 
Ireland and Luxembourg, and there 
were especially large rises in the 
Netherlands, Finland and the UK. 
In recent years, moreover, reforms 
have been introduced in this area in 
a number of countries to end public 
sector monopolies and allow private 
sector involvement (in Austria, for 
example, this occurred as recently as 
1994 and in Italy the obligation to 
notify all job vacancies to the public 
employment service was abolished 
in 1995). As a result, private place-
ment agencies have developed and 
expanded. At the same time, the 
operation of public agencies have 
been improved and made more effec-
tive (new initiatives have been 
launched in Belgium, Denmark, 
France, Finland, Sweden and the 
UK) and better links have been es-
tablished with benefit offices. In 
Belgium and Germany, temporary 
employment agencies have been es-
tablished for the unemployed, in the 
latter following the Dutch model. 
The effectiveness of expenditure on 
training is especially difficult to 
assess, partly because of the prob-
lems of monitoring the career 
profiles of the people trained over 
the long-term. The scale of spending 
varies enormously, in part reflect-
ing counterpart variations in the 
participation of the private sector in 
the training effort. In most Member 
States, it increased between 1985 
and 1993, especially in Germany, 
Sweden, Finland and France. 
Point 5: Improving 
measures to help 
groups hard hit 
by unemployment 
Two prominent features which 
emerged in labour markets throug-
hout the Union in the 1980s were, 
first, a substantial increase in un-
employment among young people 
and, secondly, the growing numbers 
of unemployed who were out of work 
for long periods of time. Both were 
reflections of the acute shortage 
of jobs in the early 1980s and both 
led to policies being developed 
in Member States, as well as at 
Union level, to tackle the problems. 
Unemployment 
of young people 
Youth unemployment, in particu-
lar, has been the focus of extensive 
and intensive action. 
This has taken two main forms: en-
couraging more young people to 
stay in education and training 
longer in order to improve their 
qualifications and basic skill levels 
and making it easier for them to 
find jobs by increasing access to 
training, developing closer links 
between education and training 
and business and through subsidis-
ing work experience (for details of 
the measures taken over the recent 
past, see Part II, Section 5). 
The proportion of young people re-
ceiving education and training 
beyond basic schooling has 
increased markedly since the mid-
1980s and, while the shortage of 
jobs in the 1990s undoubtedly con-
tributed to this, the growth could 
not have occurred without govern-
ments providing the necessary 
facilities. 
Despite the efforts made, the rate of 
youth unemployment in the Union 
at the latest count (May 1995) was 
not much different, at over 20% for 
both men and women, from the level 
reached in the mid-1980s which 
sparked the policy action in 
Member States. Rates in Spain 
(42%) and Italy (34%) remain 
extremely high, as they do in 
Finland, France and Greece (all 
over 25%). 
Both the figures and the changes 
over time, however, are deceptive. 
The increasing numbers remaining 
in education and training mean 
that the work force of young people 
on which unemployment rates are 
calculated has become progress-
ively smaller. The number of young 
people who are unemployed, there-
fore, has fallen considerably in a 
number of countries. This is par-
ticularly true of the 15 to 19 age 
group, where participation in the 
work force has fallen to only 25% 
across the Union as a whole. 
Whereas the rate of unemployment 
in the Union for teenagers was 23% 
of the labour force in 1994, this, in 
practice, meant that only 6% of 
those of this age were unemployed. 
Only in Spain (14%), was the figure 
over 10%. Most significantly, in 
Belgium and France, where teenage 
unemployment rates were over 
35%, under 4% of the people in this 
age group were unemployed. 
There remains a serious problem of 
youth unemployment in the Union, 
but in most countries it relates to the 
20 to 24 age group rather than to 
younger people. For this age group, 
21V2% of those in the labour force 
were unemployed in 1994, 14V2% of 
-26 Summary and conclusions : trends and strategies 
all those in the age group — 27% in 
Spain, over 16% in France, Ireland 
and Italy. As increasing numbers 
have stayed in education and initial 
training longer, the major unem-
ployment problem has effectively 
shifted to older age groups. 
In many Member States, policy has 
yet to catch up with this, partly be-
cause in some degree it poses 
different kinds of problems, since 
many of the people affected have al-
ready been through the further 




The scale of long-term unemploy-
ment has not changed greatly over 
the past decade. In 1994, almost 
half (48%) of those unemployed in 
the Union had been out of work for 
a year or more, more than half of 
these for two years or more. These 
figures are slightly lower than in 
the mid-1980s. However, again this 
tends to give a misleading im-
pression of the changing scale of the 
problem. In period of increasing un-
employment, as in the recent past, 
the proportion of the unemployed 
who are long-term unemployed will 
naturally tend to fall as an increas-
ing number of people (who by 
definition cannot be long-term un-
employed) join the unemployment 
register. In practice, the number of 
long-term unemployed is higher 
now than in the mid-1980s, while 
the rate of long-term unemploy-
ment (the numbers relative to the 
labour force) is the same. 
Apart from Italy and Greece, where 
more than elsewhere, it is particu-
larly a problem of the young, 
long-term unemployment affects 
older members of the labour force 
more than younger ones. Of the 
unemployed in the Union aged 
between 55 and 59 in 1994,55% had 
been unemployed for a year or more 
and over 50% of the 50 to 54 year 
olds (Graph 7). Moreover, almost 
two-thirds of the long-term unem-
ployed in the 55 to 59 age group had 
been looking for a job for at least two 
years. 
The persistence of the long-term un-
employment problem reflects the 
difficulties of alleviating it. On past 
evidence, though the achievement 
of high rates of net job creation may 
create a better environment for 
reducing the scale of the problem, 
in itself it will not resolve it. Under-
lying problems which need to be 
tackled are, on the one side, the loss 
of confidence, disillusionment and 
degradation of skills suffered by 
those who have been trying without 
success to find a job for a year or 
more and, on the other, the reluct-
ance to hire someone who has not 
worked for a long time and may 
have become unaccustomed to 
doing so. 
Because of the nature of the prob-
lem, policy in Member States has 
tended to concentrate increasingly 
on counselling and placement (see 
Part II, Section 5 for details). The 
very different levels of long-term 
unemployment across Member 
States, which seem to bear little 
relationship to overall levels of un-
employment, suggest that some 
countries — such as Denmark 
where only around 30% of the un-
employed had been out of work for 
a year of more in 1994 — have been 
more successful than others in their 
efforts. 
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Introduction 
The central aim here is to assess 
the employment performance of 
Member States by analysing the 
main developments over the recent 
past, especially over the past decade 
or so when a period of historically 
high rates of employment growth 
has been followed by a period of 
economic recession and large-scale 
job losses over much of the Union. 
Its focus is on the overall trends in 
net job creation and underlying 
labour market conditions, including 
the specific areas for action identi-
fied in the conclusions of the 
European Council meeting in Essen 
in December 1994. The aim is to 
provide a basis for assessing the 
effectiveness of employment policy 
overall, which can ultimately only 
be satisfactorily judged in terms of 
whether it results in the better 
achievement of end-objectives. 
Employment objectives, however, 
are not unidimensional. It is not 
sufficient merely to examine 
whether more or less jobs are being 
created or whether unemployment 
is going up or down. There are a 
number of other aspects which are 
no less important, such as where 
jobs are expanding or declining, the 
changing terms and conditions of 
employment and the main groups in 
the labour market being affected. 
All of these need to be considered 
in order to form an overall view of 
performance. 
Outline 
The analysis is divided into six sec-
tions. In the first, employment 
developments across the Union as a 
whole over the recent past are 
examined and compared with those 
in other industrialised parts of the 
world, specifically the US and 
Japan, in order, in part, to provide 
a background for assessing trends 
in individual Member States. 
The second section considers the 
performance of Member States in 
creating jobs relative, in the first 
place, to the need for employment, 
as reflected not only in the prevail-
ing level of unemployment but also 
in the potential growth of the labour 
force and, secondly, to the growth in 
output. 
The third section examines the pat-
tern of the change in employment in 
some detail, focusing, in particular, 
on the number of jobs going to 
women as opposed to men, the 
change in the importance of self-
employment relative to waged 
employment, the number of part-
time as opposed to full-time jobs, 
the sectors in which the jobs have 
been created or lost and the kinds of 
skills and qualifications demanded. 
A specific point of interest is to 
identify new forms of employment 
and new areas of activity which are 
developing to replace jobs lost in 
declining sectors. 
The fourth section examines the 
effects of these changes in employ-
ment on unemployment in Member 
States, especially of those groups in 
the labour market which have been 
hardest hit by job shortages — the 
young in most countries, older age 
groups in others. Particular atten-
tion is focused on long-term 
unemployment which has been a 
major problem in the Union over the 
past decade. 
The fifth section considers develop-
ments in certain important labour 
market features in Member States. 
Specifically, it examines, first, 
changes in wage levels — and in 
labour costs, in general — relative 
to changes in labour productivity 
in order to assess the scope for 
employers to create additional jobs 
and, secondly, changes in working 
time. 
The final section reviews the pros-
pects for the Union economies over 
the remainder of 1995 and in 1996 
according to the latest short-term 
forecast, focusing especially on the 
prospective growth of employment 
in the different Member States and 
on the implications for unemploy-
ment during this period. 
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Section 1  Employment and unemployment trends 
in the Union 
The numbers employed in the 
European Union as a whole (ie in-
cluding the three new Member 
States as well as the new Länder in 
the East of Germany) fell by around 
4% between 1991 and 1994 and by 
around 2% in 1993 alone, in each 
case, twice as large as any previous 
fall over a comparable period since 
the war. (Employment fell by 1% in 
1975 and 1981, following the two 
world oil price crises and by around 
2% between 1980 and 1983 (see Box 
for a description of the employment 
figures used here). The period of 
record employment growth between 
1985 and 1990, when the net addi-
tion to jobs was greater than at any 
time over the preceding 30 years 
was, therefore, followed by a period 
of record job losses. As a result, the 
total numbers in work in 1994 in the 
Member States taken together were 
about the same as they had been in 
1988. Around 60% of the 10 million 
or so extra jobs created between 
1985 and 1990 were, therefore, 
effectively lost in the three years 
1991 to 1994. 
Of the net loss of jobs of 6 million 
between 1991 and 1994, around 
800 thousand were in two of the 
new Member States, Finland and 
Sweden, both of which were hit 
particularly hard by the recent 
recession, while just over one 
million was in the former East 
Germany. At the same time, some 
of the older Member States experi-
enced similarly large job losses. In 
Italy, the numbers in employment 
fell by over 1.7 million, in the UK, 
by almost 900 thousand (and by 
1.7 million including the fall that 
occurred in 1990 before the re-
cession started elsewhere), in 
Spain, by almost 800 thousand and 
in the former West Germany, 
nearly 600 thousand. 
The three latter countries together 
were responsible for over 60% of the 
growth in the number of people in 
employment in the Union as a 
whole between 1985 and 1990 — 
each experiencing a rise of some 
2 million. Each, therefore, lost 
during the recession a significant 
proportion of the jobs gained ear-
lier. While the fall in employment 
was not common to all Member 
States between 1991 and 1994, 
in the five countries in which em-
ployment increased — Belgium, 
Ireland, Luxembourg, the Nether-
lands and Austria — the rise was in 
no case large enough to prevent 
unemployment from increasing. 
The loss of jobs meant that employ-
ment in the Union declined from a 
peak of 62% of working-age popula-
tion (the employment rate, a 
measure of the performance of 
8 Employment rates in the Union and elsewhere, 
1972-94 
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Employment in the Union 
Unlike for unemployment, where there is a generally accepted source of comparable data on the position in 
different Member States (the Eurostat comparable unemployment rates), there is no agreed set of data on 
employment in the Union which is similarly regarded as the most comparable and reliable. This is a serious 
deficiency especially given the increasing concern of policy with employment and job creation. It is even more 
serious when the two series commonly used, the employment series from the National Accounts and that 
derived from the annual Community Labour Force Survey (LFS), show different figures and different 
changes over time, as they do for some countries. 
Fortunately for the majority of Member States, there is not a significant difference between the two sources, 
though since the LFS relates to a specific point in time (Spring) and the National Accounts to annual 
averages, some difference is to be expected. For some countries, however, and for four, in particular — Italy, 
Luxembourg, the Netherlands and Portugal — there is a substantial difference, of 10% or more in terms of 
numbers employed. For Italy, the difference arises from the inclusion in the National Accounts figures of 
estimated numbers working in the informal or grey economy, who will often have two jobs; in Luxembourg, 
from the fact that significantly more people work in the country (and are included in the National Accounts 
figures) than are resident there (which is the basis for the LFS figures); and in the Netherlands, from the 
fact that the National Accounts data are in terms of person-years rather than numbers. In Portugal, the 
reason is unclear. 
In the case of all these countries, as for Belgium and Denmark in respect of changes over time, the conclusions 
drawn from an analysis of employment figures, and the policy implications, can, therefore, vary according 
to the source used. This applies not only to the numbers in work by also to the numbers in the labour force, 
which are given by the sum of those employed and those who are unemployed. (In cases where the National 
Accounts data are used to measure employment, this gives rise to an in-built inconsistency insofar as the 
labour force figures which underlie the unemployment rates are different from the sum of employment plus 
unemployment. ) 
The employment data analysed in this Report differ according to the issue concerned, as explained in the 
Sources section at the end. In general, the LFS is used for all detailed analysis of labour market features. 
When examining year-to-year changes in total employment over time, however, the National Accounts data 
are used since these ought to be a more reliable indicator of these than the LFS, partly because of the 
sample basis of the latter, partly because of periodic rebasing and improvements in design. For Italy, the 
Netherlands and Portugal, however, because of serious problems with the National Accounts data, especially 
given the main concern here which is to examine the numbers in employment rather than the volume of 
labour input or the number of jobs, LFS data have been used for total employment (the average of quarterly 
figures for Italy and Portugal). Although it is not entirely satisfactory to mix sources in this way, in this 
case, there seems little alternative given the data at present available. This means that the figures for total 
employment in these three countries and in the Union as a whole quoted in this Report may differ from 
those in other Commission publications based wholly on a single source of data. 
Employment in the new Member States 
So far as possible, given the constraints of data availability, the new Member States have been included in 
the analysis. The figures used for Finland and Sweden come from their national labour force surveys and 
should be broadly comparable with data from the Community Labour Force Survey, though the form of the 
questions asked may in some cases be slightly different. For Austria, there is as yet no labour force survey 
and the data used come from other national sources. These, it should be emphasised, are much less 
comparable with the figures for other Member States and should be considered as indicative only. 
Employment in Germany 
The data for Germany examined in this Report relate to the former West Germany for the years before 1991 
and for the years after to total Germany including the new Lander, except where indicated (which is usually 
where it significantly distorts the analysis of changes over time). 
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Member States in creating job for 
those who are likely to want to 
work, working age being defined as 
15 to 64) in 1992 to under 60% in 
1994, back to the 1988 level after 
8 years of continuous increase 
(Graph 8). (The employment 
figures used differ from those in 
previous Employment in Europe 
reports, see Box for details.) 
The decline in the new Member 
States, which was wholly confined 
to Finland and Sweden, was much 
more pronounced. After rising grad­
ually throughout the 1970s and 
1980s, in contrast to the rest of the 
Union where it fell from 65% to 58% 
in the decade after the first oil price 
crisis, employment declined be­
tween 1990 and 1994 from 73% of 
working-age population to 67%, still 
well above the level in the other 
Member States taken together but 
lower than at any time over the 
preceding 25 years. 
Because of the earlier onset of re­
covery, the employment rate in the 
US increased between 1992 and 
1994 at about the same rate as it fell 
in Europe, reaching just over 70% in 
1994, higher than ever before in the 
post-war period, reflecting the in­
creased number of women in work. 
In Japan, on the other hand, the 
employment rate fell in these two 
years but it was still almost 78% in 
1994, well above the average rate in 
Europe or the US. 
The significant fall in employment 
in the Union since 1990 has led to a 
steep rise in unemployment. After 
falling to 7V2% in 1990 from a peak 
of just under 10% in 1985, the aver­
age rate of unemployment in the 15 
Member States rose to just over 
11% in 1994 (Graph 9). (The figures 
for unemployment rates have re­
cently been revised, see Box.) The 
upward trend in unemployment 
evident since the first oil price crisis 
in 1974 seems, therefore, to have 
been resumed having been halted 
temporarily during the five years 
1985 to 1990, the only time over the 
past 20 years when the rate has 
fallen. 
Reflecting the sharp drop in the 
numbers employed, unemployment 
increased particularly steeply in 
the three new Member States, from 
under 3% in 1990 to 972% in 1994, 
though again, virtually all of the 
rise occurred in Finland and 
Sweden, especially the former 
where it rose to over 18%. This ex­
perience contrasts markedly with 
the record of these three countries 
over the 1970s and 1980s, when 
they succeeded, both collectively 
and individually in keeping the rate 
of unemployment well below that in 
the rest of the Union. 
In the US, the growth of employ­
ment from 1992 on led to a fall in 
unemployment from 7V2% to under 
6V2% in 1994, below the average of 
the past 20 years and approaching 
the lowest figure achieved since 
1974 (572% in 1989). Unlike the 
European Union, therefore, there 
is no sign of an upward trend in 
unemployment over this period, 
and since 1983, the US has 
succeeded in attaining both a con­
sistently lower rate of joblessness 
than the Union and a higher level of 
employment in relation to popula­
tion of working age. 
The same is true of Japan, though 
in this case the superior perfor­
mance in terms of maintaining high 
numbers of people in work and low 
rates of unemployment dates back 
to well before the 1980s. Despite its 
most serious recession of the post­
war years, Japan has succeeded in 
keeping employment above 75% of 
working-age population — though 
it fell slightly between 1992 and 
9 Unemployment rates in the Union and elsewhere, 
1972-94 
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Revisions to Eurostat 
unemployment rates 
The comparable unemployment rates 
published each month since 1989 by Eurostat 
are based on the Community Labour Force 
Survey to accord with ILO international stand-
ard guidelines. These are updated using the 
figures for the numbers registered as unem-
ployed in each Member State and then 
expressed as a percentage of the estimated 
labour force. The method of calculating the 
figures was revised at the beginning of 1995, in 
consultation with national statistical offices 
and the OECD, to improve international com-
parability. The published figures were also 
extended to cover Finland and Sweden (but not 
yet Austria), the new Länder in Germany and 
the US and Japan. 
The revisions consisted of: 
• the introduction of a more comparable 
benchmark from 1992 following the revi-
sion to the LFS (which could lower 
unemployment figures); 
• the inclusion of more recent data for this 
benchmark; 
• the estimation of the labour force from 
quarterly labour force surveys for Italy, the 
UK, Spain and Portugal; 
• improvements to the processing of refer-
ence periods and the integration of 1991 
Census of Population results. 
The effect of the closer application of ILO gui-
delines was to reduce the numbers unemployed 
in Belgium, Denmark, Greece, Ireland, Italy 
and the Netherlands, while the use of the 1991 
Census results increased the numbers unem-
ployed in Belgium, Spain, France, Italy and 
Portugal and reduced them in the Netherlands. 
These effects offset each other in Belgium and, 
to some extent, in Italy and reinforced each 
other in the Netherlands. 
The analysis here includes Austria for which 
national sources of data on unemployment 
have been used. These, it should be empha-
sised, are not directly comparable with the 
figures for other countries and should be 
regarded as indicative only. 
1994 — and unemployment below 
3%. While the rate has risen since 
1992, the increase has been less 
than 1% of the labour force, consid-




The latest monthly unemployment 
figures indicate that the average 
rate in the Union in May 1995 was 
just under 11% (on a seasonally-
adjusted basis, which applies to all 
the monthly figures quoted in this 
section and other parts of the Re-
port), marginally below the average 
rate for 1994. Indeed, the rate of 
unemployment seems to have 
reached a peak one year before in 
the second quarter of 1994 at 11.4% 
of the labour force. Though it has 
declined since then, the fall has, 
therefore, been small — less than 
half a percentage point (Graph 10). 
Moreover, virtually all of the fall 
occurred during the third and 
fourth quarters of 1994, and since 
January 1995, the rate has re-
mained more or less constant. 
While economic output over the 
Union as a whole seems to have 
started growing again since mid-
1993 and while there are signs of an 
increase in the numbers in employ-
ment during the course of 1994, 
these trends have so far had a mini-
mal impact on the numbers out of 
work. Although there is an inevit-
able lag before a growth of output 
feeds through into increased job cre-
ation and lower unemployment, it 
is, nevertheless, slightly disturbing 
that the fall in unemployment 
seems to be slowing down one year 
after it began to decline rather than 
accelerating. 
On the other hand, this is not so 
different from the experience 
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during the early stages of previous 
period of economic recovery in 1985 
and 1986. Then, the average rate of 
unemployment in the Union 
reached a peak in June 1985 at 
10.2% of the labour force. By the end 
of 1985, it had fallen slightly to 10%, 
but it then remained at about this 
level during the whole of 1986, 
showing only a marginal tendency 
to fall. It was not until around the 
middle of 1987, two years after the 
peak rate, that unemployment 
started to decline significantly. In 
mid-1988, however, it was still over 
9%, only 1 percentage point lower 
than at the peak. 
Although history will not necessar-
ily repeat itself, this experience 
suggests that unless the net rate of 
job creation is greater than during 
the early part of the previous econ-
omic upturn, unemployment could 
well prove very slow to fall from its 
present level. In 1986, the numbers 
in employment in the Union in-
creased by just under 1%, in 1987, 
by almost 1V2%. The 1986 figure is 
much the same as the present fore-
cast of employment growth in 1995, 
the 1987 figure higher than now 
forecast for 1996, as described 
below. The outcome, however, 
depends not just on the growth of 
employment but also on the growth 
of the labour force. The prospects for 
the latter are also examined below. 
Unemployment of 
men and women 
It remains the case in the Union that 
women are significantly more af-
fected by unemployment than men. 
In May 1995, the average unemploy-
ment rate for women stood at 12.8% 
of the female labour force, whereas 
the average rate for men was 9.8%, 
3 percentage points lower. Both 
rates reached a peak at around the 
same time in the second quarter of 
1994, the rate for men peaking at 
10.4%, the rate for women at 13.1%. 
The pattern of change since the 
peak was reached, on the other 
hand, differs for the two. Whereas 
the rate for men fell by 72% of the 
male labour force during the latter 
part of 1994 and has remained con-
stant during the first four months of 
1995, the rate for women declined 
only marginally during the course 
of 1994 but has continued to fall 
very slowly during 1995. 
On past experience, it would be ex-
pected that the rate for men will fall 
by more than the rate for women as 
the recovery proceeds, though this 
depends very much on the structure 
of employment growth, on the one 
hand, and changes in labour partici-
pation on the other. During the 
previous economic upturn, the rate 
for men fell progressively from over 
9% in May 1985 to just over 6% in 
1990. By contrast, the rate for 
women hardly changed at all in the 
first three years of recovery. In May 
1985, it was 12%. Three years later 
in May 1988, it was still over 1172%. 
The rate then fell over the next two 
years but remained above 972% 
even at its lowest point. The gap 
between the men's and women's 
unemployment rate, therefore, 
widened from 3 percentage points 
in 1985 to almost 472 percentage 
points towards the end of 1988 
when the women's rate began to fall 
more rapidly. It then narrowed as 
men were hit much harder than 
women by the recession, as ana-
lysed in more detail below. Since the 
recovery began, the gap between 
the two rates has started to widen 
again as unemployment of men has 
fallen slightly more than that of 
women. 
The comparative behaviour of the 
two rates, however, is only partly 
10 Unemployment rates by sex in the Union, 
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11 Unemployment rates by sex and age in the Union, 
1983 - May 1995 
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12 Unemployment rates in Member States, US and 
Japan, 1985,1990 and May 1995 
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attributable to the relative changes 
in employment of men and women. 
An equally important part of the 
explanation lies in the relative 
changes in the labour force, and, 
more especially, in the different 
behaviour of rates of participation 
in the labour force. In particular, an 
increasing proportion of women of 
working age entered the labour 
force as the Union economy re-
covered from the mid-1980s on, at a 
faster rate than the growth of jobs 
could match. In the subsequent 
recession, the rise in the participa-
tion of women slowed down 
moderating the rise in unemploy-
ment. Although the decline in the 
participation of men was even more 
pronounced during this period, as 
shown below, it fell a long way short 
of the scale of job losses among men 
and unemployment increased 
significantly as a result, bringing 
the rate closer to that of women. 
Nevertheless, without the fall in 
participation of men, the rise in un-
employment would have been 
significantly greater and the prob-
lem of inadequate rates of job 
creation in the Union even more 
apparent. 
Unemployment 
of young people 
Unemployment among young 
people under 25 which emerged as 
a particularly acute problem in the 
recession of the earlier 1980s de-
clined significantly during the 
period of economic recovery from 
1985 onwards (Graph 11). The rate 
for young men fell especially 
sharply, from around 22% to under 
14% over this period, while the rate 
for young women declined from 25% 
to around 18%. In both cases, the 
extent of these reductions was sig-
nificantly greater than among older 
people, for men and women aged 25 
and over the decline amounting to 
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only around 172% of the labour 
force. 
In the subsequent four years of 
recession, unemployment among 
both young men and young women 
increased markedly, especially 
among the former. Indeed the un­
employment rate for men under 25 
rose by more between 1990 and 
1994 than it had fallen during the 
preceding period of economic 
growth. By the beginning of 1994, 
therefore, at around 24%, it was 
above the level of its previous peak. 
While the rate for women increased 
by less over this period, it remained 
above that of men, rising to over 
2472% in 1994. The gap between the 
two rates, however, which had wid­
ened between 1985 and 1990, 
narrowed appreciably. 
Unemployment in 
the Member States 
been fully reversed. Other than 
Belgium, the only four Member 
States to have lower unemployment 
rates in mid-1995 than ten years 
before were the Netherlands, where 
there has been a much greater re­
duction in average hours worked 
and shift to part-time employment 
than anywhere else in the Union, 
Portugal, the UK and Ireland, 
which emerged from recession ear­
lier than the other countries and 
where in consequence, unemploy­
ment has fallen by more over the 
past year. In both cases, however, 
unemployment never quite reached 
the rates of the mid-1980s during 
the recent recession. 
The higher rate of unemployment 
for women than for men which is 
evident at the Union level remained 
true of all Member States in May 
1995, except three, the UK, Sweden 
and Finland. In 7 Member States, 
including Finland, the rate for 
women was over 13%, in Spain over 
30% (Graph 13). By contrast, only in 
three Member States, Spain, 
Finland and Ireland, where unem­
ployment overall was the highest in 
the Union, was unemployment 
among men over 13%. 
The gap between men's and 
women's rates was particularly 
wide in the Southern Member 
States, especially in Spain, Italy 
and Greece, where in each case the 
rate for women was well over 172 
times higher than the rate for men 
— over twice as high in Greece. In 
the North of the Union, only in 
Belgium was the difference simi­
larly wide. In all of these countries, 
moreover, the rate of participation 
of women in the labour force was 
lower than elsewhere in the Union, 
apart from in Ireland. In these 
countries, therefore, not only were 
a relatively small proportion of 
working-age women part of the 
The rate of unemployment is far 
from uniform across the Union. On 
the latest count, it varied from 
almost 23% in Spain and 1672% in 
Finland to under 4% in Austria and 
Luxembourg (Graph 12). In five 
Member States — the two former 
countries plus Ireland, Italy and 
France — unemployment was 
above 12% and in a sixth, Belgium, 
above 10%. In only three countries 
— the Netherlands as well as 
Austria and Luxembourg — was the 
rate below 8%. 
Moreover, in ten of the 15 Member 
States, the level of unemployment 
in May 1995 was higher than it had 
been ten years earlier at the high 
point of the previous recession, 
while in Belgium, it was only mar­
ginally lower. In all of these 
countries, therefore, the reduction 
in unemployment achieved during 
the period of high employment 
growth between 1985 and 1990 has 
13 Unemployment rates of men and women in Member 
States, US and Japan, May 1995 
._ % labour force 
00 Γ 
L NL GR Ρ D Β DK E15 I UK F S IRL SF E 
GR June 1994; J February 1995; NL, SF April 1995 
US J 
37 Section 1 Employment and unemployment trends in the Union 
work force, but a high proportion of 
those that were unable to find jobs. 
(The differing experience across the 
Union as regards unemployment is 
examined in more detail in Section 
4 below.) 
Employment and 
labour force growth 
The increase in unemployment 
which has occurred since 1990 in all 
Member States in respect of both 
men and women would have been 
greater, as noted above, had there 
not been a fall in the rate of growth 
of the labour force in the Union. The 
reduction in net job creation over 
this period, therefore, was accompa-
nied by a withdrawal of a significant 
proportion of people from the work 
force, just as the increased job cre-
ation in the preceding period of 
economic growth was accompanied 
by a rise in participation. In other 
words, there appears to be a posi-
tive relationship between the rate of 
labour force growth and employ-
ment growth, particularly over the 
past ten years. 
Thus, between 1985 and 1990, 
when employment grew on average 
by around 172% a year, the number 
of people in the Union's work force 
increased by around 1% a year. 
Between 1990 and 1994, when em-
ployment fell, the labour force 
increased only marginally, and ac-
tually contracted between 1991 and 
1994 (Graph 14). 
Demographic trends 
and changes in 
participation 
Examining the period before 1990 
and the period after in more detail 
reveals that whereas the Union's 
14 Changes in employment and labour force in the 
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labour force increased by 5 million 
between 1987 and 1990, it expanded 
by only 650 thousand in the sub-
sequent three years. Changes in 
population of working age, however, 
account for very little of the 
difference. Rather, it is due predomi-
nantly to differential changes in 
rates of participation. If participa-
tion rates had remained unchanged, 
the Union labour force would have 
increased at only a slightly lower 
rate between 1990 and 1994 than 
over the preceding three years — by 
around 950 thousand a year, 3.8 mil-
lion people in total, rather than by 
just over 1 million a year, 4.1 million 
in total, a difference of only 300 thou-
sand over the four years (Graphs 15 
and 16, which show the separate ef-
fects on the total labour force in the 
Union of changes in population and 
changes in participation of men and 
women within broad age groups — 
see Annex for details). In other 
words, changes in rates of participa-
tion were responsible for expanding 
the Union labour force by an addi-
tional 1.9 million in the earlier 
period (650 thousand a year) over 
and above the increase in population 
and for reducing it by 3 million in the 
later period. 
The sharp decline in participation 
which occurred in the 1990 to 1994 
period arose principally among 
young people under 25, both men 
and women, and among men in the 
25 to 54 age bracket. At the same 
time, while increasing participation 
of women of prime working age was 
the major source of labour force 
growth in both periods, it occurred 
at a much slower rate in the years 
after 1990 than before and, there-
fore, offset less of the declining 
participation of men of all ages and 
of younger women. 
The reduction in participation of 
young people was in itself respon-
sible for a fall in the total labour 
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force in the Union of over 3 million 
between 1990 and 1994, a consider-
ably higher figure than over the 
previous three years (600 thou-
sand). As noted in Section 4 below, 
this is mirrored in an increase in 
participation in education and 
training. 
The decline in participation among 
men in the 25 to 54 age group, which 
served to reduce the labour force by 
just over 1.2 million, is more dis-
turbing. In this case, there are no 
beneficial side-effects which can be 
cited to justify the disappearance of 
men of prime working age from the 
job market. 
In the older age groups, partici-
pation of men fell by less in terms 
of those affected but was still signi-
ficant, reducing the labour force 
by over 900 thousand between 
1990 and 1994, some 700 thou-
sand more than in the three years 
before. 
In sum, therefore, just under 45% 
of the reduction in the Union labour 
force between 1990 and 1994 of 
5.6 million relative to what it 
would have been, had participation 
continued to increase at the same 
rate as in the preceding three years, 
is attributable to lower participa-
tion of young people under 25, 
almost 20% to that of men aged 
25-54 and around 12% to men 
retiring earlier. The remainder is 
predominantly due to a reduced 
increase in the participation of 
women aged 25-54. 
As the economic recovery proceeds 
and the rate of net job creation 
increases, it can be expected that 
the tendencies evident before the 
recent recession will re-emerge and 
participation will again rise so in-
creasing the growth of the labour 
force and slowing down the fall in 
unemployment. 
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Employment and 
output growth 
Over time, the rate of net job cre-
ation and contraction in the 
European Union has closely mir-
rored the rate of change in GDP. An 
increase in GDP growth has tended 
to be followed after a period of time 
by a rise in the rate of employment 
growth. A key issue, given the large 
numbers without work in the 
Union, whether officially recorded 
as unemployed or not, is whether it 
is possible to create more jobs from 
a given level of output — ie to 
increase the employment-intensity 
of the growth. 
Over the 1980s, the growth of labour 
productivity (here defined as GDP 
per person employed) in the Union as 
a whole was remarkably constant at 
just under 2% a year during periods 
both of slow growth — 1980 to 1985 
— and of economic upturn —1985 to 
1990 (Graph 17, in which GDP is 
lagged two quarters to take some 
account of the delayed response of 
employment to changes in output, 
though, in practice, the full response 
is likely to take a number of years to 
materialise). 
In the period of economic recession 
between 1990 and 1994, when em-
ployment fell, the growth of 
productivity was much the same as 
in the preceding economic upturn. 
Employers, therefore, seem to have 
succeeded in adjusting their work 
forces in line with the depressed 
rate of output growth during this 
period. 
This experience in the European 
Union during the recent recession 
differs significantly from that in the 
US and Japan. In the recent period 
of recession, 1989 to 1992, the 
growth of productivity in the US 
was similar to the average for the 
1980s. In 1993, as the economy 
picked up, employment increased at 
the same rate as output and produc-
tivity growth was well below the 
rate experienced in the same year 
in the European Union, where the 
economic situation was markedly 
different (Graph 18). 
In Japan, where in the 1980s the 
growth of labour productivity was 
consistently higher than in Europe 
averaging over 3% a year and only 
falling below this rate when GDP 
grew by less than 372%, the recent 
recession has witnessed an absolute 
decline in productivity as the num-
bers in employment have been 
maintained (Graph 19). In both 
1993 and 1994, when output hardly 
changed at all, employment in-
creased marginally. In Japan, 
therefore, in contrast to Europe, 
productivity growth seems to have 
been sacrificed to the preservation 
of jobs. 
The contrast between the experi-
ence in Europe and that in the US 
and Japan is especially marked for 
non-manufacturing sectors as op-
posed to manufacturing industry. 
In particular, employment in non-
manufacturing activities has 
expanded much more relative to 
output growth in the 1990s in the 
latter two countries than in Europe, 
while, up to the recent recession, 
productivity in manufacturing has 
risen at least as fast. In both coun-
tries, therefore, and especially in 
the US, relatively high priority 
seems to have been accorded to 
employment in sectors where 
competitiveness and, consequently, 
productivity growth are less critical 
considerations because a much 
smaller share of output is traded 
internationally (see Annex for more 
details). 
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Changes in 
working time 
One means of increasing the num-
ber of people employed for any given 
level of output is through reducing 
the average amount of time each 
person works. Although there are 
difficulties in introducing a deliber-
ate policy of this kind centrally, 
since the scope for adjusting work-
ing time differs markedly between 
sectors of production, as do the 
potential costs — or in some cases 
benefits — it is, nevertheless, 
the case that average hours worked 
have tended to decline in most parts 
of the Union over the past ten years. 
While the precise impact on jobs 
is difficult to estimate, it has almost 
certainly contributed to increasing 
or maintaining the number of 
people in employment. As described 
below, much of this reduction 
reflects a growth in part-time work-
ing, especially among women, 
though the average hours worked 
by those employed full-time has 
also tended to come down. 
employed, the rate of decline was 
less than it had been in the preced-
ing five years. There is, therefore, 
little sign in the aggregate data at 
least, of reduced working time being 
used as a deliberate means of main-
taining the numbers of people in 
work during the period of slow 
growth (though there were dif-
ferences between sectors — see 
Annex). 
Between 1985 and 1990, average 
hours worked per week over the 
Union as a whole declined from just 
under 40 to 39, a fall of 2% in five 
years. As a result while the total 
hours worked (the volume of labour 
input) rose by 572%, the number of 
people employed increased by 2 per-
centage points more, by 772% 
(Graph 20 — see Annex for defini-
tion of working time). 
In the subsequent four years, the 
total hours worked in the Union fell 
by 472% as economies went into re-
cession. The number of people 
employed, however, declined by just 
over 3%, over 1% less, as the aver-
age hours worked per week fell from 
39 to 3872. Nevertheless, while this 
reduction in working time seemed 
to reduce the fall in numbers 
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Section 2 Member State performance in creating jobs 
Whereas the focus of the previous 
section was on employment devel­
opments in the Union as a whole, 
the concern of this and the remain­
ing sections is with developments in 
the different Member States. 
The need for jobs 
Objectives for job creation can only 
be determined in terms of the need 
for jobs. This varies from Member 
State to Member State not only 
because of differences in the 
prevailing level of unemployment 
but also because of differential rates 
of growth of the labour force. An 
important basis for assessing em­
ployment performance is, therefore, 
the extent to which countries are 
successful in achieving a rate of net 
job creation which ensures that all 
those people who want — or need — 
to work can find employment. 
Changes in 
the labour force 
Over the past, labour force growth 
has varied significantly from year 
to year, reflecting, on the one hand, 
long-term trends in population and 
participation and, on the other, shor­
ter term influences, specifically, 
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changes in migration flows and in 
economic activity or the rate of net 
job creation. 
The main long-term trends, which 
are common to most Member States, 
are: 
• a slowdown in the growth of 
population of working age as a 
result of lower birth rates — 
over the 1970s, population in 
the Union increased by around 
1% a year on average, over the 
1980s, by around 72% a year; 
• an increasing tendency for 
young men and women to stay 
longer in education and train­
ing, which is reflected in a 
reduction in rates of labour 
force participation; 
• a tendency for men to retire 
earlier which is associated 
with a declining rate of parti­
cipation in the older age 
groups; 
• a growing tendency for women, 
especially married women, to 
want to work, which has led to 
a significant upward trend in 
the participation of women in 
the 25-54 age group. 
These long-term trends, however, 
can be offset or reinforced by shorter 
term influences. Fluctuations in 
economic activity, which lead to a 
slowdown or acceleration in the rate 
of job creation, have had a major 
effect on participation in recent 
years, as described above. In only 
four of the 15 Member States, did the 
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labour force expand by more over the 
period 1990 to 1994 than over the 
preceding three years, though in a 
fifth, France, the increase was much 
the same in the two periods (Graph 
21). Moreover, in three of these four 
countries, Ireland, the Netherlands 
and Austria, there was either no sig-
nificant difference between the rate 
of employment change in the later 
and earlier periods or employment 
increased by more between 1990 and 
1994 than before. 
The only country, therefore, in which 
the labour force grew by significantly 
more in the period of lower employ-
ment growth was Ireland. Here 
labour force growth was much af-
fected by the change in the pattern of 
migration, which led to a higher 
growth of working-age population 
after 1990. In particular, large scale 
outward migration was replaced by 
inward migration, partly because 
of the lower demand for labour 
elsewhere, partly because of the 
favourable economic prospects in 
Ireland itself (GDP growth averaged 
almost 4% a year between 1990 and 
1994, far higher than anywhere else 
in Western Europe). 
The marked decline in the rate of 
labour force growth in most parts of 
the Union after 1990 was due to the 
same forces discussed earlier for the 
Union as a whole, declining partici-
pation of young people under 25, 
men of 25 to 54 and older men of 55 
and over (see Annex for a detailed 
analysis). 
How successful have 




The relationship between output 
and employment examined in 
Section 1 for the Union as a whole 
conceals significant differences 
between Member States. In 
particular, while in all countries 
there is a close association between 
changes in output and employment 
over time, in the sense that when 
GDP growth has increased or fallen 
this has normally been followed 
by a counterpart change in the 
numbers in work, some seem to 
have been noticeably more success-
ful than others in translating 
output growth into jobs. Although, 
in general, there is some tendency 
for the increase in the numbers 
employed to be higher, or reduction 
to be lower, in those countries which 
have achieved a relatively high rate 
of output growth, the relationship is 
by no means uniform. 
In the growth period between 1985 
and 1990, GDP increased by just 
over 3% a year over the Union 
as whole and the numbers 
employed by 172%. In four coun-
tries, Ireland, Luxembourg, Spain 
and Portugal, growth averaged 
more than 4% a year (Graph 22). 
In all of these apart from Ireland, 
the numbers employed also 
increased by more than the Union 
average — by over 3% a year in 
both Spain and Luxembourg. In 
Ireland, despite a growth rate of 
GDP of 5% a year, employment 
went up by only 1%. In two other 
countries, the UK and Finland, 
GDP also rose by more than the 
Union average, but whereas in the 
UK employment also went up by 
more than elsewhere, in Finland as 
in Ireland, the numbers employed 
rose by relatively little — in this 
case, by under 72% a year. 
Of the six countries in which 
employment increased by more 
than the Union average, GDP 
growth was also above average in 
all but two — Germany and the 
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Netherlands, in both of which 
growth was also only slightly below 
and where in the latter there was 
a much larger shift towards part-
time working than elsewhere. Of 
the 9 Member States where GDP 
growth was less than the Union 
average, the numbers in work also 
increased by less than average in 
six, the exceptions being Belgium, 
where the rise in both GDP and 
employment differed only margi-
nally from that in the Union as a 
whole, Ireland and Finland as 
noted above. 
The experience of this period was, 
therefore, that in countries which 
achieved a relatively high rate of 
output growth, there was a greater 
chance of a higher than average 
expansion of employment. At the 
same time, high growth was not a 
sufficient condition for securing 
a large rise in employment, 
as Ireland and Finland demon-
strated. On the other hand, 
no countries succeeded in achiev-
ing a high rate of employment 
growth between 1985 and 1990 
without having a growth rate of 
GDP above or close to the Union 
average. 
A similar conclusion emerges from 
the experience of the period of 
recession between 1990 and 1994. 
In the Union as a whole, GDP 
growth averaged 1% a year over 
this period, while the numbers 
employed fell by just under 1% a 
year. Of the six Member States — 
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, 
Ireland, Austria, Greece, Germany 
and Portugal — in which employ-
ment rose instead of falling during 
these years, all but Greece 
achieved a growth of GDP which 
was at least 2% a year (Graph 23). 
Similarly, there were five Member 
States where employment fell by 
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more than the Union average 
between 1990 and 1994 —Finland, 
where it declined by just under 
57c a year and where GDP also 
declined markedly, Sweden, 
where employment fell by 172% a 
year and GDP by just under 1% 
a year, Italy, the UK and Spain. 
Of these only in Spain was the 
growth of GDP more than the 
Union average, and then only mar-
ginally. 
Moreover in all four countries 
where employment fell but by only 
slightly less than the Union aver-
age — Denmark, Belgium, France 
and Portugal — the rate of GDP 
growth was very similar at around 
1% a year. 
Over the period of recession, there-
fore, there was a somewhat closer 
relationship between the change in 
GDP and the change in employ-
ment across Member States. 
During these years, no Member 
State, except Greece, succeeded in 
achieving an increase in the num-
bers in work without having a 
growth rate of GDP of close to 2% 
a year or more. Moreover, employ-
ment fell by most in those 
countries where GDP either de-
clined or rose by less than 1% a 
year. 
This experience, together with 
that for the earlier period of 
economic recovery, strongly sug-
gests that output growth is a 
necessary condition for achieving 
any significant expansion in the 
numbers in employment. At the 
same time, there were marked 
differences between Member 
States in the rate of productivity 
growth — or in the employment-
intensity of output growth — 
which show that a high rate of 
economic growth is not a sufficient 
condition for obtaining a high rate 
of employment growth. 
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The employment-
intensity of growth 
in Member States 
Countries have had differing suc-
cess in translating economic growth 
into more jobs, though generally the 
ones which have experienced the 
largest increase in employment per 
unit of output have also experienced 
the highest rates of net job creation. 
Between 1985 and 1990, the three 
Member States achieving the lar-
gest gains in employment — the 
Netherlands, Luxembourg and 
Spain — were also the three experi-
encing the smallest rises in output 
per person employed — ie the most 
employment-intensive growth 
(Graph 24). Indeed, the country 
where the numbers in work in-
creased by most, the Netherlands, 
was the only Member State where 
productivity measured in these 
terms declined over the period 
(though much of the apparent de-
cline in productivity was due to 
shorter hours worked per person). 
Two other countries where produc-
tivity growth was below the Union 
average — the UK — or marginally 
above — Germany — also experi-
enced above average growth in 
employment. On the other hand, in 
Portugal, the only other country 
where the numbers in work also 
expanded by more than average, 
output per person rose by more than 
anywhere else in the Union. 
At the other end of the scale, three 
of the four Member States experien-
cing significantly higher than 
average productivity growth over 
this period — Finland, Italy and 
France, where GDP per person em-
ployed rose by over 2% a year — 
were among three of the four coun-
tries where employment rose by 
less than 1% a year. 
In the subsequent four years, 1990 
to 1994, the two Member States 
where employment rose by most — 
Luxembourg and the Netherlands 
— were also the only two where 
GDP per person employed failed to 
increase at all over this period 
(Graph 25). In the other two 
Member States experiencing a 
rise in employment, however — 
Germany and Austria — GDP per 
person increased by more than 
average. On the other hand, in all 
five countries where the numbers 
employed fell by most during these 
years — Finland, Sweden, Italy, 
the UK and Spain — productivity 
increased by more than average 
(by around 272% a year). 
From this it would appear that 
those Member States in which ag-
gregate labour productivity has 
grown relatively slowly have done 
better in terms of increasing or 
maintaining levels of employment 
than those where productivity has 
risen relatively rapidly. This is also 
generally true of manufacturing 
and non-manufacturing sectors 
considered separately (see Graphs 
26 to 29). 
It should be emphasised, however, 
that it is important to be wary in 
drawing policy conclusions from 
this observation. In particular, it 
is not possible to conclude that 
those countries which experienced 
relatively high rates of labour pro-
ductivity growth before and after 
1990 would have done better if they 
had succeeded in reducing this. 
Much depends on the methods of 
achieving this and, in particular, 
the implications for output growth. 
If the growth of output is depressed 
either by the lower level of produc-
tivity itself or by the measures 
taken to raise employment, then the 
effect of this on job creation could 
offset any beneficial effects of 
the measures themselves. Thus it 
remains essential for economies to 
have highly productive and interna-
tionally competitive sectors in order 
to underpin employment growth. 
In the US, as noted above, 
employment-intensive growth 
has been concentrated in non-
manufacturing sectors where a 
high proportion of output is non-
traded and where, therefore, 
achieving high productivity growth 
is less of a priority and potentially 
less damaging to output growth. 
Much the same seems to be true of 
all three new Member States, where 
the growth of productivity in manu-
facturing was substantially in 
excess ofthat in non-manufacturing 
in the period both before and after 
1990 (by over 372 percentage points 
a year between 1990 and 1994). 
This was also true of Luxembourg 
and the Netherlands where produc-
tivity growth in manufacturing of 
2% a year since 1990 has been 
combined with a reduction of 
productivity in non-manufacturing. 
Although it is difficult to judge how 
far this has been a deliberate result 
of policy, maintaining a high level of 
employment seems to have been ac-
corded relatively high priority in 
these countries and (as noted in 
Part II), a number of measures have 
been implemented in recent years 
in pursuit of this. The fact that in 
Finland and Sweden, employment 
has fallen since 1990 by more than 
anywhere else in the Union despite 
this policy aim needs to be con-
sidered in the light of the deep 
recession which has hit them over 
this period. 
Changes 
in working time 
The changes in labour productivity 
as defined above conceal, in most 
countries, reductions in average 
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hours worked by those in employ-
ment. These have contributed 
to maintaining larger numbers 
in work, while at the same time 
causing the growth of output per 
hour worked (the true measure of 
labour productivity) to diverge from 
that of output per person. In the 
Netherlands, in particular (though 
data problems exaggerate the re-
duction which occurred), a fall in 
average working time contributed 
significantly to the growth in the 
number employed in the economy 
between 1985 and 1990 (Graph 30). 
In Belgium, Germany, Greece and 
France, moreover, the numbers in 
employment increased by twice the 
rise in total hours worked (ie total 
labour input) over this period 
(though in Greece, this seems to 
have had much to do with the 
decline of employment in agricul-
ture where average hours worked 
per week were markedly higher 
than in industry or services), while 
in Denmark and Finland, the 
numbers in work rose at the same 
time as total hours worked declined. 
In all of these cases, therefore, re-
ductions in average hours per week 
helped to increase the growth of em-
ployment significantly, as they did 
in Austria and Portugal. 
By contrast, in Ireland, Sweden, 
Italy, Luxembourg and the UK, re-
ductions in average working time 
seem to have made little or no con-
tribution to increasing the number 
of jobs in the economy. Indeed, in 
Sweden and the UK, average hours 
worked rose over this period — the 
only two Member States where this 
was the case — and the numbers in 
employment went up by less than 
total hours worked. 
In the subsequent four years, 1990 
to 1994, reductions in working time 
also contributed in virtually all 
Member States to maintaining the 
numbers in employment. The only 
two countries where this was not 
the case were Denmark and Greece, 
in the former employment falling 
by more than total hours worked 
and in the latter rising by less 
(Graph 31). The contribution to job 
preservation of reductions in work-
ing time — amounting to a fall in 
average hours of over V2% a year — 
was particularly significant in 
Belgium, Germany, Portugal, Ire-
land and Sweden. 
There is, however, a marked dif-
ference between the experience in 
manufacturing industry and that in 
the rest of the economy. In the 
growth period 1985 to 1990, the 
numbers employed in manufactur-
ing in the Union as a whole went up 
by only marginally more than total 
hours worked, implying little fall in 
average working time. This experi-
ence was repeated in most Member 
States, only Denmark, Germany, 
the Netherlands and Austria show-
ing any significant reduction in the 
hours worked per person (Graph 
32). In the subsequent four years, 
much the same was true, only 
Portugal, the UK and, most espe-
cially, Sweden, showing a 
perceptibly smaller fall in the num-
bers employed in manufacturing 
than in total hours worked, while in 
Denmark and the Netherlands, the 
numbers in employment declined 
by more than total labour input, 
indicating a rise in average hours 
worked (Graph 33). In the other 
countries, the two changed more or 
less at the same rate. 
In non-manufacturing, all countries 
except Sweden and the UK experi-
enced a reduction in average 
working time between 1985 and 
1990, so that the number of 
people employed rose by more than 
total hours worked (Graph 34). In 
the subsequent four years of re-
cession, in all Member States, 
except Denmark, reductions in 
average hours worked in non-
manufacturing sectors contributed 
to maintaining the numbers in em-
ployment, especially in Ireland and 
Portugal, where they declined by 
almost 1% a year, and Sweden, 
where they fell by over 1% a year, a 
reduction of around 1V2 hours a 
week (Graph 35). 
The reduction in average working 
time in most parts of the Union is 
linked to the growth of part-time 
working, which is examined below 
(Section 3), as is the change in the 
pattern of working time (Section 5). 
-47 Section 2 Member State performance in creating jobs 
Changes in numbers employed and total hours worked 
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Section 3 The changing pattern of employment 
More jobs for women 
less for men 
The period of job growth between 
1987 and 1990 saw the employment 
of men in the European Union in-
crease, whereas over the 20 years 
before it had fallen. In the 10 years 
1975 to 1985, the number of men 
employed had declined by around 
3 million, or 4%, and in the decade 
preceding that by around 1 million. 
In contrast, the employment of 
women had shown an even more 
pronounced long-term growth, 
increasing by 3 million, or by 
7%, between 1965 and 1975 and by 
a further 10% over the next 10 
years. 
In the three years 1987 to 1990, the 
number of men in employment went 
up by over 3V2 million, or almost 
4V2%; as a result over 45% of the net 
additional jobs created over the 
Union as a whole went to men. This 
was predominantly the conse-
quence of growth of jobs in industry, 
which like the employment of men 
had shown a marked downward 
trend over the preceding years. Just 
as men seem to have lost out more 
than women from the reduction in 
industrial employment which had 
gone before, simply because they 
accounted for the preponderance of 
the work force — over 75% in the 
Union as a whole — so too they 
gained from the renewed expansion 
of employment in industry during 
the growth years. 
In the 10 years 1975 to 1985, the 
number of industrial jobs had 
declined by 7 million, 1V2% a year on 
average. Three-quarters of those 
who lost their jobs over this period 
were men. Since this is the same 
figure as their share of employ-
ment, men's and women's jobs 
declined proportionately. Between 
1987 and 1990, the number in-
creased by 2V2 million in the Union, 
by almost 6% overall or 2% a year. 
Of these, just under two-thirds 
went to men, less than their share 
of the industrial work force. Indeed, 
the rate of growth of men's employ-
ment in industry over this period 
was only half that of women. Never-
theless, this growth was in stark 
contrast to the losses suffered in the 
years before. 
Women, therefore, gained propor-
tionately more than men from the 
expansion of employment in indus-
try over this period, taking over a 
third of the net additional jobs and 
increasing their share of the work 
force. They also, however, gained 
disproportionately from the expan-
sion of services, taking 75% of the 
net additional jobs created over this 
period, much more than their share 
of employment (under half in 1987), 
though this was broadly in line with 
the trend increase in their share in 
previous years. 
In agriculture, which continued to 
shed jobs between 1987 and 1990 
despite the overall expansion of em-
ployment, both men and women 
experienced much the same rate of 
employment loss (around 10%). 
The implication is, therefore, 
that given the rates of growth of 
industry and services which oc-
curred, the increase in the 
employment of men was lower 
than would have been expected on 
past trends. Women, in other 
words, continued to expand their 
importance in the Union work 
force over this period. 
In the years of recession after 
1990, the employment of men 
resumed its long-term downward 
trend, declining by over 4V2 million 
between 1990 and 1994, more 
than cancelling out the gains made 
in the preceding three years. At 
the same time, the employment 
of women fell only very slightly. 
Underlying this difference in ex-
perience, as in earlier years, was 
a sharp decline in employment 
in industry. Between 1990 and 
1994, the number of industrial 
jobs fell by almost 12%, almost as 
much as over the entire 10 years 
1975 to 1985 and considerably 
more than the increase experi-
enced in the latter part of the 
1980s. Unlike in earlier years, job 
losses hit women proportionately 
more than men (employment of 
women falling by over 15%, of men 
by under 11%). For women, how-
ever, unlike men, the continuing 
expansion of jobs in services com-
pensated for this decline and an 
accelerating loss of jobs in agricul-
ture (which shed over 2 million jobs 
over this period, a decline of 20%, 
though again divided evenly be-
tween men and women). For men, 
given the importance of industrial 
employment, it fell a long way 
short. 
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Changes in employment 
of men and women 
in Member States, 
1987 to 1994 
In all countries in the Union, the 
employment of both men and women 
increased between 1987 and 1990 
(Graph 36, in which changes in 
employment of men and women are 
expressed as a percentage of total 
employment in the base year to 
show their relative contribution to 
the change in employment over 
each period). In all but four countries 
— Greece, Luxembourg, the 
Netherlands and Austria — the 
number of men in work declined 
between 1990 and 1994, in Italy, 
Portugal and the UK, contributing 
around 5% to the overall decline in 
employment, in Spain and Sweden, 
6V2 and in Finland, 10V2. These all 
experienced a significant growth in 
the employment of men in the 
preceding three years, but in each 
case, the net gain was more than 
wiped out by the subsequent net loss. 
In all these countries, as elsewhere 
in the Union, the difference in ex-
perience between the two periods 
was largely attributable to what 
happened in industry. In the three 
years 1987 to 1990, the number of 
jobs in industry increased throug-
hout the Union, except in Denmark. 
In Spain, the number expanded by 
almost 5% a year, in Germany, the 
UK and Portugal, by over 2% a year. 
In each of these countries, the 
growth in employment of men in 
industry was less than that of 
women, as indeed, it was in most 
other Member States, except for 
Belgium, Ireland, Austria, Finland 
and Sweden (Graph 37). Yet in most 
cases, it was sufficient with the in-
crease in jobs for men in services to 
offset the continuing loss of jobs in 
agriculture. 
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Between 1990 and 1994, the num-
ber of jobs in industry declined in all 
Member States without exception, 
the reduction being particularly 
pronounced in Finland, where it 
amounted to over 35%, Sweden, 
where it was over 20%, and the UK 
and Spain where it was over 15%. 
This contributed to a major extent 
to the significant decline in employ-
ment of men overall in all of these 
countries. In Portugal, where there 
were also significant job losses in 
industry, an enormous loss of jobs 
in agriculture was even more im-
portant (almost 40% of agriculture 
jobs disappeared in this four-year 
period) (Graph 38). 
By contrast, the employment of 
women, having risen by much more 
than that of men throughout the 
Union between 1987 and 1990 
(except for Finland), continued to 
expand in seven Member States in 
the subsequent four years, while in 
two others, the UK and Spain, it fell 
only marginally. In Finland, 
Sweden and Denmark, however, it 
declined significantly (by 5% a year 
in the first, 2V2% a year in the 
second and 1% a year in the third). 
Nevertheless, in each case apart 
from Denmark, the fall was less 
than that of men. 
This continued growth, or much 
smaller fall than that of men, in the 
employment of women largely 
reflects, first, the fact that jobs in 
services, where the great majority of 
women are employed, went on ex-
panding in most countries over this 
period, in sharp contrast to the loss 
of jobs in industry, and, secondly, the 
increasing share of jobs in services 
going to women. Overall in the 
Union, service employment grew by 
just under 1% a year during the four 
years 1990 to 1994, though this was 
less than over the preceding three 
years (2% a year). Indeed, in France, 
Ireland and the Netherlands, growth 
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was higher over the later period. 
Moreover, in all Member States, 
where employment in services rose, 
the number of women employed in-
creased by more than that of men 
(Graph 39). The number of women 
also rose in Italy where jobs for men 
declined. In the three Scandinavian 
countries, however, employment of 
women in services fell by more than 
that of men. Significantly perhaps, 
these are also the three countries in 
the Union where the proportion of 
women employed in this sector is 
substantially greater than that of 
men (in Finland and Sweden, 60% 
of service jobs are filled by women). 
The long-term trend towards women 
taking an increasing share of jobs 
in services may, therefore, not be 
unlimited. 
As analysed in some detail below, a 
significant proportion of the addi-
tional jobs filled by women have 
been part-time, whereas the jobs 
lost in industry and agriculture 
have predominantly been full-time. 
Underlying the shift in employment 
between men and women, there-
fore, is a further trend — that of a 
shift in jobs from full-time to part-
time. Unlike the relative growth of 
women's employment, however, 
this trend is much more apparent in 
the Northern and more developed 
parts of the Union than in the South 
and less developed areas. 
As a result, growing numbers of 
men have become unemployed over 
the long-term but equally signifi-
cantly, an increasing proportion of 
men of working age have with-
drawn from the labour force 
completely, as noted above. 
The paradox is, however, that un-
employment rates of women have 
risen to higher levels than those of 
men even though women's employ-
ment has expanded while men's has 
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contracted. The explanation lies in 
the substantial increase in the 
number of women coming on to the 
labour market in most parts of the 
Union which has outstripped the 
expansion of jobs. 
The changing 




Over the period 1987 to 1994, the 
number of self-employed in the 
Union remained broadly unchanged 
in relation to the total numbers in 
work. In 1994, some 15% of those in 
employment in the Union were self-
employed, slightly lower than in 
1987. Self-employment, however, 
was significantly more important for 
men than for women, accounting for 
around 19% of the total in both years 
as against 9V2% in the case of women. 
Nevertheless, there are consider-
able differences in the importance 
of self-employment across the 
Union, especially between the 
North and the South. In Greece, 
over a third of all those in employ-
ment in 1994 were self-employed, 
in Italy and Portugal, around 25% 
and in Spain as well as Ireland, 
just over 20% (Graph 40). By con-
trast, in Denmark, Germany and 
Luxembourg, the proportion was 
less than 10%. This partly reflects 
the scale of employment in agricul-
ture where over half of those in 
work are self-employed in the 
Union as a whole. Nevertheless, 
even outside agriculture, a higher 
proportion are self-employed in the 
Southern Member States than in 
the North — around 20% in 1994 in 
Spain, Italy and Portugal, almost 
30% in Greece. 
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1987 to 1990 
Between 1987 and 1990, the num-
ber of self-employed in the Union 
increased at an average rate of just 
under 1V2% a year, slightly less than 
the growth of total employment of 
just over 1V2% a year. As a result, 
self-employment accounted for 
only 12% of the overall increase in 
the numbers in work over this 
period and its share of total employ-
ment declined slightly. Outside 
agriculture, however, where em-
ployment declined substantially, 
self-employment increased by more 
than 3% a year and its share in total 
employment in industry and ser-
vices rose over the period. 
In most Member States, self-
employment in industry and 
services grew at a similar or faster 
rate than the number of employees 
(excluding Austria, for which the 
data are not sufficiently detailed). 
This was particularly the case in 
Portugal and the UK, two countries 
where the growth of total employ-
ment was especially pronounced. In 
each case, the increase in self-
employment was responsible in 
itself for expanding total employ-
ment by some 2% between 1987 and 
1990, with women accounting for 
much of the increase in Portugal. In 
both countries, around a quarter of 
all the increase in employment 
between these two years was in the 
number of self-employed, twice 
their share of the total number in 
work in 1987 (Graph 41, which 
shows the contribution of the 
change in self-employment and em-
ployees to overall employment in 
industry and services over the 
period). 
The other countries where the 
growth of self-employment made 
a major contribution to net job 
creation were Denmark, Finland, 
Ireland and Belgium. In the former, 
where total employment declined 
over the period, the number of self-
employed increased by some 5%, 
not enough to compensate for the 
large reduction in waged and 
salaried employment. In Finland, 
self-employment accounted for a 
quarter of job growth. In Ireland, 
self-employment expanded by al-
most 10% over the period and 
accounted for almost 40% of the 
overall increase in the numbers in 
work, while in Belgium — where, as 
in Portugal, the rise in female self-
employment was especially marked 
— it increased by a similar amount 
and was responsible for a third of 
the total rise in employment. 
Apart from in Belgium and 
Portugal, and to a lesser extent, 
in Germany and Greece, the growth 
of self-employment between 1987 
and 1990 was largely concentrated 
among men, reflecting the much 
greater numbers of men who are 
self-employed in the Union. In 
Finland, the UK and Ireland, in 
particular, where the growth of self-
employment was an especially 
important source of the net addition 
to jobs, all of the people who became 
self-employed in the former were 
men and three out of four in the 
latter two. 
1990 to 1994 
In most Member States, 9 out of the 
15, the number of self-employed fell 
between 1990 and 1994, as it did 
over the Union as a whole. As in the 
preceding three years, however, 
much of the decline was a result of 
job losses in agriculture, which 
accelerated during this period. 
Excluding this sector, the number 
of self-employed expanded in 9 of 
the 15 Member States (including 
Austria, which is not shown in the 
Graph), the exceptions being 
Belgium, Denmark, France, Italy 
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Finland and the UK. In Denmark 
and the UK, in particular, the fall in 
the numbers of self-employed was 
especially marked, reducing overall 
employment by some 1%, almost as 
large as the increase had been in the 
three years before. As a result, the 
share of the self-employed in total 
employment in the UK was vir-
tually the same in 1994 as it had 
been in 1987 before the large 
growth occurred. This was also the 
case in Belgium, while in Denmark, 
France and Italy, the share was 
lower in 1994 than in 1987. 
In Finland, however, though self-
employment declined, the fall was 
much less than that of employees — 
6V2% in industry and services as op-
posed to over 19% — and the share 
of the self-employed in total employ-
ment increased. In Germany, Spain, 
Portugal and Sweden, moreover, the 
number of self-employed in industry 
and services rose while total employ-
ment declined, and in Greece, 
Ireland and the Netherlands, the 
growth of self-employment was pro-
portionately greater than the 
increase in the number of em-
ployees. In all of these countries, 
therefore, self-employment helped 
either to boost the numbers in work 
or prevent a larger fall — though this 
was disguised by the effect of large-
scale job losses in agriculture (see 
Annex for an analysis of flows into 
and out of self-employment). This 
was especially the case for men, for 
whom in sharp contrast to the reduc-
tion in waged employment, 
self-employment went up slightly 
between 1990 and 1994. 
Part-time versus 
full-time jobs 
Part-time employment in most 
parts of the Union has expanded 
significantly over the recent past 
42 Part-time working in Member States, 1987 and 1994 
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both in absolute terms and relative 
to full-time employment. This was 
especially true during the recession 
after 1990. 
In 1994, 157,% of all those in em-
ployment worked part-time as 
compared with 13% in 1987 and 
1372% in 1990. Much of the in-
crease, therefore, occurred during 
the recession years when the num-
ber of full-time workers fell. In 
1994, almost 31% of all female jobs 
in the Union were part-time, up 
from 28% in 1987 and 1990. Though 
part-time working is significantly 
less important among men, it, 
nevertheless, increased at much the 
same rate as for women between 
these two years to reach almost 5% 
of total male employment by 1994 
(Graph 42). 
Between 1987 and 1994, Greece 
was the only Member State to ex-
perience, for both men and women, 
a fall in the number of part-time 
jobs relative to full-time. There was, 
however, also a decline in the 
relative number of men working 
part-time in Italy and Luxembourg 
and a more substantial reduction in 
the number of women working part-
time in Denmark. The latter is 
significant given the high propor-
tion of women employed part-time 
and indicates perhaps that the 
trend towards part-time working 
may have some limit. Apart from in 
Greece and Denmark, the import-
ance of part-time employment 
among women increased throug-
hout the Union. 
Despite its widespread growth, 
part-time working remains a much 
more pronounced feature of North-
ern Member States than in the 
South, where in 1994 it accounted 
for only between 8% (Greece) and 
15% (Spain) of female employment. 
Part-time working among both men 
and women is particularly high in 
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Denmark, where 34V2% of women in 
employment were in part-time jobs 
in 1994 (though the figures is tend-
ing to fall rapidly), Sweden where 
the figure was 41%, the UK where 
it was 4472% and the Netherlands, 
where 66% of women and 16% for 
men worked part-time, much more 
than anywhere else in the Union. 
1987 to 1990 
Between 1987 and 1990, part-time 
working grew by 3% a year, ac-
counting for over a fifth of the total 
increase in employment over the 
period as a whole. Over the same 
period, full-time employment in-
creased by under 172% a year. 
The largest growth in part-time 
working occurred in Germany (over 
97c a year), Ireland (5V2% a year), 
Belgium and the Netherlands 
(both around 57c a year). In both 
Germany and the Netherlands, 
more part-time jobs were created 
than full-time and these were 
responsible for around two-thirds 
of the total increase in employment. 
While the increase in the Nether-
lands was in relation to an initial 
position where part-time working 
was already high, accounting for 
30% of total employment, in 
Germany, it accounted for only 13% 
of total employment in 1987, no 
higher than the Union average. 
Women filled 95% of the additional 
part-time jobs created between 
1987 and 1990 and one third of all 
the extra jobs taken by women were 
part-time. In contrast, 98% of the 
increased number of jobs for men 
over this period were full-time 
(Graph 43). In Greece, Spain, Italy 
and Finland, the number of 
men working part-time fell. Never-
theless, in three countries, in 
particular, the importance of part-
time working among men rose 
significantly. In Germany, the 
proportion working part-time in-
creased from 2% to almost 372% 
over the period and 23% of the net 
addition to jobs for men were part-
time. In the Netherlands, 47% of the 
net addition to jobs were part-time. 
In Denmark and Austria, the num-
ber of full-time jobs fell by 2% over 
the period while part-time jobs 
increased. 
By contrast, for women in Denmark 
and Finland, the reduction in part-
time jobs more than outweighed the 
expansion of full-time ones and 
employment overall declined. 
Part-time employment of women 
also declined in Greece, Italy 
and Sweden, while in each case 
the number of full-time jobs 
for women expanded. In Spain, 
Luxembourg, Portugal and the UK, 
though part-time employment of 
women rose over the period, the 
proportion employed part-time 
declined. 
On the other hand, the growth of 
part-time employment of women, as 
for men, was especially marked in 
Germany and the Netherlands — in 
the former case accounting for 83% 
of all new jobs created and in the 
latter for 75%. Elsewhere, the 
growth of part-time jobs was 
responsible for some 45% of the 
total increase in employment of 
women in Belgium and Ireland and 
for around a third of the increase in 
France and Austria, all countries 
where the proportion of women 
working part-time was below the 
Union average. 
1990 to 1994 
In the subsequent four years of re-
cession, the growth of part-time 
employment was fairly general 
across Member States. While the 
total number in employment fell by 
almost 3% in the Union as a whole, 
the number of part-time jobs 
43 Contribution of change in part-time and full-time 
working to total employment in Member States, 1987-90 
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increased by some 13%, in itself ad-
ding 2% to total employment and 
partly compensating for the decline 
in full-time jobs of 5%. In every 
Member State, with the exception of 
Luxembourg, the Netherlands and 
Austria, the number of people work-
ing full-time declined between 
these two years, while in all, except 
Denmark and Sweden, the numbers 
working part-time expanded. 
Growth of part-time working was 
common to both men and women. 
For men, whereas full-time employ-
ment declined by 57·.%, part-time 
jobs increased by 21% and the num-
ber of men working part-time 
expanded in every Member State 
except Denmark and Luxembourg. 
In all but four countries, Greece, 
Luxembourg, the Netherlands and 
Austria, this growth took place in 
the context of significant falls — of 
up to 10% in Spain and Portugal — 
in full-time working. In five 
Member States — Germany, 
Greece, Spain, France and Ireland 
— part-time employment of men 
increased by more than a third over 
the period as a whole, in another 
three — Belgium, Portugal and the 
UK — by more than a quarter. 
Although the proportion of men 
working part-time was very small, 
therefore, it was nevertheless a sig-
nificant source of job growth during 
these four years (Graph 44). 
In the case of women, total employ-
ment declined marginally between 
1990 and 1994 in the Union as a 
whole. Whereas the numbers em-
ployed full-time declined by 372%, 
the number in part-time jobs went 
up by 11%. Apart from in Denmark 
Sweden and Finland (where it re-
mained broadly unchanged), the 
number of part-time jobs expanded 
in every country, in many cases off-
setting to a major extent the fall in 
full-time working. Indeed, in 
44 Contribution of change in part-time and full-time 
working to total employment in Member States, 
1990-94 
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France, the Netherlands and 
Portugal, the increase was suffi-
ciently large more than to 
compensate for the loss in full-time 
jobs. 
In general, therefore, the growth of 
part-time working contributed to a 
major extent to maintaining levels 
of employment in the Union after 
1990, or in a number of cases, to 
preventing it from falling even fur-
ther. Unlike in previous periods, the 
number of part-time jobs for men 
increased significantly virtually 
throughout the Union. Because of 
the greater numbers involved, how-
ever, the expansion of part-time 
jobs was a particularly important 
factor in maintaining the growth of 
employment for women. 
Temporary versus 
permanent jobs 
Although temporary jobs in the 
Union account for only around 10%· 
of total employment, they have been 
an important source of employment 
growth. This was especially the case 
during the period 1987 to 1990, 
which saw significant increases in a 
number of Member States, notably 
Spain. 
Nevertheless, data on temporary 
working needs to be interpreted 
with caution (see Annex). To a sig-
nificant extent, variations in its 
importance across the Union, and 
indeed over time, tend to reflect dif-
ferences in regulations governing 
employment and in economic char-
acteristics. Temporary working is 
likely to be more prevalent in coun-
tries where agriculture remains an 
important source of employment be-
cause ofthe larger scale ofseasonal 
work, as well as in countries where 
there are more restrictions and 
higher costs on the dismissal of per-
manent staff (or, more precisely, 
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those who have no determinate date 
on their contract of employment). 
Since permanent staff, defined in 
this sense, may be subject to dis-
missal at relatively short notice, the 
fact that a particular country may 
have only a relatively large number 
of employees working on temporary 
contracts does not necessarily sig-
nify that employment is less secure 
and certain than elsewhere. This 
needs to be borne in mind when 
interpreting the results of the fol-
lowing analysis. 
In 1994, temporary jobs, here 
defined to include those on fixed-
term contracts of whatever 
duration as well as seasonal and 
other temporary workers, ac-
counted for only around 11% of the 
total number of employees in the 
Union, around 10% of men and 12% 
of women. These proportions 
ranged from 31% of men and 38% of 
women in Spain, much higher than 
elsewhere, to 6% or less of men and 
under 10% of women in Belgium, 
Luxembourg, Italy and the UK, 
countries with very different em-
ployment legislation. Apart from 
the latter four countries and Spain, 
the scale of temporary employment 
did not diverge very far from the 
Union average in 1994 in any of the 
Member States (Graph 45). 
Between 1987 and 1994, the share 
of temporary jobs in the total in-
creased by aroun 1 percentage point 
across the Union as a whole. In 
many Member States, however, 
there was no change or a reduction. 
Most of the growth occurred in 
Spain, where, because of institu-
tional changes, the share of 
temporary working doubled in the 
space of just three years between 
1987 and 1990 to reach 30% of total 
employment. By 1994 the share had 
risen further to 337c. The only other 
Member States to register a signifi-
cant growth over the period were 
France and Finland, the proportion 
of employees in temporary posts ris-
ing from under 8% in 1987 to almost 
11% in 1994 in the former and from 
11% to 13% in the latter. By con-
trast, in Germany, Portugal and 
Greece, the proportion of employees 
in temporary work fell by around a 
third. 
1987 to 1990 
The substantial expansion of tem-
porary working in Spain has been 
by far the major factor underlying 
the growth in temporary jobs in the 
Union over the past decade or so. 
Indeed this expansion accounted for 
three-quarters of the overall in-
crease in temporary employment in 
the Union between 1987 and 1990. 
The influence of Spain, therefore — 
and to a much lesser extent, the 
growth in France — resulted in 
temporary working accounting for 
a third of the total increase in 
employment across the Union 
between 1987 and 1990. For men, 
almost 40% of the net addition to 
jobs were temporary ones. 
Growth of temporary working was 
responsible for more than all of the 
large increase in employment in 
Spain over this period. While the 
number of permanent jobs declined, 
the growth in temporary jobs added 
around 12% to the total number in 
work (Graph 46). In France, expan-
sion in temporary employment 
accounted for over 90% of the net 
addition to jobs between these two 
years, while in Portugal a third of 
all new jobs were temporary. In 
Finland, moreover, wheras tempor-
ary working among men declined, it 
rose among women, more than af-
fecting the fall in permanent jobs. 
Apart from these three countries, 
however, the creation of temporary 
jobs contributed very little to the 
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46 Contribution of change in temporary and permanent 
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overall increase in employment 
over the period. In Denmark, the 
Netherlands, Sweden and the UK. 
the number of (men and women) 
employees in temporary posts 
declined. In the latter three cases, 
this fall was accompanied by a 
marked expansion in the number of 
people in jobs with normal con-
tracts. 
1990 to 1994 
Between 1990 and 1994, while the 
number of employees in permanent 
jobs in the Union fell by 4%, 
the number in temporary jobs 
declined by 1%. This, however, 
conceals marked differences be-
tween Member States. In Spain and 
France, the two countries to experi-
ence the largest expansion of 
temporary working in the growth 
years, as well as in Denmark, Italy, 
and the UK (where it had fallen or 
remained unchanged in the preced-
ing years), the number of temporary 
jobs increased over this period, 
whereas the number of permanent 
jobs declined, in Spain, Italy and 
the UK, significantly (Graph 47). 
In Ireland and the Netherlands, the 
number of employees in temporary 
work also increased, in each case by 
proportionately more than the 
growth of employment as a whole. 
In the former, the rise in temporary 
jobs accounted for a third of the 
overall increase in employment, in 
the latter, 45%. In the other seven 
Member States, the number of em-
ployees in temporary jobs declined 
between 1990 and 1994 — in Greece 
and Portugal, substantially so — 
except in Sweden, where it re-
mained unchanged. The pattern of 
change across countries was similar 
for men and women, apart from in 
Finland and Sweden, in both of 
which the number of men in tem-
porary jobs increased, while the 
number of women fell. 
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Part-time in preference 
to full-time jobs 
For employers, part-time employ­
ment may offer increased flexibility 
in adjusting the work force to vari­
ations in demand, whether over the 
working week or day, or even over 
the cycle, while at the same time 
increasing the utilisation of 
premises and equipment. Equally, 
there may be a genuine demand for 
such types of job among sections of 
the work force, in that it gives 
women — or men — greater oppor­
tunity for reconciling family 
responsibilities or other activities 
with work. 
Data collected as part of the Com­
munity Labour Force Survey 
(which exclude the three new Mem­
ber States) shows that, on average, 
six out of ten part-time workers in 
the Union in 1994 stated that they 
took a part-time job because they 
did not want a full-time one. This 
figure, however, conceals a consid­
erable difference between men and 
women. While two-thirds of women 
working part-time did not want a 
full-time job, this was the case for 
only a third of men (Graph 48). In 
both the Netherlands and the UK — 
where part-time working is more 
prevalent than elsewhere in the 
Union — four out of five women 
employed part-time did not want a 
full-time job. In France as well as in 
the Netherlands again, around half 
(51% and 46%) of all men employed 
part-time preferred this to being in 
full-time employment. 
Other answers tend to confirm 
these findings. Over one in four men 
employed part-time in the Union 
stated that they had taken this type 
of work because they could not find 
a full-time job. For women, the pro­
portion was less than one in six. 
However, as many as 55% of men 
working part-time in Ireland stated 
that they did so mainly because 
they could not find a full-time job, 
while in Greece the proportion was 
53%, in France 49% and in Italy 
44%. 
New areas 
of job growth 
Although there was a significant de­
cline in employment in the Union 
between 1990 and 1994, there was, 
nevertheless, a number of sectors in 
which jobs expanded. In ten sectors 
of activity which it is possible to dis­
tinguish from the data available and 
which together accounted for around 
47% of the total employed in the 
Union in 1994, the numbers em­
ployed increased over this period 
(Graph 49; the sectors listed in the 
graph are described in more detail in 
the Annex as are the data used). In 
another 25 sectors, however, 
including most of manufacturing 
industry, agriculture and coal and 
other mining, employment declined, 
in many cases, significantly (in coal 
and metal ore mining, jobs were lost 
at the rate of around 15% a year, in 
office machinery and chemicals, by 
over 12% a year). Moreover, many of 
these sectors were ones which ex­
perienced a significant growth in 
jobs in the period between 1985 and 
1990 (office machinery, mechanical 
and electrical engineering and motor 
vehicles). They also include four ser­
vice sectors — land and water 
transport, air transport, wholesale 
and retail distribution and insur­
ance — three of which (all except the 
first) also registered an increase in 
employment in the earlier period. 
The highest rate of job growth since 
1990 has been in business services 
and computer-related activities 
where employment increased by 7% 
a year between 1990 and 1994, much 
48 Reasons for taking a part-time job in the Union, 1994 
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the same as in the preceding five 
years. Significant employment 
growth also occured in instrument 
engineering and the collection, puri-
fication and distribution of water, 
the only two sectors where the num-
ber of jobs increased by more over 
this period than in the years before 
1990. Apart from these two indus-
tries, all of the other 8 sectors in 
which employment went up between 
1990 and 1994 were service acti-
vities, most of which recorded 
relatively high rates of job growth in 
the earlier period. 
Most of these sectors are ones involv-
ing either the provision of collective 
services, such as water, health care 
and sanitation, education and public 
administration and/or ones with a 
significant amount of central, re-
gional or local government 
involvement, such as l'ecreational 
services and post and telecommuni-
cations. 
mental sectors) are included, an ad-
ditional 500 thousand or more jobs — 
5-7'/,7c of the increase in employ-
ment in the Union (see Part III, 
Section 2 for more details). 
These sectors are included in those 
identified by the Commission's Local 
development and employment in-
itiatives (Com (95) 273, June 1995) 
as having significant future job 
growth potential as well as meeting 
local needs. They might also merit 
serious consideration of special sup-
port programmes at the Union level 




the work force 
Over the long-term in the Union 
there has been a gradual shift in the 
structure of occupations away from 
manual jobs, skilled as well as un-
skilled, towards non-manual jobs, 
especially those with a high skill 
content, requiring extensive educa-
tion and training. This shift has 
been particularly marked during 
periods of economic recession, when 
the demand for high level skills has 
usually continued to expand, while 
those with relatively few qualifica-
tions have both suffered job losses 
directly — especially those em-
ployed in industry — and have 
found it difficult to obtain alterna-
tive employment as competition on 
the labour market for scarce jobs 
has intensified (see Employment in 
Europe, 1994, Chapter 8, for an ana-
lysis of occuptaional shifts during 
the 1980s). 
The experience during the recent 
recession has been no different. In 
the two years 1992 to 1994 (the lon-
gest period for which comparable 
As described more fully later in this 
Report, many of the areas of job 
growth during the recession years 
and earlier were in environmental 
sectors, such as recycling and sew-
age and waste disposal as well as the 
water industry already mentioned. 
They include, in addition, part of 
the instrument engineering indus-
try (monitoring equipment and 
emission control devices, in particu-
lar), which was the only 
manufacturing sector to register an 
expansion of employment across the 
Union between 1990 and 1994. Be-
tween 1985 and 1992 (the last year 
for which comparable data are avail-
able for these sectors), the rate of net 
job creation averaged 3% a year, 
twice as much as in other sectors. 
This amounted to an extra 250 thou-
sand jobs in total over this period and 
if estimates of employment growth in 
nature conservation, national herit-
age preservation and parks and open 
spaces (the so-called soft environ-
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data are available because of the 
change in the system of classifying 
occupations), when the total num­
bers in work declined by 2% in the 
Union as a whole, the number of 
managers, professionals and tech­
nicians in employment expanded by 
372%. At the same time, the num­
bers employed in low skilled, 
manual jobs (in elementary occupa­
tions) and as agricultural or fishery 
workers fell by 10%. As a result, in 
just two years, the share of total 
employment accounted for by the 
higher skilled professions increased 
from just over 31% to 33%, with 
each of the categories, managers, 
professionals and technicians, 
showing an increase. 
The same tendencies are evident 
for both men and women, though 
in the case of women, there was also 
a significant growth in the relative 
numbers employed as service and 
sales workers over this period as well 
as in those employed in the higher 
skilled professions (Graph 50). 
The tendencies are also apparent in 
most Member States. Between 1992 
and 1994, all countries in the 
Union, apart from Denmark, ex­
perienced an expansion of the share 
of managers, professionals and 
technicians in total employment in 
respect both men and women (the 
figures for Denmark, moreover, 
involve some estimation to correct 
for the evident change in classifica­
tion of farmers and fishery workers 
between the two years and are, 
therefore, not entirely reliable) 
(Graph 51). 
At the same time, there was not 
only both a relative and absolute 
reduction in the number of men and 
women employed in basic manual 
occupations across the Union, the 
only exceptions being Greece and 
Portugal (where there are again 
certain problems about data com­
parability between the two years), 
but also a similar reduction in the 
numbers working in more skilled 
manual jobs (as craft and related 
workers and plant and machine 
operators). 
51 Change in employment among legistators, 
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Section 4 Unemployment trends in Member States 
As indicated above, the inroads 
made into reducing the number of 
people without work through the 
high rates of job creation between 
1985 and 1990 were nullified by 
the recent recession. Moreover, 
though the rate of unemployment 
in the Union appears to have 
peaked, the downward trend has so 
far not been significant. 
The focus here is on the groups 
which have been hit hardest by un-
employment in different parts of 
the Union. It considers, first, 
changes in total unemployment of 
men and women in the Member 
States, secondly, the problem of 
youth unemployment, thirdly, the 
problem of long-term unemploy-
ment, and, finally, the variations 
in unemployment between regions 
within Member States and the way 





In the period of economic recovery 
in the late-1980s, the rate of unem-
ployment of both men and women 
fell in every Member State, except 
Denmark, where it rose for both, 
and Greece, where the rate for 
women increased (Graph 52). In 
1987, 8% of the male labour force 
in the Union was unemployed and 
by 1990, the figure had fallen to 
just over 6%. For women, unem-
ployment declined over the same 
period from 12% to just under 10%. 
In Member States, in general, 
the rates for men and women fell 
to similar extents so that the gap 
between the two remained 
much the same, with proportion-
ately more women than men 
being unemployed except in the 
UK, Finland and Sweden. In 
Spain, however, unemployment 
among men declined by signifi-
cantly more than among women, 
by almost 6% of the labour force as 
opposed to under 4%, while in 
Belgium, the rate for women de-
clined by around 5% of the labour 
force, the rate for men by only 
around 3%. 
In the early 1990s, however, when 
unemployment began to rise again, 
men were much more affected than 
women. In all Member States ex-
cept for Denmark, where the two 
rose by much the same, the rate of 
male unemployment increased by 
more than that of women 
(Graph 53). In the Netherlands, un-
employment of women fell over this 
period, while for men it rose and in 
the UK, the rate for men increased 
from 7 V2% to just over 10%, while for 
women it remained virtually con-
stant. In Belgium (where women 
had benefited more than men from 
the fall in unemployment) and 
52 Unemployment rates of men and women in Member 
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Italy, the rate for men went up by 




by broad age group 
The greatest beneficiaries of the fall 
in unemployment between 1987 
and 1990 were young people under 
25, the number of whom in the 
Union fell by a third in the case of 
men and a quarter in the case of 
women. The decline was particu-
larly marked in the less developed 
countries (Spain, Ireland, Southern 
Italy and Portugal) where youth un-
employment was especially high 
(Graphs 54 and 55). 
In comparison, the decline in unem-
ployment among prime-age (25 to 
49) and older people (50 to 64) was 
less marked. In the case of both men 
and women, both age groups experi-
enced a fall in unemployment of 
under 2 percentage points. For 
women, in contrast to men, how-
ever, there were marked differences 
between Member States. While in 
Belgium, the Netherlands and the 
UK, there was a significant decline 
in the unemployment rate of women 
of 25 and over, in Denmark, Greece, 
Spain and Italy, the rate increased 
— in the latter two countries, des-
pite a fall in unemployment among 
women under 25. 
Just as young people gained most 
from the fall in unemployment in 
the late 1980s, they were more af-
fected by the increase that occurred 
from 1990 onwards. Although the 
rate for both men and women under 
25 increased, the rise was especially 
marked for men (Graphs 56 and 57). 
In Belgium, Spain, France, Finland 
and Sweden, the rise was more than 
10% of the labour force and in 
53 Unemployment rates of men and women in Member 
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Ireland and the UK, more than 5%. 
In the case of women under 25, only 
in Spain, France, Finland and 
Sweden, did the rate rise by more 
than 57c of the labour force, and in 
Denmark, the Netherlands and 
Austria there were falls. 
For those of 25 and over, in the 
Union as a whole men were affected 
much more than women by the 
rise in unemployment, but this was 
far from universal. In Denmark, 
Germany, Greece and Spain, the 
unemployment rate for women of 25 
and over went up by more than the 
rate for men, despite job losses 
being concentrated among the lat-
ter. On the other hand, in most of 
the other Member States, the rise in 
the rate for men was substantially 
greater than for women. Indeed, in 
the Netherlands, the rate for men 
increased while that for women fell. 
In general, the increase in unem-
ployment affected the 25 to 49 age 
group more than older people. In 
the case of men, the only exceptions 
were Greece and Portugal, where 
they were affected to the same ex-
tent, and Austria and Finland, in 
the case of women, the latter two 




by age group in 
the Member States 
At the Union level, the rate of un-
employment declines markedly 
with age, though it is relatively high 
for those between 50 and 59. Thus 
young people between the ages of 
15 and 24 who are members of the 
labour force are over three times 
more likely to be unemployed than 
someone in their late 40s, the age 
group which has the lowest rate of 
64 Section 4 Unemployment trends in Member States 
Change in unemployment rates by age group in Member States, 
1987-90 and 1990-94 
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unemployment. These, in turn, are 
half as likely to be unemployed as 
someone in their late 20s and 25% 
less likely to be employed as some-
one in their late 50s (Graph 58, 
which like the remaining graphs in 
this Section exclude the three new 
Member States for which data are 
not available). This pattern applies 
to both men and women, though for 
each age group, the rate of unem-
ployment among women is higher 
than for men, except in the case of 
those of 55 and over, where the rate 
for men is higher (Graph 59). 
This is a pattern, moreover, which 
has remained broadly unchanged 
over time, though in the recent re-
cession, those of 30 and over seem 
to have been affected more by the 
rise in unemployment than those 
under 30 and especially than those 
under 20. The pattern, however, 
and, therefore, the nature of the 
unemployment problem differ 
somewhat across the Union, in the 
sense that the age groups affected 
most are by no means the same in 
each Member State. While in the 
majority of Member States rates of 
youth unemployment are far higher 
than for those over 25 and unem-
ployment rates tend to decline with 
age, there are exceptions (Graphs 
60 to 70). 
In six Member States — Belgium, 
Spain, Greece, France, Italy and, to 
a lesser extent, Ireland — unem-
ployment rates, for both men and 
women are particularly high for 
young people under 25, with a rate 
as high as 609!: in Spain, and decline 
consistently with age. The main dif-
ference in rates is between those 
under 25 and those over. The same 
pattern holds for men and women, 
though, with the exception of the 20 
to 34 age group in Ireland, rates of 
unemployment among women ex-
ceeded those for men up to the age 
58 Unemployment rates by detailed age group in the 
Union, 1987, 1990 and 1994 
% labour force 
of 55, especially in the three South-
ern Member States. 
In the other five Member States 
— Denmark, Germany, the 
Netherlands, Portugal and the UK 
— youth unemployment rates are 
much lower, though a similar pat-
tern of differentials holds in that 
these rates are, nevertheless, signi-
ficantly higher than for older 
people. The exception is Germany, 
where there appears to be no spe-
cific youth unemployment problem 
as such. This apart, the main dif-
ference from the first group is that 
generally unemployment rates 
are relatively high for those in 
their 50s. This is particular so in 
Germany where unemployment 
among those of 55 and over is 
substantially higher than among 
younger age groups. The pattern, 
however, is less clear-cut in the 
Netherlands, where unemployment 
rates begin to rise from the age of 35 
upwards while in Denmark the rise 
begins at the age of 45. 
Overall, therefore, youth unemploy-
ment is a particular problem in the 
South of the Union as well as in 
Ireland, while unemployment 
among older age groups is a prob-
lem in the North. Though France 
and Belgium also have relatively 
high unemployment rates among 
young people, this partly reflects 
the very low levels of labour force 
participation of those under 25, and 
especially those under 20, in these 
two countries as described below. 
The numbers affected are, there-
fore, proportionately much lower 
than in the South. 
Youth unemployment 
The problem of youth unemploy-
ment is one of particular concern 
not only in itself but because of the 
potentially adverse consequences 
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Unemployment rates by age group in the Union, 1994 
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Unemployment rates by age group in the Union, 1994 
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for the future career prospects of 
large numbers of young people and 
the disillusion which could be 
generated at an early age. On the 
one hand, there is a concern that 
young people are leaving the educa-
tion system with insufficient 
qualifications, or at least ones 
which do not suitably match the 
demands of the labour market, on 
the other, that the labour market is 
failing to provide the work experi-
ence which may be of vital 
importance in their later careers. 
Across the Union as a whole youth 
unemployment rates in 1995 are 
much the same as they were in 1983 
(21%), despite efforts on the part of 
most Member States to tackle the 
problem. The average rate of youth 
unemployment remains over 272 
times higher than the average rate 
of those of 25 and over, much the 
same in the US and Japan. 
71 Unemployment rates of young people under 25 in 
Member States, 1985, 1990 and May 1995 
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Within the Union, in all Member 
States except for Denmark, the rate 
of unemployment of those under 25 
was higher in May 1995 than in 1990 
before the onset of recession. Never-
theless, in 8 of the 14 Member States 
for which data are available (there 
are no comparable data for Austria), 
the rate was lower than in the mid-
1980s (Graph 71). The exceptions 
were two Southern Member States 
— Greece and Italy — two of the new 
Member States — Finland and 
Sweden — and two countries in the 
centre of the Union — Belgium and 
France. These latter two are special 
cases because of the relatively small 
numbers involved, as shown below. 
In the other four countries, youth 
unemployment rose markedly in the 
early 1990s, especially in Finland 
and Sweden, where at the latest 
count the rate was three times as 
high as in the mid-1980s. 
Changes in youth unemployment 
rates, however, can only be properly 
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interpreted in the light of demo-
graphic trends and developments in 
participation rates. These are ex-
plored below. 
Demographic trends 
and participation rates 
As noted in an earlier section, the 
population of young people has 
tended to fall across the Union, espe-
cially in Northern Member States, 
while the participation of those 
under 25 in the labour force has 
declined. There are, however, im-
portant differences between 
teenagers, ie those under 20, and 
those aged 20 to 24. In particular, 
participation rates among the latter 
are much higher (averaging around 
65% in the Union) than for teenagers 
(averaging around 25%). Moreover, 
the variation in rates between Mem-
ber States — from 52% for women in 
Italy to 85% for men in the UK — is 
far less than among teenagers — 
from only 6% for women in Belgium 
to over 65% for men in Denmark 
(Graph 72 — there were no data for 
the three new Member States). 
For teenagers, in particular, par-
ticipation rates are relatively high 
in the Northern Member States, 
apart from Belgium and France 
where they are much lower than 
elsewhere, partly because of the 
higher school-leaving age and the 
more clear-cut demarcation be-
tween those in education and 
training and those in the labour 
force. Thus, whereas in other Mem-
ber States some proportion of those 
participating in education and 
training in this age group are also 
recorded as part of the labour force, 
in the sense that they spend part of 
their time working, in Belgium and 
France, very few are. 
This large variation in participation 
rates means that the teenage labour 
force in some countries — Belgium 
and France especially — is very 
small. A high unemployment rate 
among this group, therefore, can 
affect a relatively small number of 
people. This is demonstrated if 
teenage unemployment is 
measured not in the usual way as a 
proportion of the labour force, but 
rather as a proportion of the popu-
lation of teenagers. While almost a 
quarter (23%) of the teenage labour 
force was unemployed in the Union 
in 1994, this amounted to only 6% 
of the teenage population. Even in 
the Member State worst affected by 
teenage unemployment — Spain — 
unemployed teenagers accounted 
for only 12% of the age group as 
opposed to 52% of the teenage la-
bour force. In France and Belgium, 
one in three teenagers in the labour 
force were without work but only 
4% of the age group in France and 
under 3% in Belgium (Graph 73). 
Measuring teenage unemployment 
in this way produces a new ranking 
of Member States in terms of the 
scale of the problem. Although 
Spain remains the country with the 
most serious problem, the UK ap-
pears as having the second most 
serious, with 9% of teenagers unem-
ployed, while Belgium and France 
are ranked only behind Germany as 
the countries with the least serious 
problem in the Union. 
Unemployment rates of young 
people aged 20 to 24 are less liable 
to mislead since a higher proportion 
are economically active, as noted 
above. In 1994, 217;,% of the labour 
force in the Union in this age group 
were unemployed which repre-
sented 1472% of the total population 
of this age. In Spain, where the un-
employment rate was much higher 
73 Unemployed aged 15-19 in labour force and 
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than elsewhere, 27% of the age 
group were unemployed and in 
France, Ireland and Italy, over 16% 
(Graph 74). 
The problem of youth unemploy-
ment in the Union, therefore, seems 
far more serious for those in their 
early 20s than for those younger, 
who have tended to be the main 
target of policy. 
Participation in 
the labour force 
and in education 
and training 
From a policy perspective, it is 
important to clarify the extent 
to which both low rates of partici-
pation of young people in the labour 
force and their decline over time 
are related to increased numbers 
staying in education and training as 
opposed to high levels of genuine 
inactivity in its fullest sense. 
Over the period 1987 to 1994, activ-
ity rates for both teenagers and 
young people aged 20-24 fell signifi-
cantly across the Union, more during 
the later years of recession than in 
the earlier years of growth. In 1987, 
37% of teenagers were classed as 
being economically active — 28% 
employed and 9% unemployed 
(Graph 75). By 1990, the teenage 
participation rate had fallen to 34%, 
all of the fall being due to lower un-
employment, the proportion in work 
remaining the same. By 1994, the 
participation rate was down to 28%, 
largely reflecting a large fall in em-
ployment to only 22% of teenage 
population. The proportion unem-
ployed increased only very slightly. 
The fall in participation was general 
to all Member States except for the 
Netherlands, where it remained 
unchanged. Moreover, in most coun-
tries, the decline accelerated after 
1990. The biggest falls occurred in 
Portugal and France, where partici-
pation rates fell by 20 percentage 
points and 10 percentage points, 
respectively, though falls of almost 
10 percentage points were also 
recorded in Ireland and the UK. 
The pattern among those aged 
20-24 was similar, participation 
rates falling very slightly between 
1987 and 1990 — by 7, percentage 
point only — as a result of a drop in 
the proportion unemployed, 
coupled with a smaller increase in 
the proportion with jobs. Between 
1990 and 1994, participation rates 
fell sharply from 7372% to 67% as 
the proportion of young adults in 
employment declined from 62% to 
54% (Graph 76). 
Apart from in Greece, in all Member 
States participation rates were 
lower in 1994 than in 1987. How-
ever, in contrast to teenagers, 
participation rates increased 
slightly between 1987 and 1990 in 
five countries — Germany, Spain, 
Italy, Portugal and the UK — and 
employment rates more so, reflect-
ing perhaps the inducement effect 
of the increased chances of finding 
a job. In each of these countries, 
participation rates fell significantly 
between 1990 and 1994, as they did 
in a number of other Member States 
— in France from 71% to 62%. 
In 1994, 73% of teenagers in the 
Union were classified as economi-
cally inactive. The vast majority of 
these, 95%, however, were in full-
time education. In practice, the 
reduction in participation (ie rise in 
inactivity) since 1987 has been 
accompanied by an increase of 
equal proportions in the flows into 
75 Activity rates for teenagers aged 15-19 in Member 
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full-time education. In Greece, Spain 
and Portugal, where the proportion 
of the inactive in education or train-
ing had been relatively low, the flow 
into education exceeded the rise 
in inactivity. This was also the case 
in Belgium, Germany and the 
Netherlands, where the proportion 
of the inactive in education was 
already low. In Denmark, Ireland 
and the UK, however, the proportion 
of inactive young people in full-time 
education declined between these 
two years, especially after 1990 
(Graph 77). 
Despite the increases which have 
occurred in recent years, the hig-
hest rates of full inactivity among 
teenagers in 1994 were in the four 
Southern Member States, together 
with Denmark and the UK, where 
around 5% of the age group were 
neither in the labour force nor in 
education or training. In the North 
of the Union, these two countries 
apart, the proportion was 2% or 
less. 
Of greater concern, perhaps is the 
high proportion of young adults of 
20 and over who were neither work-
ing nor in education. While a third 
of the population aged 20 to 24 in 
the Union were classed as inactive 
in 1994, only 72% of these were in 
full-time education, so that almost 
one in ten of this age group were 
inactive in the fullest sense 
(Graph 78). 
In most Member States, participa-
tion in education or training of this 
age group rose between 1987 and 
1994 in line with the fall in partici-
pation in the labour force. In France 
and Portugal, in particular, it rose 
by much more. In contrast to the 
situation for teenagers, there were 
no marked differences between the 
South and the North of the Union in 
1994 in the rates of full inactivity, 
Greece and Italy apart, where the 
rates approached 15%. 
Long-term 
unemployment 
On past experience, a substantial 
proportion of the unemployed in the 
Union at present will remain out of 
work for a long period of time, at 
least a year or more and in many 
cases, longer. In 1994, around 48% 
of the unemployed had been out of 
work for at least a year, a proportion 
which has fallen only slightly over 
the past decade. Long-term unem-
ployment has a self-perpetuating 
character. For the employer, 
there is the psychological barrier of 
hiring someone who has not worked 
for some time and, therefore, has 
in some sense lost the habit. For 
the employee, there is the sense of 
disillusion and loss of confidence 
and motivation which results 
from vainly searching for a job for 
months or even years. 
The evidence indicates that in most 
countries it is the older people who 
become unemployed who are most 
at risk of long-term unemployment 
and this may significantly affect 
their decision to remain in the la-
bour force. In many cases, those on 
the verge of pensionable age may 
well be pushed into early retire-
ment if their chances of finding 
employment are poor. 
On average, men and women are 
affected to a similar degree by long-
term unemployment. In 1994, 47% 
of unemployed men in the Union 
and 50% of unemployed women had 
not worked for a year or more, while 
more than half of these (26% of men 
and 29%' of women) had not had a 
job for two years or more. Moreover, 
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9% of unemployed men and 10% 
of unemployed women had been 
out of work for at least four years 
(Graph 79 — there are no com-
parable data for Austria and 
Finland). 
Long-term unemployment bears 
little relationship to overall unem-
ployment rates. Belgium, the 
Netherlands and the UK all had 
below-average unemployment rates 
in 1994 yet — in the former espe-
cially for women, in the latter two, 
for men — relatively high propor-
tions of long-term unemployed (over 
50%). By contrast in Spain, which 
had by far the highest rates of total 
unemployment, the proportion who 
were long-term unemployed was no 
higher than the Union average, 
while in France with higher than 
average unemployment, the propor-
tion was one of the lowest in the 
Union. 
79 Incidence of long-term unemployment by duration 
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Not surprisingly, there is a close 
relationship between long-term un-
employment — where job seekers 
have not worked in a year — and 
very long-term unemployment — 
where they have not worked in two 
years. Hence 45% of unemployed 
men in 1994 in Ireland, where long-
term unemployment was higher 
than anywhere else in the Union, 
had been out of work for over two 
years compared with only 13% in 
Denmark where it was lower than 
anywhere else. The same is true by 
and large for those who have been 
out of work for four years or more, 
which was the case for 24% of un-
employed men in Ireland and 25% 
of unemployed women in Belgium, 
as against less than 1% of unem-
ployed women in Denmark. 
The implication is that, over the 
Union as a whole, one in two people 
who have been out of work for a year 
is likely to remain unemployed for 
at least another year and often 
80 Unemployment and long-term unemployment 
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longer, for men in Ireland, Italy, the 
UK and the Netherlands and 
women in Belgium, Italy and the 
Netherlands, two out of every three. 
This provides some indication of the 
relative failure of these Member 
States to integrate the long-term 
unemployed back into work. 
Changes in long-term 
unemployment 
1987 to 1994 
While the proportion of the jobless 
in the Union who are long-term un-
employed has declined slightly 
since the mid-1980s, there are 
somewhat different experiences be-
tween the Member States. During 
the period 1987 to 1990, when un-
employment fell in most Member 
States, so did the proportion of long-
term unemployed, though there 
were exceptions — notably Greece, 
Italy and the Netherlands — where 
falling unemployment was accom-
panied by an increase in the 
proportion out of work for a year or 
more. 
A degree of caution, however, is 
needed when interpreting these 
figures since the proportion of long-
term unemployed will tend to vary 
81 Long-term unemployment in the Union, 
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according to the state of the econ-
omic cycle. Thus during a recession 
when there are significant inflows 
of people into unemployment the 
share who are long-term unem-
ployed will inevitably decline 
because of the increasing propor-
tion who have newly lost their jobs. 
Conversely, during periods of econ-
omic upturn when there are less 
flows into unemployment, the pro-
portion will tend to increase. 
In terms of long-term unemploy-
ment rates (ie long-term 
unemployed as a percentage of the 
labour force), which give a better 
indication of developments than the 
figures for shares of the unem-
ployed, all countries experienced a 
reduction between 1987 and 1990 
apart from Greece and Denmark 
where the overall unemployment 
rate increased as well as the long-
term rate (Graph 80). 
In the period 1990 to 1994, as the 
overall rate of unemployment in-
creased in all Member States, the 
proportion of long-term unem-
ployed fell in Belgium, Germany, 
Italy, France and Ireland and rose 
in Greece, the UK, Spain and 
Luxembourg. In terms of long-term 
unemployment rates, however, 
apart from Ireland, where it re-
mained constant, and the 
Netherlands, all Member States 
registered an increase over this 
period and in 7 of the 12 Member 
States considered here the long-
term rate was higher in 1994 than 
it had been in 1987. The increase 
was particularly marked in 
Germany and Spain, in the former, 
partly reflecting the problem in the 
former East Germany, in the latter, 
the steep rise in total unemploy-
ment. 
Looking at the year-to-year changes 
in more detail, it is evident that as 
overall unemployment has fallen in 
the Union so has the rate of long-
term unemployment, though not 
necessarily the share of unem-
ployed who have been out of work 
for a year or more (Graph 81). By 
1994, the share of long-term unem-
ployed in total unemployment had 
reached the same level as in 1990. 
From past experience, it can be ex-
pected that this share will increase 
in 1995 and possibly 1996 unless 
there is a higher rate of net job 




by age group 
Long-term unemployment seems to 
have a disproportionate effect on 
older people than on younger 
people. Whereas 60% of the unem-
ployed aged between 55 and 64 had 
been unemployed for a year or more 
in the Union in 1994, and almost 
55% of the 50 to 54 year olds, the 
figure for those in the 20 to 24 age 
group was only around 43% 
(Graph 82). A similar tendency is 
apparent for the incidence of very 
long-term unemployment. On aver-
age 37% of the unemployed in the 
55 to 59 age group had been unem-
ployed in 1994 for two years or more 
as compared with 27% in the 25 to 
29 age group. 
Of the 10 Member States for which 
there are reliable data (ie excluding 
Denmark and Luxembourg where 
the numbers are very small), 8 dis-
played the same pattern of 
variation between age groups as the 
Union as a whole. Only in Greece 
and Italy was there a lower in-
cidence of long-term unemployment 
among those of 50 and over than 
among younger people. In all the 
other Member States, the propor-
tion of long-term unemployment 
in the total increases with age 
74-Section 4 Unemployment trends in Member States 
(Graph 83). This was especially the 
case in Belgium, Ireland and the 
Netherlands, where two out of three 
of the unemployed between the age 
of 50 and 64 had been out of work 
for at least a year. In every Member 
State — Greece and Italy included 
— the probability of being unem-
ployed for two years after already 
having been out of work for one year 
was higher in the older than 




The way that unemployment affects 
different regions across the Union is 
important not only in respect of 
economic and social cohesion but 
also in relation to labour market 
balance. The lack of job oppor-
tunities, however, is reflected not 
only in the unemployment figures 
but also in rates of participation in 
the labour force. The two, therefore, 
have to be considered together 
when assessing both the threat to 
cohesion and the need for jobs. 
Regional unemployment 
and participation rates 
In 1994, unemployment rates in 
the (NUTS 2) regions of the Union 
varied from a low of 3V2% in 
Luxembourg to a high of 35% in 
Andalucía (Southern Spain). In 22 
regions, the unemployment rate 
was above 18%. Most of these re-
gions were in Spain (16) and 
Southern Italy (4), areas with a his-
tory of high unemployment 
(Map Ml). Two of the new German 
Länder also had unemployment 
rates above 18%. 
By contrast, the 20 regions with the 
lowest unemployment rates were 
82 Incidence of long-term unemployment by age group 
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somewhat more scattered across 
the Union, in Luxembourg, 
Germany (12), Portugal (2), North-
ern Italy (1) and Greece (4), though 
in general, regions with lower than 
average rates tend to be in the 
central regions rather than the 
peripheral ones. 
The rate of participation (defined as 
active population in relation to popu-
lation aged 15 to 64) varies just as 
much between regions as unemploy-
ment, largely reflecting differences 
in the proportion of women in the 
work force. Moreover, the regions 
where it is low also tend to be those 
where unemployment is high. In 
1993, the lowest rate was 51% in 
Ceuta y Melilla (Spanish province in 
North Africa), the highest 867,% in 
Berlin. There were 17 regions in 
1993 with participation rates above 
75%, of these 7 were in the UK 8 
in Germany (including all the new 
Länder and Berlin), Denmark 
(counted as one region here) and 
Basse-Normandie (North-West 
France) (Map M2). Of the 20 regions 
with the lowest participation rates, 9 
were in Spain (7 of these also being 
among the 20 regions where unem-
ployment was highest) 8 in Italy (of 
which 4 were among the top 20 un-
employment regions), two in Greece 
and one in Belgium (Hainaut). 
Of the 20 regions with the highest 
unemployment rates, therefore, 15 
also had rates of participation in the 
bottom quarter of the distribution. 
The other five had participation 
rates which were only just above 
this, apart from the two new 
German Länder, where the partici-
pation rates were over 80%. In these 
regions (in Spain and Southern 
Italy), therefore, high unemploy-
ment is combined with low 
participation and the potential for a 
large rise in the labour force. Their 
need for job growth is, in other 
words, doubly pressing. 
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Of the 20 regions with the lowest 
unemployment rates, 16 had par-
ticipation rates above the Union 
average, 7 of these in the upper 
quarter of the distribution. The ma-
jority of regions with low 
unemployment rates, therefore, 
also have a high rate of partici-
pation, and accordingly a 
comparatively low potential for 
labour force growth and a lower 
need than elsewhere for a high rate 
of employment growth. In general, 
therefore, taking account of dis-
parities in participation serves to 
increase the apparent scale of the 
problem of employment imbalances 
across the Union. 
Changes in 
unemployment 
disparities in the Union 
There are clear signs that dis-
parities in regional unemployment 
rates across the Union as a whole 
tend to narrow during periods of 
economic growth and high rates of 
net job creation as occurred in the 
second half of the 1980s. There are 
equally clear signs that they tend to 
widen during periods of recession. 
Between 1990 and 1994, therefore, 
problem regions with the highest 
rates of unemployment suffered the 
largest increases in joblessness, so 
reversing the improvement in their 
relative position experienced over 
the preceding five years. 
However, these aggregate tenden-
cies for the Union as a whole conceal 
divergent trends within Member 
States. In particular, over recent 
years, there are equally clear signs 
that differences in rates of unem-
ployment between regions in the 
larger countries of the Union at 
least have tended to narrow rather 
than widen. The resolution of this 
apparent inconsistency — widening 
disparities in unemployment across 
the Union's regions and narrowing 
disparities within countries — lies 
in the fact that differences in aver-
age rates of unemployment between 
Member States have tended to 
widen significantly over the past 
few years, and especially during the 
recent recession. 
A statistical measure of the dis-
parity in unemployment rates (the 
standard deviation weighted by the 
labour force within each NUTS2 
region, excluding the new German 
Länder and the French Overseas 
Departments for which insufficient 
data are available) indicates that 
during the late 1980s, the disparity 
between Member States fell, 
though only marginally, from 4.1 in 
1985 to 3.3 in 1990 (Graph 84 — 
there are no data for the three new 
Member States). During this period 
of recovery, therefore, there was 
some convergence in unemploy-
ment rates between Member States 
— those with the highest rates ex-
perienced on average a larger 
decline than those with the lowest 
rates. For example, unemployment 
in Spain fell by 6 percentage points, 
from 22% to 16%, in Luxembourg, 
by l'/2 percentage points, from 3% to 
1V2%. 
However, by 1994, after three years 
of recession, the disparity between 
Member States was larger than it 
had been in 1985 (4.6 compared to 
4.1). The difference between the un-
employment rates in Spain and 
Luxembourg had risen from 1472 
percentage points to 20. The 
disparity between rates of unem-
ployment in (NUTS 2) regions, 
which is, of course higher than 
between Member States, rose from 
4.2 in 1983 to 5.1 in 1985 as unem-
ployment increased, declined only 
slightly to 4.9 in 1990 and then rose 
during the recession, but by less 




in the Member States 
In most Member States, regional 
disparities in unemployment seem 
to have narrowed over the recent 
past, though in a number of cases 
they remain wide. In Spain, the dif-
ference between the unemployment 
rate in the region where this was 
highest and in the region where it 
was lowest was over 19 percentage 
points in 1994, higher than in any 
other country. Nevertheless, it was 
lower than it had been in 1987 when 
the difference was over 23 percent-
age points (Graph 85). In the UK, 
the difference in 1994 was only 
8 percentage points, down substan-
tially from that in 1987 or 1990 
when it was 14 percentage points, 
as a result of unemployment declin-
ing in the worst affected regions and 
rising in regions with historically 
low rates. In Germany, where the 
addition of the new Länder widened 
disparities considerably (from 7 
percentage points to 15), in the for-
mer West Germany, the difference 
between the highest and lowest 
rates also narrowed, if by less than 
in the UK (by 172 percentage points 
between 1987 and 1994). 
Although in France there was 
no change in the gap between 
the highest and lowest regional 
unemployment rates over this 
period, the difference remaining at 
around 8 percentage points, this 
was in the context of a rise in 
national unemployment from 10V2% 
to 1272%. 
Of the larger countries, only Italy 
experienced a widening of dis-
parities between 1987 and 1994, the 
difference between the highest and 
lowest rates increasing from 16V2 
percentage points to rates to nearly 
19. 
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Despite this general narrowing of 
disparities, the areas affected by 
high unemployment and those enjo-
ying low rates have not changed 
much. The identity of the regions 
with the highest and lowest rates 
was in many cases the same in 1994 
as in 1987 and where it changed, the 
new region is usually located very 
close to the old one (typically in the 
same NUTS 1 area — the key in 
Graph 85 lists the regions with the 
highest and lowest unemployment 
rates). 
This narrowing of regional dif-
ferences in regional unemployment 
rates is confirmed by the statistical 
measure of disparity (though the 
there are some interesting dif-
ferences between the Member 
States as noted in the Annex to this 
Report, which also examines 
changes in unemployment rates by 
Structural Funds status). 
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These results indicate that there is 
no simple relationship between dis-
parities in regional unemployment 
and the national rate of unemploy-
ment in most of the larger Member 
States. The tendency for disparities 
to narrow during periods of falling 
unemployment and to widen when 
it increases, apparent at the Union 
level, no longer seems to hold in all 
Member States. From one perspec-
tive, this is encouraging, since it 
signifies that periods of increasing 
unemployment do not necessarily 
need to be associated with widening 
inequalities in job opportunities. 
From another, however, it raises an 
important question as to why dis-
parities between Member States 
widened during the recent 
recession. 
Β DK D E F I NL Ρ 
Left bar 1987. middle bar 1990, right bar 1994; no regional data for GR, IRL 
UK 
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Section 5  Developments in key features 
of the labour market 
Changes in labour 
costs relative to 
productivity 
The rate of growth of wages in any 
economy is important from a num-
ber of perspectives, not least from 
that of job creation. If average 
wages rise faster than the growth of 
value-added per person employed 
— or labour productivity — then 
this will tend to squeeze profits and 
the finance for investment as well 
as putting upward pressure on the 
rate of inflation. This will threaten 
employment both directly and indi-
rectly through the potential effect 
on cost competitiveness and trade 
performance. If alternatively, 
wages increase by less than produc-
tivity, then this will provide scope 
for the generation of more jobs 
whether in the short-term because 
firms can employ more people for a 
given sum or in the longer-term if 
the additional profits produced by 
higher productivity are invested in 
business expansion or are used to 
increase market share. 
Two points to note in this regard 
are, first, that wages are only one 
element of costs — other elements, 
such as raw materials or intermedi-
ate goods imported from abroad can 
equally affect profits and the scope 
for job creation, as can the beha-
viour of exchange rates which has 
been particularly volatile in recent 
years. Secondly, the key relation-
ship in the context of inflation is 
between changes in value-added 
per person and average labour costs 
(including the non-wage element) 
measured in relation to the average 
price of output rather than of con-
sumption which is the usual 
measure. What matters to a pro-
ducer, in other words, is how labour 
costs are rising relative to the price 
which is obtained for the product 
sold, since this will determine the 
profit margin, and not whether the 
wages paid to employees give them 
more or less purchasing power. This 
measure, normally termed the real 
product wage — though since it 
needs to be defined to include all 
labour costs, direct as well as indi-
rect, it is termed average real 
labour costs here — can behave very 
differently from the real wage as 
usually measured. 
Over the Union as a whole during 
the period of high employment 
growth between 1985 and 1990, 
labour productivity grew by just 
under 2% a year as already noted. 
This was the same rate of increase 
as average real wages as conven-
tionally measured but because 
output prices rose faster than con-
sumer prices, it was significantly 
higher than the rise in average real 
labour costs (under 1V2% a year) 
(Graph 86). Over this period, there-
fore, average real wages were able 
to rise by almost 27c a year and still 
provide scope for increases in the 
numbers employed. 
In 12 of the 15 Member States, 
labour productivity growth also 
exceeded the rise in average real 
labour costs over this period. The 
three exceptions were Luxembourg, 
Sweden and the UK, where in some 
degree the growth of average wages 
imposed a squeeze on profits. This, 
moreover, was also the case in the 
US, where real labour costs also 
rose by more than labour productiv-
ity. 
In the recession period from 1990 to 
1994, the growth of real wages in 
the Union fell to only 1% a year. 
Average real labour costs, however, 
because of output prices increasing 
by less than consumer prices, rose 
at much the same rate as in the 
preceding five years — just under 
1V2% a year — as did labour produc-
tivity, at just under 2% a year 
(Graph 87). This, therefore, left 
much the same scope for expanding 
the numbers in employment as in 
the earlier period, though this time, 
a rise in profit margins was not ac-
companied by any growth in 
employment. Indeed, the numbers 
in work fell. 
In this period, however, six Member 
States experienced higher growth 
in average real labour costs wage 
than in labour productivity — 
Luxembourg once more, Belgium, 
Denmark, the Netherlands, Austria 
and Portugal (though in the latter 
case, data problems make it hard to 
be sure). Real wages also went up 
by more than labour productivity in 
the US and Japan over this period 
despite the more employment-
intensive pattern of growth that 
79 Section 5 Developments in key features of the labour market 
86 Growth in labour productivity and real labour 
costs in Member States, US and Japan, 1985-90 
Annual change (%) 
Π Labour productivity 
■ Real labour costs 
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87 Growth in labour productivity and real labour 
costs in Member States, US and Japan, 1990-94 
Annual change (%) 
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both achieved as compared with 
Europe. In these two countries, 
therefore, an expansion in the num-
ber of jobs was accompanied by a 
fall in the share of profits in value-
added (see Annex for an analysis of 
changes in manufacturing and non-
manufacturing). 
Changes in 
the pattern of 
working time 
In many parts of the Union, the 
pattern of average hours worked a 
week has changed very little over 
the past ten years or so. In the ma-
jority of Member States, for men in 
particular, though in many cases 
also for women, there is a standard 
number of hours a week which most 
employees work, ranging from 
37 hours in Denmark to 40 hours in 
the Southern Member States, and 
this tends to alter only very grad-
ually over time. In most cases, 
therefore, the distribution of em-
ployees in terms of the number of 
hours worked a week was much the 
same in 1994 as in 1987 (there are 
no data available for the three new 
Member States). 
At the Union level, the most notable 
features over the period 1987 to 
1994 were, first, a small reduction 
in the proportion of both men and 
women in full-time employment 
working a standard 40 hour week 
and an increase in those working 
between 37 and 39 hours, with most 
of the change occurring before 1990 
(Graphs 88 and 89). This change, 
however, was by no means univer-
sal. It occurred predominantly in 
Denmark (from 39 hours in 1987 to 
38 hours in 1990 and 37 hours in 
1994), Germany (from 40 hours in 
1987 to 38 hours in 1990) and 
Ireland (from 40 hours in 1990 to 
39 hours in 1994). By contrast, in 
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Greece and the Netherlands, there 
was some increase in the proportion 
of men and women working 40 
hours a week and a reduction in 
those working 38 hours a week, 
especially after 1990, though in the 
Netherlands, this was coupled with 
growing numbers working under 
35 hours a week and in Greece, with 
a rise in the numbers working over 
45 hours a week. (The analysis here 
relates to those employed in indus-
try and services taken together and 
excludes agriculture where there 
are problems measuring hours of 
work on a comparable basis — see 
Annex for a more detailed analysis 
of changes over this period.) 
The second feature was a general 
expansion of the relative numbers 
of women in particular working 
part-time hours of between 10 and 
29 a week. Over the Union as a 
whole, the proportion of women 
working these hours increased from 
24% in 1987 to just over 26% in 1994 
(Graph 90). This is in line with the 
growth in part-time employment 
noted above, though the scale of 
the change is somewhat less, 
reflecting the rising numbers work-
ing 30 hours a week and over who 
regard themselves as part-time 
rather than full-time employees, 
especially in the Netherlands. The 
only Member State where such a 
growth did not occur between 1990 
and 1994 was Denmark, which 
stands out as the one country to 
experience not just a decline in the 
proportion of women working part-
time hours, but a substantial one 
(from 27'/,% in 1987 to 21V2% in 
1994). 
Almost all Member States also 
experienced a growth in the propor-
tion of men working part-time 
hours over the recession years 1990 
to 1994. The only country to experi-
ence a decline was the Netherlands 
(where the proportion fell from 7V2% 
88 Distribution of male employees in industry and 
services by hours usually worked in the Union, 
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to 5V2%), which conflicts with the 
data on part-time employment 
which show an increase (from 14V2% 
to 1572%). 
The third feature was an equally 
widespread growth in the relative 
numbers of men in particular nor-
mally working relatively long hours 
a week of 50 and over, especially over 
the period after 1990. This propor-
tion rose from an average of 8V2% in 
the Union in 1987 to over 972% in 
1994 (which may not seem large but 
amounts to an increase in numbers 
of 14% or around 700 thousand). 
Again the rise was widespread, with 
only the Netherlands showing any 
fall in relative numbers over this 
period. For women, there was rela-
tively little change in most Member 
States, the only countries experien-
cing a significant increase in the 
proportion with a normal working 
week of 50 hours or more being 
Greece, Portugal and the UK, coun-
tries where this was already high. 
Although the changes in working 
time have in most cases been com-
paratively small, the overall picture 
is one of a gradually declining uni-
formity and a very slow movement 
towards a smoother frequency 
distribution curve with the propor-
tion of men and women working a 
standard full-time number of hours 
a week tending to fall, the propor-
tion working part-time hours 
tending to rise and, in the case of 
men, the proportion usually work-
ing long hours also tending to go up. 
90 Share of women working part-time and part-time 
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Section 6  Short-term prospects for growth and 
employment 
The recovery of the Union economy 
became firmly established in 1994, 
output recovering by just under 3%. 
The renewed growth was driven by 
a strong pick-up in the world econ-
omy, a marked easing of monetary 
conditions within the Union and the 
achievement of higher productivity, 
improved competitiveness and 
better profitability by Union enter-
prises. As a result, the recovery has 
been led by strong export perfor-
mance and increased investment. 
The factors underpinning the re-
covery in 1994 are expected to 
continue to exert a positive in-
fluence in 1995 and 1996. However, 
the pace of economic growth is likely 
to be moderated by the exchange 
rate turbulence which led to large 
movements in intra-European 
exchange rates in early 1995, trig-
gered by pronounced weakening of 
the US dollar against the Deutsch-
mark. As a result, instead of the 
increased pace of expansion pre-
viously foreseen, economic growth 
in the Union is forecast to stabilise 
at around 3% a year in both 1995 
and 1996 (Graph 91). 
The main factors shaping the 
growth outlook are: 
• growth in the rest of the world 
is expected to slow down from 
its high rate in 1994, but Union 
export markets should still 
expand significantly. US 
growth is expected to regain 
momentum after weakening in 
the first half of 1995, Japanese 
imports to rise following the ap-
preciation of the Yen and Union 
export markets in South-East 
Asia, Eastern Europe and Latin 
America to continue growing 
rapidly; 
business and consumer con-
fidence in the EU weakened 
somewhat in early 1995, but is 
expected to remain consistent 
with healthy GDP growth; 
the exchange rates develop-
ments in early 1995 are likely 
to affect growth adversely espe-
cially in the countries where 
appreciation occurred, while in 
the depreciating countries the 
need to prevent higher inflation 
from becoming ingrained may 
offset any short-term boost to 
activity; 
changes in monetary policy 
partly may offset the effects of 
91 GDP, 1992-96 
Annual change (%) 
the exchange rate changes, 
short-term interest rates hav-
ing been reduced in Germany 
and increased in most deprecia-
ting countries. In the Union as 
a whole, monetary conditions 
remain supportive of economic 
growth continuing at its pres-
ent rate; 
• long-term interest rates fell sig-
nificantly in early 1995 
throughout the Union, thereby 
reversing much of the increase 
in rates which took place in 
1994. 
Recovery remains soundly based. 
Union exports are expected to con-
tinue increasing at a relatively high 
rate, though by less than in 1994 
(Graph 92), and investment to ex-
pand by some 6% a year in 1995 and 
1996 (Graph 93). The resulting ex-
pansion of productive capacity 
combined with only a moderate 
92 Exports, 1992-96 
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increase of private consumption 
growth to 2 and 272% in 1995 and 
1996, respectively (Graph 94), 
implies that, for the Union as a 
whole, capacity constraints are less 
likely to be encountered at an early 
stage of the recovery. Relatively low 
wage and price inflation, relatively 
high profitability, investment 
growth and labour availability are 
conducive to a prolonged period of 
robust, non-inflationary output 
growth so long as appropriate mac-
roeconomic policies and effective 
labour markets policies are fol-
lowed. 
Inflation 
Inflation appears to have reached 
a low point around the end of 
1994. However, no resurgence of 
inflationary pressure is expected 
in 1995 and 1996 and the rate of 
price increase is forecast to re-
main low at just over 3% a year, 
largely because wage increases 
are assumed to remain subdued 
(even though there were signs of 
acceleration in some Member 
States in early 1995) so keeping 
down the rise in unit labour costs 
despite increasing resource utilisa-
tion. 
Inflation rates across the Union, 
however, are likely to become more 
diverse in 1995. In 11 of the 15 
Member States inflation of 2-3%, or 
only slightly above, is expected, 
while it is expected to remain at 
472-5% in Italy, Spain and Portugal 
and at 9% in Greece (Graph 95). Any 
resurgence of wage and price infla-
tion could jeopardise the pace of 
recovery by forcing an early tighte-
ning of monetary policies. 
Public finances 
Over the Union as a whole, public 
deficits are expected to decline from 
572% of GDP in 1994 to just under 
4% in 1996, half the reduction being 
due to increased economic activity, 
half to tighter fiscal policies. The 
aggregate structural deficit of 
Member States taken together is 
estimated to remain high in 1995 
and 1996 and the projected reduc-
tion is only enough to stabilise 
government debt at 70% of Union 
GDP in 1995 and 1996. Fiscal con-
solidation efforts are, therefore, set 
to achieve a relatively small reduc-
tion in the structural deficit by 
1996, despite three years of output 
growth of around 3% a year. The 
forecast, however, is based on 
policies which were known in May 
1995, and additional tightening in 
Member States could produce a 
larger reduction. 
Given present policy, the general 
government deficit in 7 countries is 
expected to be at or below the refer-
ence value of 3% of GDP by 1996 
(Denmark, Germany, Ireland, 
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, 
Finland and the UK), while the ad-
ditional tightening in order to meet 
this value is equivalent to less than 
1% of GDP in three countries 
(France, Belgium and Austria). 
Fiscal deficits are projected to re-
main high in the remaining 
Member States, particularly in 




The uncertainties surrounding the 
forecast for 1995 and 1996 have 
been heightened by the currency 
turmoil of early 1995. There is a risk 
that loss of competitiveness in ap-
preciating countries may lead to a 
more pronounced reduction in busi-
ness confidence and dampen the 
growth in investment by more than 
93 Investment, 1992-96 
Annual change (%) 
94 Consumption, 1992-96 
Annual change (%) Forecast 
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expected. In depreciating countries, 
the risk of higher inflation and con-
sequent erosion in purchasing 
power along with expectations of 
tighter economic policies may re-
strain consumption by even more. 
In addition, a more pronounced 
slowdown in the US than antici-
pated could depress world growth 
and reduce Union exports. If these 
risks were to materialise, the out-
look for growth and employment 
would be less favourable, though 
any complete halt to recovery is 
unlikely. 
Employment 
The recovery in 1994 led to an ear-
lier rise in employment than 
previously expected. Fears of a 'job-
less' recovery do not appear well 
founded. In 1995 and 1996, growth 
in the Union is projected to lead to 
an increase in employment of 
around 1% a year, which corre-
sponds to the net addition of about 
3 million jobs over the two years, in 
line with past relationships. 
In 1995 as well as in 1996, employ-
ment is expected to rise in all 
Member States, with particularly 
strong rates of increase in 
Denmark, Spain, the Netherlands, 
Sweden, the UK and most espe-
cially in Luxembourg, Finland and 
Ireland (Graph 96). 
Unemployment 
Despite this growth of employment, 
a projected expansion in the labour 
force of some 1.4 million people over 
the two years (more than in the 
recent past, but less than in pre-
vious periods of recovery) means 
that unemployment in the Union 
will decline by only around 1.6 mil-
lion. Consequently, the rate is 
forecast to fall from 11% to an 
average of 10% in 1996, still unac-
ceptably high. 
Unemployment is forecast to fall in 
all Member States between 1994 
and 1996, the largest declines being 
expected in Finland, Denmark, 
Ireland, the UK, Spain and Sweden. 
Nevertheless, the rate is expected to 
remain well above 20% in Spain and 
above 10% in France, Finland, 
Ireland and Italy, though in 1996 
it should decline to below 8% in 
Germany and the UK (Graph 97). 
In Austria, Luxembourg, the 
Netherlands and Sweden, where 
unemployment is well below the 
Union average, the reduction is ex-
pected to be less than elsewhere. 
If the economic recovery were to 
continue at a similar rate in 1997, 
unemployment in the Union could 
be reduced by a further 1% of the 
labour force to around 9%. In order 
to reduce it significantly below this, 
strong and sustainable growth is 
necessary over the medium-term, 
combined with more effective 
labour market policies, which may 
need to be accompanied by signifi-
cant changes in systems of 
education and training and possible 
reform of labour market regula-
tions. 
96 Employment, 1992-96 
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Moreover, whether unemployment 
falls at the rate projected depends 
on future changes in the rate of 
labour force participation across the 
Union which are difficult to predict. 
As emphasised earlier, if a high rate 
of employment growth is sustained, 
then participation and the labour 
force could well increase by more 
than expected as more people are 
attracted onto the labour market. In 
this case, the fall in unemployment 
could be slower than forecast — or, 
more precisely, the fall in hidden 
unemployment could be greater, 
the fall in open unemployment 
smaller. 
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Essen Conclusions: "Improve employment opportunities 
for the labour force, by promoting investment in vocational 
training. To that end a key role falls to the acquisition of 
vocational qualifications, particularly by young people. 
As many people as possible must receive initial and further 
training which enables them through life-long learning to 
adapt to changes brought about by technological progress, 
in order to reduce the risk of losing their employment." 
The promotion of investment in vo-
cational training concerns the 
financial commitments made by all 
those involved — governments, 
enterprises, social partners and indi-
viduals — to increase the skill levels 
of the work force. However, it is also 
important to see investment in a 
wider sense of the use of financial 
and other resources to improve the 
quality of vocational training and the 
opportunities provided by diversi-
fying provision and making it more 
accessible. This section examines the 
development of training policies and 
action in Member States in the light 
of these various objectives drawing 
upon the information which they 
have provided, and which has been 
summarised and integrated into the 
education and training contribution 
to the 'Tableau de bord' (see Box). 
This analysis is centred around 
three main themes: 
• improving training systems in 
the Member States; 
• improving the employability of 
people; 
• developing new relations be-
tween training and work. 
Improving training 
systems to respond 
more effectively 
to needs 
Many Member States had already 
committed themselves to a process 
of reform of education and training 
systems before publication of the 
Commission White Paper, Growth, 
Competitiveness, Employment, with 
the specific aim of making training 
more responsive to differing geo-
graphical, occupational, sectoral 
and individual needs. 
This has led to training becoming 
more decentralised. In Belgium 
responsibility for the content of 
training has been devolved to the 
Flemish and French speaking com-
munities, while training itself is 
provided through organisations 
covering specific regions. In France, 
responsibility for the training of 
young people has been devolved to 
the regions. In Italy, the regions 
have responsibility for promoting 
and financing training in the con-
text of a national framework, while 
educational institutions have 
autonomy over management and 
teaching methods. In Denmark, 
vocational training colleges and 
local training committees have also 
been given greater autonomy in 
planning and delivery. In the UK, 
the implementation of national 
training policy has been devolved to 
a network of locally-based Training 
and Enterprise Councils (TECs), 
with the aim of tailoring provision 
to local needs. In Finland, where 
public authorities play an import-
ant role, initial training is provided 
mainly by vocational institutes and 
universities with particular em-
phasis on maintaining a high level 
of provision in quantitative and 
qualitative terms. In Sweden, basic 
vocational training, which is or-
ganised somewhat differently from 
elsewhere, takes place within the 
education system and local employ-
ment agencies are, in principle, free 
to purchase on the open market the 
training courses they consider best 
suited to the needs of the unem-
ployed. 
In many Member States — 
for example, Germany and the 
Netherlands — there is a long tradi-
tion of private sector involvement 
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in both initial training under 'dual-
system' arrangements and 
continuing training in respect of 
their employees. Nevertheless, in 
these countries and elsewhere, 
decentralisation and attempts to 
make training more relevant to 
changing labour market needs 
has been accomplished by greater 
emphasis on private sector involve-
ment in the implementation of 
policy and efforts to improve links 
between education and training 
and industry and commerce. There 
has also been a marked expansion 
in the training services provided by 
the private sector. For example, the 
TECs in the UK are led by private 
sector employers. In Spain, public 
authority training plans provide for 
cooperation with the private sector 
in the preparation and implementa-
tion of training measures. In 
Austria, the public sector has given 
up its monopoly over the provision 
of vocational training in the spe-
cialised higher education sector, 
while in Sweden, upper secondary 
schools are obliged to have contact 
with employers, since 15% of stu-
dent courses in the third year are 
carried out in the work-place. 
Training provision 
All Member States provide a wide 
range of training programmes and 
arrangements to meet the needs of 
the labour market and of individuals 
and to encourage life-long learning. 
In the context of tight control on pub-
lic expenditure and budgetary 
constraints, training continues to be 
afforded high priority. In Germany, 
for example, spending on training 
has increased in 1995 despite a 
reduction in total public expendi-
ture. There is, however, a clear trend 
towards rationalisation, improved 
coordination and better targeting of 
provision. In Sweden, the number of 
people in different forms of training 
within the education system will be 
higher in 1995 than ever before and, 
together with traditional labour 
market programmes, some 190 thou-
sand people on average will 
undertake a training course of some 
kind. 
All Member States have developed 
publicly-funded initial training 
programmes to help reduce unem-
ployment among young people. 
Provision for young people consists 
largely, on the one hand, of school-
based systems incorporating 
periods of work experience, as in 
France, Sweden, and Finland and, 
on the other, of work-based systems, 
as in Germany, the Netherlands 
and Denmark with periods of off-
the-job training in vocational 
schools or colleges. It also includes 
additional support for those with 
special needs to help integrate them 
into the labour market. 
Training provision for adults is char-
acterised by a wide range of systems. 
As for training of young people, the 
private sector plays a substantial 
role, both as investor and provider. 
Flexibility is given a high priority, 
though in all Member States the 
framework for provision is not as 
clearly defined or as systematised as 
for young people. A notable tendency 
is to give individuals greater respon-
sibility for identifying and meeting 
their own training needs. Publicly 
funded provision in all Members 
States is aimed at priority groups. In 
all cases, training programmes are 
provided for the unemployed, 
The tableau de bord 
This section is based upon information collected during the Commission's 
preparation of a 'Tableau de bord' (management chart) to provide an 
overview of Member State policies in the framework for employment 
(including the adaptation of education and training systems) agreed by 
the European Council at Brussels. 
Information on education and training was compiled and presented in 
close cooperation with the Directors-General for Vocational Training in 
the Member States and in consultation with the social partners. Member 
States provided contributions focusing on: 
• the development of vocational training policy (including strategic 
objectives, decision makers and quality); 
• ways in which they are promoting access to training and lifelong 
learning; 
• ways in which training is used to help people adapt to structural 
change; 
• vocational education and training and the transition to working life 
for young people. 
Additional information is taken from Member State reports on continuing 
training, the report on the implementation of the PETRA programme and 
Quality and Relevance — The Challenge to European Education 
(IRDAC). 
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particularly the long-term unem-
ployed, while enterprises are 
assumed to be responsible for train-
ing their own employees, most 
Member States provide publicly-
funded training for those in 
employment focused particularly on 
those threatened by unemployment 
because of industrial change and 
those at a disadvantage (eg low 
qualified workers, people with dis-
abilities and ethnic minorities). 
Other priorities reflect particular 
national concerns. In Ireland, there 
is public support for the training of 
managers and employees of com-
panies locating in Ireland. 
Management training is also a 
priority in Portugal. In Italy and in 
the new Länder in Germany, train-
ing support is provided for regional 
development, while in Luxembourg, 
there is a provision for professionally 
qualified workers who are unable to 
find a job to match their skills. In 
Denmark, greater flexibility has 
been introduced for target groups, 
including the possibility of cross-
sectoral training. 
The growing role of the private sector 
in the provision of vocational train-
ing is a notable feature across 
Europe. The increased need for new 
and sometimes more specialised 
skills, often resulting from the intro-
duction of new technology, has in 
many areas encouraged the private 
sector to develop its own training. In 
France, there are over 20,000 known 
private training providers and it is 
estimated that there are around 
60,000 in the Union as a whole, many 
of them small. Most larger com-
panies have departments dealing 
with human resources or contract 
out training to independent pro-
viders. 
As part of efforts to improve the effi-
ciency of training, there is a trend 
towards greater use of new techno-
logies and flexible forms of learning 
in both the public and private sector. 
Flexible forms of learning include 
multi-media material and open and 
distance learning, often combined 
with traditional methods. These en-
tail certain advantages such as a 
reduction in learning time, greater 
adaptability and increased access. 
In France and Luxembourg, for 
example, centres for research into 
the potential use of new technology 
in training have been set up. To 
widen accessibility, the UK has used 
television broadcasting of education 
material and lectures for many years 
in the form of the Open University. 
Some Member States are seeking 
to take advantage of innovation 
in training practice and delivery 
developed at both national and, 
through partnerships, European 
level. In France and the Nether-
lands, information campaigns and 
publicity material have been used to 
promote the use of innovative train-
ing techniques and to disseminate 
the use of good practice. In Austria 
'trainer circles' have been estab-
lished to encourage the exchange of 




The quality of vocational training 
programmes is another increasingly 
important concern. To ensure 
quality, national governments often 
require training providers to meet 
certain standards before they are 
allowed to give courses. Firms and 
individuals purchasing training ser-
vices, however, tend to have little 
guide to the quality of the training on 
offer, particularly of continuing 
training. Increasing effort is, there-
fore, being made to improve the 
transparency of the diverse market 
of training providers to introduce 
various quality standards and 
measures in a number of different 
ways. Systems of quality certifi-
cation are being used or developed in 
a number of Member States, includ-
ing Belgium, Denmark, France, 
Portugal and Greece. In Germany, 
Austria and the Netherlands there 
are statutory standards for conti-
nuing training provision. In Ireland, 
the Government is in the process of 
establishing TEASTAS — the Irish 
National Certification Authority — 
to be responsible for the develop-
ment, implementation, regulation 
and supervision of the certification 
of all non-university third level and 
all further and continuing educa-
tion and training programmes. 
TEASTAS will also provide a struc-
ture for the formal involvement of 
business and the social partners and 
will try to ensure that the needs of 
business for skilled personnel are 
met, in particular, by improving 
links with the education and train-
ing system. In addition, it will 
facilitate access to a structured sys-
tem of graded educational/training 
qualifications, allowing progression 
from basic levels to advanced degree 
level, in accordance with needs and 
abilities. In the UK, the focus is 
on the results of training pro-
grammes, rather than the way it 
is provided (see Box). In Finland, 
an evaluation system for training is 
being developed by the National 
Board of Education, to include self-
assessment of schools, outside 
evaluation and evaluation made 
within branches as well as a national 
set of indicators. The quality, relev-
ance and effectiveness of training are 
also being evaluated through a num-
ber of research programmes. 
Identifying future 
skill needs 
All Member States are affected by 
the changing nature of the labour 
market and the new skills it 
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requires. The trend is towards 
skilled jobs. Professional and techni-
cal occupations increased even 
during the recession years 1990 to 
1994, while jobs for production 
workers fell significantly. Job con-
tent is also changing as are the 
sources of employment. 
Member States are attempting to 
keep pace with this change. In a 
number of them, including 
Germany, France, the Netherlands, 
Austria, Sweden and the UK, there 
are regular revisions to job profiles 
and qualification content, often 
carried out in consultation with 
the social partners and employers 
organisations. 
towards the development of initial 
and continuing training pro-
grammes incorporating both the 
theory and application of new tech-
nology. In Finland, information 
technology is a compulsory element 
of vocational education and training. 
Similarly, a foundation course in in-
formation and communication 
technology is compulsory in all 
schools in Austria. In Ireland, under 
the Vocational Preparation Training 
Programme (VPTP), which provides 
integrated education, training and 
work experience to improve the em-
ployment prospects of young people 
who have completed compulsory 
schooling but whose skills are 
inadequate, there is an obligation on 
providers to include a 'new technol-
ogy' component. However, the 
importance of the Information 
Society and its impact on vocational 
training goes beyond meeting 
emerging skill needs. It also includes 
a need to ensure wide participation 
and to avoid exclusion which itself 
is dependent upon education and 
training. 
Raising the skill level 
of the work force 
In all Member States, there is 
recognition of the importance of 
Most Member States also make 
some efforts to forecast skill needs, 
seeking to improve the effectiveness 
of the resources allocated to training 
by concentrating on areas of need. A 
variety of methods are used often in 
combination, the most common 
being: vacancy analysis (in 
Belgium), analysis of the trends in 
qualifications (Denmark, the 
Netherlands, Portugal and Finland), 
labour market, sectoral and regional 
surveys (Germany, Greece, Spain, 
Sweden, the UK and Austria) and 
forecasting models (Ireland and 
some regions of Italy). In France, 
skill needs are monitored by a net-
work of training observatories, in 
Luxembourg, by the National 
Institute for the Development of 
Continuing Training. Despite the 
variety of means, there is a common 
view that current methods are not 
effective in forecasting change and 
there remains difficulty in anticipat-
ing skill needs in different sectors, 
especially given the pace of techno-
logical advance. 
The importance of keeping pace with 
new technology and the emergence 
of the Information Society is also 
recognised. There is a clear trend 
Ensuring quality in vocational training 
provision 
UK 
The UK approach is characterised by a focus on outputs. There has been 
considerable effort to develop standards of competence which are 
reflected in vocational qualifications and increasingly training is geared 
towards achieving these. Contracts for publicly-funded training provision 
specify that training should lead to a qualification, the Training and 
Enterprise Councils (TECs) acting as monitoring bodies. 
Portugal 
Quality is maintained through legal provisions and guidelines which set 
minimum standards. Work is underway to specify current needs in order 
to regulate the training market, with a view to introducing a certification 
system for vocational training provision. 
France 
The government has responsibility for the administration and financial 
management of training organisations. The Office professionnel de 
qualification des organismes de formation (OPQF) can issue an opinion 
on training providers following assessment of their organisational struc-
ture, the views of clients and the competence of the trainers. Standards 
are in the process of being prepared to establish a framework for defining 
occupations. The certificate of quality assurance (AFAQ), awarded to 
training providers, conforms with the international quality standard ISO 
9000 and encourages them to develop quality assurance systems enabling 
them to clarify their procedures and establish arrangements for ensuring 
quality. 
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improving the skills of the labour 
force as a whole. This is, in part, to 
increase the productive potential of 
the economy, in part, to widen indi-
vidual access to jobs. There is a 
clear link across the Union between 
someone's chances of being em-
ployed and their level of education. 
In 1994, around 11V2% of those in 
the labour force with only basic edu-
cation or less were unemployed — 
1072% of men, 1272% of women. For 
those with additional educational 
qualifications (who had completed 
an upper secondary education 
course), the average unemployment 
rate was reduced to 8% — just 
under 7% of men and 10% of women 
— and for those with university 
education or the equivalent (third 
level education), to 5V2% — 4V2% of 
men, just under 7% of women 
(Graphs 98 and 99). This relation-
ship holds for almost all Member 
States, the main exception being 
Greece, where unemployment was 
higher among men who had com-
pleted a university or equivalent 
course. The extent of the difference 
in rates between those with differ-
ent educational attainment levels, 
however, varies somewhat across 
the Union. For men, it is particu-
larly wide for Ireland, the UK and 
Germany; for women, for Ireland, 
Belgium and Denmark. 
At Essen, the European Council 
pointed to the key role of vocational 
qualifications in improving em-
ployment opportunities. It is 
increasingly clear, that though 
higher qualifications are not a 
guarantee of employment, since 
the poorly qualified are more prone 
to unemployment, access to train-
ing and qualifications are of key 
importance. 
Access to training 
A combination of factors has led to a 
growing emphasis on the importance 
of continuing training throughout 
the Union. Demographic trends 
mean that fewer young people are 
entering the labour market each 
year so that the skills of the existing 
work force need to be adapted and 
improved. Moreover, the impact of 
technological change upon job con-
tent and work organisation requires 
the ongoing adaptation of skills to 
meet new and ever more pressing 
needs. However, despite the growing 
requirement for on-going continuing 
education and training, systems in 
the Member States remain centred 
upon the provision of an initial block 
of learning to qualify in a trade, craft 
or profession. Nevertheless, steps 
have been taken in Member States 
to promote continuing education and 
training. 
The principle of access to training 
throughout a person's working life is 
accepted in all Member States who 
have introduced a range of measures 
to promote it. Some have legal entit-
lement to paid training leave, with 
take-up being determined most often 
at the level of the firm. For example, 
in Belgium, there are arrangements 
for paid study leave for approved 
general or vocational education for 
workers under 40, the cost to the 
employer being covered (fully or 
partly) by public funds. Most of the 
German Länder have laws providing 
for around 5 days educational leave, 
implemented through collective 
agreements. In Denmark, up to one 
year can be taken on approved adult 
education or vocational training 
courses. The trainee receives an 
allowance — which can be supple-
mented by the employer — and 
under job rotation arrangements, 
the worker can be temporarily 
replaced by someone who is unem-
ployed. In Portugal, Finland, 
98 Unemployment rates of men aged 25-59 by 
education level, 1994 
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Sweden and France, employees are 
entitled to training leave (in France 
training credits are being developed 
to provide entitlement to time off for 
off-the-job training). In Greece, 
Luxembourg, the Netherlands and 
Italy, entitlement to training leave 
— paid and unpaid — tends to be 
decided through collective agree-
ments between the social partners, 
again with implementation at the 
enterprise level. In Ireland and the 
UK, access to training is a matter of 
negotiation and voluntary agree-
ment between employers and 
employees. 
In addition to providing allowances 
to the unemployed who participate 
in government training pro-
grammes, Member States have a 
variety of financial incentives to 
facilitate access to and encourage 
take up of training. Tax relief on 
expenditure by individuals for train-
ing in specific occupations or leading 
to recognised qualifications is avail-
able in Belgium, Greece, France and 
the UK, where a system of subsi-
dised loans for education and 
training linked to career develop-
ment has also been introduced. A 
range of measures are also in place 
to encourage investment by enter-
prises. The UK has initiatives to 
assist small and medium-sized en-
terprises develop the skills of their 
work force and integrate training 
into company business plans, and to 
promote the message that good 
training practice pays. In France, tax 
relief is available to enterprises for 
certain types of training expendi-
ture, while in Greece, Spain, Ireland 
and Portugal, there are public funds 
to help firms implement training 
plans. 
Training levies on such expenditure 
is financed by company wage bills in 
a number of Member States. In 
Belgium, there is a compulsory levy 
of 0.1% of the total salary bill to 
finance unemployment support 
measures and a further 0.15% (to be 
increased to 0.2% in 1996) for train-
ing of groups at risk. In Greece, the 
levy which funds general training 
programmes is to be increased from 
0.25% of the salary bill to 0.45%. In 
France, firms are obliged to invest at 
least 1.5% of their salary bill in train-
ing (0.15% for companies with less 
than 10 employees). In Ireland, the 
levy varies from 0.25% to 1.25% of 
the salary bill according to sector. 
However, the effect of the extensive 
provision in Member States is diffi-
cult to assess. The data available on 
continuing education and training 
are not standardised, with training 
being defined in different ways in 
different countries — in some coun-
tries, for example, workers' salaries 
are included as a training cost, in 
others not. These difficulties have to 
be borne in mind when interpreting 
figures on participation in job-
related continuing education and 
training, defined as all organised 
systematic activities in which people 
take part to obtain new skills for a 
current or future job, increase earn-
ings or generally improve their 
opportunities for advancement 
(Graph 100, which is based on LFS 
data, shows those receiving training 
in 1993 in the four weeks immedi-
ately prior to the survey). 
Despite the desire in Member States 
to improve the skills of the work force 
as a whole, evidence suggests that 
participation in job-related conti-
nuing training is closely linked to the 
previous level of educational attain-
ment, which implies that the focus is 
on those who already have skills to 
continue to develop their ability. By 
the same token, those least qualified 
and so most vulnerable in the labour 
market are least likely to receive 
training. There is also concern about 
access to continuing education and 
100 Proportion of employed aged 25 and over receiving 
vocational training in Member States, 1993 
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training for other sections of the 
labour force, notably women and 
those working in SMEs. 
Equal opportunities 
for women 
In most European countries, 
women generally attain an equally 
high level of education as men, but 
in a more limited range of subjects. 
Moreover, proportionally more 
women are employed in low-skill 
occupations, in fewer sectors and 
occupy a minority of managerial 
and supervisory jobs. This is true of 
all Member States. Existing precon-
ceptions remain a barrier to access 
to training opportunities for 
women, though often they choose 
not to enter certain professions, 
such as engineering. Women also 
are more likely to face the problem 
of combining training and family 
responsibilities. 
The growing importance of women in 
the labour force is widely recognised 
and a number of initiatives have 
been taken in Member States to pro-
mote access to training for women 
and to tailor provision to meet their 
needs. Many involve positive action, 
such as specific courses for women in 
occupations or sectors traditionally 
occupied by men, including manage-
ment. There is also a focus on 
guidance and support for women 
returning to the labour market after 
a period of absence (see Box). 
Small and medium sized 
enterprises 
SMEs account for 70% of Union em-
ployment in the private sector and 
Promoting access to training for women 
In all Member States, a small minority of engineers are women. In 
Ireland, the figure is only 4%. Studies to identify the reasons for this have 
highlighted the stereotypes already present in initial training, with more 
emphasis being placed on science subjects for boys than for girls and with 
engineering being seen as a 'dirty job' and 'not for girls'. Yet the results 
of girls in science at school match those of boys. 
The Dublin Institute of Technology in Ireland, for example, has launched 
two initiatives to stimulate women's interest in engineering, one a two-
week summer course for young girls at secondary school, to inform them 
about the engineering profession, the other to provide part-time scientific 
training to young women under 25, who have completed secondary 
education with insufficient grades in science subjects to enter the 
Institute of Technology. Successful completion of this course qualifies 
them for the first year of engineering studies. 
A savings bank in Denmark in which 57% of staff were women, but only 
5% of whom held serious managerial posts as against 93% who were 
secretaries, introduced in the recent past training courses for women 
wanting to become managers. The aim was to overcome perceptions of 
career advancement being an 'all or nothing process' and to help women 
define a long-term career plan, combining the company's needs with their 
personal circumstances. In a few years, the number of women managers 
has increased to 20%. 
are the principal job creators, being 
responsible for an estimated 80% of 
jobs generated in the private sector 
over the past decade. In addition, an 
increasing number of larger firms 
are reorganising into SME-type 
structures, to become more flexible 
and respond more rapidly to the 
market. However, SMEs face a num-
ber of barriers as regards investment 
in training. Some, such as a lack of 
finance and skills are familiar, but 
SMEs often also have difficulty in 
quantifying their skill needs. As a 
result, they can be reluctant to invest 
in training except where there is an 
immediate business problem or be-
cause there is a legal requirement. 
To address these problems, some 
Member States, including Belgium, 
France, Ireland and Portugal, 
include those working in SMEs 
among priority groups for receipt of 
publicly-funded training provision. 
In Spain, public funds are available 
to groups of SMEs for the 
implementation of joint training 
plans. In Finland, training for 
workers in SMEs is supported by 
labour market programmes. In 
addition, in many other Member 
States, regional and local organisa-
tions such as Chambers of 
Commerce, have policies which in-
clude the promotion of training 
opportunities to develop SMEs. 
New routes to 
qualifications 
As well as widening and promoting 
the take up of training provision, 
some Member States, such as 
France, Austria, Finland and the 
UK have developed new ways of rec-
ognising and validating informal 
training and/or work experience (see 
Box). Systems of accumulating 
credits that can lead to a formal 
qualification are also being intro-
duced in Italy. In Ireland, the 
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National Certification Authority 
(TEASTAS) will facilitate access to a 
structured system of graded qualifi-
cations, as noted above, while the 
possible accreditation of prior learn-
ing is currently being considered by 





The role of the Social 
Partners 
Another clear trend is the increasing 
involvement of the social partners in 
training. Although their importance 
has long been recognised and in 
some Member States their involve-
ment, in policy-making has been 
institutionalised, there has recently 
been greater emphasis on the role 
and responsibility of the social part-
ners whether in the context of 
existing arrangements or in the de-
velopment of new ones. As a result, 
in all Member States, social partner 
organisations are represented at 
various levels of decision-making 
and are involved in some capacity in 
the planning and content of voca-
tional training as well as the 
development of qualifications. In 
some Member States, notably 
France, Germany, the Netherlands 
and Austria, training and skill 
needs, access to training and train-
ing leave and allowances, feature in 
legally-binding collective agree-
ments. The social partners are also 
actively involved in training de-
livery, as in Denmark and Italy, 
while in Spain they jointly manage 
public funds for the development and 
implementation of training plans. In 
Portugal, the social partners develop 
their own initial and continuing 
training programmes. 
New forms of working 
time/training 
arrangements 
Economic restructuring in Member 
States has been accompanied by 
the use of more flexible working ar-
rangements, involving, for example, 
part-time employment. There has 
also been a trend towards contract-
ing-out activities previously 
performed within the firm, in an 
attempt to reduce costs while main-
taining quality. New technology is 
also leading to the development of 
new forms of employment, such as 
teleworking. This trend has import-
ant implications for training in 
terms of access — part-time and tem-
porary workers are among those 
least likely to receive training — and 
the way businesses perceive their 
training needs as regards, for 
example, the training standards 
they expect from subcontractors. 
The development of new arrange-
ments combining working time and 
training is still at an early stage in 
some Member States. 
Towards life-long 
learning 
The developments taking place 
show that all Member States recog-
nise the need to improve and adapt 
their education and training sys-
tems and are actively engaged in 
reform. Although the systems are 
different, the problems faced are 
similar, though varying in import-
ance. All are seeking to create a 
Recognition of work experience 
and informal training 
Finland has recently adopted a system for recognising vocational 
qualifications irrespective of how they are acquired. Those who have 
acquired their skills through work experience as well as those in educa-
tion or training are able to take the same examination and receive a 
formal qualification, awarded by examination boards comprising 
employer and trade union representatives and teachers. 
The UK has a system of National Vocational Qualifications (NVQs) which 
specify the standards required for competence and which are gained 
either formally through training or informally through work experience. 
Assessment for NVQs is carried out by approved centres operating under 
the control of the body awarding the qualification. Competence is 
assessed by observation in the workplace of a person's skills in carrying 
out specific activities and by oral and written tests. 
In Austria, those who have not taken an apprenticeship examination but 
have work experience can enter the final apprenticeship examination, so 
long as they are at least 21 and provide evidence of their skills and 
knowledge. In addition, those with upper secondary level vocational 
qualifications who have completed three years of work experience are 
entitled to call themselves 'engineer'. After three further years of work 
experience they can take an examination to qualify for the corresponding 
diploma. 
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framework for encouraging invest-
ment in vocational training and the 
development of life-long learning. 
Although there are no clearly 
defined models of the latter, the re-
forms have certain common 
features. 
Life-long learning is, in general, 
seen as an overall system incorpor-
ating the range of education and 
training aspects to economic and so-
cial development, as well as a 
shared responsibility between the 
public sector, employers, trade 
unions and individuals. The need 
for on-going investment in educa-
tion and training is recognised 
along with the need to encourage 
firms and individuals to invest in 
skills and to adapt them continu-
ously to meet future economic and 
The European Social Fund contribution 
to investment in training 
In addition to direct measures for job creation, the European Social Fund 
(ESF) devotes a large share of its resources (around 47 billion ECU in the 
period 1994 to 1999) to supporting Member State training efforts. 
Objective 3 of the Structural Funds, which absorbs about 27% of ESF 
resources, focuses on young people, the long-term unemployed, those who 
have difficulty entering the labour market — such as the disabled — and 
women. Support is given to improvements in training systems as well as 
training itself. The basic aim is to improve the employability of the people 
targeted. As regards young people, there is special emphasis in several 
Member States on developing apprenticeship schemes and changing both 
the theory and practical content of training. The Employment Initiative 
will enable the ESF to support innovation in the field of training for the 
target groups. 
Ensuring equality of opportunity is a general aim of the Structural Funds 
and especially of the ESF under Objective 3, which seeks to promote a 
wider access of women to training schemes, including apprenticeships, 
the development of specific programmes for women where necessary, and 
support services such as child care. 
The new Objective 4 of the ESF is geared especially to the identification 
of future skill needs and to the corresponding adaptation of worker 
qualifications. As such, it supports Member State efforts to develop 
life-long learning and adaptation to changes brought about by technologi-
cal progress (which is one of the Essen priorities). Its aim is to encourage 
greater investment by businesses in human resources in order to both 
preserve jobs and increase competitiveness. Priority is given to support 
of SMEs to anticipate their skill needs and train their employees accord-
ingly. Particularly innovative ideas to adapt the training systems to this 
preventive approach will be supported through the ADAPT programme. 
The ESF also makes a major contribution to national training measures 
in the context of regional programmes (Objectives 2 and 5b and regional 
Initiatives) and gives special support to the less developed Objective 1 
regions to strengthen and improve education and training systems and 
to encourage closer links with business. 
social challenges. Different 
methods of financing training have 
also begun to be explored as has the 
need for a wide range of accessible, 
flexible training provision using a 
variety of approaches and methods 
including new technology. 
A key feature emerging is a commit-
ment to equality of opportunity for 
men and women and for different 
sections of society, particularly 
those who are disadvantaged. All 
Member States take responsibility 
for training provision for the most 
vulnerable — specifically young 
people and the unemployed — and 
recognise the need to improve ac-
cess to training more generally. 
There is also awareness that the lack 
of clear measurable indicators 
makes it difficult to assess the 
impact of reforms — or the return 
on investment. The European 
Commission has undertaken with 
the Member States a wide-ranging 
study of expenditure and participa-
tion in continuing vocational 
training which could provide a 
clearer picture. It is already clear, 
however, that the reform process will 
need to be sustained over a long 
period to be successful. 
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Section 2 Increasing the employment-intensity of growth 
Essen Conclusions: "Increasing the employment intensity 
of growth, in particular by: 
• a more flexible organisation of work, in a way which 
fulfils both the wishes of employees and the requirements 
of competition; 
• a wage policy which encourages job-creating investments 
and in the present situation requires moderate wage 
agreements below increases in productivity; 
• finally, the promotion of initiatives, particularly at 
regional and local level, that create jobs which take 
account of new requirements, e.g. in the environmental 
and social-service spheres." 
A more flexible 
organisation of work 
A general trend in the regulation of 
working time is towards greater 
flexibility. Several Member States 
have encouraged a shortening of 
working time and a number of 
measures have been taken to pro-
mote the development of flexible 
arrangements. Though in most 
countries working time is a matter 
of negotiation between the social 
partners, governments can exert an 
influence by removing obstacles to 
adjustment. Working time can be 
reduced in several ways: 
• by reducing standard full-time 
hours 
• by work sharing or job splitting 
• by replacing full-time by part-
time jobs 
• by limiting overtime 
• by working short-time during 
periods of depressed demand 
• by introducing career breaks 
and other special forms of 
leave. 
Over the long-term, the average an-
nual hours worked per employed 
person have declined across the 
Union. Between 1983 and 1994, 
normal weekly working hours de-
clined on average by around 4%, or 
by an hour and a half (Graph 101). 
However, the extent of the reduc-
tion varies considerably between 
Member States, which suggests 
that there is untapped potential for 




In several Member States a shor-
tening of working time and 
increased work sharing is seen as 
one way of raising employment and 
combating unemployment. The 
main ways of exerting an influence 
directly have been by limiting the 
normal hours of work and overtime 
working. However, most of the 
agreements on shortening of work-
ing time have been negotiated at 
plant level. Since 1984, a series of 
agreements for reducing weekly 
hours have been concluded in 
Germany, the most prominent re-
cent example being the Volkswagen 
four-day week experiment. 
In some countries, governments 
have sought to introduce positive 
incentives into collective agree-
ments to increase employment 
through working time reductions 
and promote work-sharing. Such 
initiatives have been taken in 
France and Belgium, which also ex-
perimented with similar measures 
in the early 1980s. In France, the 
Loi quinquennale includes a num-
ber of measures relating to the 
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organisation of working time. Firms 
signing work sharing agreements, 
for example, were entitled — until 
December 1994 — to rebates of 
social security contributions of 
40% in the first year and 30% in the 
two following years, so long as hours 
worked were reduced by at least 
15% and combined with a propor-
tionate reduction in wages and a 
10% expansion in the work force. 
Employers, however, showed little 
interest in this, apparently because 
of the requirement to offset two 
thirds of the reduction in working 
time by new recruitment. The same 
law also provides for the possibility 
of annualisation of working time on 
the initiative of the employee, on 
condition that this is coupled with a 
reduction in standard working 
hours. Since 1994, employers in 
Belgium expanding their work force 
on the basis of a company work 
sharing plan have been entitled to a 
flat rate reduction in social security 
contributions of around 625 ECU a 
quarter per employee. In addition, 
legislation provides for a range of 
possibilities to introduce flexibility 
measures through collective agree-
ments. In Spain, labour market 
reform has introduced a number 
of possibilities for increased flexi-
bility of working time. In Finland, 
revised regulations are under prep-
aration to increase flexibility in 
working time. In 1993, there were 
agreements in the metal and engin-
eering industry, which increased 
flexibility, while an ongoing re-
search project is considering the 
different working hours and their 
effects. In Sweden, the government 
has recently appointed a spe-
cial Working Hours Committee to 
investigate the consequences of 
alternative reductions in working 
hours and the way in which 
Swedish law can be changed to 
make rules on working hours more 
flexible. 
101 Change in average hours usually worked per week 
in Member States, 1983-94 
% change 
UK I SF E L S DK F E15 A IRL GR Ρ D Β NL 
E 1987; Ρ 1986; D excludes new Länder 
The substitution 
of part-time for 
full-time work 
Several Member States have taken 
measures to promote part-time 
work, with the aim of increasing the 
numbers employed. (In 1994, 4V2% 
of men unemployed in the Union 
and 23V2% of women were seeking 
part-time rather than full-time em-
ployment, though the figures for 
men varied from 27V2% in the 
Netherlands to only 2% in Spain, 
and for women from 70% in the 
Netherlands to under 6% in Greece 
— see Graph 102.) 
In most Member States, legislation 
on part-time employment gives 
the same social protection as for 
full-time workers as regards the 
minimum period of notice, redun-
dancy pay and so on. However, 
part-time employees often suffer in 
terms of promotion and career pros-
pects and have greater difficulty in 
exercising their trade union rights. 
In a number of Member States, 
including Germany, France and 
Belgium, there are incentives to em-
ployers and employees designed to 
expand part-time employment or to 
convert full-time contracts into part-
time ones. In Germany, employees 
who become unemployed after 
switching from full-time to part-time 
jobs are entitled to unemployment 
benefit at the full-time rate for a 
period of three years. A part-time 
initiative (Teilzeitoffensive) was in-
troduced in 1994 to promote the 
acceptance of part-time work on a 
voluntary basis. According to a 
study, more than 25% of full-time 
employees would be willing to reduce 
working hours, and it is estimated 
that 60% of jobs could be converted 
to part-time with costs being offset 
by productivity gains. In France, 
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employers have been able to obtain a 
rebate of social security contribu­
tions since 1992 if they hire an 
additional part-time employee or 
convert an existing full-time job into 
a part-time one. In Belgium, in 1994 
the Flemish Government introduced 
incentive allowances for employees 
transferring from full-time to part-
time jobs and working between 50% 
and 80% of normal hours. In Italy, 
subsidies for employees and cuts in 
employer's social contributions have 
been introduced to encourage the ex­
pansion of part-time work (see 
Section 3). 
In many countries, older workers 
have been encouraged to opt for par­
tial retirement, in some cases 
coupled with the requirement that 
the firm in question takes on some­
one from the unemployment 
register. France in 1992 expanded 
its programme of giving income 
support to employees taking up 
gradual early retirement, so long as 
additional jobs were created and 
redundancies avoided. In Belgium, 
workers who change their contract 
of employment to part-time are 
entitled to unemployment benefit 
plus a supplement from their em­
ployer if a younger person is hired. 
In Portugal, older workers have 
been able since 1993 to opt for a 
reduction in working time during 
the four years before retirement 
with their income maintained by a 
subsidy (of up to twice the minimum 
wage) from the IEFP (the Por­
tuguese labour market authority) if 
an unemployed person is hired and 
trained by them. In this way, addi­
tional jobs are created and skills 
passed on. In Denmark, workers 
aged between 60 and 65 are able 
partially to retire and receive a flat-
rate allowance if their working time 
is reduced by at least 25% but less 
than 12 hours a week. In Sweden, 
partial retirement is also open to 
workers aged 60 to 64, so long as 
they work more than 17 hours and 
less than 35 hours a week. In 1994, 
the rate of compensation was re­
duced to 55% of the former wage. In 
Spain workers over 62 are able to 
reduce their working time by 50% 
by agreement with their employer 
so long as they accept a 55% reduc­
tion in wages and an unemployed 
person is hired to work for the other 
half of the time. In Finland and 
Austria, legislation also provides 
for the partial retirement of older 
workers providing certain condi­
tions are met. 
Limiting overtime 
to create additional 
employment 
Little if any attempt has been made 
in Member States to limit the use of 
overtime in order to promote em­
ployment, mainly because overtime 
is regulated in most countries. In 
some Member States, including 
Sweden, Denmark, Finland and 
Italy, it is controlled by collective 
agreements, in others, general 
legislation is open to modification 
by collective agreements to accom­
modate the particular needs of 
different sectors. Only two coun­
tries, the UK and the Netherlands, 
have no overtime regulations. 
In Spain, statutory premia for over­
time working were abolished in 
1993 and where there is no collec­
tive agreement, compensation for 
overtime takes the form of time off 
rather than additional pay. In 
Germany, on the other hand, the 
Working Time Law stipulates that 
daily hours of work in 1994 can 
be extended without any need for 
special reason. 
This will allow employers to make 
more flexible use of their existing 
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work force, but the effect on employ-
ment is likely to be marginal. 
Short-time work 
Several Member States, including 
Austria, France, Germany, Italy, 
Portugal and Spain, have schemes 
to encourage temporary reductions 
in working time as an alternative to 
redundancies, providing income 
support to the employees affected 
who work less than their normal 
week. The workers concerned 
remain employed while receiving 
public benefits — usually paid 
through the unemployment insur-
ance system. The take-up rate of 
these schemes, as expected and 
intended, is highly cyclical. During 
the recent recession, the number of 
participants in such schemes in-
creased sharply in several Member 
States, especially in Germany, 
where short-time working was 
heavily used to soften the effects of 
the economic transformation in the 
East. 
In both France and Germany, 
the maximum duration of benefits 
for short-time working has been 
extended. In France, a special 
short-time working programme 
was introduced in December 1993 
for firms with economic difficulties. 
The maximum duration of benefits 
was extended to 1,200 hours from 
700 over a period of 18 months to 
two years. The state subsidy to em-
ployers for workers on short-time 
working was also increased. In 
Germany, special conditions for 
extended structural short-time 
working of up to 2 years have been 
applied across the whole country. 
However, in contrast to France, 
German employers have to bear the 
costs of health and pension insur-
ance contributions during the 
period of short-time working. A 
number of German firms in 
economic difficulty have also nego-
tiated cuts in working time outside 
the framework of the short time 
working programmes. In Italy, spe-
cial temporary conditions were 
introduced between 1993 and 1995 
for workers in companies conclud-
ing 'solidarity contracts' (contratti 
di solidarietà) to avoid redundan-
cies or increase jobs. Employees 
may receive up to 75% of wages 
(normally 50%) for lost hours for 
a maximum of two years (in the 
Mezzogiorno up to three years). 
Maternity leave 
The most common form of leave is 
for maternity. Though this was pri-
marily introduced for health 
reasons, it has consequences for em-
ployment. The duration of leave and 
level of benefit vary between Mem-
ber States. The duration is 14-16 
weeks in most Member States 
(Belgium, France, Germany, 
Ireland, Luxembourg, the Nether-
lands, Portugal, Spain and the UK), 
though is longer in Italy at 20 weeks 
and in Denmark at 26 weeks. 
In some Member States, including 
Denmark, Finland and Sweden, 
employees of both sexes are entitled 
to parental leave. In addition to the 
statutory 26 weeks' leave, in 
Denmark a new scheme enables 
employees to agree with their 
employers extended leave of up to 
52 weeks. In December 1994, there 
were around 50,000 people on 
parental leave — 64% of the total 
number on leave at the time. 
Sweden has the most extensive 
parental leave system with em-
ployees receiving 90% of their 
previous wage for the first month, 
80% (reduced to 75% from 1996) for 
the next 270 days and a flat-rate 
allowance for a further 90 days. In 
Finland, women receive maternity 
allowance for 105 working days and 
either parent then receives a paren-
tal allowance for a further 170 
working days. In the UK, women 
who have been in employment for at 
least two years are entitled to 40 
weeks' maternity leave. In Ger-
many, employees have a statutory 
right to parental leave for a maxi-
mum of three years (previously two 
years). In Ireland, the new Mater-
nity Protection bill will make it 
easier for women to combine work 
and family responsibilities. 
Career breaks 
In addition to maternity and paren-
tal leave, other forms of temporary 
absence from work exist in a num-
ber of Member States, including 
training leave, sabbaticals and 
career breaks. 
In Belgium, a right for employees in 
the private sector to take career 
breaks for up to one year, or to 
change temporarily to working 
part-time instead of full-time, was 
introduced in 1994, a similar right 
already existing in the public sector. 
In Denmark, a scheme granting em-
ployees entitlement to training and 
sabbatical leave for up to one year 
in addition to parental leave was 
also introduced in 1994, the main 
aim being is to encourage voluntary 
job rotation between the employed 
and the unemployed, though re-
placement is required only for 
sabbatical leave. Employees on 
parental and sabbatical leave re-
ceive an allowance equal to 80% 
(from 1995, 70%) of unemployment 
benefit, whereas for training they 
receive 100%. In Sweden, a special 
labour market measure, the trainee 
temporary replacement scheme, was 
introduced in 1991 with the aim of 
assisting employers to increase the 
skill level of their work force. Under 
the scheme, firms obtain a reduc-
tion in the levy on payroll if they 
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hire someone temporarily to replace 
an employee undergoing training. 
In Finland, there are plans to intro-
duce a system of job rotation to 
enable someone unemployed to re-
place an existing employee for a 
fixed period of time. 
Employment creation 
to meet new needs 
Following the Commission's report, 
Local development and employment 
initiatives: an investigation in the 
European Union (SEC 564/95), 
which identified 17 areas of activity 
which could potentially expand to 
meet new needs, such as social and 
communal services and environ-
mental protection, the Essen 
conclusions singled out job creation 
in these areas for special attention. 
The paradox of high unemploy-
ment, especially among the low 
skilled, coexisting with needs that 
remain unmet was, according to the 
White Paper, in part a result of the 
relatively high cost of labour 
coupled with the reluctance of 
workers to take jobs classified as 
personal services or unskilled work. 
There are a number of ways of pro-
moting employment in these areas 
including subsidising demand 
(through, for example, tax deduc-
tions or voucher schemes) or the 
supply of such services. 
Two recent initiatives in France 
and Belgium seek to promote job 
creation in services by tax rebates 
and voucher schemes. In France, 
'service employment vouchers' have 
been introduced to encourage the 
creation of jobs in domestic services 
— and the substitution of legal for 
illegal (black) labour. The scheme 
provides both a subsidy in the form 
of a tax deduction (of 50% of costs 
up to a maximum of around 7,300 
ECU for domestic employees work-
ing less than 8 hours a week or 
under a fixed-term contract of less 
than one month) and simplified 
administrative procedures (no em-
ployment contract or pay slip is 
required and social insurance con-
tributions do not have to be 
calculated). In Belgium, Agences 
locales pour l'emploi (ALE) were 
established since 1994 with the aim 
of placing the unemployed in jobs in 
areas such as personal services, 
environmental protection, security 
services and leisure activities. Em-
ployers are able to purchase special 
vouchers from the ALE to pay the 
people they hire. In Germany, a new 
national programme (produktive 
Arbeitsforderung) was established 
in 1994 under which non-profit-
making firms in social services, 
environmental protection and 
youth assistance are entitled to a 
wage subsidy equal to the average 
level of unemployment benefits. In 
Sweden, the Government has pro-
posed that the labour market 'Work 
experience' programme should 
operate primarily in the environ-
mental and cultural sectors. In the 
Netherlands, the Government is 
considering reducing labour 
charges on firms in the domestic 
services sector, the intention being 
to put those working legally on a 
more equal footing with those work-
ing illegally, and plans to introduce 
experiments in 1996. In Denmark, 
the Government in 1994 introduced 
for a period of three years an allow-
ance (of around 12 ECU an hour) to 
households declaring work carried 
out for them (such as washing, 
cleaning or gardening). In Ireland, 
Community Employment provides 
temporary work experience plus 
training for between one and three 
years for the long-term unemployed 
and other special categories of 
unemployed. Under the scheme, 
public sector and voluntary organi-
sations receive grants to carry 
out projects of benefit to the local 
community. 
Several Member States have 
adopted measures to stimulate the 
environmental sector, to assist 
mainstream industry meet new 
environmental standards and to 
support firms producing relevant 
equipment, technology and environ-
mental services. In Italy, tax 
incentives are available to new firms 
establishing in energy efficiency, re-
cycling and related sectors. In Spain, 
there is financial support for the con-
version of production processes and 
machinery to reduce pollution. In the 
Netherlands, green investment is 
exempt from taxes on dividend and 
interest. In Sweden, a scheme to 
subsidise jobs in environmental 
industries has recently been intro-
duced to accompany existing support 
for investment in sewage treatment, 
extension of central heating net-
works, noise reduction, the clean-up 
of contaminated sites and improve-
ment of natural areas, as well as for 
household investment in solar heat-
ing and for firms investing in 
sustainable processes over and 
above what is required by law. 
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Essen conclusions: "Reducing non-wage labour costs 
extensively enough to ensure that there is a noticeable effect 
on decisions concerning the taking on of employees and 
in particular of unqualified employees. The problem 
of non-wage labour costs can only be resolved through 
a joint effort by the economic sector, trade unions and 
the political sphere." 
Statutory levies on employers range 
from 14% to 34% of GDP across the 
Member States; taxes on employ-
ment, including both employers' 
and employees' social contribution 
and payroll taxes, vary equally as 
widely from 25% to around 50% of 
GDP (Graph 103). Despite these dif-
ferences, common trends can be 
identified in almost all Member 
States. Whereas between 1980 and 
1992 the average rate of taxation on 
consumers' expenditure was stable 
(at around 13%) and declined on 
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capital (from 44% to 41V2%), taxes 
on labour rose (from around 35%· to 
40%). The UK is the only country in 
which the overall tax burden did not 
increase over this period. 
Since 1993, all Member States have 
introduced, or are planning to intro-
duce, reductions in indirect labour 
costs by reducing social contribu-
tions. In some countries, the 
reductions are temporary and 
targeted at certain groups of worker 
to stimulate increased employment. 
Others have taken steps to reduce 
indirect labour costs permanently. 
General reductions 
In recent years, several Member 
States — specifically, Luxembourg, 
Portugal, Spain and the Nether-
lands — have made permanent 
reductions in social contributions. 
In Spain, contributions were 
reduced by one percentage point 
(0.8% for employers and 0.2% for 
employees) in 1995 and in Portugal 
employers' contributions were 
lowered by 0.75 of a percentage 
point. In Austria, attempts were 
made to lower indirect labour costs 
by introducing a negative tax option 
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of 10% of social contributions in 
1994. In Spain also, direct taxes on 
firms have been reduced in an effort 
to stimulate employment (by just 
under 5,000 ECU for each new job). 
In Denmark, the five-year tax 
reform is aimed at reducing margi-
nal tax rates on wages around the 
average by 1998, while social con-
tributions will be increased from 5% 
to 8.6%. Income taxes have already 
been reduced, financed by more con-
sistent taxation of unearned income 
and by so-called green taxes on con-
sumption. 
Temporary reductions 
Several Member States have made 
temporary reductions in employers' 
social contributions to stimulate 
employment. In most countries, 
these are targeted at disadvantaged 
groups such as the long-term unem-
ployed, young people or the 
handicapped. 
In Belgium, social contributions 
were reduced in 1994 on sectors 
particularly exposed to interna-
tional competition and on 
employers taking on manual 
workers. In France, proposals have 
been made to reduce employers' 
contributions for each additional 
person taken on and for people who 
were previously unemployed. In 
Sweden, a new temporary recruit-
ment incentive in the form of a 
reduction in employers' contribu-
tions for people who were 
previously unemployed has been in-
troduced amounting to some 30% 
of total wage costs. (Sweden has a 
long tradition of wage subsidies, 
usually payable for six months or 
so, to encourage employers to take 
on, for example, the long-term un-
employed, young people or 
immigrants, though for the handi-
capped subsidies tend to be on a 
more permanent basis. Different 
forms of wage subsidy are also used 
in the context of regional policy.) In 
Ireland, the 1994 Budget restruc-
tured employers' contributions, 
removing the obligation to pay 
health contributions and the em-
ployment and training levy in 
respect of employees holding medi-
cal cards. Employers taking on 
someone previously unemployed — 
or, after the 1995 Budget, anyone 
under 23 — are also exempt from 
social contributions for up to two 
years. In addition, VAT has been 
reduced in certain labour intensive 
sectors. In Italy, employers taking 
on young people previously unem-
ployed or handicapped people are 
entitled to a tax credit of 25% of the 
taxable salary paid to the employee. 
In Denmark, subsidies have been 
introduced to increase employment 
in the construction industry. 
In Belgium, the Plan plus un was 
extended in 1994 to reduce social 
contributions for a three year period 
by 100% in the first year and 50% in 
the third year in the case of em-
ployers taking on someone who had 
been long-term unemployed or 
someone under 26 who had been out 
of work for six months. In Germany, 
a form of payroll subsidy targeted at 
the long-term unemployed has been 
introduced. In Portugal, there are 
special reductions for the recruit-
ment of first-time job-seekers and 
the long-term unemployed as well 
as handicapped people. In Italy, em-
ployers who create jobs for those 
classified as belonging to a disad-
vantaged group are entitled to a 
reduction in social contributions 
and tax credits, while those based in 
the South also pay lower contribu-
tions. The system of incentives 
directed at young entrepreneurs in 
the Mezzogiorno (ie in Objective 1 
regions) was extended in 1995 to 
areas eligible for aid under Objec-
tives 2 and 5b of the Structural 
Funds. In Spain, employers who 
take on young people or who take on 
someone of 45 or over who was pre-
viously unemployed or is disabled 
on a temporary contract (1-3 years) 
are entitled to a 75% reduction in 
social contributions. Those with 
less than 25 employees and taking 
on someone under 45 who was long-
term unemployed receive a 50% 
reduction. In Greece and Germany, 
tax cuts have been introduced for 
Member State pursuit of the double dividend 
Several Member State have pursued the notion of the double dividend 
(described in the Commission White Paper, Growth, Competitiveness, 
Employment, of reducing social charges on the employment of labour in 
order to encourage job creation while imposing increased taxes on the use 
of natural resources in order to protect the environment (see Part III, 
Section 2 of the present Report for an analysis of the effects). 
The UK has recently imposed VAT on energy and is introducing a new 
landfill tax coupled with further reductions in employers' social security 
contributions. Belgium is developing a plan for eco-taxes. Denmark is 
considering raising eco-taxes to yield the equivalent of 1.4% of GDP. 
Luxembourg has imposed a social charge (an added excise tax) on energy 
consumption. Spain has introduced charges on the discharge of effluents. 
Italy taxes C02 and S02 emissions and the Netherlands is considering a 
tax on the use of energy, the revenue from which will finance various 
reliefs for taxpayers. 
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employees in certain regions, while 
in Finland, social contributions 
vary with firm size and turnover, 
small firms paying less than larger 
ones. 
This potential job creation effect 
has led several Member States to 
follow up on the idea of the so-called 
'double dividend', lowering charges 
on employment, while at the same 
time imposing heavier taxes on the 
use of natural resources which 





In some Member States, measures 
have been directed at stimulating 
the creation of jobs for low-wage 
earners. In Belgium, Ireland and the 
UK, employers' social contributions 
for those on low pay were reduced in 
1994. In Ireland, this was followed in 
1995 by the introduction of a new 
lower contribution rate of 9% (in-
stead of the normal rate of 12.2%) in 
respect of those earning less than 
around 15,000 ECU a year. In 
France, the five-year law on employ-
ment introduced in 1993 entitles 
employers to a 5-year exemption 
from the 5.4% contributions to 
family allowances in respect of em-
ployees earning up to 1.3 times the 
statutory minimum wage (SMIC). In 
the Netherlands, the general reduc-
tion of taxation planned for the 
period 1995-1998 will be targeted on 
the low-paid. 
As noted in Section 2, there are 
measures in France and Denmark 
to encourage 'legal' employment in 
domestic services, while the Dutch 
Government is planning similar 
measures (see Part III, Section 1 for 
further analysis of the problem of 
taxation and employment). 
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Section 4  Improving the effectiveness of labour market 
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Essen Conclusions: "The effectiveness of employment 
policy must be increased by avoiding practices which are 
detrimental to the readiness to work, and by moving from a 
passive to an active labour market policy. The individual 
incentive to continue seeking employment on the general 
labour market must remain. Particular account must be 
taken of this when working out income-support measures. 
The need for, and efficiency of the instruments of labour 
market policy must be assessed at regular intervals." 
The general objective in Member 
States in recent years has been to 
shift the balance of resources from 
income maintenance for the unem-
ployed towards more active labour 
market policies. 
The large increase in unemploy-
ment in Europe since the 
mid-1970s, which has been concen-
trated on particular groups — the 
unskilled, young people and women 
— and in certain regions and which 
has been accompanied by the emer-
gence of a serious problem of 
long-term unemployment, has 
forced governments to react in 
various ways. Budgets for labour 
market policies have risen substan-
tially and many experimental 
measures have been introduced in 
the search for an effective solution. 
Income maintenance for the unem-
ployed, which was initially 
introduced to support people over 
short periods of time while they 
were looking for a job or undergoing 
training, has increased substan-
tially. Mass unemployment has 
placed enormous strains on public 
budgets and systems of support as 
well as changing their underlying 
objective. 
With a high level of unemployment 
more pressure has been put on ac-
tive measures to play a more 
important role in improving the 
functioning of labour market. Such 
measures can be divided into three 
broad kinds: 
• job mediation and placement 
aimed at matching vacancies 
and job seekers; 
• vocational training to improve 
the skills and abilities of the 
labour force; 
• subsidised job creation in either 
the public or the private sector. 
This section examines changes in 
the amount and pattern of public 
expenditure on labour market 
measures and considers each of the 
different kinds of measure in turn. 
Expenditure 
on active labour 
market policy 
Public expenditure on labour mar-
ket policies amounted in total to 
around 372% of GDP in 1993 for the 
Member States taken together. 
Almost 60% of this was spending on 
unemployment benefits and around 
10% on early retirement pensions 
(Graph 104). 
Expenditure, however, varied widely 
between Member States, partly be-
cause of major differences in levels of 
unemployment. Between 1985 and 
1993, total expenditure on such 
measures, adjusted for the change in 
unemployment, increased relative to 
GDP in most countries, the excep-
tions being the UK, Ireland, 
France, Luxembourg, Sweden and 
Denmark. The scale of spending in 
1993, adjusted for differences in the 
numbers unemployed, ranged from 
under 1% of GDP for each 5% of the 
- 105 Section 4 Improving the effectiveness of labour· market policy 
104 Public expenditure on labour market policies in the 























0 0.5 1 1.5 
I no data; DK, Ρ 1985=1986; IRL 1993=1991; GR 1993=1992 
2 2.5 
% GDP 
105 Public expenditure on active and passive labour 
market policies in Member States, 1985, 1990 and 1993 
% GDP per 5% unemployed 
I no data; DK. Ρ 1985=1986; IRL 1993=1991; GR 1993=1992; Left bar 1985, middle bar 1990, rght bar 1993 
work force unemployed in Greece 
and Spain to 4% in Austria (Graph 
105). 
Expenditure on passive measures, 
with the steep rise in unemploy-
ment, increased in all Member 
States in the early 1990s, except in 
Ireland where it remained constant. 
Adjusted for the rise in unemploy-
ment, however, it declined relative 
to GDP in 9 of the 14 countries for 
which data are available (the only 
exceptions being France, Portugal, 
the Netherlands, Denmark and 
Austria), whereas it had risen in all 
countries apart from Denmark over 
the period 1985 to 1990. The decline 
between 1990 and 1993 was par-
ticularly marked in Finland and 
Sweden where unemployment went 
up considerably. 
Expenditure on income support 
(ie passive measures) was around 
1% of GDP or less for each 5% of the 
work force unemployed in Greece, 
Spain, the UK, Ireland, France and 
Portugal and around l'/2-2% in 
all other Member States, except 
Denmark, where it was over 2'4% 
and Austria, where it was over 3%. 
Expenditure on active measures for 
each 5% of the labour force unem-
ployed was less than 72% of GDP in 
Greece, Spain and the UK, around 
V2% in Ireland, France, Finland and 
Luxembourg, 72-1% in Portugal, 
Belgium, Denmark and Austria, 1% 
in Germany and the Netherlands 
and 1V2% in Sweden. 
The results of efforts to shift the 
balance towards active policy are 
somewhat mixed. While expendi-
ture on active measures was higher 
in relation to total labour market 
spending in 1990 than in 1985 in 
most Member States, the share de-
clined in all but four Member States 
between 1990 and 1993. However, 
it is important to emphasise in this 
context that these figures cover only 
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spending by the public sector and 
exclude private sector expenditure 
which may well have tended to in-
crease in recent years with the 
trend towards privatisation of ser-
vices previously performed by the 
public sector, with firms taking 
more responsibility for training, as 
described above, and with the en-
ding of state monopolies on job 
placement in a number of countries. 
The distribution of public expen-
diture between different kinds 
of active measures varies sub-
stantially between Member States 
(Graph 106). In Portugal, Belgium, 
the UK, Sweden, Germany, the 
Netherlands and Austria, expendi-
ture on public employment services 
amounted to around 0.1% of GDP or 
more in 1993 for each 5% of the 
labour force unemployed, in Spain, 
Greece, Ireland, Denmark and 
Finland, to under 0.05%. Spending 
on youth measures was highest in 
Denmark, Ireland, Sweden and 
Portugal, where it varied from 0.5% 
of GDP (in this case unadjusted for 
unemployment) to over 0.7%. In 
Greece and Austria, it was less than 
0.1% (though it should be empha-
sised that in some countries, youth 
measures are not separately distin-
guished). Expenditure on training 
amounted to 0.25%-0.4% of GDP 
for each 5% of unemployment in 
Ireland, Denmark, Germany and 
Sweden but less than 0.1% in Spain, 
Luxembourg and the UK. Expendi-
ture on job subsidies were of most 
importance in Belgium, Denmark, 
Finland and Sweden at over 0.5% of 
GDP in 1993 (again unadjusted for 
differences in unemployment). 
Improving 
job matching 
Public Employment Services have 
potentially a central role in improv-
ing the functioning of the labour 
market. Although the precise allo-
cation of responsibilities varies 
slightly between Member States, 
their tasks generally include 
matching job seekers to notified 
vacancies, counselling and advising 
those looking for work, job broking 
and, in many cases, administration 
of income support and of active 
programmes. 
Substantial changes and some im-
provements in public employment 
services have been made in several 
Member States in recent years, and 
in the majority of countries (8 out of 
the 14) expenditure was higher 
relative to GDP in 1993 than in 
1985 when adjusted for the change 
in unemployment (Graph 107). 
Reorganisation has taken place in 
Belgium, Germany and Austria, 
for example, while in the former 
two countries, special temporary 
employment agencies for the 
unemployed have been established. 
As noted above, in Belgium, Local 
employment agencies (Agences 
locales pour l'emploi — ALE) were 
introduced in 1993 to place the un-
employed persons in temporary jobs 
(see Section 2). In Germany, spe-
cial temporary employment 
agencies (START) have recently 
been introduced for the long-term 
unemployed and other people diffi-
cult to place, modelled on the 
agencies with the same name in the 
Netherlands, which have achieved 
some success. In Austria, the Public 
Employment Service Act of 1994 
increased more decentralisation 
and legalised private placement 
agencies, while the training of staff 
was improved to provide a more 
professional service. In Italy, the 
obligation on employers to notify all 
job vacancies to the public employ-
ment service was abolished in 1995 
and replaced by a requirement to 
notify after hiring someone. In 
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Sweden, employment agencies were 
expanded in both 1994 and 1995. In 
Finland, the revised Public Employ­
ment Services Act was introduced 
in 1994 to intensify active labour 
market policy and improve the func­
tioning of the labour market, in part 
through more effective public em­
ployment services. 
New placement initiatives or 
refined counselling were introduced 
in several Member States in the 
early 1990s. In France, the employ­
ment service (ANPE) launched 
'Programme 900,000' in 1992, 
under which special placement 
initiatives for the long-term unem­
ployed were taken (see Section 5). 
In Belgium, a supervision plan for 
all long-term unemployed under the 
age of 46 was introduced in 1993. In 
the UK, 'Restart' interviews were 
introduced as a major instrument of 
labour market policy. In Denmark, 
the 'Employment opportunities' 
plan was established with the aim 
of offering a job to all the unem­
ployed over the age of 25 who were 
still without work after 12-21 
months. 
The Employment Services in some 
countries, such as France and the 
Netherlands, have made efforts to 
establish relations with particular 
firms or sectors, in the former with 
several large national companies, 
in the latter with firms in the 
graphics industry and in health 
care. In Germany, efforts have been 
made to increase contacts with 
small firms. 
Training 
In many Member States, including 
Denmark, France, Germany, 
Greece, Ireland, Sweden and the 
UK training is one of the largest 
areas of active expenditure and in 
most cases spending was higher in 
1993 than in 1985 (Graphs 106 and 
108). In most countries, publicly-
funded training schemes are 
targeted at the unemployed. 
In Denmark, the number of both 
unemployed and employees under­
going training at any one time is 
among the highest in the Union. 
This has been boosted by training 
leave measures (as described in 
Section 2 above). In Sweden, the 
proportion of the unemployed in 
training increased significantly 
at the beginning of the 1990s. In 
Finland, the number has doubled in 
the 1990s as unemployment has 
risen, those with no vocational 
qualifications, in particular, being 
encouraged to take a training 
course. In Germany, the unem­
ployed and those threatened by 
unemployment are actively encour­
aged to undertake vocational 
training or retraining. 
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Subsidised 
employment 
Measures of job subsidy take a var­
iety of forms, including: temporary 
jobs in the public sector; subsidies 
to private sector firms taking on 
someone who was long-term unem­
ployed, and loans or grants for the 
unemployed to start up their own 
businesses. Job subsidies are rela­
tively important in Belgium, 
Denmark, Germany, Finland and 
Spain and increased substantially 
in the latter four countries between 
1990 and 1993 (Graph 109). 
In most Member States wage sub­
sidies are targeted at certain 
categories of worker, especially the 
long-term unemployed and young 
people. In Germany, the 'productive 
labour promotion' scheme was 
introduced in the new Lander in 
1993 and subsequently extended to 
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other parts of the country to provide 
a flat-rate wage subsidy, equal to 
the average level of unemployment 
benefit, for taking on hard-to-place 
unemployed for a maximum period 
of two years (three in the new Lan-
der). In Denmark, the 'job offer' 
scheme has been set up to help the 
long-term unemployed (see Section 
5 below). In Spain, recruitment sub-
sidies in the form of a rebate of 
50-100% of employers' social con-
tributions have been introduced for 
firms providing fixed-term contract 
jobs for 1-3 years to older people or 
the long-term unemployed receiv-
ing benefits. In the UK, 'work trials' 
were introduced in 1993/4 for 
people who had been unemployed 
for more than 6 months enabling 
them to work for three weeks in a 
company without it paying any-
thing, the people concerned 
continuing to receive their usual 
benefits as well as travel and meal 
expenses. In Finland, the subsi-
dised employment system was 
modified in 1995 with the purpose 
partly of making it possible to com-
bine employment subsidies more 
effectively with employment ser-
vices, rehabilitation and training. 
The number of subsidy schemes 
was reduced from 19 to 5 and local 
employment offices were given 
more freedom of action. In Sweden, 
there are various forms of wage sub-
sidy including temporary public 
employment and recruitment sup-
port. It was recently decided to 
target the latter at the long-term 
unemployed (see Section 5). 
Promoting 
self-employment 
Most Member States have 
measures aimed at encouraging un-
employed people to start up their 
own business by being able to capi-
talise or continue receiving 
unemployment benefit. Such 
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measures have existed since the 
1980s, except in Austria, Italy, 
Luxembourg and the Netherlands. 
Between 1990 and 1993, expendi-
ture increased in Denmark, 
Finland Portugal and Sweden, 
though it fell substantially in Spain. 
In Germany, the period for which 
the unemployed becoming self-
employed can continue to receive 
benefits was extended from 10 to 26 
weeks in 1994 and the ceiling on the 
amount was abolished. In Portugal, 
increased funding has been made 
available for business start-ups 
since 1993. In Belgium, the existing 
programme of start-up loans for the 
unemployed was reorganised in the 
same year. In Ireland, the 'back-to-
work allowance' scheme enables the 
unemployed (including out of work 
self-employed) to take up work and 
retain a percentage of their benefit 
for up to three years. In France, 
assistance to the unemployed who 
create or take over a business was 
recently extended, and firms are 
encouraged to lend money to em-
ployees who start up on their own. 
Maintaining 
work incentives 
The incentive to look for a job is 
determined by several factors, one 
of which is the availability of work, 
another of which is the design of the 
unemployment benefit system and 
social protection arrangements in 
general. In this context both the re-
placement rate (ie the level of 
payment relative to income when in 
work) and the duration of benefit 
play a role. These issues are exam-
ined in more detail in Part III, 
Section 1 and in Social Protection in 
Europe, 1995 (forthcoming). 
Some countries have recently intro-
duced measures which attempt to 
create a more positive link between 
income support and incentives 
to work. In the UK, for example, 
'in-work' benefits in the form of 
Family Credits have been intro-
duced to increase the incomes of 
low-paid workers relative to what 
they receive when unemployed. The 
scheme, however, is limited to those 
with dependent children, though 
extension to single people is at pres-
ent being considered. In 1992, the 
minimum hours of week worked 
was reduced from 24 hours a week 
to 16, a change which seems to have 
increased the number of people tak-
ing up such jobs. In Ireland, 'Family 
Income Supplement' is payable to 
low-paid workers with families, 
providing they work at least 20 
hours a week. 
Evaluations of 
active measures 
Evaluation of labour market pro-
grammes has taken the form of both 
micro and macro studies, the former 
attempting to assess the effects on 
individuals, the latter those on 
wages and employment generally. 
The results obtained have been sub-
ject to a high degree of uncertainty 
and have sometimes been conflict-
ing. Moreover, many studies relate 
to economic conditions which are 
different from those which obtain 
now which raises questions about 
the relevance of the results. 
Evaluations of public 
employment services 
Studies in several countries have 
shown that intensified counselling 
and job search assistance tend to 
improve the likelihood of finding a 
job, especially as regards the long-
term unemployed. Unlike other 
active measures, there is much less 
risk that participants will find 
themselves locked into programmes 
and so reduce their job search 
activity. In Sweden, a study of the 
Employment Services found that a 
much larger proportion of those who 
had received intensive counselling 
were in work after a year than those 
who had not received extra help. 
Studies in the UK and the US have 
come up with similar results. In the 
UK, evaluation of the 'Restart' 
scheme found that, over the year 
following the Restart interview, the 
time spent working increased and 
the time drawing benefit declined. 
In the US, people who had received 
more intensive job search assist-
ance were found to have better 
employment and earnings pros-
pects. 
Evaluations of training 
In Sweden, a number of studies of 
the effects of training on sub-
sequent earnings have been carried 
out with mixed results, some find-
ing positive effects, others negative. 
A recent study (by Regner in 1993) 
found that training had negative 
effects for most groups, possibly be-
cause those receiving benefits while 
being trained have less incentive to 
look for a job than those whose 
benefits are close to being ex-
hausted. Another study concluded 
that training raises the employ-
ment probability of participants by 
around 5%, which seems to be smal-
ler than the effect of intensive job 
counselling. The most recent study 
from the Swedish National Labour 
Market Board found a significant 
effect both on salary and the prob-
ability of finding a new job. 
Evaluations of employment train-
ing in the US have also found 
positive effects, while in the UK, 
follow-up surveys of 'Training for 
Work' (for adults) and 'Youth Train-
ing' indicate that both improve the 
employment prospects of trainees. 
In Finland, a comprehensive re-
search programme evaluating 
training from the individual, firm 
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and labour market standpoint is at 
present being undertaken. 
Evaluations of direct job 
creation measures 
The empirical evidence on the ef-
fects of job creation schemes seems 
to indicate that both the 'dead-
weight' losses (ie the money spent 
which is not actually effective in 
putting into employment who 
would have not found jobs anyway) 
and the substitution effects (ie the 
fact that the employment subsi-
dised effectively displaces other 
jobs or other people in work) can be 
substantial. However, by targeting 
wage subsidy programmes to par-
ticularly disadvantaged groups it 
seems possible to reduce the dead-
weight costs. A study of the 
Employment Incentive programme 
in Ireland showed that only about 
30% of the participants became 
employed as a direct result of the 
subsidies given. Evaluation of the 
recruitment subsidy in the 
Netherlands found that the com-
bined deadweight and substitution 
effects were of the order of 70-90%, 
though this may still be acceptable 
if an aim is to redistribute unem-
ployment between people. In 
Finland, a study of subsidised em-
ployment found several positive 
aspects, such as increased motiva-
tion and employability of the 
unemployed helped, as well as ne-
gative aspects, such as fewer jobs 
than hoped and subsidies being 
used to finance jobs which would 
have existed anyway. In Denmark, 
results of studies on the job-offer 
scheme indicate that around 40% of 
participants are in work one year 
after finishing the scheme, though 
half of these with a different em-
ployer than the initial one. 
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Section 5  Improving measures for groups particularly 
hard hit by unemployment 
Essen Conclusions: "Particular measures are necessary 
to help young people, especially school leavers who have 
virtually no qualifications, by offering them either 
employment or training. " 
"The fight against long-term unemployment must be a major 
aspect of labour market policy. Varying labour market policy 
measures are necessary according to the very varied groups 
and requirements of the long-term unemployed." 
"Special attention should be paid to the difficult situation of 
unemployed women and older employees. " 
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Long-term 
unemployed 
The evidence suggests that the 
problem of long-term unemploy-
ment cannot be solved by 
employment growth alone. In the 
period of high net job creation from 
1985 to 1990, the number who had 
been out of work for a year or more 
only fell from 52% of the total num-
ber unemployed to 48%, where it 
remained in 1994 (Graph 110). The 
need is to deal with the specific 
problem of reintegrating the long-
term unemployed back into work by 
overcoming their particular disad-
vantages (see Employment in 
Europe 1992, Chapter 8, for a 
review of the lessons to be drawn 
from the different experiences in 
Member States). 
The long-term unemployed are by 
no means a homogeneous group. 
Measures of assistance must take 
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account of differences in age, gender 
and education level. Better results 
seem to have been achieved in cases 
where local circumstances and the 
economic situation have been 
allowed for and counselling appears 
to be essential to achieving the most 
effective targeting and choice of 
measures for each individual. 
Since 1990, several Member States 
have introduced new initiatives to 
combat long-term unemployment, 
including training, job-matching, 
job clubs and other job search acti-
vities, wage subsidies, temporary 
employment in the public sector 
and help to the unemployed to start 
their own businesses. 
Job matching 
measures 
A number of recent initiatives have 
focused on counselling and place-
ment, activities which have proved 
to be effective in several Member 
States. 
In Belgium and Germany, tempor-
ary employment agencies have been 
formed to help the long-term unem-
ployed establish contact with 
potential employers and gain work 
experience, so increasing their em-
ployability. In Belgium, agencies 
have been established in every local 
authority, with the long-term un-
employed being obliged to 
participate (unlike in the case of 
other unemployed where it partici-
pation is voluntary). In Germany, 
as noted above, START agencies 
have been established to arrange 
placements for the long-term unem-
ployed as well as other difficult to 
place people. 
At the beginning of the 1990s, new 
placement initiatives or improved 
counselling measures were taken in 
a number of Member States. In 
France, all long-term unemployed 
were interviewed under 'Pro-
gramme 900,000'. In Ireland, a 
more active and locally-based Em-
ployment Service is being developed 
to help the long-term unemployed 
and increase their access to general 
labour market, training and educa-
tion programmes. In the UK, a 
special two-week (mandatory) pro-
gramme has been introduced for 
those unemployed for two years or 
more who refuse other offers of help 
at their Restart interview in order 
to identify for them a route back to 
work. A system of work trials of up 
to three weeks has also been intro-
duced for those unemployed for 
more than six months to enable em-
ployers (without having to pay 
anything) to assess their suitability 
before committing themselves to 
employing them. In France, job 
clubs have recently expanded their 
activities with an emphasis on the 
special placement scheme for the 
long-term unemployed. In Finland, 
a special programme for the long-
term unemployed has been 
developed with the aim of halving 
the numbers by 1999, through 
various means such as increasing 
the proportion involved in active 
labour market programmes and 
developing special employment 
services for them. 
Wage subsidies 
In Denmark, the Job Offer scheme 
under which those unemployed are 
entitled to a job after 12 months has 
recently been expanded. The job 
lasts for at least 9 months in the 
private sector (7 months in the pub-
lic sector) and the person concerned 
receives normal contractual wages. 
The scheme can be combined with a 
two-week trial period to enable the 
employer to decide whether or not 
to offer a job. In addition, a subsi-
dised 'self-found' job offer scheme 
has been introduced under which 
someone who has been unemployed 
for at least 6 months can find an 
employer willing to hire them, who 
then becomes entitled to receive a 
wage subsidy for three months 
equal to the full wage so long as the 
job lasts for at least nine months. In 
Spain, as described above, a new 
wage subsidy scheme gives firms 
offering fixed-term jobs to someone 
who has been unemployed for a year 
or more a rebate of social security 
contributions. In Sweden, policy 
has been focused more on those un-
employed for more than six months 
since April 1995 by concentrating 
recruitment support on such people 
and by allowing this to be combined 
with the new recruitment incentive 
for newly hired employees (see Sec-
tion 3 above). In Finland, a large 
proportion of those in subsidised 
jobs are long-term unemployed. In 
Italy, a new national collective 
agreement enables a special initial 
wage negotiated below the normal 
starting level (70% in the first year, 
80% in the second) as an incentive 
for employers to take on those out of 
work for a long time and others who 
are hard to place, provided that the 
job is a permanent one. Work 'in the 
public interest' (lavori socialmente 
utili) is also being encouraged in 
areas such as cultural activities, 
environmental protection, urban 
renewal, research, vocational train-
ing and support for small and 
medium-sized firms. 
Other measures 
In Netherlands, in addition to a 
range of labour market measures 
directed at the long-term unem-
ployed, 40,000 extra jobs will be 
created specifically for them over 
the period 1995 to 1998 in the 
health and care sectors, in security 
services and child care, partly fin-
anced by the benefits they would 
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have otherwise received. In the first 
year, pay levels have to be limited 
to the legal minimum wage and may 
not increase by more than 20% in 
subsequent years. The new jobs 
must be additional and regular and 
must be for an average of 32 hours 
a week. The scheme will be moni-
tored at least once a year. 
In Ireland, the 'Back To Work 
Allowance' scheme enables the 
long-term unemployed to take up 
work and retain a percentage of 
their unemployment benefit for up 
to three years. In addition, the Com-
munity Employment Programme 
was launched in 1994 to provide 
jobs for 40,000 people who had been 
unemployed for more than a year 
and other disadvantaged groups. In 
Finland, the Temporary Employ-
ment Contract Act allows 
employers to take on someone who 
was long-term unemployed for a 
fixed period of time even if the 
preconditions for a fixed-term con-
tract are not met. 
Youth unemployment 
Action to improve the employment 
prospects of young people, including 
those with inadequate qualifica-
tions and/or those leaving the 
education system prematurely, is a 
priority area for all Member States. 
There have been two principal ap-
proaches: 
• encouraging young people to 
stay in education and initial 
training longer to minimise the 
number entering the labour 
market without adequate basic 
qualifications; 
• facilitating the transition from 
school to working life by 
developing closer links between 
the two and by improving 
Examples of target figures for young people 
going into further and higher education 
Italy: to increase the proportion of those staying on in education after 
secondary level to 74% with 65% obtaining a qualification by 1999. 
UK: to increase the proportion achieving a National Vocational Qualifi-
cation (or Scottish Vocational Qualification) level 2 or the academic 
equivalent by the age of 19 to 85% by 1997, with at least half attaining 
level 3 or equivalent by the year 2000. 
Spain: to increase the proportion staying on in school up to 18 to 80% and 
to give them the possibility of choosing between a specific training course 
(middle level) or the 'bachillerato' by the year 2000. 
France: to ensure that, by the end of this century, 75% of young people 
obtain a qualification at baccalauréat level. 
Ireland: to increase the proportion of 16 to 18 year-olds completing the 
senior cycle to at least 90% by the year 2000. 




The number of young people staying 
on in education has been steadily 
rising, as shown in Part I. In some 
Member States, for example Spain, 
France, Ireland and Italy, target 
figures have been set for this, while 
the UK has fixed targets for 
achievement of recognised qualifi-
cations (see Box). In Ireland, the 
aim of increasing the numbers 
staying on in education is being pur-
sued through trying to ensure an 
effective foundation of general 
education combined with a streng-
thened and expanded vocational 
orientation and through making 
courses at senior level follow on 
more closely from those at junior 
level, as well as by achieving a 
better balance between vocational 
studies and preparation for work, 
on the one hand, and further educa-
tion, on the other. 
In many of the Member States, 
however, there is a problem of voca-
tional education and training being 
perceived as a second-class option, 
offering limited career prospects 
compared to general academic edu-
cation and being chosen by young 
people only because they have no 
alternative. Raising the status, 
quality and attractiveness of voca-
tional training is a major policy aim 
in a number of Member States where 
action has been taken, as in the 
Netherlands, for example, to pro-
mote 'parity of esteem' with 
academic education by improving 
the career prospects offered by the 
vocational option (see Box). In Bel-
gium, the status of vocational 
education is being progressively 
raised through closer links between 
technical and general education. In 
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Portugal, vocational schools for 
15-18 year olds have been intro-
duced to encourage more of them 
to take this option. In Ireland, the 
establishment of TEASTAS — 
the Irish National Certification 
Authority — is intended to help raise 
the status of vocational education 
and the National Council for Educa-
tional Awards (NCEA — which is to 
be reconstituted as a sub-board of 
TEASTAS), has developed a struc-
ture for evaluation, to be operational 
from 1995/96, to provide for the ac-
creditation of prior learning. In 
addition, the 'Youthreach' pro-
gramme, aimed at assisting early 
school leavers, has been expanded in 
terms of participant numbers since 
1994. In the UK, the 'Technical and 
Vocational Initiative' aims to in-
crease the number of young people of 
14 and over studying and qualifying 
in vocational subjects. General voca-
tional qualifications are also being 
developed for entry into employment 
or progression to higher education. 
supported by the White Paper. 
Along with conventional informa-
tion and advice, efforts have been 
made in a number of Member States 
to be more responsive to individ-
uals, enabling pupils at an early age 
to identify the characteristics and 
requirements of a profession and to 
make them aware of their capa-
bilities. In the UK, recent changes 
have been introduced to make 
management of the Careers Service 
more flexible and responsive and 
further changes are planned. In 
France, there are classes at voca-
tional colleges to prepare young 
people of 14 and over for work. In 
Luxembourg, vocational guidance 
is provided at an early stage in sec-
ondary schools to students 
according to their attitudes and 
interests. In Spain, under a new 
law, tutoring and guidance will be 
part of the curriculum at every 
stage of compulsory schooling, with 
specialist staff being available to 
support teachers. In some Member 
States, the choice between general 
and vocational education is post-
poned to give the student longer to 
decide which to opt for. 
A variety of schemes have been de-
veloped across the Union to 
integrate young people into the 
labour market, particularly 
through training and work experi-
ence, often in the form of 
apprenticeship or trainee contracts. 
In France, for example, there is a 
range of employment and training 
contracts to provide young people 
between 16-25 with work experi-
ence alternating with training for 
both short periods of 2-8 months 
and longer one of up to two years. In 
Finland, the Government in 1994 
established a programme for 
the period 1994 to 1996 to provide 
vocational training for 30,000 un-
employed young people each year 
and to increase apprenticeships and 
In Austria, even though vocational 
training has a high reputation, 
there are a number of measures to 
sustain and strengthen its attrac-
tiveness, including access through 
the apprenticeship system to higher 
education. In Sweden and Finland, 
where there is roughly equal 
balance between those taking voca-
tional courses and those taking 
general courses, reforms were 
introduced some years ago to reduce 
the number of specialisations in 
vocational education and provide 
access to higher education. In both 
countries as well as in France, how-
ever, more recent measures have 
been taken to make education more 
practically based and to provide 
longer periods of practical work-
place experience for students. 
There is also an increasing focus in 
Member States on vocational guid-
ance, a development strongly 
The search for parity of esteem 
In the Netherlands, a connected series of measures have been introduced 
to promote parity of esteem between general and vocational education 
• ensuring that both sets of qualifications provide access to tertiary 
legal provision 
• delaying the final choice of students between the two for as long as 
possible 
• informing parents, guidance counsellors and other relevant people 
about opportunities in the vocational training system 
• improving the information given to young people about vocational 
education and the long-term prospects it offers 
• introducing financial incentives to widen the choice of technology 
courses. 
(Source: The prevention of school failure and marginalisation among 
young people, European Commission, 1994) 
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further training of university grad-
uates. In addition, the Employment 
Contracts Act was amended to 
allow conclusion of a contract of em-
ployment for a specified period, 
irrespective of the nature of work. 
In Ireland, a 'Youthstart' pro-
gramme is in the process of being 
launched aimed at 16 to 21 year-
olds and at integrating the 
provision of initial training for new 
entrants to the labour market, with 
the focus on young people seeking 
vocational qualifications. In the 
UK, according to recent figures, 
91% of children were involved in 
work experience in their last year of 
compulsory schooling, and in-
creased funding to extend this 
provision was announced in 1995, 
together with a new apprenticeship 
initiative covering some 50 sectors. 
Several Member States have re-
formed the content of initial 
training to promote the acquisition 
of key, or transferable, skills. In the 
Netherlands, for example, the in-
clusion of key qualifications in 
training curricula helps people 
change jobs during their working 
careers. In Luxembourg, a develop-
ment project launched in 1991 in 
cooperation with the social partners 
called for the definition of the prac-
tical skills required in different 
vocational training courses to en-
able these to be acquired and used 
in a flexible way. In a number of 
Member States, including Italy, 
Sweden and Finland, the general 
education content in vocational 
education and training has been in-
creased in recent years and some of 
the barriers between general and 
vocational education and training 
removed by allowing more individ-
ual choice of courses. 
There is also some trend towards 
trying to ensure that all children 
have some idea of technology in 
111 Public expenditure on youth measures in Member 
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order to help create a broad-based 
technological culture from early on. 
In Denmark, there are special intro-
ductory courses of 2-5 days for 
pupils in their 8th and 9th years 
who want to enter commercial and 
technical education and training. In 
Luxembourg, the 'work-life' project 
is aimed at raising awareness about 
the world of work at an early stage 
and at helping children make a 
more informed choice about voca-
tional education. 
Many Member States have intro-
duced guarantees of training 
opportunities for young people leav-
ing the education system, though 
the training offered varies in scope 
and length. 
In Belgium, those leaving school 
under-qualified can enter 'promotion 
sociale', which is training tailored to 
individual abilities, designed to pro-
vide relevant skills for work. In 
Spain, a 'social or training guaran-
tee' consisting of a number of special 
programmes aimed at providing 
'middle level' training for up to two 
years has been introduced to ensure 
that young people do not leave the 
education system unqualified. In 
Portugal, the Government and social 
partners concluded an agreement in 
1991 to guarantee at least one year's 
initial vocational training to young 
people, especially those leaving the 
education system with few or no 
qualifications. In the UK, 'Youth 
Credits' are being progressively in-
troduced for 16-17 year olds which 
can be exchanged for training lead-
ing to a recognised qualification, 
with the aim of motivating young 
people to train, of encouraging em-
ployers to invest in training and of 
establishing an efficient market in 
training. 
In Finland and Sweden, the upper-
secondary school systems are 
designed to accommodate all young 
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people moving from compulsory 
schooling. In Sweden, everyone has 
a right to such education and mu-
nicipalities have an obligation to 
organise this in accordance with 
the wishes of young people. In addi-
tion, upper secondary school course 
have been extended to include a 
third year of vocational training. In 
Finland, grants to general and vo-
cational upper-secondary schools 
ensure that there is no shortage of 
finance to accommodate everyone 
wishing to enter. 
The expansion of vocational train-
ing throughout the European Union 
has helped reduce youth unemploy-
ment. Several Member States also 
provide financial incentives to em-
ployers to take on young people. 
Youth measures 
Expenditure on labour market pro-
grammes for young people is 
highest relative to GDP in Portugal, 
Denmark, Ireland and Sweden, 
though there was no general tend-
ency for spending to increase in the 
early 1990s as youth unemploy-
ment rates rose. While there was a 
marked rise in Finland, France, 
Sweden and Denmark, spending 
declined in Luxembourg, the UK, 
Portugal and Ireland (Graph 111). 
Several Member States have job 
guarantee programmes for unem-
ployed youth. In the Netherlands, 
this programme gives all those 
under 21 unemployed more than 
6 months the right to a job. In 
Denmark, municipal authorities are 
obliged to give young people (under 
25) an activation offer after being 13 
weeks on social assistance. In 
Belgium, permanent youth employ-
ment guarantee programmes have 
been introduced. In the Flemish 
region, guaranteed employment is 
provided in the public sector for the 
young very long-term unemployed 
(those under 25 who have been out of 
work for more than two years), with 
employers being paid the minimum 
wage by the Government. In the 
Walloon region, the local recruit-
ment plan enables municipalities to 
employ young long-term unem-
ployed people for up to three years. 
In Ireland, following the 1995 Bud-
get, employers are entitled to a two 
year exemption from social contribu-
tions in respect of new recruits under 
23 years. In Sweden, vocational 
training for young people has been 
expanded by increasing the capacity 
of upper secondary schools to accom-
modate people in the third year and 
of universities to admit people. In 
addition, several programmes, such 
as European scholarships and com-
puter training centres, have been 
introduced and those unemployed 
between 20 and 24 can enter the 
'Introduction to Working Life' pro-
gramme consisting of an on-the-job 
traineeship for up to four months 
followed by paid employment for at 
least six months with the same em-
ployer, the aim being to ensure that 
all young people are employed, in 
education or on a labour market 
programme within 100 days of 
becoming unemployed. In Finland, 
the number of starting places in 
vocational training has recently 
been increased, with emphasis on 
apprenticeships as a means of reduc-
ing youth unemployment, and 
special employment services have 
been established for the young. 
Wage subsidies 
In a number of Member States, in-
cluding Greece, Belgium, France, 
Finland and Portugal, there are 
subsidies to encourage the recruit-
ment of young people. In Belgium, 
for example, employers hiring 
people under 26 who have been un-
employed for 6 months are exempt 
from all social contributions in the 
first year, 75% in the second and 
50% in the third. 
Older workers 
The European Union population is 
on average becoming older and 
traditional attitudes towards the 
elderly and their role in society is 
tending to change. Growing num-
bers of people reaching retirement 
age would like to continue working. 
While the main labour market 
measures in Member States are 
targeted at young people and long-
term unemployed, there is an 
evident need to take more account 
of this desire. 
In several Member States, includ-
ing Austria, Belgium, Germany and 
France, there are signs of moves in 
this direction. In Austria, early 
retirement is being restricted. In 
Germany, those unemployed aged 
over 50 are entitled to a subsidy of 
up to 75% of earnings for a job last-
ing 5-8 years. In Portugal, funding 
has been increased for the long-
term unemployed over 45 starting 
their own business. In Spain, em-
ployers pay 75% less in social 
contributions on temporary con-
tracts concluded with those 
unemployed aged 45 or over. In 
Sweden, it is planned to introduce a 
wage subsidy of half of the cost of 
wages for long-term unemployed 
aged over 60. 
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Section 1 Labour costs, social charges and employment 
Essen Conclusions: "The measures to be taken should 
include ... reducing non-wage labour costs extensively 
enough to ensure that there is a noticeable effect on decisions 
concerning the taking on of employees and in particular 
of unqualified employees. 
The first reports will be used to examine ... the effects of tax 
and support systems on the readiness both to create and to 
take up jobs." 
High and persistent levels of 
unemployment in the European 
Union have prompted a search for 
measures for increasing the rate 
of job creation in virtually all 
Member States in recent years. 
One increasing focus of policy has 
been, on the one hand, on the large 
number of unemployed with rela-
tively few qualifications and 
comparatively low skill levels and, 
on the other, on the costs involved in 
employing such people. 
In particular, attention has been 
directed at ways of reducing labour 
costs to employers, especially those 
taking on young people and/or 
workers with relatively low skill 
levels, to bring the costs of employ-
ment more into line with the 
additional value-added likely to be 
generated and, therefore, to give 
employers more incentive to create 
jobs. At the same time, there is 
widespread concern to avoid any sig-
nificant reduction in the income 
received by those towards the bottom 
end of the earnings scale who might 
already be close to the poverty line. 
In other words, the aim across much 
of the Union has been to avoid 
solving one problem — high unem-
ployment — by creating another — a 
growth in the numbers of working 
poor. 
This has led to the active consider-
ation in a number of Member States 
and, indeed, at Union level, of the 
possibility of reducing the scale of 
social charges — ie social security 
contributions — imposed on em-
ployers taking on relatively low paid 
workers. Indeed, in some Member 
States, selective measures of this 
kind have been introduced in the 
past year or two, concentrated espe-
cially on relieving the charges levied 
in respect of those previously unem-
ployed (see Part II of this Report 
above). 
At the same time, in many Member 
States reviews have been initiated of 
the way in which social protection 
systems and certain other collective 
services, such as health care, are 
funded, with the aim of assessing the 
potential advantages of moving 
away from a pattern of financing 
which, through social contributions 
in particular, seems to impose a tax 
on employment. This, however, 
raises fundamental and potentially 
far-reaching questions about the 
basic principles on which social pro-
tection systems have been developed 
— in particular, that entitlement to 
benefit should be linked to contribu-
tions and employers should bear 
some responsibility for the costs of 
social support for their employees 
when they can no longer work (see 
Social Protection in Europe 1995, 
forthcoming, for a summary descrip-
tion of the social protection systems 
obtaining in the Member States). 
The concern here is to examine the 
scale of charges on employment in 
different parts of the Union, includ-
ing not only the social contributions 
levied on employers, but also the con-
tributions and taxes on pay levied on 
employees. These affect the gross 
wage which employers need to pay 
since they determine the take-home 
earnings of employees or, in other 
words, what the latter are prepared 
to work for. In general, therefore, the 
demand for labour on the part of 
employers is affected by total labour 
costs (the gross wage plus employers' 
social contributions and other non-
wage labour costs) and labour supply 
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by what employees receive as pay 
after the deduction of payroll taxes 
and other charges. 
The focus of this chapter is on the 
overall difference between total 
labour costs and take-home pay, or 
what is usually termed the tax 
wedge, and on the different elements 
which this comprises, and, in par-
ticular, on the size of this at the lower 
end of the earnings scale, where 
labour costs are likely to be a more 
important determinant of job 
creation than at the upper end. 
Outline 
A major aim, therefore, is to compare 
the scale of social charges and taxes 
which apply to the employment of 
workers on low rates of pay across 
the Union in order to give an indica-
tion of the differential disincentive 
which exists against taking on such 
people. The broader objective is to 
examine rates of contribution and 
taxes levied at various levels of 
earnings on workers with differing 
family circumstances in the various 
Member States, to analyse how these 
change as pay and labour costs 
increase or decline and to compare 
the characteristics of the fiscal sys-
tem in the European Union in these 
respects with those in the US. The 
analysis is based on a detailed model 
of the tax and social insurance 
system in each Member State and 
in selected American States which 
has been constructed (by the Central 
Planning Bureau in the Nether-
lands) to enable estimates to be 
made of the charges payable both by 
employee and employer in particular 
cases at widely differing earnings 
levels. 
As such, it extends the analysis 
included in Employment in Europe 
1994 (Chapter 6), which was 
restricted by the availability of data 
to analysing the tax and social con-
tributions paid by someone on 
average earnings and on 80% and 
125% of average earnings. It enables, 
in particular, the level of taxes and 
social charges to be assessed and 
compared at rates of pay well below 
the average, which is where policy 
aimed at reducing labour costs is at 
present being directed. 
It also enables account to be taken of 
the effect on charges and disposable 
income of other fiscal measures, spe-
cifically housing benefits and 
various credits and allowances, such 
as the family credit in the UK, avail-
able to low wage earners with 
children and complementary social 
assistance in Luxembourg which set 
an effective floor to the income of 
those on low pay. These can be im-
portant in some countries in 
changing the apparent scale of de-
ductions from earnings as well as the 
marginal rate of deduction as pay 
increases. Indeed in certain cases, 
the inclusion of these items can sig-
nificantly alter the conclusions 
reached about the impact of the fiscal 
system on earnings and their poten-
tial disincentive effects. At the same 
time, however, they add a further 
layer of complication in that their 
value depends in individual cases 
not just on family circumstances but 
also on housing and similar costs 
which will vary from person to per-
son in a way which is difficult to 
predict. 
Average tax and 
contribution rates 
Social contributions 
levied on employers 
As is by now well known, the aver-
age rate of social contribution levied 
by governments on employers 
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The data and method 
used in the analysis 
The analysis in this chapter is based heavily on a model 
of the tax and social protection system developed by 
the Central Planning Bureau in the Hague for the 
Commission Services. It enables the social contribution 
and taxes payable by a single person, a married couple 
and a couple with two children to be estimated at 
different levels of gross earnings. It also enables the 
unemployment benefit or social assistance receivable 
by such a person to be estimated, taking account of 
their age and employment record. The new Member 
States were not included in the exercise and, therefore, 
were not incorporated in the analysis. The exercise did 
include, however, three selected US States, New York, 
California and Texas and the figures in the text and in 
the graphs labelled US are an average of the former 
two States. 
The average gross wage of a male manual worker in 
industry, as estimated by OECD, has been taken as 
the benchmark against which to compare rates in the 
different Member States and to assess the way that 
these change as earnings and family circumstances 
vary. Although other figures for the average could have 
been used instead, it should be emphasised that the 
results depend only to a minor extent on the precise 
figure used for the benchmark. It does not mean, in 
particular, that the results apply only to workers in 
industry or even only to full-time workers. Indeed when 
interpreting the results for those on low earnings, it 
should be borne in mind that a large number of 
workers, especially women, are employed part-time 
and, therefore, may earn a wage which represents only 
a small proportion of the average as defined here. 
Partly for convenience in the analysis, employees' 
social contributions are included with taxes and are 
treated in the same way as a deduction from gross 
earnings and it is assumed that wage earners are likely 
to react in the same way to both. In practice, this is a 
gross simplification. As noted in the text, employees 
might well treat social contributions whether paid by 
themselves or by employers on their behalf as future 
income in some degree rather than as taxes and, there-
fore, as equivalent to part of their earnings. How far 
they are likely to be indifferent to a rise in take-home 
pay and an increase in employers' or employees' social 
contributions depends in part on how closely benefits 
are tied to contributions — whether, in other words, 
increased contributions are matched by a counterpart 
increase in benefit entitlement. This will tend to vary 
from country to country according to the details of the 
social protection in force. 
varies markedly across the Union, 
from 30% of the total cost of emplo-
ying someone on the average 
earnings of a (male) manual worker 
in manufacturing in Italy in 1993 
— an addition of over 41% to their 
gross wage — almost 27% in 
France, 25% in Belgium and 24% in 
Spain, to around 10%- of the total 
cost in Ireland and the UK and 
under 5% in Denmark (Graph 112, 
in which, it should be noted, 
employers' contributions relate 
only to statutory charges levied 
as part of the social protection 
system; discretionary contribu-
tions paid by employer which 
also form part of indirect labour 
costs are considered below — see 
Box for a description of the data 
used). 
Since these rates are in the main 
proportional to gross pay, they 
are the same in most countries 
over the range of wage levels paid 
to the large majority of the work 
force. (They tend to decline as earn-
ings rise above a certain point since 
in the majority of countries a ceiling 
is imposed on the maximum 
amount payable in respect of any 
employee, which reflects the 
counterpart ceiling on benefits. 
This point varies somewhat be-
tween countries, though mostly it is 
between 1V2 times and 4 times 
average earnings.) 
The two main exceptions are 
Denmark, where a flat-rate charge 
is levied, which makes it regressive 
in relation to pay but the amount is 
small in relation to earnings, and 
the UK, where employers pay noth-
ing on employees on very low wages 
(below around 20%< of average earn-
ings) and reduced rates on a sliding 
scale for those on wages below 70% 
of the average. On the other hand, 
in the UK because of the low levels 
of basic state pensions which exist, 
it is also the case that many 
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employers, though by no means all, 
contribute to private pension 
schemes on behalf of their em­
ployees. This tends to increase in 
some degree the average rate of 
social contribution — discretionary 
plus statutory — actually paid by 
employers in the UK relative to 
that in other Member States and 
should be borne in mind throughout 
the following analysis. (In the 
Netherlands, the contribution rate 
also varies with earnings but only 
to a minor extent on earnings below 
the average.) 
The level of social contributions 
levied in Europe tends to be much 
higher than in other parts of the 
world. At the same time, however, 
employers in other countries tend 
to pay more in non-statutory con­
tributions which provide the access 
to benefits and services which 
statutory charges provide in 
Europe. Although such contribu­
tions are nominally discretionary, 
in practice, they have become con­
ventional, at least so far as most 
reputable employers are concerned, 
and apply to most full-time jobs, 
though at more variable rates 
than is the case for statutory 
charges. These contributions have, 
therefore, to be taken into account 
in any meaningful comparison of 
European countries with those else­
where. 
For example, in the US, statutory 
contributions amounted to under 
10% of labour costs for employees on 
the average wage of a production 
worker in 1993. However, most 
employers also covered at least part 
of the health care insurance costs of 
most of their employees, which 
added another 3^4% or more to what 
they paid in social contributions. 
Even leaving possible contributions 
to pensions out of account, therefore, 
the effective level of social charges on 
employers in the US for a single 
person on average wages was around 
13% of labour costs, more than in 
Denmark, Ireland or the UK, on a 
par with Luxembourg and not much 
lower than in Germany (where it was 
around 16%) (Graph 112). If the em­
ployee has a family and the employer 
covers health care insurance costs, 
then social contributions can ap­
proach 20%, not far below the 
average for the European Union 
(Graph 113). 
Indirect labour costs 
Social contributions on employers 
levied by government are, as noted 
above, only one element of indirect 
labour costs paid by businesses, 
though in the Union they tend to be 
by far the largest component, others 
include contributions to vocational 
training and to private insurance 
schemes, but not bonuses or holiday 
pay which are included in direct 
costs. Results from the Community 
Labour Cost Survey (which have 
only very recently become available 
for 1992) give some indication of the 
overall importance of these indirect 
costs in Union Member States and 
elsewhere. They show that while the 
level of indirect labour costs in 
Europe, especially to cover social 
security, are higher than in either 
the US or Japan, the extent of the 
difference in most cases is not large, 
and for five Member States, the level 
is below that in these two countries. 
In total, taking the figures for in­
dustry alone, which are most 
relevant for assessing the potential 
effects on relative costs of produc­
tion, in four countries in Europe, 
Belgium, France, Italy (probably 
since data are only available for 
1988) and Sweden, indirect labour 
costs were, on average, around 30% 
of the total costs of employment in 
1992, with the figure in Sweden 
being just over 31%. Moreover, in 
113 Average deduction rate for a couple at the 
average wage in Member States and US, 1993 
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Spain, they were only slightly lower 
than this at 28% (Graph 114 ). At 
the other end of the scale, five 
Member States — Denmark, where 
they were under 4%, Greece, 
Ireland, Luxembourg and the UK — 
had average levels below 20% of 
labour costs. 
These levels were also below those 
in both the US and Japan, where in 
each case they were around 22% 
(though in the US, the figure is 
likely to be higher, perhaps around 
24-25%, since this relates only to 
the social security element). 
In most Member States, the level of 
indirect costs in relation to the total 
remained much the same between 
1988 and 1992. Only in three cases, 
Spain, France and the Netherlands 
— in the first, up, in the latter two, 
down — did it change by more 
than one percentage point over 
this period. (As Part II, Section 3 
indicates, however, a number of 
Member States have introduced 
measures to reduce indirect costs 
since 1992.) 
Deductions from gross 
earnings for someone 
on average wages 
In some degree, there is an inverse 
relationship across the Union 
between the level of social contribu­
tions levied on employers and the 
scale of contributions and taxes on 
income paid by employees. This re­
flects the fact that low contributions 
do not necessarily signify a low level 
of provision of social protection and 
collective services, but rather a 
greater reliance on tax as a means 
of financing expenditure. Denmark, 
which has the lowest rate of em­
ployers' contributions, has one of 
the highest levels of expenditure on 
social services in the Union. The 
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social contributions and taxes 
which employees pay on their earn­
ings, therefore, vary substantially 
between Member States. (The two 
are treated here as largely synony­
mous, on the grounds that, to a 
significant extent, they will tend to 
be perceived in the same way by the 
person concerned: they each repre­
sent a statutory deduction from 
gross earnings and, though the pay­
ment of contributions may give 
entitlement to various kinds of 
benefit, including a retirement pen­
sion, this is not so different from the 
payment of taxes which are used to 
provide collective services as well as 
benefits, even if there may be a less 
close link between what is paid and 
what is received — see Box p. 122.) 
While employees' contributions, 
like those of employers, generally 
vary in proportion to earnings in 
Member States, at least up to a 
certain wage level somewhere 
above the average — except for the 
countries mentioned above — taxes 
on pay are progressive everywhere 
and rise more than in proportion to 
earnings. For a single person on the 
average manufacturing worker's 
wage in 1993, the average rate of 
contribution ranged from 19% of 
labour costs in the Netherlands 
(just over 23% of the gross wage) 
and around 15'/2% in Germany and 
14V2% in France to 5% in Spain and 
only 2% in Denmark. 
On the other hand, the rate of in­
come tax at average male earnings 
for a single person was considerably 
high in the latter country than else­
where in the Union, at over 42% of 
labour costs (44% of the gross 
wage). This served to reduce net 
earnings of the employee in ques­
tion — their disposable income — 
to only just over half of the overall 
cost of their labour to the employer. 
Almost 50% of this cost, therefore, 
went to the state in one form or 
124-Section 1 Labour costs, social charges and employment 
another (without taking account of 
the indirect taxes paid on what the 
employee spent out of their dispos-
able income). 
Ireland, which like Denmark, also 
has relatively low social contribu-
tion rates, had the second highest 
rate of income tax in the Union for 
someone on average earnings 
in 1993, though at 21% of total 
labour costs, this was half the 
Danish rate. While in the UK, the 
other country with low contribution 
rates, the rate of income tax on 
average earnings was also above 
the average in the Union (at 16%), 
it was, nevertheless, below the rate 
in Belgium, a country with among 
the highest rates of social contribu-
tion in Europe. Indeed, the overall 
payment of tax and social charges in 
Belgium was significantly above 
that in most other Member States, 
almost 55% of the cost of employing 
someone on the average wage going 
to the state and only just over 45% 
going to the employee. 
Apart from in Belgium, in all 
Member States, the net earnings 
received by a single person on the 
average wage in 1993 amounted to 
more than half of the cost of their 
labour, even if in Germany, Italy 
and the Netherlands, as well as in 
Denmark, it was only slightly 
above. In the three Southern, less 
developed, countries — Greece, 
Spain, and Portugal — as well as in 
Luxembourg and the UK — the 
country with the lowest combined 
rate of tax and contributions — it 
was over 60%. 
This was also true in the US, where 
there was a similar division of 
labour costs between taxes, con-
tributions and take-home pay as in 
the UK, though with a slightly 
higher contribution rate and lower 
taxes. For the single worker in ques-
tion, therefore, the deductions from 
labour costs in the US were on a 
comparable scale to those in low tax 
areas of Europe (US figures quoted 
in here and elsewhere are an aver-
age of two US States as explained in 
the Box, p. 122). 
The effect of differences 
in family circumstances 
If the analysis is broadened to in-
clude workers with different family 
circumstances, with spouses and 
children, the results are somewhat 
different, since countries vary con-
siderably in the way they treat 
dependants from a fiscal point of 
view. In all Member States of the 
Union, families with children are 
entitled to allowances or benefits at 
differing rates and in many cases to 
some tax relief. In all countries, 
moreover, workers with dependent 
spouses pay less taxes than single 
people. 
In the case of an employee with a 
dependent spouse, tax concessions 
tend to be higher in the more de-
veloped and prosperous Member 
States than elsewhere, which, 
therefore, serves to narrow the ex-
tent of differences in the overall tax/ 
contribution burden — and in net 
earnings after tax — across the 
Union. Thus, whereas in Belgium, 
Denmark, Germany and 
Luxembourg, the effect of a depend-
ent spouse is to reduce the income 
tax levied on employees by 6% of 
labour costs or more, in Greece, 
Spain and Portugal, it is reduced by 
only around 2% or less (Graph 113, 
in which disposable income as well 
as the net wage is shown; the two 
are the same in this case, except for 
Greece, though they will differ if 
family or other allowances are 
paid). This is also the case in the 
UK, the country with the lowest ef-
fective tax burden for a worker 
without dependants, where income 
tax is reduced by under 3% of labour 
costs. In contrast, in Ireland, a 
country with relatively high tax 
rates, it is reduced by 7%, resulting 
in the combined amount of social 
contributions and tax being much 
the same in relation to labour costs 
for a married couple as in Spain or 
Portugal, whereas for a single per-
son it is higher. 
Greece is the only country in the 
Union where family circumstances 
alter the rate of employers' con-
tributions. Here, the social charge 
levied on employers, who directly 
pay for family support, was higher 
by just over 7% of labour costs in the 
case of an employee with a depend-
ent spouse. As a result, the tax 
burden on such an employee was 
reduced to a similar extent as in the 
more developed parts of the Union, 
though at the expense of increased 
labour costs for employers. (For 
Greece, disposable income in rela-
tion to labour costs is the same for 
a couple as for a single person be-
cause of the higher labour costs, but 
the employee receives more in abso-
lute terms.) 
Taking account of family circum-
stances also alters comparisons 
between Europe and the US. While 
there are also tax concessions for 
dependent spouses in the US, on the 
same scale as those in the more 
developed parts of the European 
Union, which increase an em-
ployee's disposable income, 
employers' social contributions 
tend to be higher as well, specifi-
cally as regards paying for health 
care (though this is voluntary 
rather than obligatory). In conse-
quence, labour costs tend to be 
higher in respect of worker with a 
dependent spouse than for a single 
person, in the same way as in 
Greece, and the total charges 
payable in the form of income tax 
and social contributions out of 
- 125-Section 1 Labour costs, social charges and employment 
labour costs are correspondingly 
increased relative to those in most 
European countries. 
Including children in the calcula-
tions changes the comparative 
results even more. As in the case of 
tax concessions for dependent 
spouses, employees with children 
tend to receive more disposable in-
come relative to gross earnings in 
the more prosperous Member 
States than in the less developed 
ones, through higher tax relief 
and/or more generous child allow-
ances. In other words, the effective 
government take from labour costs 
is in general reduced by more in the 
former countries when there are 
children than in the latter. 
In 1993, the total deductions out of 
labour costs for a worker with a 
spouse and two children on average 
earnings were, for example, re-
duced to 46% of labour costs in 
Belgium, putting these at a similar 
level as in Italy and the 
Netherlands and below those in 
Greece (Graph 115). In the latter, 
because of the additional social con-
tributions payable by employers 
— in this case, almost 35% of labour 
costs, 53% of the gross wage paid to 
the employee — labour costs are in-
creased. The total amount paid 
from labour costs in the form of 
taxes and social contributions was, 
therefore, higher in Greece for a 
worker with two children than any-
where else in the Union, at over 
47%. 
Moreover, because of the additional 
health care costs which are likely to 
be paid by employers in the US 
(though on a voluntary rather than 
statutory basis), combined with a 
relatively small amount of tax relief, 
the overall tax plus social contribu-
tion payment out of labour costs for 
workers with children in the US is 
115 Average deduction rate for a couple with 2 children 
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increased further relative to that in 
Europe as compared with a single 
worker. In 1993, the total amount 
paid out of labour costs in these 
forms was higher in the US than in 
five European countries — Spain, 
Ireland, Luxembourg, Portugal and 
the UK — and only slightly lower 
than in Germany and France. 
Taking account of child allowances 
changes the comparative picture 
even more. These vary significantly 
in amount across the Union, from 
over 4,500 ECU a year for someone 
with two children on average earn-
ings in Luxembourg, if school 
allowances are included, to nothing 
in Spain and relatively low amounts 
in the other countries with income 
per head below the Union average, 
apart from Greece, where they 
amount to around 20%> of disposable 
income. 
In 1993, for a worker with two child-
ren on average earnings, the net 
deduction from labour costs was re-
duced to under 40% in all Member 
States, apart from Italy, where, 
because of the relatively low level of 
family allowances, it was still as 
high as 43%. Indeed, for 8 countries 
in the Union, the overall net 
amount deducted from labour costs 
was within the range 30%) to 39% 
of the cost of employment. Apart 
from Italy, the only three of the 12 
Member States to lie outside this 
range were Portugal, where net 
deductions amounted to 27% of 
labour costs, the UK, where they 
were 24% and Luxembourg, where 
they were under 8%>. 
In the US, where no child allow-
ances were payable for someone on 
average earnings, the net deduction 
out of labour costs was similar to 
that in most parts of the Union. 
There is a an additional factor to be 
taken into account in France. Here, 
126 Section 1 Labour costs, social charges and employment 
because of relatively generous hous-
ing benefits, a worker on average 
earnings paying a typical level of 
rent for someone with this income 
and with two children, is eligible for 
a sizeable amount in this respect 
— around 10% or more of their 
gross wage. This serves to reduce 
net deductions even further and to 
raise the disposable income of em-
ployees relative to labour costs. 
Indeed, after allowing for the pay-
ment of housing benefit, the net 
deduction out of labour costs in 
France in this particular case was 
similar to that in the UK in 1993 
and lower than in every Member 
State except Luxembourg. 
Nevertheless, including housing 
benefits in the estimation raises 
certain problems. In the first place, 
the amount of benefit entitlement is 
likely to vary significantly from 
person to person according to the 
housing costs incurred. Secondly, 
payment of benefit is not automatic, 
as is that of tax or social contribu-
tions, but has to be claimed. 
Accordingly, it cannot necessarily 
be assumed that everyone entitled 
to receive payment will actually 
make a claim or that claims will be 
met quickly. Thirdly, housing 
benefit is also payable to someone 
not in work — as indeed are child 
allowances. How far a worker takes 
housing benefit into account when 
assessing earnings from employ-
ment and how far it influences their 
behaviour — in respect of working 
or not working or seeking to im-
prove their job — is, therefore, open 
to question. 
Tax and contribution 
rates on low earnings 
Since, as noted at the outset, the 
main focus of concern about the 
level of labour costs relates to those 
with relatively few skills who are 
capable of making a comparatively 
small contribution to a firm's value-
added, it is the social contributions 
and taxes levied on the employment 
of such workers which are the sub-
ject of most policy interest at 
present. In most Member States, 
the amount of these in relation to 
labour costs is significantly differ-
ent than for someone on average 
earnings, largely because of the 
lower rates of income tax to which 
they are subject. The extent of the 
difference, moreover, is by no 
means uniform across the Union, 
reflecting the marked variations 
in the schedule of tax rates 
which exist. Nevertheless, in 
general, countries which have 
low rates of deduction from labour 
costs for those on average earnings, 
also tend to have low rates of deduc-
tion for those lower down the pay 
scale. 
As noted above, only in the UK is the 
rate of social contributions generally 
paid by employers for someone on a 
relatively low wage significantly 
lower than for someone on average 
earnings, though it is slightly less in 
Denmark and the Netherlands and, 
in a number of countries, lower in 
selected cases (for young people 
and/or those who have been unem-
ployed), as also noted above. In 1993, 
employers' contributions in the UK 
for someone on 50% of the average 
wage of a manual worker in manu-
facturing was only 6% of labour 
costs, about the same as in Denmark 
where contributions are set at a low 
flat-rate. 
Partly because of this, the total de-
duction of social contributions and 
taxes in the UK for a single person 
on this level of earnings was mar-
kedly lower than anywhere else in 
the Union, at just over 22% of labour 
costs (Graph 116). Nevertheless, in 
four other Member States, Spain, 
Ireland, Portugal and Luxembourg, 
the overall deduction amounted to 
less than 30% of labour costs, 
though, in the case of Spain and 
Portugal, by far the greater part of 
this deduction fell on employers 
rather than employees. 
In Greece, where deductions were 
also comparatively low at average 
earnings, the percentage of labour 
costs deducted at 50% of the aver-
age wage, 34%, is only slightly 
different than at the average wage 
— by less than 2 percentage 
points — since most of the deduc-
tion consists of social contributions 
which are proportional to income. 
Because the rate of income tax is 
both very low and only slightly pro-
gressive, the tax system in Greece 
overall is less progressive than any-
where else in the Union. 
In the six other Member States, the 
total deduction from labour costs 
even for someone paid only 50% of 
average earnings was over 40% in 
1993 — in Belgium, as much as 
44%. 
In Denmark and France, however, 
a person on earnings as low as this 
would probably have been eligible 
for housing benefit. This would 
have raised their disposable income 
by around 10% in France if their 
rent was at a typical level, reducing 
net deductions to just over 30% of 
labour costs, similar to the level in 
Spain and Portugal — and Ireland 
and Luxembourg — and with much 
the same proportion falling on em-
ployers. In Denmark, housing 
benefits might have raised dispos-
able income by 3-4%, leaving net 
deductions of tax and social con-
tributions still at some 40% of 
labour costs. 
Deductions in the US for someone on 
50% of average earnings are some-
what less than they are in Denmark, 
but the difference is not substantial. 
127 Section 1 Labour costs, social charges and employment 
In 1993, for a single person on this 
wage level, the total amount of social 
contributions and tax payable 
amounted to just over 30% of labour 
costs, half falling on employers, half 
on employees. This level of deduction 
is around the same as in France, if 
housing benefits are taken into ac-
count, slightly lower than that in 
Greece but above that in five other 
Member States. 
This assumes, however, that em-
ployers pay health care insurance 
costs. If they do not the overall de-
duction in the US amounted to just 
under 30% of labour costs in 1993, 
on a par with Spain, Ireland, 
Luxembourg and Portugal. In this 
case, however, employees would 
have to pay their own health insur-
ance which would reduce their 
disposable income accordingly. 
Relatively few men, at least of 25 
and over and working full-time, are 
likely to earn less than 50% of the 
average wage for a male worker in 
manufacturing. Nevertheless, a 
significant proportion of women, 
as well as young people, will 
have earnings below this in most 
Member States. The comparative 
pattern of tax and contribution 
rates as between Member States, 
however, does not change greatly if 
the calculations are carried out for 
even lower earnings levels. 
At 40% of the average wage, for 
example, total deductions for a 
single person still amounted to 
around 40% of labour costs in 1993, 
in Belgium, Italy and France, if 
housing benefits are ignored (a high 
proportion of women and young 
people are probably not eligible for 
such benefits because housing costs 
are paid by their parents or hus-
bands), and to around 35% in 
Denmark, Germany, Greece and 
the Netherlands. In Spain and 
116 Average deduction rate for a single person at 50% of 
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Portugal, moreover, the rate of 
overall deduction was similar to 
that at half average earnings, at 
just under 30%, as it was in Ireland, 
where the rate falls with earnings 
as income tax is reduced. In 
Luxembourg and the UK, however, 
the rate declines to below 20% of la-
bour costs at this level of earnings. 
This is substantially less than the 
rate in the US, which remains at 
around 30% in 1993 (or just over 
25% if health care insurance is 
excluded). 
The effect of differences 
in family circumstances 
The amount of tax and contribu-
tions payable in respect of a single 
person on low wages is particularly 
relevant from a policy perspective 
since a significant proportion of 
those for whom increased job oppor-
tunities are sought are young 
people, most of whom will not be 
married or have children. Never-
theless, many will also be people 
with dependants for whom the 
amount of labour costs paid in tax 
and social contributions will be 
somewhat different. 
As for someone on average ear-
nings, the effect of taking account of 
family circumstances is generally to 
narrow the extent of differences in 
combined tax and contribution de-
duction rates which exist across the 
Union. In the case of a worker on 
50% of the average wage with a 
dependent spouse as compared 
with a single person, the amount 
of deductions paid out of total 
labour costs in 1993 is reduced par-
ticularly significantly in Denmark 
and Germany from over 40% to 
around 30%, while in Belgium and 
the Netherlands, it is reduced from 
around 45% to under 40% and in 
Italy, from over 40%« to under 35% 
- 128 Section 1 Labour costs, social charges and employment 
Graph 117). Though it is also re-
duced in Ireland and the UK to 
below 20%, it remains broadly un-
hanged in Greece, Spain, 
Luxembourg and Portugal, coun-
tries with low deduction rates for 
single workers. 
In the US, the rate of deduction is 
also lower for a worker on half aver-
age earnings with a dependent 
spouse than for a single person, at 
around 24% of labour costs, less 
than in all countries in the Union, 
except Ireland and the UK. 
In Luxembourg, moreover, a 
worker on this level of earnings 
with a dependent spouse is eligible 
for complementary social assist-
ance even though in paid 
employment. This effectively sets a 
floor on their level of disposable 
income and, in 1993, added some 
20% to their net wage, so offsetting 
virtually all of the contributions 
and income tax payable. 
amounting to around 5% of dispos-
able income). 
Because, with the exception of the 
UK, these countries have relatively 
high rates of tax, taking account of 
housing benefits tends further to 
narrow the extent of differences 
between countries. In France, the 
net deduction from labour costs is 
reduced in 1993 to below 30% and in 
Denmark to just over 25% for a 
couple on 50% of the average wage, 
assuming they have an average level 
of rent — ie to a level below Spain 
and Portugal — in the Netherlands 
to around 30%, the same level as in 
Spain, and in the UK, to below 15%. 
Including children in the compari-
son makes an even greater 
difference. The payment of child 
allowances to a worker with two 
children on 50% of average earnings 
reduced the overall net deduction of 
tax and contributions in 1993 to 
20% of labour costs or below in 
Belgium, Denmark and Germany 
and lowered even further below 
20% in Ireland, Luxembourg and 
the UK, while in the Netherlands 
and Italy, it reduced it below 25%, 
to a level similar to that in Spain 
(Graph 118). This left only Greece 
and France of the Member States 
with total deductions of more than 
25% of labour costs (34% and 28%, 
respectively) for someone in these 
circumstances, and the only coun-
tries in the Union apart from Spain 
and Italy with deductions at a 
significantly higher rate than in 
the US. 
The difference with the com-
parative picture for a single worker 
on average earnings is striking. 
While in Greece and Spain, the 
difference between labour costs and 
the disposable income received 
by such a worker was among the 
smallest in the Union in 1993, for a 
In addition, in Italy, a couple with 
earnings lower than average is 
eligible for household family 
benefit, which in 1993 at 50% of the 
average wage would have added 
just over 7% to disposable income, 
reducing the overall net deduction 
from labour cost to under 35%. 
The potential availability of hous-
ing benefits for those on low 
earnings also comes more into play 
for a couple then a single person, 
and even more so for couples with 
children who are likely to have 
higher costs of accommodation. In 
general, such benefits are payable 
in the higher income Member 
States, specifically, in Denmark, 
Germany, France, the Netherlands 
and the UK, though they also exist 
in Spain but in the form of a tax 
credit rather than an actual 
payment (and are included in 
the estimates discussed above, 
117 Average deduction rate for a couple at 50% of the 
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couple with two children on half 
average earnings, it was among the 
largest. Conversely, in Belgium, 
Denmark and Germany, with a 
relatively large difference for the 
former case, the difference was 
around the Union average and simi-
lar to that in the US. 
Housing benefits in the five 
Member States where they are 
available serve further to reduce 
the difference between labour costs 
and disposable income. In the 
Netherlands, they result in the net 
deduction from labour costs for a 
worker on 50% of the average wage 
with two children being lowered in 
1993 to under 20% of labour costs, 
in Denmark and Germany, to only 
around 10%, in France, to under 
7%, and in the UK, to zero. 
In the UK, in addition, workers on 
low rates of pay with families are 
also eligible for family credit, 
designed to bring their disposable 
income up to an acceptable level. In 
1993, for the worker in question, 
family credit would have added 
around 25% to disposable income, 
increasing this to well above the 
cost paid by the employer for their 
labour. Like housing benefits, how-
ever, family credit is not provided 
automatically but has to be claimed. 
Estimates are that around 25% of 
those eligible do not, in fact, claim. 
In Luxembourg, eligibility for 
complementary social assistance 
increases disposable income 
relative to labour costs to an even 
greater extent. In 1993, for a worker 
on half the average wage in manu-
facturing with two children, this 
added over 60% to net wages and 
with child allowances more than 
doubled disposable income. 
In summary, therefore, the present 
policy focus on trying to reduce 
118 Average deduction rate for a couple with 2 children at 
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labour costs at the bottom end of the 
pay scale without making workers 
who take up such jobs significantly 
worse off is against a background 
where there is already a marked 
difference in many Member States 
between what it costs an employer 
to take on a worker and what the 
worker receives in the way of dis-
posable income. In other words, 
much more than in the US, Member 
States are accustomed to raising 
the income levels of those on low 
pay. As a result, they have in some 
degree relieved employers of the 
task of ensuring acceptable wage 
rates. At the same time, over a large 
part of the Union, employers' con-
tributions on low paid jobs remain 
relatively high, increasing the diffi-
culty of firms to raise pay levels and, 
in some cases, of maintaining or 
creating such jobs. 
Labour costs 
for women 
relative to men 
As is well known, women tend to 
earn less then men and though the 
gap has narrowed over time, partly 
as a result of equal pay legislation, 
it remains significant throughout 
the Union. The purpose here is not 
to examine reasons why this gap 
should exist — how far it is due to 
women earning less for doing the 
same type of job as a man as op-
posed to women doing different, and 
lower value-added, jobs — but to 
consider the average costs of emplo-
ying women relative to men in 
different Member States and the 
relative levels of disposable income 
after taxes and social contributions 
have been deducted. 
The analysis is based on the aver-
age gross hourly earnings of women 
manual workers in industry in 1993 
as compiled by Eurostat, these 
130-Section 1 Labour costs, social charges and employment 
figures being related to the same 
series for men. While in practice 
relatively few women in employ-
ment fall into this category, it is the 
most complete set of comparative 
data on women's wages available 
and the figures for earnings of 
women non-manual workers, where 
they exist, show in most cases a 
fairly similar differential in relation 
to men's earnings. The analysis is 
restricted to some extent since the 
tax model used does not explicitly 
incorporate tax rules as they apply 
to married women which in some 
cases differ from those which apply 
to single women. The estimates are, 
therefore, confined to single 
women, though in most Member 
States, because of the right to opt 
for separate taxation, the deduction 
rates calculated will be the same or 
very similar. 
In 1993, the cost of employing a 
woman on the average earnings of 
manual women workers in manufac-
turing varied from around 85% of the 
cost of employing a man on average 
male earnings in Denmark and just 
over 80% in France to just over 70% 
in Ireland and Luxembourg and to 
only 68% in the UK (Graph 119). 
These figures are, in general, the 
same as the differences in gross 
earnings between men and women, 
though in the case of the UK, because 
of the progressive nature of social 
contributions, the difference in 
terms of labour costs is slightly 
wider, and in Denmark and the 
Netherlands, where they are re-
gressive, marginally narrower. 
The scale of deductions from labour 
costs are similar for women on aver-
age earnings as for men, though 
in each Member State, slightly 
smaller because of lower taxes on 
income — the result of the pro-
gressive nature of rates. The extent 
of the difference, however, varies 
from only around V2% of labour costs 
in Greece and 1% in Italy to 4% in 
Luxembourg and the UK and 5% in 
Ireland, with the difference in the 
other countries in each case being 
between 2% and 3% of labour costs. 
In consequence, the pattern of vari-
ation in deduction rates across the 
Union in 1993 was much the same 
as for men, with just over half of 
labour costs in Belgium being ab-
sorbed by social contributions and 
taxes and 46-47% in Denmark, 
Italy and the Netherlands, and, 
by contrast, only just over 30% in 
Luxembourg and Portugal and only 
28% in the UK. 
In the UK, Luxembourg and 
Ireland, therefore, the average cost 
of employing women as compared to 
men is lower than elsewhere in the 
Union and the proportion going in 
charges to government is also less, 
so that women retain more of what 
they earn. In Denmark, Italy and 
the Netherlands, on the other hand, 
the comparative cost is relatively 
high and, at the same time, deduc-
tions from labour costs are also 
higher than in other Member 
States. 
The apparent comparative cost 
disadvantage, however, has not 
prevented the employment of 
women reaching higher levels in 
Denmark than anywhere else in the 
Union — though perhaps the high 
relative earnings in this country are 
a consequence of the high rate of 
employment rather than a deter-
rent. 
Marginal tax rates 
As well as the average deduction 
from labour costs represented by 
taxes and social contributions, 
the marginal rate of deduction is 
also of relevance. It is this which 
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determines how much of any in-
crease in wages directly benefits the 
worker and, therefore, how much, on 
the one hand, labour costs for em-
ployers will rise for any given 
increase in pay and, on the other, 
how much incentive there is to any 
individual to seek a better job or to 
increase their work effort. (A further 
important question is the extent to 
which there is an incentive for people 
to work rather than to be unem-
ployed or inactive. This depends in 
part on the level of income support 
available under systems of social 
protection, which is an issue exam-
ined in some detail in Social 
Protection in Europe 1995, forthcom-
ing.) 
High marginal tax rates tend, there-
fore, to imply relatively large 
disincentives, though how large and 
how important relation to other fac-
tors, are questions which have been 
the subject of much debate and much 
empirical study over the years in 
many countries without clear conclu-
sions emerging. Nevertheless, other 
things being equal, any government 
should seek to keep down marginal 
tax rates to avoid possible disincen-
tive effect. Other things, however, 
are rarely equal. In the first place, 
low marginal tax rates tend to con-
flict with the equity principle that 
those who can best afford it should 
pay more in tax. As a result, income 
tax schedules are progressive in 
virtually all countries. Secondly, low 
marginal rates also conflict with the 
need for government to raise 
revenue to fund social protection sys-
tems and collective services. In 
practice, it is difficult to find the 
finance for the extensive social ser-
vices which have been developed in 
Europe while keeping marginal tax 
rates down. The continuous at-
tempts to broaden the tax base have 
in large measure been pursued with 
this end in mind. 
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Marginal rates 
at average earnings 
The relative levels of marginal rates 
of tax — or more precisely the 
marginal rate of tax and social con-
tributions combined — in Member 
States, measuring how much total 
charges change as gross earnings 
rise or fall, vary in some degree with 
average levels. The composition of 
charges, however, especially the 
split between social contributions, 
which tend to be proportional to 
earnings, and taxes, which tend to 
be progressive, is also an important 
influence. This is particularly the 
case for a single person on average 
earnings for whom complications 
like tax concessions for dependants 
or special allowances do not apply. 
In 1993, the marginal rate of deduc-
tion for such a person varied from 
66% in relation to labour costs in 
Belgium (ie almost two-thirds of 
any increase in labour costs result-
ing from an increase in earnings 
went in taxes and social contribu-
tions and only one third to the 
employee), 61% in Ireland and 
around 60% in Denmark and the 
Netherlands to 37% in Greece and 
only 31% in Spain, in both cases 
reflecting the importance of social 
contributions as compared with in-
come tax (Graph 120, which also 
shows the marginal rate of deduc-
tion out of gross earnings for 
employees — ie excluding em-
ployers' contributions from both 
numerator and denominator). In 
Spain, the marginal rate of deduc-
tion for an employee out of gross 
earnings — the rate most relevant 
for a worker, who is not much con-
cerned with how employers' 
contributions vary with pay — was 
under 10% in 1993, in Greece, under 
20%.) 
Of the other Member States, all 
apart from Portugal and the UK, 
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where they were just over 40%, had 
marginal deduction rates of over 
50% in relation to labour costs. By 
comparison, the rate in the US was 
under 40%. 
For workers on the same wage level 
with dependent spouses and child-
ren, the marginal deduction rates 
were lower than for single people in 
8 of the 12 Member States in 1993 
and the same in four — Denmark, 
Greece, Portugal and the UK 
(Graph 121). The extent of the dif-
ference in rates is most marked for 
Ireland, where the marginal deduc-
tion rate was just over 40% for a 
couple with two children at this 
level of earnings as opposed to just 
over 60% for a single person, and 
Luxembourg, where it was only 
around 257c instead of 50%. 
In the US, the marginal deduction 
rate was also lower for workers with 
dependants. In 1993, for someone 
on average earnings with two child-
ren it was around 35%, lower than 
in any European country except 
Luxembourg. 
Marginal rates 
on low paid jobs 
Although the variation between 
countries in marginal deduction 
rates for workers on below average 
earnings is similar to that described 
above, there are a number of dif-
ferences. In particular, in some 
countries, marginal rates are lower 
on low paid jobs than on more 
highly paid ones, in other countries, 
they are higher, though much de-
pends on individual and family 
circumstances. 
In 1993, there were 9 Member States 
where the marginal rate for a single 
worker tended to decline as earnings 
fell, one where it remained much the 
same — Denmark — and only two 
where the rate was slightly higher 
towards the bottom end of the in-
come scale — Italy and the UK 
(Graph 122). In these two countries, 
this reflects the progressive nature 
of income tax and, in the case of the 
UK, of social contributions, at this 
end of the scale, which is designed, 
in practice, to relieve the tax burden 
on those with low levels of pay and to 
increase their disposable income. 
The pursuit of such an objective, 
however, can give rise to high rates 
of marginal tax especially if relief is 
targeted on those below a certain 
level of earnings. As noted below, 
there is an inherent conflict, which is 
often ignored in the policy debate, 
between bringing the income of those 
on low rates of pay up to an accept-
able level and keeping down 
marginal tax rates to avoid signifi-
cant disincentive effects. 
Despite the general lower rates of tax 
prevailing at low pay levels, for a 
single worker on half average earn-
ings, in three Member States — in 
Belgium, Denmark and Italy — the 
marginal rate of deduction was over 
55% (in the first, over 60%) and in 
three other countries — Germany, 
France and the Netherlands, it was 
over 50%. Only in three countries — 
Greece, Spain and Portugal — three 
of the least developed in the Union, 
was the rate under 40% (in the two 
former, under 35%). 
The marginal rate in the US for 
such a worker was around 40%, 
similar to that in Luxembourg and 
below that in all Member States 
apart from Greece, Spain and Por-
tugal. 
Taking account of differences in 
family circumstances changes 
the comparative picture substan-
tially. In seven Member States, 
the marginal rate of deduction for a 
worker on half average earnings 
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with two children was lower than for 
a single person in 1993, in some 
cases only slightly, but in France and 
Ireland, significantly (by around 25 
percentage points in the latter). In 
two, Denmark and Portugal, it was 
much the same. In three countries — 
Italy, Luxembourg and the UK — 
however, the marginal rate was 
higher (Graph 123). This was espe­
cially so in the latter two, where the 
interplay of the tax and benefit sys­
tems, designed to maintain the 
income of those at work at acceptable 
levels, leads to very high marginal 
rates. 
In Luxembourg, this resulted in a 
marginal deduction rate of over 
100% in relation to labour costs for a 
worker with these characteristics. In 
other words, a rise in earnings at half 
the average wage led to more than 
the whole of the associated increase 
in labour costs being swallowed up 
by tax and social contributions and 
the worker's disposable income 
being reduced slightly. The reason 
for this was the guarantee of a mini­
mum level of income in Luxembourg 
through the complementary social 
assistance scheme which meant that 
any change in earnings below the 
minimum level left income unaf­
fected (except for a need to pay more 
or less out in social contributions). 
Workers on low pay, therefore, have 
their income protected against a 
possible fall in earnings, but at the 
same time, gain nothing from any 
increase in earnings. 
In the UK, the marginal deduction 
rate for someone on half average 
earnings with two children was 
around 90% in 1993, so that their 
disposable income went up by only 
10% of any increase in gross pay, 
90% going in tax and social contribu­
tions. The main reason for this was 
the operation of the Family Credit 
system, referred to above, which pro­
vides a benefit to workers with 
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families whose income falls below a 
certain level. In order to maintain 
some incentives, however, the mar-
ginal rate of benefit is less than 
100%, so that as income increases, 
payment is reduced by less than in 
proportion to the rise (in practice, the 
taper is 70%) and the worker is bet-
ter off by earning more. 
A second reason for the high margi-
nal rate in the UK is the operation of 
housing benefits which cover part of 
the accommodation expenses of 
people on low earnings. At an aver-
age level of rent (25-30% of gross 
earnings), the change in housing 
benefit entitlement adds around 7% 
to the marginal deduction rate. For 
low paid workers with families in 
particular circumstances — and by 
no means abnormal ones — the rate 
can reach even higher levels. Accord-
ing to calculations made by the 
Department of Social Security in the 
UK, if relief for the Community 
Charge as well as rent rebates is 
taken into account, the marginal de-
duction rate for a worker on around 
half average earnings below with 
families of one or two children can be 
around 95-96% and at critical points 
where eligibility for rent rebate is 
lost can be over 130%. At the same 
time, it has to be recognised that only 
around 35 thousand people, well 
under '/·>% of the work force, have 
marginal deduction rates of 90% or 
above. 
The operation of housing benefit 
schemes also affects marginal deduc-
tion rates in other countries. In 
Denmark and Germany, they were 
of the same order of importance as in 
the UK, adding some 7% to the mar-
ginal rate for families on 50% of the 
average wage, while in France and 
the Netherlands, they were slightly 
less important, adding 3-4%. (At dif-
ferent wage levels, however, they 
can be much more important, ad-
ding, for example, 15% to the 
marginal deduction rate in Denmark 
for a family with two children at 90% 
of the average wage, 18% at 70% of 
the average wage in the Netherlands 
and 22% for a couple without child-
ren at 50% of the average wage in the 
UK.) 
In addition, in some countries, the 
amounts of child allowance paid 
varies with earnings, especially at 
the bottom end of the scale (which is 
similar to the UK family credit 
scheme, though the sums involved 
tend to be smaller and are not con-
fined to those in work). In Germany, 
the reduction in allowances as earn-
ings increase added over 10% to the 
marginal deduction rate for a family 
with two children at half the average 
wage. In Spain, the phasing out of 
child allowances at just over 60% of 
average earnings pushes up the mar-
ginal deduction rate at this point by 
over 20%, while in Italy, the gradual 
reduction in allowances adds a maxi-
mum of about 8% to the marginal 
rate at just over 80% of the average 
wage. In all other Member States, 
child allowances tend to be a flat-
rate, though in some countries they 
vary with the number of children, 
which in itself serves to increase the 
marginal deduction rate (ie allow-
ances decline in relation to earnings 
as the latter rise). 
Although in the US there are no 
housing benefits as such or child 
allowances, people on very low in-
comes are entitled to food stamps 
which are intended to cover part of 
their basic needs, including housing 
costs, and which are related in part 
to family size. The reduction in these 
as earnings increased was respon-
sible for increasing the marginal rate 
of deduction at half average wages by 
just over 20% in 1993 for a worker 
with two children. As a result, the 
marginal rate in this case was 
pushed up to around 55%, higher 
than in all European Union Member 
States, except Denmark, Italy, 
Luxembourg and the UK. 
Marginal tax rates 
at different wage levels 
Since income tax systems in the 
Union tend to be progressive in the 
sense that the schedule of tax rates 
rise with earnings, it might be ex-
pected that the overall marginal 
rate of deduction from labour costs 
would also rise as wages went up. In 
practice, there is no general tend-
ency for this to be the case, partly 
because of the effects of benefits and 
allowances at the bottom end of the 
income scale, discussed above, 
partly because of the capping of 
social contributions in many coun-
tries at higher earnings levels, and 
partly because the income tax sys-
tem in many cases is not all that 
progressive. As a result, marginal 
deduction rates are similar to aver-
age rates over much of the earnings 
range in most countries and for 
most people in employment, deduc-
tion rates do not differ a great deal. 
Only in four Member States — 
Belgium, Denmark, Greece and 
Portugal — did the overall marginal 
rate of deduction in relation to labour 
costs generally increase in 1993 as 
earnings rose. 
In Belgium, it reached a level of just 
over 74% at earnings of three times 
the average and above, the highest 
at high income levels in the Union 
(Graph 124). 
In Denmark, the rate reached just 
under 70% on earnings of just above 
the average for a single worker and 
at just over l'A times the average for 
a married worker with children and 
then remained constant (Graph 
125). Here, however, the marginal 
rate was almost as high, because of 
the operation of housing benefits, 
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on earnings below the average in 
certain cases. 
In Greece and Portugal, the margi-
nal rate was uniformly higher at 
higher income levels, reaching a 
maximum of 45% in the former and 
57% in the latter, though in both 
cases, it was constant over a range of 
earnings around the average 
(Graphs 126 and 127). 
In the other Member States, margi-
nal deduction rates were either 
higher at the bottom end of the scale 
than at the top, or reached their hig-
hest levels in the middle of the 
earnings range and then declined or 
showed no clear overall pattern. 
France, Ireland, Luxembourg and 
the Netherlands fall largely into the 
latter category. 
In France, marginal rates tended for 
the most part to be higher at the top 
end of the income scale, but were as 
high in 1993 for a single person 
around average earnings and for a 
couple with children at just above the 
average as at levels well above 
(Graph 128). 
In Ireland, the marginal rate for a 
single worker was higher in the 
middle income range than on high 
incomes and for a couple with child-
ren was highest on low earnings, in 
both cases because of the nature of 
the schedule of tax rates (Graph 
129). 
In Luxembourg, though for a worker 
with dependants the marginal rate 
was much higher at low wage levels 
than at higher ones, as noted above, 
for a single person it fluctuated a 
good deal and was generally highest 
at just above average earnings 
(Graph 130). 
In the Netherlands, the marginal 
rate for a single person was much the 
same at the average wage as at high 
income levels but higher than at 
around 1V2 times the average. For a 
couple with children, it was highest 
for those on low pay — because of 
housing benefits — and then largely 
constant for earnings above the aver-
age, except for dipping at the same 
earnings levels as for a single person 
(Graph 131). In both the latter two 
countries, the behaviour of marginal 
rates at earnings above the average 
reflects in part the ceiling imposed 
on social contributions for employers 
as well as employees. 
In Spain, the marginal deduction 
rate was for the most part higher for 
those with earnings around the aver-
age than at the top or bottom of the 
income scale (Graph 132). 
For the other three Member States 
— Germany, Italy and the UK — 
marginal rates tended to be higher 
for those on low pay than those on 
high earnings. 
In Germany, the highest rates both 
for a single person and for a couple 
with two children were at earnings 
levels below the average in 1993. In-
deed, for the latter, the lowest 
marginal rates, at under 30% were 
at a level just below twice the aver-
age wage (Graph 133). 
In Italy, the marginal rate for a 
single person was much the same at 
low rates of pay as at high rates, 
while for a worker with children, it 
was highest at earnings below the 
average (Graph 134). 
In the UK, the marginal rate for a 
single person on low levels of pay — 
at below 80% of average earnings — 
was as high as at the very top of the 
income scale and at its lowest at 
around l'A times the average be-
cause of the ceiling on employees' 
social contributions. For a worker 
with a dependent family, the margi-
nal rate, as seen above, was 
considerably higher at low pay levels 
than on high incomes (Graph 135). 
Finally, in the US, as in many Euro-
pean countries, there was no clear 
pattern in the relationship between 
the marginal deduction rate and 
earnings. The marginal rate was at 
its highest for a single person at 
earnings just above the average and 
for a worker with two children, at low 
pay levels (Graphs 136). 
Concluding remarks 
A number of points emerge from the 
above analysis which are of potential 
importance for policy. In the first 
place, while the social contributions 
levied on employers vary markedly 
in scale between Union Member 
States — more so in fact than 
between the Union and the US and 
Japan — the extent of the difference 
in the overall deductions from labour 
costs, in terms of the tax and con-
tributions levied on employees as 
well as in the charge on employers, 
is much narrower. 
Moreover, if the comparisons are not 
confined to averages but take ac-
count of the substantial differences 
which exist in the scale of deductions 
at different earnings levels and for 
workers with different family cir-
cumstances, the picture is changed 
radically. Countries like Greece and 
Spain which have low deductions for 
a single person on average earnings 
have among the highest in the Union 
for workers on low pay with families, 
while countries like Belgium, 
Denmark and Germany, have levels 
of deduction which are much the 
same as in the US, and in France as 
well as Luxembourg and the UK, the 
level is significantly lower. 
A key question for policy in this re-
gard is whether in terms of the 
influence of the fiscal system on job 
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:reation it is the scale of the charges 
evied directly on employers which is 
)f most importance or whether it is 
he total deductions out of the costs 
)f employing someone. The answer is 
}y no means straightforward. Al-
though employers' contributions are 
he most tangible element so far as 
employers are concerned in that they 
ire a direct addition to the gross 
.vage paid to employees, the scale of 
deductions from the gross wage and 
;he disposable income that em-
Dloyees actually receive at the end of 
;he day will affect the gross wage 
hey are prepared to work for and, 
herefore, what employers need to 
Day. In other words, the overall level 
)f deductions, both those levied on 
employers and those paid out of em-
oloyees' gross earnings, is likely to be 
m important influence on the level 
)f wages and labour costs and on the 
lob creation process. 
By the same token, the main in-
fluence of the level of employers' 
:ontributions relative to other de-
ductions is arguably on the level of 
kvages relative to labour costs rather 
than on the scale of labour costs per 
se. In other words, the larger the 
amount of revenue collected by 
means of charges on employers, the 
lower the level of gross wages will 
tend to be. At the same, as empha-
sised in previous Employment in 
Europe reports, these relationships 
are long-term ones in the sense that 
they form part of the institutional 
structure of an economy which deter-
mines its behaviour. For example, 
the high level of employers' contribu-
tions compared to taxes on earnings 
in France or Italy have over time 
resulted in gross wages in these two 
countries being relatively low com-
pared to elsewhere (ie relative to the 
value-added generated by labour), 
just as low contributions in Denmark 
and the high taxes on earnings 
explain why gross wages are com-
paratively high. 
Nevertheless, whatever the long-
term relationship, in the short and 
medium-term at least, it is changes 
in employers' contributions which 
by altering the cost of labour affect 
the rate of job creation (ie the de-
mand for labour), while it is changes 
in payroll taxes and other charges 
on employees which by altering 
their take-home pay affect their 
willingness to work (ie the supply of 
labour). In other words, reductions 
in employers' contributions will 
tend to lower the cost of employ-
ment (as confirmed by a number of 
studies) and give an incentive for 
more jobs to be created, at least 
until behaviour in the economy ad-
justs to the new configuration of 
fiscal charges, which could take a 
number of years. 
As noted at the outset, in many parts 
of the Union, a further focus of policy 
has been to reduce the costs of em-
ployment at the bottom end of the 
labour market to encourage firms to 
maintain low-productivity jobs — at 
least temporarily — to make it easier 
for low-skilled workers to find a job 
and to stimulate job creation in new 
economic activities with compara-
tively low levels of 'marketable' 
value-added (eg social services and 
environmental protection). The ana-
lysis indicates that in a number of 
Member States, the overall govern-
ment charge on low paid workers is 
already at a relatively low level — 
indeed, in most countries, not much 
different than in the US. This, how-
ever, applies much more to workers 
with families than single people who 
make up the majority of the young 
seeking jobs for the first time. For 
these, the deduction from labour 
costs in the form of contributions and 
charges, except where selective 
exemptions or concessions apply, 
still amounts to 40% of labour costs 
or more at half average earnings in 
five Member States, though in five 
others, it is less than in the US. 
There are two dilemmas facing gov-
ernments seeking to lower charges 
at the bottom end of the scale. The 
first is that the revenue foregone has 
to be recouped in some other way — 
since it will reduce government in-
come and add to its borrowing needs. 
The second is the high rates of mar-
ginal deduction which tend to result 
from doing this. As indicated above, 
marginal rates on low paid jobs in 
Luxembourg and the UK in 1993 are 
close to 100% in many cases, or even 
higher. In consequence, for many 
workers in low paid jobs, there is 
little incentive to seek to earn more 
— or, indeed, for employers to pay 
more — and to escape from the pov-
erty trap which has been created. 
Moreover, relatively high rates of 
deductions on low pay may also help 
to create an unemployment trap in 
the sense that for some people dis-
posable income from work may be 
little different than from income sup-
port schemes when not in work (see 
the forthcoming Social Protection in 
Europe 1995 for an analysis of the 
importance of this). Such consider-
ations suggest the need for a detailed 
assessment of the effects of the 
interaction of taxes and benefits, 
especially for those on low pay, and 
of the trade-offs available to policy-
makers. For example, the only way 
of avoiding high marginal rates is to 
introduce a less steeply graduated 
schedule of allowances, credits and 
tax rates but to do this without 
lessening the effect on those at the 
very bottom is to extend the range of 
such schemes to cover those further 
up the income scale, which inevit-
ably increases the cost. 
High marginal rates are, therefore, 
an inherent feature of attempts to 
target support on the low paid and to 
reduce the cost of employing such 
people whilst trying to maintain 
their disposable income at an accept-
able level. 
- 139 Section 1 Labour costs, social charges and employment 
140 Section 2 The environment and employment 
Section 2 The environment and employment 
Essen Conclusions: "The first reports will be used to 
examine ... the inter-relationship between economic growth 
and the environment and the consequences this has for 
economic policy. 
The measures to be taken should include ... the promotion 
of initiatives, particularly at regional and local level that 
create jobs which take account of new requirement, eg in 
the environmental sphere." 
The relationship between environ-
mental protection, on the one hand, 
and economic growth and employ-
ment, on the other, is one that has 
commanded increasing attention as 
concern about the damage inflicted 
by economic activities has in-
creased. Though the objective of 
achieving high levels of employ-
ment, which in the past has been 
seen as depending on securing high 
rates of output growth, has been 
widely regarded as being in conflict 
with the equally pressing aim of 
limiting and where possible reduc-
ing the degradation of the 
environment, there is growing rec-
ognition that the two have to be 
pursued in tandem. 
At the same time, there is also in-
creasing awareness of the potential 
for job creation of environmental 
protection and improvement 
measures and for the development 
of new activities, both in this area 
and in others, such as tourism and 
leisure which stand to benefit from 
a cleaner environment, which have 
to be set against the possible loss of 
jobs in sectors which are major 
sources of ecological damage. 
Though there is an inevitable con-
cern about such losses, as well as 
about the financial costs involved, 
to both government and private 
business, in giving greater priority 
to environmental issues, it is ques-
tionable whether employment 
overall will be reduced, except poss-
ibly in the very short-term, or 
whether the costs of taking action 
now will be less than those of delay. 
The issue for policy has become not 
whether the European Union can 
afford to increase efforts to protect 
and improve the environment but 
about the scale of those efforts in 
relation to other objectives and 
about the most efficient means of 
pursuing them. 
The Maastricht Treaty (Article 2) 
states that a major objective of the 
Union is to achieve 'sustained and 
non-inflationary growth respecting 
the environment'. Transforming 
this aspiration into concrete action, 
however, has certain implications. 
It implies, first, that environmental 
considerations need to be inte-
grated directly into the formulation 
of policies generally, but especially 
economic policies. This is explicitly 
recognised in the Treaty (Article 
130R). 
Secondly, it implies an acceptance 
of the structural changes — the 
shift of labour and other resources 
between sectors of activity — which 
are inevitable consequences of such 
a shift in the orientation of policy. 
The need for a new pattern of devel-
opment in the Union is not only 
implicit in the Treaty but has been 
explicitly acknowledged in the 
programme 'Towards sustainable 
development' approved by the 
European Council and Member 
States in February 1993 and in the 
Commission 1993 White Paper, 
Growth, Competitiveness, Employ-
ment, published in December 1993 
and endorsed at the Edinburgh 
Summit. Such structural changes 
are not necessarily any greater or 
costly than those which normally 
take place as economies grow and 
adapt to new technology and the 
changing pattern of global competi-
tion. Nor are they any more likely to 
lead to higher levels of unemploy-
ment in the longer term, in the 
sense that, so long as the — often 
substantial — obstacles to the shift 
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of resources between sectors and ac-
tivities can be overcome, job losses 
in parts of the economy should be 
compensated by job gains else-
where. 
These changes, however, have to 
take place at the same time as the 
increased pace of technical advance 
and the intensification of competi-
tion on world markets, especially 
with the industrialisation of less 
developed economies in South-East 
Asia and elsewhere, are already 
forcing firms in Europe to adapt 
their methods of production more 
rapidly than ever before. Faced 
with these pressures, there is an 
understandable temptation on the 
part of both governments and busi-
ness to limit or delay the pursuit of 
environmental aims. This tempta-
tion is increased by the usual 
budgetary constraints on spending 
together with the fact that compet-
ing producers in other parts of the 
world, especially in less developed 
economies, are not necessarily fac-
ing the same restrictions on their 
activities. 
In practice, instead of being a 
reason for relegating environmen-
tal considerations in the list of 
priorities, this kind of consideration 
reinforces the need for European 
producers to focus on other aspects 
of competitiveness rather than 
simply low cost and to exploit their 
comparative advantage in having 
access to a relatively highly edu-
cated and trained work force, as 
emphasised in the White Paper 
cited above. Indeed, the implemen-
tation of higher environmental 
standards can be seen as a means of 
encouraging firms to adapt to 
cleaner technologies and to move 
into new environmentally-friendly 
product areas in advance of those in 
other countries and so attain a com-
petitive edge and stronger market 
position in the long-term. 
Thirdly, it implies a need for gov-
ernment intervention which is 
coherent and predictable over the 
long-term, so that private business 
can take decisions on how to 
produce and what products to 
develop in full knowledge of envi-
ronmental constraints and with 
sufficient information to be able to 
determine the options which are 
available. Though it may be in the 
long-term interests of companies to 
incorporate environmental con-
siderations into their policies and 
planning, the evidence indicates 
that the short-term constraints of 
competition, together with inertia 
and the reluctance to sacrifice 
immediate profits, limit the extent 
of action which is taken in the ab-
sence of legislation. At the same 
time, because it takes time to mod-
ify processes of production and to 
equip plants so that they comply 
with environmental standards, en-
vironmental protection measures 
need to be introduced gradually 
with sufficient advance warning to 
enable producers to make the 
necessary alterations to their pro-
duction methods. 
The onus on government, therefore, 
is to adopt a clear long-term 
strategy which sets the guidelines 
within which the private sector 
needs to operate so that its beha-
viour conforms with environmental 
objectives as well as with the pur-
suit of other economic and social 
goals and which ensures that suffi-
cient information is provided to 
companies about the ways of avoid-
ing or minimising polluting 
activity. In the past, uncertainty 
about government intentions and 
about the degree of enforcement of 
standards and regulations has 
limited the measures taken by 
firms to change their methods of 
production and the way they control 
emissions or organise waste dispo-
sal. 
There is also an onus on govern-
ments to choose the most efficient 
means of regulating behaviour, to 
minimise both the administration 
costs and the costs of adjustment 
imposed on business. This, in prac-
tice, tends to mean moving, where 
possible and practical, away from 
rigid controls towards market-
based instruments such as taxes 
and charges which impose the true 
costs of their activities on polluters 
(ie internalising externalities to en-
force the polluter pays principle), 
while at the same time leaving them 
free to decide the optimal way of 
modifying their behaviour. 
Fourthly, it implies a need for co-
operation on environmental policy 
which extends beyond the EuiOpean 
Union and which recognises that 
damage to the environment caused 
by certain activities cannot in many 
cases be confined within national 
boundaries. This is particularly the 
case in respect of emissions from 
fossil fuels, which, in the form of 
carbon dioxide (C02), are a major 
source of global warming and, in the 
form of sulphur dioxide (SOj), of acid 
rain and damage to forests and 
lakes. In other cases, however, the 
damage may primarily be local or 
regional, as in respect of heavy metal 
particles in the air, untreated sew-
age, contamination of local water 
reserves or despoliation of the 
countryside or urban landscapes. In 
principle, effective action to tackle 
the former can only be taken at the 
international and, preferably, global 
level. With the spread of industriali-
sation, this requires cooperation 
between developed and developing 
countries and a recognition of the 
need for substantial transfers from 
the former to the latter to help fin-
ance remedial action, and energy 
saving, in particular. 
In principle also, environmental 
damage which is local or regional in 
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scope can be left to national or lower 
level governments to tackle in the 
light of local priorities as well as the 
absorptive capacity of the local 
environment. In these areas, there-
fore, there is less need for the 
imposition of common standards 
and those adopted can justifiably 
vary from one part of the Union to 
another according to the pref-
erences of the people concerned, the 
level of economic development and 
so on. In practice, however, it is 
not always easy to identify environ-
mental damage which is purely 
local in character. Local pollution of 
water reserves or soil can spread via 
rivers or underground aquifers to 
other areas and other countries, 
especially on the European main-
land, as well as by sea to affect 
off-shore islands. Thus according to 
the new European Environment 
Agency, the most serious common 
environmental problem affecting 
the Union is pollution of ground-
water by pesticides, heavy metals 
and nitrates, followed by derelict 
industrial sites which will event-
ually contaminate the water table. 
Environmental policies agreed at 
the Union level often set a common, 
minimum set of environmental 
standards for all Member States. 
This not only serves common envi-
ronmental ends but is in line with 
the single market aim of trying 
to ensure common competitive 
conditions throughout the Union 
and of avoiding some producers 
gaining an 'unfair' advantage from 
having to comply with significantly 
lower standards than elsewhere. 
This provides, in turn, an incentive 
for the richer, more developed parts 
of the Union to help the poorer, 
less developed areas to comply with 
the standards set, just as there is for 
the Union at the global level to 
assist developing countries to meet 
international standards on 
emissions. 
In practice, environmental pro-
grammes are included in the 
support to poorer regions provided 
by the Community Structural and 
Cohesion Funds, and assistance is 
given in different forms, including 
training for the unemployed to 
equip them for the jobs created by 
protection measures as well as aid 
to investment in projects linked to 
environmental improvement. 
Outline 
The aim of this chapter is to: 
• examine the relationship be-
tween environmental protection 
and employment in its many 
aspects; 
• to outline the environmental 
policies at present being im-
plemented or considered and 
their potential implications for 
employment; 
• to give an indication of the 
number of jobs in the Member 
States of the Union which 
stand to be affected by the im-
plementation of these policies 
and the sectors in which they 
are located; 
• to review the changes in em-
ployment which have occurred 
in these sectors in recent years. 
In the light of this, it considers the 
prospects for employment growth in 
environmental activities in the 
future. It also emphasises that the 
effect on jobs of increased efforts to 
protect the environment are likely 
to be spread widely throughout the 
economy, rather than being con-
fined to environmental industries 
as such, and that these effects take 
the form of new tasks which need 
to be performed and additional 
responsibilities for management, 
both of which imply a need for train-
ing. 
Potential conflicts 
between growth and 
environmental 
protection 
The conventional wisdom in the 
past was that economic growth and 
environmental protection are con-
flicting objectives. Growth tends to 
be accompanied by increased de-
mand for energy and natural 
resources, higher levels of produc-
tion and greater use of transport, 
which other things being equal lead 
to higher levels of emissions and 
industrial waste. 
Other things, however, are not 
equal. As economies grow, they tend 
to develop more efficient, lower cost 
methods of production which save 
on resource use, including energy. 
Moreover growth itself provides the 
finance for the implementation of 
measures to protect the environ-
ment, while at the same time 
increasing the demand for such 
measures, as with higher real in-
come people come to attach more 
importance to a safer water supply, 
the clean-up of derelict sites, im-
provements in air quality and so on. 
This tends to be coupled with a long-
term shift from industry to services 
as economies develop, which of it-
self causes a decline in polluting 
activities (though not necessarily on 
a world-wide scale as developed 
economies source basic manufac-
tures from developing countries). 
As a result, many aspects of envi-
ronmental degradation, such as 
poor quality water or local air pollu-
tion tend to improve rather than 
deteriorate with economic growth 
so that the more developed and 
prosperous economies have lower 
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levels of pollution per unit of GDP 
and devote more resources to envi-
ronmental protection measures 
than less developed countries. 
Nevertheless, other aspects, par-
ticularly those associated with the 
consumption of fossil fuels tend to 
deteriorate, as other factors, espe-
cially the increased demand for 
luxury goods and services like cars, 
air travel, central heating and air 
conditioning with rising real in-
comes, offset improvements in the 
efficiency of energy use. 
This lack of relationship between 
economic growth and environmen-
tal damage, however, is dependent 
on legislation. Though growth pro-
vides the potential for pollution 
control and various kinds of clean-
up measure, it is only through 
government action that this poten-
tial is translated into reality. The 
difficulties which governments face 
in taking such action is that there 
are inevitable losers in the form of 
those whose activities are respon-
sible for the environmental damage 
it is intended to curb. Moreover, 
while these tend to be readily ident-
ifiable, the gains are usually more 
diffuse and intangible. 
Thus controls, charges or other 
measures designed to limit or pro-
hibit certain emissions or other 
forms of polluting behaviour will ine-
vitably, in the short-term at least, 
impose costs on producers and/or 
force them to adopt a less preferred, 
and, therefore, more costly method of 
production. It may also mean that 
that they divert investment, and 
managerial effort, away from im-
proving efficiency or expanding 
production towards compliance 
with environmental standards. Em-
ployment in such activities stands 
to be reduced both directly as a re-
sult of the increased costs and 
decreased demand for the product in 
question and indirectly through a 
deterioration in the competitiveness 
of domestic producers affected and 
lower world market shares. 
These potentially damaging, and 
tangible, effects on employment can 
represent a powerful case against 
taking action, particularly during 
times of slow growth when the rate 
of net job creation is already de-
pressed and when unemployment 
might be increasing. This is even 
more the case as the slowdown in 
growth will of itself tend to curb pol-
luting activity and disguise the true 
scale of the underlying problem. 
What is less tangible are the addi-
tional jobs which will be created in 
the activities benefiting from the 
action taken to offset those lost in 
the activities which are the target of 
such action. These activities may 
include construction, as new fa-
cilities for cleaner water or waste 
recycling or disposal are developed, 
the manufacture of pollution con-
trol or filtering devices and of 
new materials to replace those 
whose cost of production or cost in 
use has increased and various 
services associated with environ-
mental protection. Overall as long 
as demand and real income levels 
in the economy are maintained, 
there is no reason to expect the 
number of people in employment to 
be any less in the new situation 
than before, though they will be 
employed in slightly different acti-
vities and slightly different kinds of 
job, which implies that there may be 
transitional adjustment costs and, 
possibly, a temporary rise in unem-
ployment. Whether in practice the 
number of jobs is more or less than 
before once the transition period is 
over depends on two factors. One is 
the employment-intensity of the 
new pattern of production — and 
consumption — relative to the old, 
that is whether more or less people 
are required to produce a given level 
of output than before. The other is 
whether in fact real income levels 
can be maintained, which depends 
in turn on the effect of the action 
taken on competitiveness — that is 
whether it raises or lowers the 
share of markets taken by the pro-
ducers in the economy in question. 
On the first issue, there is little 
evidence that the employment-
intensity of production is any less in 
sectors of activity likely to benefit 
from environmental protection 
measures as compared with those 
likely to be harmed. Indeed a num-
ber of the most polluting activities 
are highly capital intensive, 
whereas a number of labour-
intensive service sectors stand to 
gain. Overall, however, the change 
in the pattern of production is likely 
to have little effect on job numbers. 
On the other hand, the jobs will be 
different in some degree, involving 
changes in the skills and qualifica-
tions required, and they may not 
necessarily be in the same location. 
Indeed, there is no compelling rea-
son why the production of the goods 
and services for which demand is 
increased should be located in the 
same places as that for which de-
mand is reduced. This implies a 
potential need both for training of 
those who take up the new jobs cre-
ated and for retraining and support 
of those who lose their jobs in sec-
tors adversely affected, combined 
perhaps with aid to assist those re-
gions where activity declines to 
restructure. 
Ultimately, whether employment 
declines or expands will depend in 
the long-term on the effect of the 
measures taken on competitiveness 
or, in other words, on the ability of 
the economy concerned to generate 
income to maintain jobs and 
achieve a desirable rate of employ-
ment growth. 
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Competitiveness and 
the environment 
Justifiably, the issue of the relation-
ship between environmental 
protection and competitiveness has 
been the focus of much debate in the 
recent past. Essentially the argu-
ment on one side is that measures 
introduced in one location — one 
country or region — which are not 
introduced elsewhere will inevit-
ably raise the relative costs of these 
and thereby reduce the competitive-
ness of the producers concerned, 
with adverse consequences for their 
ability to maintain employment. 
The counter-argument is, first, that 
the additional costs imposed on pro-
duction are unlikely to be a major 
element in determining whether a 
particular activity is profitable or 
not, and, if they are, then it raises 
serious questions about their 
longer-term viability. Secondly, 
producers who fail to adapt suffi-
ciently to new environmental 
standards will ultimately fall be-
hind their competitors eventually 
losing market share and having to 
reduce employment whatever hap-
pens in the short-term. Conversely, 
firms that are quick in reacting to 
new environmental standards 
through innovation will reap the 
benefits from the modernisation of 
their production processes. Only in 
the short-term, and to the extent 
that they are forced to adopt less 
preferred and higher cost methods 
of production, will domestic pro-
ducers be put at a competitive 
disadvantage in relation to those 
elsewhere who face no such con-
straints, so reducing their capacity 
to maintain employment and create 
new jobs. 
In the very long-term, on the other 
hand, there may be no effective al-
ternative to modifying production 
methods and what is produced 
because of the severity of the envi-
ronmental damage or the depletion 
of exhaustible resources entailed. 
Ultimately, therefore, producers 
will tend to be in the same boat 
irrespective of where they are lo-
cated and may have no possibility of 
adopting relatively low cost, but 
relatively highly polluting, methods 
of production. To the extent that 
this is the case, what seems damag-
ing to cost competitiveness in the 
short-term may well turn out to be 
advantageous in the long-term, 
since those producers introducing 
the necessary changes at an early 
stage will tend to accumulate more 
experience and know-how of the 
new ways of producing and to have 
established markets before their 
competitors. 
How important these consider-
ations are likely to be will depend 
in large measure on the kind of good 
or service concerned and the im-
portance of the changes in the 
production methods involved. The 
more extensive these changes, in 
terms, for example, of the materials 
used, the more likely is it that know-
how and experience will be key 
factors in determining long-term 
competitiveness. It will also depend 
on the importance attached by pur-
chasers to aspects of the product 
other than price, such as product 
quality and the environmentally-
friendly — or unfriendly — methods 
used in manufacture. The increas-
ing attention paid in marketing in 
Europe to environmental impact 
suggests that this latter aspect is of 
growing importance. On the other 
hand, there is less evidence that 
consumers are willing to pay a sig-
nificantly higher price for this. 
At the same time, the above dis-
cussion has been based on the 
premise that the implementation of 
environmental protection measures 
will inevitably raise production 
costs and force manufacturers to 
adopt a less cost-effective method of 
producing. In practice, this is by no 
means necessarily the case. The evi-
dence suggests that firms are rarely 
producing optimally at minimum 
cost (ie on their 'production fron-
tier'). Indeed, it often takes an 
external event, such as the imposi-
tion of a tax or restrictions on how 
they produce, to force a reconsider-
ation of operating methods which 
can lead to a reduction both in the 
costs of production and in the ad-
verse effects on the environment, 
such as the level of emissions, the 
use of water or the generation of 
waste. 
In many cases, what is important to 
bring about a 'win-win' outcome is 
not just the incentive to make 
changes but also information both 
about potential options and the 
damage which is being caused by 
existing methods of operation, which 
is sometimes not known with any 
degree of precision. The implication 
for policy is that the imposition of 
standards, controls or taxes should 
be only one aspect of the measures 
taken and that these need to be ac-
companied by other policies to 
convey more information. Two such 
measures are eco-auditing and eco-
labelling schemes, both of which 
have been established at the Union 
level in the recent past, the former to 
inform businesses of the environ-
mental consequences of their 
operations, the latter to inform con-
sumers of the environmental 
implications of their purchases. 
These kinds of scheme are a means 
not only of increasing the amount 
and quality of information available 
but also of tapping, on the one hand, 
peer group pressure and, on the 
other, customer preferences in order 
to encourage producers to comply 
with minimum standards (see Box 
p. 151). 
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The evidence, as described below, 
suggests that there is no necessary 
conflict between economic growth, 
employment creation and environ-
mental protection. Producers in 
countries where relatively tough 
environmental controls and stand-
ards have been imposed do not seem 
to have lost out on world markets 
and in a number of cases have in-
creased their share of trade. 
Empirical evidence on 
the competitive effects of 
environmental protection 
Evidence on the possible employ-
ment cost of environmental 
regulation is hard to find, conflict-
ing and difficult to interpret. One 
study on the UK, Germany and 
France found that the cost of com-
plying with new environmental 
legislation depends not just on the 
nature of the production process 
itself, but also on the length of the 
investment cycle, firm size and the 
rigour of enforcement. Costs, it 
concluded, were likely to be highest 
in chemicals, metals and food-
processing. According to a UK 
study, the strict enforcement of the 
Environment Protection Act could 
cost between 1 in 10 and 1 in 20 jobs 
(BOC Foundation 1991). This, how-
ever, is only measuring the direct 
impact in the sectors affected adver-
sely by legislation and takes no 
account of the additional jobs likely 
to be created in other sectors as the 
pattern of demand and output shifts 
in response to an effective rise in the 
relative cost of producing in the for-
mer. 
Studies of the actual rather than 
hypothetical effect of environmen-
tal protection on competitiveness 
and employment tend to come to 
different conclusions. In particular, 
a major study for the World Bank 
(carried out by P. Sorsa) which 
examined developments in a num-
ber of OECD countries (including 
the US, Japan and Germany) in a 
group of industries with high pollu-
tion control costs i.such as pulp and 
paper, coal mining, fertilisers and 
organic chemicals) over the period 
1970 to 1990, found that even 
for these sectors, there was little 
sign that tougher environmental 
standards had affected their compe-
titiveness. While the share of these 
countries in world exports of manu-
factures declined markedly, from 
91% to 81%, as exports from new 
industrialising economies in-
creased, their share of the exports 
of environmentally sensitive indus-
tries remained much the same at 
around 81%. 
Indeed, the performance of these 
industries in the US in terms of 
export performance was better than 
the average in manufacturing as a 
whole. Moreover in Germany, 
where the imposition of regulations 
to increase environmental stand-
ards has been more extensive than 
in most other countries and where 
those standards have been set at a 
comparatively high level, manufac-
turers of the products most affected 
increased their share of export mar-
kets, from 12% to nearly 14% 
between 1970 and 1990. This con-
trasts with a fall from just over 17% 
to 15%> in the German share of total 
world manufactured exports. In two 
of the new Member States of the 
Union, Austria and Finland, the 
export market share of environ-
mentally sensitive industries also 
rose over this period (Graph 136). 
These results do not necessarily 
show that environmental regula-
tion in these countries had a 
positive effect on trade and compe-
titiveness in the sectors 
affected. But they do imply that any 
adverse effects were offset by other 
factors. 
Further evidence seems to indi-
cate that companies in such 
industries have not tended to relo-
cate production to countries where 
environmental standards are lower. 
In fact, although investment in de-
veloping countries, which also 
generally happen to be those with 
weak environmental legislation, 
has increased markedly since the 
mid-1980s, the proportion of such 
investment going into environmen-
tally sensitive industries in less 
developed countries — 5% — was in 
fact much lower than the proportion 
of direct investment going to sensi-
tive industries in more developed 
countries — 24%. In practice, direct 
investment in less developed newly 
industrialising economies has 
relatively little to do with lax envi-
ronmental standards and a great 
deal to do with their high rate of 
growth and efficiency in producing 
particular kinds of good. 
A final point to note is that, expen-
diture on pollution control even in 
the sectors most affected, such as 
chemicals and metal production, 
does not seem in most cases to rep-
resent a major element in the costs 
of production, or at least was not a 
major element in the 1980s, when it 
amounted to under 2% of turnover 
and only around 1% of value added 
(ECOTEC in 1988). This, of course, 
may reflect the relatively lax nature 
of such controls, though it may help 
to explain why estimates produced 
by the ILO are that only 1% of plant 
closures can be attributed to envi-
ronmental regulation. 
The new approach 
of Union policy 
to environmental 
protection 
The Fifth Environmental Action 
Programme (COM(92) 23) adopted 
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in 1992 proposed a series of actions 
in favour of environmental protec-
tion while promoting economic 
growth, the emphasis being on 
integrating environmental con-
siderations into economic policies. 
The idea of a new integrated devel-
opment plan which breaks with 
traditional attitudes and ap-
proaches to the environment is 
echoed in the White Paper, Growth, 
Competitiveness, Employment. 
Central to the new approach is the 
use of market forces to encourage 
sustainable economic decisions by 
consumers and businesses alike 
though the use of taxes and charges 
to internalise the external costs of 
environmental damage and make 
polluters pay for these. (This ap-
proach has been more recently 
endorsed by a Communication from 
the Commission to the European 
Parliament and Council — Econ-
omic Growth and the Environment 
[COM(94) 465].) 
the pattern of prices faced by pro-
ducers and consumers alike so that 
it better reflects the true costs of 
using a particular resource or of 
adopting a particular method of 
production, it effectively takes 
advantage of the operation of mar-
ket forces to achieve its ends, while 
leaving the maximum freedom to 
exercise choice. Producers remain 
free to go on using the same inputs 
and the same methods as before, if 
this is the optimal strategy for 
them, but they are obliged to pay for 
the damage they cause by so doing. 
The proceeds then become available 
for other uses, such as clean-up 
operations or for investment in the 
development of alternative pro-
cesses or materials. 
A further aspect of the new ap-
proach is the integration of 
environmental considerations into 
the development of sectoral policies, 
especially those relating to energy, 
transport, industry, agriculture 
and tourism and the promotion of 
the use of clean technologies 
through supporting and encoura-
ging research and development. 
Effects on the 
environment, economic 
activity and employment 
A recent study (Potential benefits of 
the integration of environmental 
and economic policies, DRI), finan-
cially supported but not necessarily 
endorsed by the Commission, has 
attempted to quantify the conse-
quences of the actions proposed by 
the Fifth Action Environmental 
Plan if they were combined in an 
optimal mix of policies. This is 
based on a macro-economic model 
incorporating environmental ef-
fects which is used to explore 
alternative scenarios up to the year 
2010. Though such a model can at 
Although there is an under-
standable concern among those 
likely to be directly affected by the 
imposition of taxes, the key issues 
to be addressed, given the accept-
ance of the imperative of taking 
action to reduce environmental 
damage in its various forms, are, 
first, whether there are alternative 
approaches which would achieve 
the same or better results, and, sec-
ondly, what the scale and timing of 
the implementation of measures 
should be. 
On the first issue, a tax-based ap-
proach to achieve environmental 
objectives has the merit over other 
approaches, such as the imposition 
of restrictions or regulations, of 
avoiding much of the need for sur-
veillance and policing and, 
therefore, much of the administra-
tive costs and bureaucracy 
associated with this. By adjusting 
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best give only an approximate rep-
resentation of the changes which 
are likely to occur, especially given 
the lack of historical evidence about 
the measures proposed and the re-
action of businesses, consumers and 
employees to them, it is, neverthe-
less, a useful tool for clarifying both 
the potential effects of the measures 
and their possible scale. 
The results are, first, that if new 
policies in favour of the environ-
ment were to be adopted, there is 
likely to be continued environmen-
tal degradation with a 30% increase 
in solid waste and C02 emissions 
and a 10% rise in NOx emissions. 
Secondly, if all the policy measures 
at present under consideration — 
such as legislation to raise fuel 
quality standards, standards of 
vehicle and other emissions, 
measures to increase the use of 
renewable energy and other 
Directives on nitrates, water and 
sewage, as well as the carbon/ 
energy tax (discussed further 
below) — were to be implemented, 
the environment would benefit sig-
nificantly, but only at the cost of 
lower GDP, partly because the 
measures in question are not yet 
designed to secure an optimal 
trade-off between improving envi-
ronmental quality and achieving 
acceptable rates of economic 
growth. 
Thirdly, assuming the design and 
implementation of a combined 
package of fiscal measures (energy 
taxes and water charges), other 
market-oriented instruments (es-
pecially at the local level, such as 
charges on traffic, landfill sites and 
access to natural parks), aimed at 
internalising externalities associ-
ated with energy production and 
transport use, and appropriate 
changes in both producer and con-
sumer behaviour (encouraged by 
changes in the structure of prices, 
better information and increased 
provision of training), significant 
environmental benefits could be 
achieved without hindering econ-
omic growth. According to the 
model simulation, on these assump-
tions, C02 emissions would be 
reduced by 20% relative to what 
otherwise is likely to happen and 
emissions of S02 and NOx would be 
cut by 70% and 55%, respectively, 
compared to their 1990 level, while 
urban air and water quality would 
be improved. 
The simulation also indicates that, 
on these assumptions, higher econ-
omic growth and more employment 
could be achieved as a result of the 
measures introduced. In particular, 
GDP is projected to be almost 1% 
higher in the year 2010 under this 
scenario than with no changes in 
policy, while employment in the 
same year is increased by around 
1 million. Underlying these results 
is the assumption that the various 
taxes introduced would generate 
additional revenue equivalent to 
around 172% of Union GDP, which 
could be spent in various ways, 
either through additional public 
expenditure or reductions in other 
forms of tax to maintain economic 
activity and employment or even 
raise it through stimulating in-
creased investment. Moreover, if 
the proceeds from the taxes were to 
be used for reducing employers' 
social contributions to lower non-
wage labour costs, this would both 
reduce the inflationary impact of 
the package and directly stimulate 
job creation, so increasing the gain 
in employment to over 2 million by 
2010. 
At the same time, significant struc-
tural shifts would be induced. The 
external costs associated with glo-
bal warming, congestion and air 
pollution by the transport sector 
have been estimated to amount to 
around 4% of GDP. Under the 
policies proposed, a significant pro-
portion of these costs would be 
internalised through road pricing, 
fuel taxation, vehicle emission per-
mits and so on. This would reduce 
the growth of road usage and air 
travel and increase the use of 
trains, as well as encouraging a 
shift from private cars to public 
transport. The total number of jour-
neys taken would fall significantly 
with adverse consequences for em-
ployment in the transport sector as 
well as in the production of vehicles. 
Employment in manufacturing in-
dustries which are important 
sources of pollution, such as iron 
and steel, pulp and paper and tex-
tiles and clothing (which pollute 
water through cleaning and dying) 
would also tend to fall, but job losses 
here could be more than offset by job 
creation in industries benefiting 
from the measures taken, such as 
advanced ceramics, light metal 
alloys and thermo-plastics as well 
as the manufacture of monitoring 
instruments, control devices and 
filters. 
In the agricultural sector, the in-
creased cost of pesticides and 
chemical fertilisers under such a 
policy combined with the removal of 
price distortion under the CAP, the 
reduction of prices to world market 
levels and a shift from price to less 
distortive income support, which 
could be topped up by farmers sell-
ing environmental services to the 
public, could both improve the rural 
environment and increase employ-
ment. 
In the case of the tourist sector, 
which should benefit directly from 
environmental improvements, the 
aim would be to base policy on the 
concept of the 'carrying capacity' of 
tourist sites to limit the number of 
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people they can be expected to sus-
tain, which would encourage 
greater efficiency of water and land 
use and, over time, may result in 
the spreading of holidays and an 
extension in the season, so helping 
to alleviate any adverse effects on 
competitiveness of the increased 
costs which the industry would 
bear. 
Although an interesting conclusion 
of the study is that neither output 
nor employment need decline in 
the Union as a result of an exten-
sive package of environmental 
protection measures, this does not 
necessarily hold for all parts. 
Member States gain or, possibly, 
lose according both to their prevail-
ing structure of economic activity 
and their competitiveness in the 
production of the goods and services 
which benefit from the measures 
taken. Thus, for example, Germany 
is well placed to gain because it has 
already gone some way towards 
implementing the kinds of measure 
proposed, is highly competitive in 
the industries likely to gain — such 
as instrument engineering — and 
has a relatively low dependence on 
road freight transport. On the other 
hand, the UK has much further to 
go in meeting the standards set for 
air quality, acid rain and the dispo-
sal of solid and/or hazardous waste, 
is relatively dependent on air travel 
and is an important manufacturer 
of aerospace equipment. Although 
these problems are offset in 
some degree by its importance in 
environmental services, such as 
eco-auditing and waste manage-
ment, GDP, nevertheless, is 
projected to fall under the impact of 
the measures taken (though em-
ployment is projected to be 
marginally increased). This is also 
possible for Spain, which like other 
less developed parts of the Union 
could suffer because of dependence 
on agriculture, the possibility of a 
steep rise in fuel prices and its 
relative unimportance as a pro-
ducer of engineering equipment or 
'green' products, coupled with the 
growing importance of its car manu-
facture. 
The model projections, therefore, il-
lustrate the possible uneven effects 
on economic activity and employ-
ment of environmental action, 
especially measures which are uni-
formly imposed without taking 
explicit account of the implications, 
and the compliance costs, for the 
less developed parts of the Union, 
where, in practice, many of the en-
vironmental problems are as yet 
less serious than in the more 
developed areas. 
The 'double dividend' 
One element which is incorporated 
in the proposals considered above is 
the so-called 'double dividend', or, 
in other words, the implementation 
of measures which achieve both 
employment and environmental ob-
jectives. One example which has 
been proposed by the Commission, 
and which Member States are now 
allowed to introduce so long as they 
respect certain common guidelines, 
is a combination of a C02/energy tax 
and a reduction in employers' 
contributions. This is aimed at both 
protecting the environment 
through encouraging energy saving 
and lower emissions (which since 
there is no economically viable way 
of filtering C02 is a necessary condi-
tion for reducing the environmental 
damage) and stimulating job 
creation through lowering the costs 
to businesses of employment by 
means of a single self-financing 
package. It is, moreover, based on 
the economic principle of taxing a 
resource which is limited, the 
capacity of the environment to 
absorb emissions from fossil fuel, 
and effectively subsidising one for 
which there is excess supply, 
labour. 
Such a package will hit some sectors 
and benefit others, and lead to 
structural shifts in activity and em-
ployment, but this is an inevitable 
consequence, as emphasised above, 
of any serious efforts to incorporate 
environmental objectives into 
policy and to move the Union econ-
omies onto a new and sustainable 
development path. It is, therefore, 
not a compelling reason in itself for 
rejecting the proposal. 
Indeed, simulations carried out on 
a number of macro-economic 
models have demonstrated that a 
package of this kind not only need 
not harm competitiveness, but is 
capable of stimulating higher 
growth of GDP and more employ-
ment. This especially the case if it is 
targeted on the relatively low 
skilled at the bottom end of the pay 
scale who make up the bulk of the 
unemployed. 
On the assumption of the imposi-
tion of a $10 per barrel of 
oil-equivalent C02/energy tax, 
which is used to finance a cut of 
around 10% in employers' social 
contributions across the Union, 
GDP is boosted (by some V2% after a 
few years compared with what it 
otherwise would be) and the num-
bers in employment increased (by 
some V2% or more relative to its 
assumed level without the package) 
both in the medium and long-term. 
This is the result partly of increased 
investment stimulated by a shift of 
taxes from companies to individuals 
(ie all consumers of energy pay the 
additional tax while the benefit 
from lower contributions is confined 
to companies only), partly of lower 
labour costs directly encouraging 
increased use of labour in the 
production process. Moreover, 
although there may be some 
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Expenditure on environmental 
technology in the Union 
In the Netherlands, the promotion of technological 
innovation is a central part of industrial policy and 
environmental protection is an important aim. 
There are measures to promote research into reuse 
and recycling and energy technology and incen-
tives to companies to increase the number of R&D 
personnel. Cooperation between government, 
technology institutes, industry and the univer-
sities is encouraged and the Government is 
currently spending around 50 million ECU over 
a 4-year period on R&D under the National 
Environmental Policy Plan. 
In Denmark, around 50 million ECU have 
been earmarked under an action plan for less 
polluting technology for the period 1993-97, while 
expenditure under the strategic programme for 
environmental research 1992-96 amounts to some 
40 million ECU. 
In Italy, legislation has been introduced to support 
research on less polluting technology and its 
implementation. 
Sweden has policies to assist less polluting 
technology and products, especially in the energy 
sector. 
The UK encourages cooperation in research on 
energy emissions and supports certain R&D 
activities related to the diffusion of better environ-
mental practices. 
At the Union level, 170 million ECU was spent on 
research programmes in 1992, including STEP and 
EPOCH — dealing with research on protection of 
the aquatic environment and of the soil against 
environmental hazards such as organic and 
inorganic pollutants and erosion — and 110 million 
ECU on environmental demonstration pro-
grammes, MEDSPA, NORSPA and LIFE. The first 
provided expenditure for demonstration projects 
for the protection and enhancement of Mediter-
ranean coastal areas — and particularly their 
biotope systems. A number of the projects under 
the LIFE programme were aimed at encouraging 
sustainable development in tourist sites. 
In total, the Third Framework Programme for 
Community Research and Technological Develop-
ment provided 580 million ECU for environmental 
and energy research between 1990 and 1994. 
increase in inflation from the tax on 
energy, this is likely to be very 
small, unless the reduction in social 
contributions or the rise in employ-
ment leads to any increase in real 
wages. Indeed, it is important that 
a climate of both wage and profit 
restraint is encouraged not only to 
keep down inflation but to prevent 
the relief to employers being swal-
lowed up either by pay increases for 
existing workers or higher profits 
rather than leading to employment 
of additional people. 
Furthermore, if the reduction in 
employers' contributions were to be 
concentrated on low wage earners, 
which allows a cut of 40%, employ-
ment, especially of the relatively 
low skilled, is likely to increase by 
significantly more (by perhaps as 
much as 2-3%) because of a 
stronger incentive to take on such 
workers and their comparatively 
low level of productivity (ie the 
higher number of workers per unit 
of output than in the previous sce-
nario. 
Expenditure in 
the Union to protect 
the environment 
At the European Union level, policy 
on the environment manifests itself 
in a number of ways: through 
expenditure from the Structural 
Funds, environmental pro-
grammes, regulations and a series 
of directives defining the action to 
be taken by Member States. 
In 1992, total expenditure on envi-
ronmental action under Structural 
Fund programmes amounted to 1.6 
billion ECU, half of which was fin-
anced by the Union, half by Member 
States. Between 1994 and 1999, 
this is planned to double to 3.2 bil-
lion ECU, which will represent an 
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estimated 5% of all environmental 
expenditure in the Union, divided 
between environmental protection 
and infrastructure, waste manage-
ment, water treatment and research 
and technology including clean tech-
nology and the training associated 
with it (see Boxes pp. 150 and 151). 
In addition, activities supported by 
the Funds include: building public 
awareness about environmental 
issues through education and sensi-
tising campaigns, retraining of those 
who face losing their jobs in sectors 
adversely affected by protection 
measures and training people who 
are unemployed to take up new jobs 
generated by such measures, 
whether in the environmental sector 
or in areas, such as tourism which 
benefit from a cleaner environment. 
In 1995, around two-thirds of this 
expenditure will be in the less de-
veloped, low income per head 
regions (Objective 1), supplemented 
by additional expenditure from 
the Cohesion Fund. This environ-
mental spending could, according 
to Commission estimates, generate 
over 150 thousand additional jobs in 
the Union, and 100 thousand in 
Objective 1 regions by the year 
2000. 
If expenditure by both the public 
sector in Member States and the 
private sector (which spends in 
response mainly to regulations, 
though partly to public opinion) is 
aggregated, a 63.3 billion ECU or 
1.2% of Union GDP was spent on 
the environment in 1992 (ERECO 
estimate). Around half of this was 
on waste water management, 
around a third on waste disposal, 
13% on control of air pollution, 3% 
on noise abatement and just 2% on 
the natural environment. Almost a 
third — 32% — of this expenditure 
took place in Germany, 21% in 
France, 20% in the UK, 11% 
in Italy, 6% in Spain and the 
Recycling and other positive environmental 
measures in the Union 
In recent years, there have been widespread attempts to encourage 
recycling. These have culminated in the adoption by Member States of a 
Council Directive (94/62/EC) in December 1994 on packaging and packa-
ging waste, under which all countries have to draw up legislation within 
18 months aimed at recovering and recycling packaging waste. Member 
States have five years to reach targets of recovering between 50% and 
65% by weight and recycling between 25% and 45% of packaging waste 
each year. Further targets for the five years after that will be established 
no later than 6 months before the end of the first five-year period. 
Partly to meet these targets, action has been taken in a number of 
Member States. In Austria, legislation has been passed aimed at increas-
ing the level of recycling to 80%. In Belgium, a regulation has recently 
been introduced to encourage the recycling of packaging materials and 
Denmark has launched an action plan with the same objective. Finland 
is taking measures to introduce paper-recycling in order to conform with 
Union standards. In France, legislation has been introduced to compel 
companies to adopt waste treatment processes by 2002 and the UK has 
set a target of a 25% reduction in household waste by the year 2000. 
In several countries, agreements have been reached between government 
and industry on recycling. In Austria, for example, such an agreement 
extends to paper, cement and motor vehicles while a similar agreement 
in the Netherlands covers base metals, chemicals and printing. 
Financial incentives have also been introduced in some Member States 
to increase recycling and reduce polluting activities. In Italy, for example, 
tax incentives are available to new firms setting up operation in activities 
relating to energy efficiency, recycling and other environmental sectors, 
while in Spain, financial support is provided to companies changing 
production processes or machinery to reduce pollution. In other countries, 
such as the Netherlands, dividends and interest on environmental invest-
ment are exempt from tax. 
A common eco-labelling scheme was established in the Union in 1992 
(Council Regulation No 882/92), aimed at promoting products with a 
reduced environmental impact during their entire life-cycles (from design 
and production to marketing and use) and at providing consumers with 
better information on the environmental impact of products. Though the 
scheme is voluntary, producers are encouraged to participate through 
market pressure. The scheme is similar to those which already existed in 
a several Member States (the Blue Angel system in Germany or the NF 
environment system in France, for example). 
A common eco-auditing scheme was introduced more recently in April 
1995 (the eco-management and audit scheme). This is also voluntary, 
giving producers the opportunity to accept their environmental responsi-
bilities, while bringing peer pressure to bear on companies to participate, 
which involves them formulating an environmental policy, conducting an 
environmental review, introducing an environmental management pro-
gramme, engaging in environmental audits, preparing an environmental 
statement and having an external verifier to validate this. 
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The definition and quantification 
of the environmental sector 
The task of counting the number of people in employment in the environ-
mental sector is not easy. 
Generally the sector is broken down into: 
• pollution control and the waste industry which takes in sewage and 
refuse disposal and recycling; 
• water supply industry which includes the collection, purification and 
distribution of water; 
• environmental management activity in industry and the public sector; 
• the suppliers of environmental management equipment such as filters 
and instruments for monitoring emissions; 
• consultancy on environmental issues and research and monitoring 
activities; 
• people employed in nature conservation, parks, and various environ-
mental amenities. 
Although some of these categories, such as water supply and waste 
management, for instance, can be separately identified in the statistical 
data, others are included with other activities and the numbers employed 
on environmental tasks cannot be easily distinguished. For instance, the 
manufacturing of instruments for measuring emissions or of devices for 
filtering them accounts for only part of the output of the instrument 
engineering sector, while environmental consultancy which has been a 
rapidly growing activity as legislation has increased is included in a wide 
range of business services. 
Moreover, a significant number of people spend part of their time on 
environmental management in a large number of companies and organi-
sations in many different sectors and these can only be identified from 
detailed survey information, which is rarely available. 
Partly as a basis for establishing the number of employed, Eurostat is at 
present working with various private sector organisations on a project 
entitled 'Eco-industries — Eco-products' to quantify the environmental 
industry using various existing sources of data, including company ac-
counts as well as eco-product labelling systems (such as the blue label 
system in Germany or the NF environment system in France) to give an 
indication of the number of products in the economy which have been 
'adapted' to make their whole life-cycle cleaner than before. The inclusion 
of such products, however, raises certain problems of definition, of where 
to draw the dividing line between environmental products and others. 
Given that environmental considerations are gradually being incorpor-
ated into production processes in most if not all sectors, the whole 
economy in some sense is likely to become 'environmental' eventually. 
Netherlands and 4% in total in the 
other six countries. Only in five 
countries — Germany, Denmark, 
France, the Netherlands and the 
UK — did expenditure amount to 
more than 17c of GDP. 
Moreover, during the recession in 
the early 1990s, the growth in en-
vironmental expenditure slowed 
down, particularly in the private 
sector, where it increased by under 
1% a year between 1990 and 1992. 
By contrast, public spending 
grew by almost 2V2% a year. While 
expenditure on waste water man-
agement also increased by 2V2% a 
year, spending on waste disposal 
management went up by l'/2 % a 
year and expenditure on air pollu-
tion control went down by 2V2 % a 
year. 
On the other hand, OECD forecasts 
for the present decade are for a 50% 
growth in demand in Europe for 
waste management products and 
air pollution control equipment and 
an increase of a third in water and 
effluent treatment. Such forecasts, 
however, depend critically on legis-
lation being implemented in these 
areas and, just as importantly, on 
this being enforced. 
The number 
of jobs affected 
by environmental 
measures 
There are no reliable figures for em-
ployment in the environmental 
industry in the Union, partly be-
cause employment does not break 
down into neat sectors which lend 
themselves to being separately dis-
tinguished in industrial systems of 
classification. In practice, jobs with 
a significant environmental content 
are to be found right across the 
economy (See Box). 
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Nevertheless some, reasonably up-
to-date, estimate of the number of 
people working in the main parts 
of the environmental sector can be 
obtained from Community Labour 
Force Survey data, which divides 
employment into around 60 
(NACE 2-digit) sectors of activity. 
These are likely to be overesti-
mates to the extent that the 
'environmental' sectors distin-
guished also cover other activities 
and underestimates to the extent 
that they exclude employment in 
environmental jobs in other sec-
tors. 
These data also provide some indi-
cation of the number of jobs in 
other sectors of the Union economy 
in different Member States which 
could potentially be affected by en-
vironmental protection measures, 
in the sense that they are in sectors 
where pollution is a problem, such 
as agriculture, chemical produc-
tion or transport. This does not 
necessarily mean that there will 
be job losses in these sectors as 
measures are implemented or 
increased in scale. Indeed in some 
sectors, the increased protection 
of the environment could lead to 
job gains as methods of production 
change, such as in agriculture, 
for example. Rather, it means that 
the nature of what is produced and 
the methods used are liable to 
change and with them the nature 
of the jobs performed. In this 
event, some jobs will be lost to be 
replaced by others, though not 
necessarily in the same firm or the 
same type of activity or even in the 
same location. At the very least, 
some adaptation to the new cir-
cumstances on the part of 
management and labour alike is 






Sectors vulnerable to increased ac-
tion to protect the environment, in 
the sense that they are responsible 
for a relatively high level of environ-
mental damage (in an aggregate 
sense, it should be emphasised) in-
clude agriculture, chemicals, paper 
and pulp production, basic metals, 
the electricity and gas industry, 
land and air transport and whole-
sale distribution. Excluding 
agriculture, which is in a special 
position in that it has experienced 
continuous large-scale job losses in 
most Member States over a long 
period of time, these together ac-
counted for just under 14% of total 
employment in the Union as a 
whole in 1994 (Graph 137). 
Their importance, however, varies 
significantly between Member 
States, tending to be greatest in the 
higher income, more developed 
countries in the North of the Union 
and least in the South. Thus while 
in Luxembourg, some 16% of jobs 
were in these sectors in 1994, in 
Greece, the figure was only just over 
10%. Moreover, their share in em-
ployment was above the Union 
average in Belgium, Germany, 
France and the Netherlands and 
below the average in Portugal, 
Spain and Italy as well as in Ireland 
and the UK. 
Over time, the relative number of 
jobs in these sectors has tended to 
decline in the North and increase in 
the South. Whereas in the Union as 
a whole, the growth in their employ-
ment averaged just under 1% a year 
between 1985 and 1992 (the last 
year for which consistent data are 
available) as compared with a 
137 Employment in polluting, environmental and 
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growth of just over 1% in total em-
ployment, in five Member States — 
Belgium, Denmark, Ireland, 
Luxembourg and the UK— employ-
ment in these sectors actually fell 
(Graph 138). Moreover, in Ger-
many, while employment increased 
significantly, the rate of growth was 
less than in the rest of the economy. 
In France, on the other hand, 
employment in these sectors in-
creased at a similar rate as in the 
economy as a whole, while in the 
Netherlands, it rose at a higher 
rate. In the South of the Union, in 
Greece and Spain, the number em-
ployed in these sectors went up by 
more over this period than in other 
activities, though in Portugal, it 
rose by less. 
In overall terms, therefore, employ-
ment in most Member States has 
grown by less in 'polluting' sectors 
in recent years than elsewhere in 
the economy. This may be due, in 
some degree, to environmental 
regulations, but in large measure 
it reflects trend changes in the 
structure of employment, from 
manufacturing to services in par-
ticular. It also reflects, however, a 
shift away from public transport — 
which employs people directly, to 
private car use, which does not — 
138 Change in employment in polluting 
sectors, 1985-92 
Annual change(%) 
which is more worrying from an en-
vironmental perspective. 
Employment in agriculture, of 
course, has also declined, indeed 
much more so than the other acti-
vities considered here (by an 
average of almost 4% a year be-
tween 1985 and 1992), though it is 
difficult to argue that the regula-
tions and other policies, such as 
pesticide charges imposed in the 
Netherlands, are a major factor be-
hind this. Other factors, such as 
increased mechanisation and spe-
cialisation in the sector, together 
with the growth of job opportunities 
in other sectors, have been of major 
importance. 
Other sensitive sectors 
Other sectors of activity, though not 
directly a major cause of pollution, 
are a potential source of environ-
mental damage in that they either 
involve the depletion of scarce re-
sources or are an indirect cause of 
pollution. As such, they are also 
liable to be affected by increased 
efforts to protect the environment. 
These activities include the mining 
and processing of (non-renewable) 
minerals and fossil fuels and fore-
stry and fishing (where the 
139 Change in employment in other 
environmentally-sensitive sectors, 1985-92 
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resources are renewable but require 
careful management and control to 
ensure stocks are maintained). 
They also include the car industry 
which, as well as being an import-
ant indirect cause of the toxic 
exhaust gases its product emits, is 
a major consumer of primary en-
ergy, largely in the form of the steel 
which it uses (it is estimated that 
over half of the primary energy con-
sumed by a car over its lifetime is 
used in its production). 
In 1994, these activities accounted 
for just over 4% of total employment 
in the Union. In this case, there is no 
particular pattern as regards their 
relative importance in different 
parts of the Union. Their share of 
employment is comparatively high 
in Germany, largely because of the 
scale of car production, as well as in 
Spain and Portugal, reflecting in 
part the relatively large numbers 
employed in fishing. In each case, 
these activities accounted for 5-6%> 
of employment. In more than half of 
the Member States, by contrast, 
their share was between 3% and 4%. 
Employment in these activities has 
tended to grow by less than in other 
sectors. Between 1985 and 1992, 
the rate of increase over the Union 
as a whole was just under 1% a year, 
much the same as in polluting sec-
tors (Graph 139). In three countries, 
France, Italy and Luxembourg, the 
number employed declined — by al-
most l'/2% a year in the former two 
and by just under 3% in the latter. 
Only in Denmark and Greece was 
the growth in these activities more 
than in others, while apart from in 
Germany and Spain, where the dif-
ference in the rate was small, 
growth was substantially lower in 
these sectors in all other Member 
States. 
The relative fall in the numbers em-
ployed in these other sensitive 
- 154 Section 2 The environment and employment 
sectors cannot, of course, necessar-
ily be attributed to the effect of 
environmental restrictions. In the 
car industry, large increases in pro-
ductivity coupled with growing 
foreign competition and a conse-
quent loss of domestic and export 
market shares have been major fac-
tors underlying job losses. In 
fishing, forestry and mining, the 
natural depletion of stocks rather 
than controls imposed by govern-
ment to limit exploitation, along 
with shifts in demand and competi-
tion from lower priced imports, 
have been largely responsible. 
These factors are likely to continue 
to be the main determinants of em-
ployment in these activities rather 
than restrictions and higher costs 





Increased concern for the environ-
ment, the implementation of 
protective measures and action to 
clean up polluted areas also, of 
course, has positive effects on em-
ployment, in terms of creating jobs 
in new areas of activity as well as 
new jobs in existing areas. Measur-
ing the scale of these effects, 
however, is complicated since they 
tend to be spread throughout the 
economy and in many cases envi-
ronmental jobs overlap with other 
production activities. The areas in 
which net job creation can be ex-
pected are: 
• the treatment of waste water 
and toxic waste and the dispo-
sal of noxious substances; 
• the recycling of materials of 
various kinds; 
• the manufacture of environ-
mental equipment, such as 
pollution control devices, waste 
disposal facilities and monitor-
ing apparatus; 
• administrative activities relat-
ing to the enforcement of 
environmental legislation and 
the monitoring of compliance 
with standards and regulations, 
as well as to the collection of 
taxes and charges; 
• environmental management 
jobs in the private and public 
sector as firms and organisa-
tions are obliged to ensure that 
their activities comply with en-
vironmental standards and 
regulations; 
• consultancy on environmental 
issues, including eco-auditing, 
as well as research activities 
associated with monitoring en-
vironmental conditions; 
• activities which would not have 
been possible in the absence of 
environmental improvements, 
such as particular tourist or 
leisure pursuits. 
Most of these jobs are in activities 
which cannot easily be identified in 
the statistics on employment in the 
sense that they are not classified 
separately from others but form 
part of a wider sector. All that is 
possible is to examine employment 
in the sectors which are clearly en-
vironmental in nature or in which 
there is a significant environmental 
element in the output produced. 
These sectors comprise recycling, 
sewage and refuse disposal, the 
collection, purification and dis-
tribution of water and instrument 
engineering (in which, of course, 
only a minor proportion of output 
consists of control and monitoring 
equipment). 
In the Union as a whole, these sec-
tors were the source of almost l'A. 
million jobs in 1994 (according to 
the Labour Force Survey), or 
around 1% of total employment 
(Graph 140). Of these jobs, almost 
500 thousand were in sewage and 
waste disposal, just under 250 thou-
sand in the water industry, just 
over 90 thousand in recycling and 
around 650 thousand in instrument 
engineering. 
At the Member State level, environ-
mental sectors were of most 
importance in terms of jobs in the 
UK, France and Germany, where 
they accounted for well over 1% of 
total employment in 1994 (around 
300 thousand in the UK, 250 thou-
sand in France and 450 thousand in 
Germany — in the latter, the figure 
involves some estimation since data 
are not yet available on a new 
NACE basis as for other countries). 
The relative number of jobs was 
smallest in the least developed 
Member States, in Greece, where 
they amounted to only just over V2% 
of total employment, and in 
Portugal, where they were signifi-
cantly below. In these two 
countries, employment was particu-
larly low compared with that in 
other Member States in instrument 
engineering, which is only to be 
expected given the advanced nature 
of this industry; it was also low in 
Portugal in sewage and refuse dis-
posal, reflecting the relative 
underdevelopment of these acti-
vities. 
Apart from in Greece and Portugal, 
on the one hand, and Germany and 
France, on the other, however, there 
is no clear tendency for the relative 
scale of employment in environmen-
tal industries to vary across the 
Union with the level of economic de-
velopment. Though the relative 
numbers employed were also lower 
than average in 1994 in Spain, this 
-155-Section 2 The environment and employment 
was also true of Belgium, Denmark 
and the Netherlands. Given the rela-
tively high level of concern with 
environmental issues in these latter 
two countries, in particular, and the 
correspondingly high level of stand-
ards imposed, this is somewhat 
surprising and may reflect problems 
with the comparability of the data as 
much as genuine differences relative 
to other Member States (based on 
the old NACE classification, which is 
only slightly different in term of 
coverage, employment in these sec-
tors was similar to the Union 
average in Denmark and above in 
the Netherlands). 
Over the past decade or so, employ-
ment seems to have increased at a 
much higher rate across the Union 
in the environmental sectors than 
in the rest of the economy. Indeed, 
between 1985 and 1992, the rate of 
net job creation in these sectors 
averaged over 3% a year, well over 
twice as much as in other sectors 
(Graph 141). 
At the Member State level, employ-
ment growth in environmental 
sectors exceeded that in the rest of 
the economy in all Member States, 
except Greece and Portugal, where 
the scale of employment in the en-
vironmental industry was already 
much lower than elsewhere in the 
Union. In both countries the num-
bers working in these sectors 
declined between 1985 and 1992. 
In the other Member States, growth 
of employment in the environmen-
tal sector was three times higher or 
more than in the rest of the economy 
in all countries except the UK, 
Luxembourg and the Netherlands, 
and in the former two it was twice 
as high. 
At a more disaggregated level, there 
were marked differences in the rate 
of employment growth between 
the sectors included in the environ-
mental industry over this period. 
While the numbers employed in the 
water industry and in sewage and 
refuse disposal increased in most 
Member States where data are 
available, especially in the latter, 
where the growth averaged 3V2% 
a year over the Union as a whole, 
in the recycling industry, employ-
ment declined in three of the five 
countries where the data are rea-
sonably reliable, the exceptions 
being Germany and France (Graph 
142). In instrument engineering, 
employment rose in half the Mem-
ber States for which there are data. 
The exceptions were Denmark, 
Germany, France and the UK. This 
was sufficient, however, to cause a 
reduction of employment in the 
Union as a whole. At the same time, 
employment increased significantly 
in this industry in Spain and 
Ireland. 
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The rate of net job creation in 
environmental sectors in the 
Union has, therefore, been higher 
than in other parts of the econ-
omy in the recent past. Though the 
additional number of jobs gener-
ated in these sectors has not been 
very large, accounting for only 
around 2V2 % of the total net 
addition to employment between 
1985 and 1992, they nevertheless 
provided work for an extra 250 
thousand in the Member States as 
a whole over this period. Moreover, 
it has been estimated that employ-
ment in 'soft' environmental 
industries, such as nature con-
servation, national heritage 
preservation and the provision of 
amenities such as parks and open 
spaces, which is not included in 
these figures, amounted to an addi-
tional 250 to 500 thousand 
(ECOTEC), making a contribution 
of 5-7V2 % to the increase in total 
employment. 
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The kinds 
of environmental 
jobs being created 
The increasing importance ac-
corded to environmental issues is 
likely to affect the nature of jobs as 
well as the number. This will tend 
to have implications for the skills 
required of workers employed in 
particular activities across a wide 
area of the economy, not just in en-
vironmental sectors or in those 
most affected by protective 
measures, which in turn will have 
consequences for education and 
training needs. 
In environmental management, in 
particular, there are a range of 
tasks which are likely to become 
more important, including: 
• acquiring awareness of the rele-
vant environmental legislation 
and keeping up to date on new 
regulations and standards in-
troduced; 
• introducing changes in produc-
tion processes to ensure 
compliance with environmental 
standards; 
• sampling and analysis of waste; 
• liaison with regulatory indus-
tries; 
• ensuring possession of the 
licences or permits required to 
operate or discharge certain 
substances in particular sec-
tors. 
In only large concerns are such ac-
tivities likely to involve the 
employment of full-time staff, but in 
smaller concerns they will tend to 
take up an increasing amount of 
time, particularly of senior and 
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middle management who will need 
to keep abreast of new regulations 
and legislative requirements and to 
adapt production processes and 
working methods accordingly. This 
will inevitably mean certain 
changes in the jobs performed by 
operatives and, in some cases, addi-
tional tasks, such as the monitoring 
and testing of emissions or of waste 
material. It will also tend to mean 
the need for special and additional 
qualifications and training for those 
responsible for environmental 
issues. 
According to recent case studies, 
however, there is still a lack of 
training facilities in this area in 
most Member States. The Structu-
ral Funds are aimed, in part, at 
alleviating this shortage by suppor-
ting training in this area. Moreover, 
there seems to be insufficient 
awareness in industry of the need 
for environmental management 
and of the increasing importance of 
taking account of environmental 
issues when planning and organis-
ing the production process, 
particularly among smaller firms 
where often no-one has responsi-
bility for monitoring requirements 
and new developments in this area. 
Since the ability to respond to the 
introduction of new or tougher regu-
lations and standards is likely to 
become an increasingly important 
determinant of competitiveness in 
certain areas, the deficiencies in 
this regard should be an urgent 
matter of policy concern. 
Future employment 
prospects 
Present forecasts are that by the 
year 2000, a further 250 thousand 
additional jobs could be created in 
the environmental sector across the 
Union as a whole, while employ-
ment in nature conservation, 
heritage preservation and the pro-
vision of amenities such as parks 
and open spaces — the so-called 
'soft' environmental industries — 
could contribute about the same 
number (ECOTEC estimate). 
The rate of employment creation in 
the environmental sector, however, 
like the growth of demand for its 
products, depends critically on the 
future course of legislation in the 
Union and the nature and scale of 
measures taken to protect the envi-
ronment. If the introduction of new 
legislation, including new taxes and 
charges aimed at imposing the true 
cost of their actions on polluters, 
slows down or its enforcement 
becomes more lax, past experience 
demonstrates forcibly that the 
growth of environment-related acti-
vities will also slow and job creation 
in this area will be retarded. With 
the implementation at the end of 
1994 of the Directive on recovering 
and recycling of packaging waste, 
investment and jobs in waste man-
agement are likely to be stimulated, 
but in areas, such as the control of 
emissions, there is a good deal of 
uncertainty about the timing and 
scale of future legislative action. 
If the problems and costs to busi-
nesses of adapting to new 
environmental standards, and the 
potentially adverse effects on jobs, 
are to be minimised, it is critically 
important, as emphasised above, 
that governments make their fu-
ture legislative intentions clear as 
far in advance as possible. Until 
they are, most businesses will, on 




This Annex contains more detailed analysis of a number of 
issues and supporting evidence for some of the conclusions 
reached in Part I of the Report. The issues covered are: 
• demographic trends and changes in participation; 
• the employment-intensity of growth in the Union as 
compared with the US and Japan; 
• changes in working time; 
• the rate of entry into self-employment and the rate of 
exit; 
• entry into part-time employment and temporary jobs; 
• the degree of overlap between temporary and part-time 
employment and the average duration of fixed-term con-
tracts; 
• disparities in rates of unemployment across the regions 
of the Union; 
• the growth of real labour costs and real wages in manu-
facturing and non-manufacturing in relation to the 
growth of labour productivity over recent years; 
• the changes in the distribution of hours worked. 
Demographic trends, participation 
and labour force growth 
The evidence of the 1980s and early 1990s strongly suggests 
that labour force growth is not independent of the growth 
of employment. Accordingly, any assessment of the Union's 
work force in future years, and of unemployment, is depend-
ent on what is projected about the prospects for job creation. 
Ignoring this interrelationship is liable to result in an 
overestimate of the fall in unemployment as employment 
expands. 
Changes in the labour force by age 
In the growth period between 1987 and 1990, the main source 
of the expansion in the labour force was the increase in women 
in the 25-54 age group. This alone was responsible for increas-
ing the Union labour force by almost 3% over this period 
(Graph 143). The number of men in this age group also 
expanded, though by much less, adding around l'/2% to the 
Union's work force. 
These increases were partly offset by a substantial reduction 
in the number of young men and women of under 25, which 
in total was equivalent to an overall reduction of over 1% in 
active population, while there was little change in the number 
of those aged 55 and over. 
This pattern of change was in large degree repeated in all 
Member States. In all countries, except Denmark and 
Finland, an increase in the number of women aged between 
25 and 54 was the major source of labour force growth over 
this period. In all countries, apart from Greece, the number 
of men in this age group also expanded. Moreover, in all 
countries apart from Greece again and Sweden, the number 
of young men and women under 25 in the labour force con-
tracted. 
The change in the number of older people in the work force, 
however, differed somewhat between Member States, for 
men especially. Whereas for women, the number aged 55 and 
over increased everywhere apart from France, Ireland, 
Luxembourg, Austria and Sweden, though in many cases only 
slightly, for men, the numbers declined in seven Member 
States (Belgium, France, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, 
Austria and Sweden) and remained unchanged in another 
(the UK). Only in four countries (Germany, Greece, Luxem-
bourg and Portugal) was the increase significant. 
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In the period of slow employment growth between 1990 and 
1994, the pattern of change was different in a number of 
respects. Women aged 25-54 still represented the main source 
of labour growth (Graph 144). The number of men of this age 
rose by only just over half the rate of increase in the earlier 
period. At the same time, the number of young men and women 
under 25 in the labour force declined by a much higher rate than 
between 1987 and 1990 — 60% higher in the case of men, over 
twice as high in the case of women. A contraction in the number 
of men in the work force aged 55 and over reinforced the effect 
of the decline in young people. The number of women in this age 
group continued to expand, though only at two-thirds of the rate 
of increase in the earlier period. 
As in the earlier period, this general pattern was repeated in 
the majority of Member States. Except for Luxembourg, there 
was a continuing contraction in the number of young men and 
women under 25 in the labour force in all Member States, in 
most cases, a substantial one. 
The number of men in the labour force aged 55 and over 
declined in all Member States, apart from Germany, Greece, 
Ireland and Finland (for Austria, data discontinuities prevent 
a conclusion being reached). The fall was particularly marked 
in Denmark, Spain and Italy. For women aged 55 and over, 
only five countries showed a reduction of any size — Denmark, 
Spain, France, Italy and Sweden. 
Changes in participation 
and working-age population 
A key question arising from the above is how far the changes 
which have occurred are the result of demographic trends — 
ie of a changing rate of growth of working-age population — 
as opposed to changes in the rate of participation in the labour 
force of those of working age (see Box). 
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Separating the effects on 
the labour force of changes 
in population and 
participation 
The data in this section, as well as in the 
Report itself, come from the Community La-
bour Force Surveys for the years in question. 
Because these relate to private households 
and tend to exclude people living elsewhere, 
such as the armed forces, they differ sightly 
from the usual statistics on demography. They 
also differ slightly from the figures for the 
labour force derived from the employment and 
unemployment data used to examine changes 
over time elsewhere in this Report. These dif-
ferences, however, are likely to have only a 
small effect on the results of the analysis, 
particularly as regards the relative import-
ance of changes in the different age groups 
One problem in distinguishing between the 
effect on the labour force of changes in 
working-age population and changes in par-
ticipation of people of working age is that the 
concept of working age is an imprecise one. 
Though it is customary to define this in terms 
either of those aged between 15 and 64 or of 
those aged 15 and over, there are difficulties 
with both definitions. These arise not only 
because rates of participation are much lower 
for younger and older people than they are for 
those in the middle, but because the extent of 
the difference varies significantly both be-
tween countries and over time. Any definition 
of working-age population is, therefore, liable 
to give a misleading impression of differences 
in participation rates between countries and 
of the changes in population from which the 
labour force is drawn. 
To overcome this problem, population is 
divided into age groups as well as between 
men and women and is then effectively 
weighted by the rate of participation for each 
group. On this basis, the change in population 
weighted by participation rates at the begin-
ning of the period indicates what would have 
happened to the labour force had these rates 
remained unchanged. The difference between 
this and the actual change indicates the ag-
gregate effect of changes in rates of 
participation. 
More formally, the change in the labour force 
over any period is sub-divided between the 
population effect, measured by a-i(P-P-i), and 
the participation effect, (a-a-i)P for all age 
groups, where a is the rate of participation in 
a given age group, Ρ is the population of that 
age and the subscripts refer to the base period. 
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Sub-dividing the change in the labour force between these two 
sources shows that changes in rates of participation are the 
primary factor. 
As indicated in Part I, Section 2, there was an overall rise in 
participation over the period 1987 to 1990 which added 
1.9 million to the Union labour force. In the period 1990 to 
1994, participation fell, reducing the labour force by 3 million. 
Examining changes in participation by age group, the sharp 
decline in participation which occurred in the 1990 to 1994 
period arose principally among young people, both men and 
women, and among men in the 25 to 54 age bracket. The 
former was responsible by itself for a fall in the total labour 
force in the Union of some 3.3 million over this period, a 
considerably higher figure than over the previous three years 
(600 thousand). Though some of this rise might be due to a 
genuine increase in the desire of young people to raise their 
qualification and basic skill levels, it also almost certainly 
reflects a reduction in the availability of suitable employment 
opportunities. In this regard, it is especially notable that 
much of the fall in participation occurred in those Member 
States which experienced the largest decline in employment 
— Spain, Germany, Italy, Finland, Sweden and the UK, in 
particular. 
The reduction in the numbers of young people was reinforced 
by a decline in participation of men, both in the 25 to 54 age 
group, which served to reduce the labour force by over 1.2 mil-
lion, and in the 55 and over age group, which served to reduce 
it by over 900 thousand, some 700 thousand more than in the 
three years before. 
These changes were common to most Member States. In most 
countries, rates of participation among young people under 25 
declined markedly in the period 1990 to 1994, in some cases 
— Greece, Spain and Portugal — offsetting a rise in the labour 
force which would have resulted from demographic trends. 
Only in Luxembourg, the Netherlands and Austria did the 
participation of young people rise over this period and only in 
Belgium and Ireland was the fall in participation less than 
over the previous three years. In most cases, it was substan-
tially more (Graphs 145 and 146). 
Similarly, for men aged 25 to 54, the rate of participation fell 
in all Member States, except for Greece and Austria, between 
1990 and 1994. The fall was particularly pronounced in 
Denmark, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg and Sweden, in each 
case amounting to an effective reduction in the labour force of 
over 1% in these four years. By contrast in the 1987 to 1990 
period, there was an increase in participation among men in 
this age group in seven Member States (Graphs 147 and 148). 
In all Member States, except Belgium and Greece, the partici-
pation rate of men of 55 and over declined over the 1990 to 
1994 period (for Austria, there are no consistent data), in 
Denmark, the Netherlands, Sweden and the UK more than 
offsetting a positive demographic effect. Although there was 
also a fall in participation among older men in the majority of 
Member States in the three preceding years, in seven it 
increased, including in Denmark, Germany, Luxembourg, 
Finland and the UK, in all of which the decline in subsequent 
years was significant (Graphs 149 and 150). 
Examining the changes within the 55 and over age group in 
more details reveals that in most cases a substantial part of 
the reduction in participation in the years after 1990 (80%) 
was attributable to those under 65 and, in particular, to those 
under the official age of retirement in Member States. In other 
words, much of the fall was due to significantly more people 
retiring early during the period than over the preceding one, 
despite the change in policy in a number of Member States 
away from active encouragement of early retirement to free 
up jobs for younger people — a change motivated by cost 
considerations in a context of growing numbers of older 
people. It would seem that declining job availability during 
this period outweighed the effect of declining financial 
inducements. 
The implications for future 
labour force growth 
The above analysis indicates that the slowdown in the rate of 
employment growth after 1990 significantly reduced the 
growth of the labour force across the Union and in a number 
of Member States resulted in an absolute reduction in the 
numbers involved. The evidence of the last period of economic 
recovery in the latter part of the 1980s strongly suggests that 
increased labour force growth is likely as the rate of net job 
creation rises. An important question is how rapid this 
increase is likely to be. The answer depends on a number of 
issues, in particular, on: 
• how far the marked contraction in participation among 
young people will slow down or even be reversed as the 
availability of jobs improves, which depends in turn on 
how far the increased participation in education and 
training signals a rise in long-term trend as opposed to a 
short-term reaction to job shortages; 
• whether the rise in participation of women in the 25 to 
54 age group will continue at the same rate as over the 
past 10 to 15 years; 
• how far men of prime working age who have left the 
(official) labour force will be attracted back as employ-
ment prospects improve; 
• whether the increase in early retirement among men in 
many Member States will continue at the same rate. 
On the first issue, the likely trend in the participation of young 
people, there remain significant differences in prevailing 
levels of participation across the Union, with rates for the 
15 to 24 age group varying from only around a third in 
Belgium and under 40% in Greece, France and Italy to around 
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Effect of changes in population and participation on the labour force 
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65% in Austria and the UK and over 70% in Denmark (which 
partly reflect variations in the labour force participation of 
those in education and training) (Graph 151). In general, 
however, rates of participation tend to be relatively low in the 
less developed parts of the Union where unemployment is 
high. 
On the second issue, similarly large differences across the 
Union remain in the rate of participation among women in the 
25 to 54 age group. Despite the substantial growth which has 
occurred over the past decade in particular, these are still 
much lower than in most other parts of the Union in the less 
developed regions, Portugal apart (Graph 152). The likelihood 
of continuing increases in participation among women in 
these countries will add to the pressure for job creation. 
On the third issue, there is much less variation in rates of 
participation of men in the 25 to 54 age group between 
Member States, though in Ireland and Italy, where unemploy-
ment is relatively high, rates are slightly lower than 
elsewhere in the Union (90-91% as opposed to a Union aver-
age of 93%). 
On the fourth issue, the rate of participation of men in the 
older age groups tends to be relatively high in the less 
developed parts — in Greece, Spain, Ireland and Portugal, for 
men in their late-50s it is around 75% as against 60% or less 
in Belgium, France and Luxembourg — which might suggest 
that this is one area where pressure for jobs may be less acute 
than elsewhere (Graph 153). 
Output and employment growth in 
manufacturing and non-manufacturing 
The relationship between the growth of employment and 
output seems to have been closer in non-manufacturing sec-
tors than in manufacturing industries, both during the period 
of economic recovery in the latter part of the 1980s and in the 
period of recession in the early 1990s. 
In the growth period 1985 to 1990, the increase in the num-
bers employed in manufacturing in the Union as a whole was 
concentrated in just four Member States — Spain, the 
Netherlands, Germany and Italy (Graph 154). In only two of 
these, however — Spain and Italy — was the growth of 
value-added (or net output) in manufacturing, at around 4% 
a year, significantly greater than the Union average (3%). 
Moreover, in five Member States where employment in 
manufacturing fell during this period, growth of value-added 
was also greater than the Union average — indeed, in 
Luxembourg and Portugal, it was close to 5% a year. These 
five countries include the two countries showing the largest 
fall in employment — Finland and the UK, where employ-
ment declined by 2% a year and 1% a year, respectively. 
Much the same is true of manufacturing in the subsequent 
period of recession, in the sense that there was not a substantial 
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difference in terms of the change in output achieved as between 
those Member States experiencing a relatively large fall in 
employment and those experiencing a relatively small decline. 
No country managed to prevent employment in manufactur-
ing falling over this period, though the fall varied from under 
1% a year in Portugal to over 5% a year in Finland and Sweden 
(Graph 155). Output, however, declined by more in Portugal, 
by 2% a year, than anywhere else in the Union. By contrast, 
output increased in Finland, one of only six countries in the 
Union where this was true, and fell only slightly more than 
the Union average in Sweden. Of the six countries in which 
output fell over this period, three experienced a fall in the 
numbers employed of less than the Union average — though 
in two cases only just — and three experienced a larger 
decline. Moreover Austria which achieved the highest rate of 
output growth — just under 1% a year — experienced much 
the same reduction in employment as Germany which showed 
the second biggest fall in output — almost 1% a year. 
In non-manufacturing sectors, there was a somewhat closer 
relationship between the rate of change of output and employ-
ment. In the period 1985 to 1990, five countries experienced 
a higher growth of employment in non-manufacturing sectors 
than the average across the Union as a whole of just over 1'4% 
a year. Four of these countries — Luxembourg, Spain, the UK 
and Portugal — also achieved a higher than average increase 
in value-added in these sectors, over 3% a year (Graph 156). 
The one exception, the Netherlands, where growth of value-
added was only just below 3% a year, experienced an usually 
large increase in the importance of part-time working. 
In the subsequent period of recession, 1990 to 1994, all 
four countries experiencing any significant increase in 
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employment at all in non-manufacturing — Luxembourg, 
the Netherlands, Austria and West Germany — achieved 
much greater than average rates of growth of value-added, 
over 2% a year (Graph 157). Similarly, the two Member 
States showing the largest reductions in employment — 
Finland and Sweden — were the only countries in the Union 
experiencing falls in value-added, while the two with the 
next largest falls — Italy and the UK — were also the two 
countries where value-added in non-manufacturing rose by 
least. Moreover, the four Member States where the numbers 
employed declined by only slightly more than the Union 
average — Spain, Denmark, Portugal and Belgium — all 
showed similar rates of growth in value-added of between 
1V2% and 2% a year. 
Changes in 
working-time 
Between 1985 and 1990, average hours worked per week 
declined in most Member States, contributing to the growth 
in the numbers in employment (see Part I and Box for a 
description of the data used). Examining the most intense 
period of employment growth, 1987 to 1990, in more detail, 
average weekly hours usually worked in the economy as a 
whole declined in 10 countries, remained broadly 
unchanged in three — Greece, Luxembourg and Italy — 
and increased in another two — Sweden and the UK 
(Graph 158). 
There were, however, some differences in experience 
between sectors over this period. In agriculture, average 
hours declined in most countries of the Union except Italy, 
Greece, Austria, Finland and Sweden, where they increased 
and Germany, where they remained unchanged 
(Graph 159). In services, they were reduced in the majority 
of Member States — Denmark, the UK, Italy, Portugal, 
Sweden and Greece being the exceptions (Graph 160). In 
industry (which broadly corresponds to manufacturing in 
the analysis in Part I), however, average hours either in-
creased or remained unchanged throughout the Union, 
apart from in Denmark, Germany, Finland and Austria 
(Graph 161). 
In the years of recession, 1990 to 1994, average hours 
usually worked declined in all countries except Denmark 
and Greece, where they increased, and, significantly, in the 
Netherlands, which has the shortest average working week 
in the Union, where they remained unchanged. This pattern 
of change reflects developments both in services, where 
usual hours declined throughout the Union except in these 
three countries, and in industry, where they remained 
broadly unchanged, apart from in these three countries and 
in Sweden, the UK and Portugal where they fell (by 1% or 
more). In agriculture, average usual hours fell everywhere, 
apart from in Spain, Finland and Luxembourg as well as in 
Denmark, where they increased, and in Italy, where they 
were unchanged. 
Working time 
The data available on working time in the European 
Union are largely confined to average hours worked 
per week. These leave out of account changes in the 
number of weeks worked per year, which could well 
have been important in recent years as more attention 
in a number of Member States has been focused on the 
issue of time off. Although data on average time 
worked per year are collected as part of the Community 
Labour Cost Survey, this takes place only periodically 
— every four years at present — and the results are 
published only with a lengthy lag (the full 1992 results 
are unlikely to be available until the end of 1995). 
Moreover, the results do not cover the whole economy 
but are limited to industry and a few selected services, 
excluding, in particular, the public sector. 
The data on average hours worked per week are col-
lected as part of the annual Community Labour Force 
Survey. These relate both to actual hours worked 
during a particular week (the reference week) and the 
usual hours worked by respondents. In principle, it is 
the data on actual hours which should indicate how 
average working time changes in the short-term, in 
response to variations in the level of economic activity 
and should, therefore, be the most appropriate series 
to use for adjusting the figures for the number of people 
in employment to obtain a measure of total hours 
worked, and of labour productivity. The data on usual 
hours should indicate longer-term changes in working 
time. 
In practice, however, there are a number of problems 
with the data collected on actual hours which make it 
difficult to use them for measuring changes over time 
or, indeed, to estimate the numbers of hours worked 
during a given year. In particular, they include the 
effect of time off for holidays, time off for sickness, bad 
weather and other reasons unconnected with the state 
of economic activity. Moreover, because they relate to 
a particular week in the year — usually between 
March and May depending on the country — the 
answers are not necessarily representative of the year 
as a whole and because the week in some cases changes 
from one year to the next, they are not necessarily 
reliable indicators of changes over time. As a conse-
quence, the usual hours worked data have been used 
in the analysis here. 
Analysis of the difference over the Union as a whole 
between the usual and actual hours worked data for 
1993, chosen as a year when employment declined 
significantly, shows either that this is a very poor 
indicator of the effect of a low level of economic activity 
on working time or that depressed demand has a 
minimal impact on average hours worked. In this year, 
when it would be expected that such an effect should 
be at its greatest, the difference between usual and 
actual hours which is attributable to slack working 
amounted to an average of just three minutes a week 
over the Union as a whole. 
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Flows into and out 
of self-employment 
The numbers of self-employed in the Union as a whole 
increased by around 2% a year between 1986 and 1990 when 
total employment rose by around l'/2% a year. In the 
subsequent four years they fell by 1% a year, slightly more 
than the overall decline in the numbers in work. 
These changes, however, are liable to conceal very different 
patterns of change so far as inflows and outflows are con-
cerned. Thus, periods of recession tend to hit very small 
businesses relatively hard, in part because of the shortages of 
financial reserves and, in many countries, a lack of sources of 
borrowing. It might be expected, therefore, that the rate of 
exit from self-employment would be comparatively high 
during such periods, though this remains to be confirmed 
from the evidence. 
What is less easy to judge is whether the rate of entry into 
self-employment is likely to increase or contract during these 
periods, since there are plausible arguments either way. On 
the one hand, the increased shortage of jobs and the alterna-
tive of being unemployed may induce more people to seek to 
start up their own businesses, especially since there is usually 
government financial and other support available to assist. 
On the other hand, business prospects tend to be unfavourable 
at such times and the risk of failure, and possibly losing 
savings, higher. 
Data from the Community Labour Force Survey, specifically 
on what the self-employed were doing one year before, enable 
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estimates to be made of inflows into self-employment (ie of the 
numbers who are self-employed at the time of the Survey who 
were not self-employed the previous year). From these, esti-
mates of outflows can be made by comparing estimates of 
inflows with the change in self-employment between one year 
and the next (ie outflows are given by inflows minus the (net) 
change). These data are not ideal since they depend heavily 
on personal recollection, which is sometimes fallible (espe-
cially in the case of a household survey where one person may 
respond on behalf of all the members). Nevertheless, examin-
ation of the results in each year since 1987 shows relatively 
little year-to-year fluctuation which would seem to indicate 
that the problems are not too serious. 
In the period of employment growth between 1986 and 1990, 
inflows into self-employment averaged around 10% a year in 
the Union (ie some one in 10 of those self-employed when the 
survey was conducted had become self-employed during the 
course of the year — the figures exclude Italy for which no 
data were collected until 1992) (Graph 162). During the same 
period, outflows from self-employment, whether because of 
retirement or business failure or simply a change in occupa-
tion, averaged 7V2% a year. 
In the four subsequent years of recession and declining employ-
ment, inflows averaged 13%, significantly higher than in the 
preceding four years. Since the numbers of self-employed 
declined over this period, outflows were even higher, averaging 
14% a year, almost twice as high as over the growth period. 
The clear conclusion, therefore, is that the fall in self-
employment during the recession period was the result of a 
substantial rise in the rate of exit, reflecting perhaps a 
marked increase in business failures. This more than offset 
the increase in the rate of entry into self-employment. 
A further conclusion is that government efforts to induce more 
people to become self-employed seem to have met with some 
success, though not sufficiently to match the increased rate of 
exit. Moreover, these efforts have been largely directed at the 
unemployed, who have been given various incentives to set up 
business. Yet further analysis reveals that a declining propor-
tion of those becoming self-employed during the recession 
years had come from the ranks of the unemployed. During the 
growth years, 1987 to 1990, around 15'/2% of those becoming 
self-employed in the Union had been unemployed the previous 
year. During the recession years, 1991 to 1994, this proportion 
fell to under 11% (Graph 163). At the same time, the propor-
tion of the self-employed who had previously been inactive 
was much the same in the two periods. 
The increase in inflows into self-employment, therefore, is 
largely attributable to an increasing proportion of people 
moving from waged employment into self-employment. A 
significant number of these may have lost their job and 
become self-employed as an alternative to unemployment — 
indeed, many may have been unemployed for a period of time 
(the fact that they were not unemployed one year previously 
does not imply that they were not out of work at some time 
during the course of the year). 
Some proportion, however, may also have merely altered 
their employment status, doing the same job as before but as a 
self-employed person rather than as an employee, so 
perhaps relieving a firm of some of the costs of employ-
ment and increasing their flexibility. From the data there is 
no way of knowing how widespread such a change in status 
Flows into and out of self-employment 
in the Member States 
The scale of flows both into and out of self-employment varies 
markedly between Member States, though in most cases, they 
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show the same kind of pattern of variation over time as for 
the Union as a whole. 
The rate of entry into self-employment over the growth years, 
1987 to 1990, ranged from over 20% a year in the Netherlands 
and 16% in the UK to only around 4% a year (not much higher 
than would be expected from the self-employed reaching re-
tirement age) in Belgium, Greece and Ireland, with Germany 
and France being around the Union average (Graph 164). 
In the recession years, 1991 to 1994, the rate of entry into 
self-employment increased in all Member States, except the 
Netherlands where it remained as high as in the earlier years 
(Graph 165). The rise was particularly marked in Belgium, 
Denmark, Germany and Portugal, in all of which the rate of 
inflow more than doubled over this period as compared with 
the earlier one. In Germany, where the increase in inflows 
dates from 1991 (in the other countries, the significant rise 
occurred in 1992), part of the growth may be related to 
unification. Even though the analysis is confined to the former 
West Germany, excluding the new Länder, in order to reduce 
the distortive effect of unification, it is still the case that 
significant numbers of people moving from East to West may 
have taken up self-employment. 
In most cases, the rate of exit from self-employment also 
increased in the years 1991 to 1994, to 20% a year in the UK 
and over 15% a year in Germany and France. In all Member 
States, therefore, the fall in the numbers of self-employed 
which most of them experienced during these years was due 
to increased outflows rather than a fall in inflows. 
The fall in the proportion of those becoming self-employed who 
were formerly unemployed between the years before 1990 and 
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the years after is also common to most Member States, the 
only exceptions being Denmark and the Netherlands 
(Graphs 166 and 167). As for the Union as a whole, the main 
cause of the growth in inflows into self-employment in most 
Member States was an increased movement of people from 
waged jobs. 
Flows into part-time work 
As indicated in Part I, part-time working has grown markedly 
in most parts of the Union over the period since 1990 in 
particular. The aim here is to examine the growth of part-time 
employment in more detail by focusing on those people who 
found a part-time job after being unemployed or economically 
inactive, either because they were still at school or in further 
education or because they had interrupted their working 
careers for various reasons (in the case of women especially, 
to take care of young children). The specific point at issue 
concerns the proportion of those taking up employment who 
moved into a part-time rather than full-time job and how far 
this tended to increase as the Union economy went into 
recession. The Community Labour Force Survey provides 
some answer to this question since, as indicated above, it 
includes details of what respondents were doing one year 
earlier. As also indicated above, however, this kind of infor-
mation can sometimes be unreliable since it depends on 
respondents' power of recall. Nevertheless, as in the case of 
self-employment, the results for individual years indicate a 
fair amount of stability in the answers given, so that the likely 
margin of error ought not to be large. 
Women entering part-time jobs 
In the growth period from 1987 to 1990, around a third of 
all women in the Union who took up work after being unem-
ployed moved into a part-time rather than a full-time job 
(Graph 168). This is slightly more than the average share of 
jobs which were part-time, which is consistent with the 
relative numbers of part-time jobs increasing over this period. 
This aggregate figure, however, is misleading since it is 
essentially determined by the kinds of job being created in the 
countries in which employment is expanding most rapidly and 
where, therefore, large numbers are moving into work. In this 
period, one of the countries in which employment was growing 
by most was Spain which has among the lowest proportions 
of women working part-time (only around 12%- in 1987). 
It is, therefore, important to examine the position in each 
country. This ranged from over 50% of women moving into 
work from being unemployed taking up a part-time job in 
the Netherlands and the UK and over 40% in Belgium and 
Germany to 15% in Spain and only just over 10% in Greece 
and Portugal (Graph 169). Though the figures are broadly 
in line with the relative importance of part-time working 
across the Union, the relationship between the two is by 
no means uniform. In particular, whereas in Denmark and 
the Netherlands, the proportion moving into part-time 
jobs was slightly less than the share of part-time in total 
employment, in Belgium, Germany, France and Ireland, it 
was much higher, partly reflecting the growth of part-time 
work over this period, though partly indicating that for 
those who had been unemployed, there was a disproportion-
ately higher chance of finding a part-time job than a 
full-time one. 
For those who had been in education or training, over the 
Union as a whole, there was also a slightly greater probability 
during this period of taking up a part-time job than in the case 
of those who had been unemployed. Around 39% of women in 
the Union moving from education or training into work found 
part-time rather than full-time employment in the years 1987 
to 1990 (Graph 170). However, while the proportion of those 
moving from education or training into part-time work over 
this period was much higher than in respect of those moving 
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from unemployment in Denmark, the Netherlands, Greece 
and Ireland, it was much lower in Belgium, Germany and the 
UK (Graph 171). 
For women who had been economically inactive for reasons 
other than being in education and training — to a large 
extent, because of family responsibilities — the proportion 
moving into part-time rather than full-time work was much 
higher in most Member States than in respect of those 
finding a job after a spell of unemployment. Over the Union 
as a whole between 1987 and 1990, an average of 69% of 
women finding jobs after such a period of inactivity went 
into part-time work (Graph 172). In the Netherlands, the 
figure was as high as 93%, in Ireland and the UK, around 
77% and in Germany over 60%. By contrast, in Portugal, the 
figure was only just over 20% and in Greece, under 20% 
(Graph 173). 
In the period of recession, 1991 to 1994, the average propor-
tion of women moving from unemployment into work who took 
up part-time jobs increased from 34% to 39%. Such an 
increase, however, did not occur in all Member States. Indeed, 
in five countries — Belgium, Denmark, Germany, 
Luxembourg and the UK — the proportion was much the 
same in the later period as in the earlier one. On the other 
hand, in France, Ireland and the Netherlands, the rise was 
especially pronounced at around 10 percentage points or more 
between the two periods. 
In the case of women moving from education or training into 
employment, only a slightly greater proportion in the Union 
as a whole went into part-time jobs over this period than over 
the preceding four years (40% as against 39%). Again, 
however, there were some differences in experience between 
Member States, though in most cases the proportion either 
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rose between the two periods or remained much the same. In 
six countries, the proportion increased significantly — 
Denmark, Spain, Ireland, the Netherlands and the UK as well 
as in Germany, if an allowance is made for the effect of 
unification. Only in Greece and Portugal was there a marked 
fall. 
In the case of women moving into work after being inactive 
for other reasons, there was a reduction in the proportion 
taking part-time rather than full-time employment. Over the 
Union as a whole, the average declined from 69% to under 
63%. In most Member States, however, there was little signi-
ficant change in the proportion between the two periods, the 
only exceptions being Belgium, where the figure went up 
substantially (from 36% to over 45%) and the Netherlands 
where it went down equally as much (from 93% to 82%). 
Men entering part-time jobs 
During the growth years 1987 to 1990, over the Union as a 
whole, an average of some 10% of men finding a job after being 
unemployed went into part-time work. This is around 2'/2 
times higher than the proportion of men in employment who 
worked part-time, which emphasises the importance of 
growth in part-time work for men over this period and, in some 
degree, the slightly more restricted choice of job for those 
unemployed. 
The share of men moving from unemployment into part-time 
jobs over this period varied substantially across the Union, 
from almost 25% in the Netherlands and around 20% in 
Ireland to under 5% in Spain and Portugal. Apart from the 
latter two countries, however, in each case the share was 
much larger than the proportion of men already working 
part-time (Graph 174). 
The share of men moving from full-time education or training 
into part-time employment rather than into full-time jobs was 
even higher. Indeed over the Union as a whole, it was only 
slightly below the share of women, just under a third of men 
who had found a job after being in education or training went 
into part-time rather than full-time work. In this case, the 
proportion varied from almost 70% in the Netherlands and 
over 35% in Denmark to around 10% or less in Greece, Spain 
and Portugal (Graph 175). In many parts of the Union, there-
fore, the first job of a significant proportion of men seems to 
have been a part-time one, though in a number of cases, this 
might have involved combining part-time work with educa-
tion or training. 
In the years of recession, 1991 to 1994, over the Union as a 
whole, the proportion of men moving from unemployment into 
a job who took up part-time work increased from an average 
of 10% to an average of 11 V2%. This, however, varied from 35% 
in the Netherlands and 25% in Ireland — both significantly 
higher than in the preceding three years — to under 5% in 
Spain and Luxembourg. With the exception of the latter and 
the UK, the proportion was higher during this period in all 
countries than over the years before 1990. 
In the case of those moving from education or training into 
employment, the proportion taking up part-time jobs in the 
Union remained much the same in this period as over the 
preceding one. In a number of Member States, however, there 
were significant increases. In Denmark, the Netherlands and 
the UK, the proportion moving into part-time jobs rose by over 
10 percentage points — to 80% of the total in the Netherlands 
and almost 50% in Denmark. 
In general, therefore, an increasing proportion of those taking 
up work during the recession years went into part-time jobs. 
This suggests that part-time work may have provided more 
opportunity for employers to vary their work force in line with 
changes in the demand for their products when the market 
was slack. The results from the period before 1990, however, 
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Temporary working can mean differ-
ent things in different Member 
States. Generally it is divided into 
those who have a temporary job, 
where the exact duration is not speci-
fied, and those who are working on a 
contract of limited duration (fixed-
term contract). Because each of these 
can be subject to different institu-
tional arrangements in the Member 
States, it is important to note the 
differences which apply to each. 
According to the Community Labour 
Force Survey: 
a job may be regarded as temporary if 
it is understood by both employer and 
employee that the termination of the 
job is determined by objective condi-
tions such as reaching a certain date, 
completion of an assignment or return 
of another employee who has been 
temporarily replaced. In the case of a 
work contract of limited duration the 
condition for its termination is gener-
ally mentioned in the contract. 
As a result, the Labour Force Survey 
includes as temporary workers those 
with a seasonal job, those engaged by 
an employment agency or business 
and hired out to a third party for the 
carrying out of a work mission and 
those with specific training contracts. 
Fixed-term contracts are permitted 
in all Member States and in 9 out of 
the 12 they are regulated. 
Temporary working on the other 
hand is subject to much more regula-
tion. In fact in Greece temporary 
employment agencies are prohibited, 
while in Spain and Italy measures 
have only recently been introduced to 
lift the prohibition on temporary em-
ployment agencies. 
The differences between the two 
types of working are that basically 
where restrictions exist on the maxi-
mum duration of each type of working 
■— and this is the case in half the 
Member States — the maximum dur-
ation of temporary contracts is often 
far less than it is for fixed-term con-
tracts. 
Member States, men as well as women, moved into part-time 
employment even during a period of high employment growth. 
Flows into temporary employment 
The same kind of Labour Force Survey information provides 
an insight into the scale of movement into temporary, or 
fixed-term, employment, as opposed to jobs with standard, 
open-ended contracts (see Box for the definition of temporary 
jobs). As noted in Part I, only around 10% of those in employ-
ment in the Union work in jobs which are fixed-term. A much 
higher proportion, however, take up such jobs after a spell of 
unemployment or after being economically inactive. 
Men entering temporary jobs 
Over the Union as a whole, half of men who found work after 
being unemployed went into temporary rather than perma-
nent jobs in the four years 1987 to 1990, the figure varying 
comparatively little from year to year (Graph 176). As might 
be expected from the relative importance of this kind of work 
in the different Member States, the proportion was highest in 
Spain, at over 73%, though in Portugal, it was also around 
70% (Graph 177). Elsewhere, the figure was just over 50% in 
Greece and around 45% in Ireland and the Netherlands, 
though it was only around a quarter in Belgium and the UK 
and under 20% in Luxembourg. 
The proportion of men finding a job after being in education 
or training who went into a temporary work in the Union was 
much the same as in respect of those moving from unemploy-
ment, at just under a half (Graph 178). However, in Germany, 
over 70% of men going into employment after being in educa-
tion or training moved into a temporary job, and in France, 
65% (Graph 179). In these two countries, therefore, as well as 
in Greece, Spain and Portugal, where the proportion was also 
over 60%, the normal tendency seemed to be for a young man's 
first job to be one with a fixed-term contract or period of 
probation. Indeed, in all Member States, around 30% or more 
of men went into temporary rather than permanent jobs after 
leaving education and initial training. 
In the four years of recession, 1991 to 1994, in the Union as a 
whole, the proportion moving from unemployment into work 
who went into a temporary job was the same as in the earlier 
four years. The experience in Member States, however, was 
mixed. In four cases — Denmark, Spain, France and Ireland 
— it went up, in Spain, substantially to 85% and in France to 
almost a half from 41%, in Belgium, it remained much the 
same and in the other countries, it fell, markedly so in Greece 
and Portugal, matching the fall in the share of jobs which were 
temporary in the economy. 
In the case of those moving from education or training into 
work, the proportion going into temporary jobs over the Union 
as a whole rose to 53% in the recession years. The proportion 
increased in Spain, France, Ireland and the Netherlands, 
especially in Spain, where the figure reached 83% almost as 
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high as in respect of those moving from unemployment, and 
fell markedly in Greece and Portugal, in both cases, to under 
half. Nevertheless, only in Belgium, Luxembourg and the UK, 
did less than 40% of men leaving education or training go into 
temporary jobs over this period. 
Women entering 
temporary jobs 
Despite the slightly higher share of women than men in 
fixed-term jobs, the proportion of women moving from unem-
ployment into work who took up temporary employment was 
somewhat less than in the case of men in the period 1987 to 
1990. Over the Union as a whole, the figure averaged 42% 
during these years (Graph 180), following a similar pattern 
of variation between Member States as for men, with the 
proportion in Spain and Portugal being around 70% and in 
Luxembourg and the UK 20%. 
In the case of those moving from education and training, the 
proportion of women going into temporary rather than 
permanent work was also less than for men, at just under 40% 
(Graph 181). Again the variation between Member States was 
similar to that for men, with both Germany and France having 
relatively high figures (74% for the former, 59% for the latter) 
and the UK and Luxembourg having relatively low figures, 
though still around 30%. 
For women moving into work after being inactive for other 
reasons, mainly to do with family responsibilities, the propor-
tion going into temporary employment was very much lower 
at only around 17% in the Union as a whole (Graph 182). In 
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180 Flows of unemployed women into temporary 
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this case, only in Spain and Portugal was the figure above half, 
and elsewhere in the Union, only in Greece and Ireland above 
a quarter (Graph 183). Since a significant proportion of part-
time jobs are also temporary (see below), these low figures 
suggest perhaps that part-time, temporary jobs are more 
important for younger people going into work for the first time 
rather for women re-entering the labour market. 
For women moving from education or training into employ-
ment, the proportion going into temporary work also 
increased in much the same way as for men. Like men, a 
significant proportion of women in most Member States seem 
to go into temporary employment as their first jobs, the 
proportion being less than a third only in the UK and, else-
where, being under 40% only in Belgium and Luxembourg. 
Over the period of recession, 1991 to 1994, the proportion of 
women moving from unemployment into work who went into 
temporary jobs increased across the Union to 47%, much 
closer to the rate for men. As for men, however, there was a 
significant rise in the proportion only in four Member States 
— Denmark, Spain, France and Ireland. In Greece and 
Portugal, as well as in Belgium, the figure fell significantly. 
For women moving into work from being inactive for other 
reasons, the proportion going into temporary jobs also rose in 
the Union as a whole from 16V2% to 22% between the 
two periods. Only in Spain, France, Luxembourg and the 
Netherlands, however, did the figure increase significantly. 
In Belgium, Germany and the UK as well as in Greece and 
Portugal, it fell. 
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The overlap between temporary 
and part-time working 
Although the two have been examined separately above, in 
practice, a high proportion of temporary jobs also tend to be 
part-time ones. Given the lower degree of employment protec­
tion with which each may be associated, this may mean that 
employment is doubly precarious. 
In 1992,13% of temporary jobs for men in the Uni on as a whole 
were part-time (Graph 184), a much higher proportion than 
for permanent positions (under 4%). This proportion, how­
ever, varied markedly between Member States. In two 
countries, Ireland and the UK, around one third of all such 
jobs were part-time, while in the Netherlands over half of men 
— around 55% — in temporary posts worked part-time. In 
other countries, part-time employment among those in tem­
porary jobs was much closer to the proportion of those in 
permanent jobs, though in all cases, it was higher. In Spain, 
in particular, where the expansion of temporary work was so 
rapid in the late 1980s, only around 7% of the jobs created of 
this kind created were part-time rather than full-time. 
As might be expected, the proportion of women working on 
part-time temporary contracts is much higher than for men. 
In 1992, around 35% of women employed in temporary jobs 
worked part-time, slightly higher than the share of part-time 
working in permanent employment (Graph 185). The propor­
tion, however, was over 80% in the Netherlands, around 60% 
in Luxembourg and the UK and 55% in Ireland. In all these 
countries, part-time working was far more prevalent among 
those on fixed-term contracts than among those in permanent 
jobs. This was also true of Belgium (45%), France (40%), Italy 
(37%) and Greece (25%), where part-time working even among 
women is comparatively unusual. On the other hand, in 
Denmark and Germany, proportionately fewer women in 
temporary jobs worked part-time than those in permanent 
employment. 
Over recent years, the proportion of temporary jobs which are 
part-time has tended to decline in the Union. Between 1987 
and 1992, the average proportion in the case of men fell from 
17% to 13% across the Union as a whole and increased more 
than marginally in only four Member States (Germany, 
Greece, and most especially, Ireland and the Netherlands). 
The decline was especially pronounced in Italy, Luxembourg 
and the UK, where the proportion fell in each case from over 
45% to 30% or less (to under 20% in Italy). The same is true 
for women. Over this period, the average proportion of women 
employed under temporary contracts working part-time fell 
from 39% to 35% in the Union, though in this case, there were 
five Member States experiencing a rise — the four listed above 
in respect of men plus France. As for men, the decline in the 
proportion was particularly large in Italy, Luxembourg and 
the UK — in each case over 10% of the total number of 
temporary jobs, with Spain showing only a slightly smaller 
fall. 
The duration of temporary contracts 
The typical duration of fixed-term contracts varies markedly 
across the Union, in large measure inversely with their pre­
valence. In the Southern Member States, in particular — 
Spain, Greece and Portugal — where a larger share of employ­
ment consists of jobs of fixed duration, a higher proportion of 
these tend to be for relatively short periods of time than is the 
case in most Northern countries, France, where temporary 
working is also comparatively important, being the main 
exception. 
In 1993, 57% of fixed-term jobs were for 6 months or less, in 
Portugal, 53% and in Greece, 46% (Graph 186). Similarly, in 
France, 44% of such jobs were for the same period of time, a 
figure matched only by Ireland of Northern Member States. 
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By contrast, in Belgium, the Netherlands and the UK, only 
around a third of temporary jobs were for 6 months or less, in 
Denmark, a quarter and in Germany, only 15%. 
In Germany, on the other hand, half of the people employed 
in fixed-term jobs had contracts of over 2 years and in 
Luxembourg, only slightly less than this. In Spain and 
Portugal, however, only 11% of people in temporary jobs were 
employed on contracts of this duration and in Greece the 
proportion was only slightly higher, while in Italy, it was even 
less at only 8% and France, it was as low as 6%. 
Areas of new job growth 
There are some difficulties in identifying in any detail the 
sectors of activity which have been responsible for net job 
creation during recent years. This is partly due to lack of 
consistent and comparable data at the Union level which are 
sufficiently disaggregated to enable more than relatively 
broad sectors to be distinguished. The results of the 
Community Labour Force Survey, however, provide some 
indication of this in the form of the numbers employed by 
NACE 2 digit sector, which divides the economy into 60 areas 
of activity. Although the figures are based on a sample survey 
of households and are, therefore, subject to some margin of 
error, especially for sectors employing relatively few people in 
the smaller Member States, they are, nevertheless, by some 
way the most up-to-date and comprehensive data available. 
Moreover, for the Union as a whole, sampling problems are 
reduced in importance. 
On the other hand, there are further problems in examining 
changes over time because of the revision to the NACE system 
of classification in 1993. While this gives more detail for 
service sectors where most of the job growth has occurred in 
recent years, the change from the former system to the new 
one means that there is some difficulty in comparing 
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employment for all the sectors (ie there is not an exact match 
between old and new ). 
In practice, of the 60 sectors distinguished at the 2-digit level 
of classification, it is possible to compare changes in employ-
ment before and after the revision for only 23. The rest have 
to be aggregated into 12 more broadly defined groups in order 
to achieve a sufficiently precise matching. (These 12 groups 
include some individual sectors where the definition of acti-
vities seems to be the same in the new as in the old system, 
but for which there is a much larger change in employment 
between 1992 (the old system) and 1993 (the new) than can 
plausibly have occurred without some change in coverage. 
One such sector is health care which has to be included with 
sewage, sanitation and other personal services in order to 
achieve reasonable compatibility between the old and new 
systems. Though, in general, it is only to be expected that 
there should be a less good matching of service sectors given 
the increased disaggregation which has been introduced, it is, 
nevertheless, unfortunate that it will be difficult to identify 
medium and longer term changes in the sectoral distribution 
of employment in any detail for some time.) 
We are, therefore, left with 35 sectors of activity, of varying 
sizes, for which it is possible to examine changes over the 
recent period of recession and the earlier years of growth 
(Graph 187). These, it should be emphasised, vary signifi-
cantly in terms of the numbers employed, which needs to be 
taken into account when assessing differences in the rate of 
employment change which has occurred. In terms of job losses 
— though not necessarily in terms of the social problems 
resulting — it is much more significant, for example, that 
employment in wholesale and retail distribution, which 
amounts to 14% of the total in the Union, should have declined 
by nearly 3% a year between 1990 and 1994 than that the 
relatively few people employed in the mining of metal ores 
should have fallen by over 15% a year. 
Between 1985 and 1990, employment over the Union as a 
whole increased in most of the sectors. Nevertheless, it fell in 
12, mostly relatively basic, sectors of activity including three 
mining sectors (where jobs declined by around 6% a year) as 
well as agriculture (see Graph 52 in Part I, Section 3). In total, 
these sectors accounted for around 209Í of total jobs in the 
Union. Apart from land and water transport, the numbers 
employed increased in all service sectors, the largest rises 
occurring in business services and computer-related activities 
(over 7% a year) and recreational services (just under 5%- a 
year). Employment also expanded, however, in a number of 
industrial sectors, including the manufacture of office 
machinery (over 4% a year), electrical engineering, motor 
vehicles (both 2'/2% a year) and construction (just under 2'/2% 
a year). 
Over the four years of recession, 1990 to 1994, employment 
fell in 25 of the 35 sectors distinguished here. While the 
reduction was largely concentrated in industry and agricul-
ture, four service sectors — land and water transport, as in 
the preceding period, air transport, insurance and wholesale 
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and retail distribution also experienced a decline. The biggest 
job losses were recorded in coal and metal ore mining, where 
the numbers employed declined by around 15% a year, so 
halving the work force over the four year period, though 
substantial reductions also occurred in office machinery, 
which had experienced significant growth in the preceding 
period, and chemicals. In both of these employment fell by 
over 12% a year. It also fell substantially in electrical engin-
eering (almost 7% a year) and motor vehicles (just under 4% 
a year), two other sectors in which jobs had expanded in the 
preceding five years. 
Of the industrial sectors, only instrument engineering (where 
jobs had risen only modestly in the earlier period) and the 
purification and distribution of water (where job losses had 
occurred before 1990) showed any increase in employment 
over this period. Although these generated a significant rate 
of job gain — 4 V2% a year and 3'/2% a year, respectively — they 
are small in terms of the numbers employed, being respon-
sible for only just over V2% of employment in the Union. 
with largest losses to have shown a continuing fall, this 
tendency is by far from being universal or uniform. The 
opposing examples of the water industry, on the one hand, and 
office machinery, on the other, emphasise this. 
Regional disparities 
in unemployment 
In the growth period between 1987 and 1990, unemployment 
fell in most regions of the Union. The largest falls in many 
cases occurred in areas where unemployment was relatively 
high, so narrowing regional disparities in rates. Reductions of 
over 4 percentage points were, therefore, recorded in many 
parts of Spain, particularly in the South and East where the 
unemployment problem was acute, as well in many old indus-
trial areas in the UK where rates were also high (Map 3). In 
addition, rates also fell by more than average in Ireland, 
where unemployment in the mid-1980s was over 16%. 
As between 1985 and 1990, the largest expansion in employ-
ment occurred in business services and computer-related 
activities, where the number of jobs rose at only a marginally 
slower rate after 1990 than before (at 7-8% a year). Employ-
ment in recreational activities also continued to expand 
significantly, though only at half the rate recorded in the 
earlier period, which was also true of health care, sanitation 
and other personal services and hotel and restaurants. 
These 10 sectors in which job growth occurred together ac-
counted for some 47% of the total employment in the Union 
in 1994. Although some tendency is evident for the sectors in 
which job growth was most pronounced during the period of 
growth between 1985 and 1990 to have continued to expand 
during the subsequent years of recession, and for the sectors 
The growth of employment over this period, however, did not 
benefit all problem regions. Many in Southern Italy, espe-
cially, experienced below average reductions in rates or even 
increases. Conversely, a number of regions with low unem-
ployment, such as in the South-East of England and Northern 
parts of Italy, experienced reductions in rates which were 
above average. 
Over the subsequent four years of general rises in unemploy-
ment, many of the regions which gained from the previous 
period of growth suffered the largest increases. This was 
especially true of Spain, where all regions without exception 
experienced bigger rises in unemployment between 1990 and 
1994 than the Union average (Map 4). Similarly, unemploy-
ment also increased relatively rapidly in a few parts of 
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Southern Italy and Northern France where rates were rela-
tively high. On the other hand, most parts of Southern Italy 
experienced below average increases over this period, which 
was also the case in Ireland, Northern Ireland and much of 
Scotland, in all of which rates were relatively high. 
Regional disparities in Member States 
In France, the disparity in regional unemployment rates 
(measured as the standard deviation weighted by the labour 
force in each region) fell steadily from 1983 to 1991 while 
unemployment rose, then fell, then rose again (Graph 188). 
Between 1991 and 1994, the disparity increased from 1.8 to 
3.0 as unemployment went up markedly from 972% to 12'/2% 
in 1994. 
In Gennany, the unemployment rate and disparity have 
tended to move in opposite directions (Graph 189). The 
national rate of unemployment increased from just over 4% 
in 1991 to 6'/2% in 1994, while the disparity in regional rates 
declined from 4.5 to 3.9. 
In Italy, there has been a similar pattern to that in Germany. 
Up to 1991, the unemployment rate and disparity in regional 
rates moved in the same direction. However between 1990 and 
1994 they moved in opposite directions, though in 1994 both 
disparity and unemployment rose (Graph 190). 
In Spain, however, the disparity in regional unemployment 
seems to mirror the change in national unemployment fairly 
closely. Between 1993 and 1994, the unemployment rate rose 
from 17'/2% to 24%, while the disparity rose from 8.6 to 15.2 
(Graph 191). 
In the UK, the disparity in regional rates remained fairly 
constant between 1983 and 1989 while the unemployment 
rate fell markedly (Graph 192). Unemployment then rose but 
the disparity fell from 3.8 in 1989 to 2.4 in 1994. 
Changes in unemployment in the Union 
by Structural Funds status 
The regions which have been identified as those where 
unemployment is highest and participation rates lowest 
tend to be in areas of the Union which are receiving assist-
ance under the Structural Funds — in particular in 
Objective 1 areas where GDP per head is less than 75% of 
the Union average. Regions with higher than average un-
employment are also prominent among those classified as 
Objective 2 regions suffering from industrial decline. 
Although it should be emphasised that the success or failure 
of support programmes cannot be assessed in terms only, or 
even mainly, of changes in unemployment rates, it is of 
interest to examine how unemployment rates have tended 
to change in these areas relative to the rest of the Union 
since they have been identified as those affected by the most 
serious structural problems. This, at least, provides an 
indication of whether in terms of a major manifestation of 
structural problems, these are getting better or worse. 
Available NUTS 2 data have been weighted by the propor-
tion of the population within each region covered by each of 
the Structural Fund classifications to make it possible to 
calculate aggregates at the Union level for Objective 2, 
Objective 5b and unassisted areas as well as Objective 1 
regions which mostly coincide with NUTS 2 regions 
(Graph 193). 
Between 1987 and 1994, the average unemployment rate in 
the unassisted areas of the Union rose marginally to just 
under 9%. In the Objective 5b areas, the rate fell sharply to 
under 6%, while in Objective 2 areas, the average declined 
from 12V2% to just over ll72%. In Objective 1 regions, by 
contrast, average unemployment rose from 15'/2% to 18%. In 
these terms, therefore, disparities in access to employment 
opportunities have widened in recent years. 
Growth in labour costs and 
productivity in manufacturing 
and non-manufacturing 
As emphasised in Part I, Section 5, the rise in average labour 
costs relative to the growth of output per person — or labour 
productivity — is a key determinant of the scope which 
employers have for job creation. In manufacturing, where the 
rise in real labour costs (average labour costs deflated by the 
average price of manufacturing output) tended to be higher 
than in non-manufacturing sectors, average labour costs went 
up by around V2% less than the growth of labour productivity 
in the Union as a whole between 1985 and 1990 (Graph 194). 
This was repeated in all Member States for which data are 
available (the 15 except Greece, Ireland and Austria), apart 
from Denmark, Germany, Spain and Sweden, though in the 
former two, the difference between the two rates of increase 
was small. 
In the subsequent four years, 1990 to 1994, when the average 
growth of real labour costs in manufacturing in the Union was 
slightly higher than in the preceding five years (3% a year 
rather than 2V2%), labour costs went up by much the same 
rate as labour productivity (Graph 195; real labour costs 
involve more estimation for this period as the data for 
manufacturing value-added in current prices, which are re-
quired to calculate the price of output are not available for 
1994 for most countries and for 1993 for several; in these 
cases, the consumer price deflator has been used instead). 
This outcome, however, was greatly influenced by Germany, 
which is of major importance in manufacturing in the Union 
and where labour costs rose by over 50% more than the growth 
in productivity. In all the other Member States, except for 
Belgium, Portugal and the UK, labour costs rose by less than 
productivity. This was also the case in the US and Japan, 
as it had been in the earlier period, with the US, in particular, 
showing much lower increases in labour costs than 
productivity. 
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194 Growth in labour productivity and real labour 
costs in manufacturing in Member States, 1985-90 
195 Growth in labour productivity and real labour 
costs in manufacturing in Member States, 1990-94 
Annual change (%) 
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In non-manufacturing, real labour costs across the Union 
rose by over V2% less than labour productivity in the period 
1985 to 1990 — and by only 1% a year. In only three 
countries, the Netherlands (marginally), Sweden and the 
UK, did labour costs increase by more than productivity 
(Graph 196). 
In the following four years, average real labour costs in 
the Union went up by even less — by only around V2% a 
year — and by some 1% below the rate of labour productiv-
ity growth (Graph 197). Labour costs also rose by less 
than productivity in 8 of the Member States, the exceptions 
being Belgium (marginally), the Netherlands, as in the 
earlier period, Luxembourg and Portugal, as for manufac-
turing. Over this period, in both the US and Japan labour 
costs in non-manufacturing increased by more than produc-
tivity. 
The distribution of hours worked 
in the Member States 
The proportion of people working different numbers of hours 
a week has in many Member States changed very little over 
the past 10 years or so. Moreover, what change there has been 
tended to occur before 1990 rather than after. 
Excluding agriculture, where hours of week are relatively 
difficult to measure, the pattern of usual hours worked by 
employees in industry and services combined changed signi-
ficantly between 1987 and 1994 in only five of the 12 Member 
States (ie excluding Austria, Finland and Sweden for which 
data are not available) (Graphs 198 to 209 formen and Graphs 
210 to 211 for women). These were: 
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• Denmark, where usual hours worked by the majority of 
men and most full-time women employees were reduced 
from 39 hours a week in 1987 to 38 hours by 1990 and to 
37 hours by 1994, coupled with some fall in the propor-
tion of women working part-time between 20 and 24 
hours a week; 
• Germany, where for most men and women employed 
full-time, usual hours worked were reduced from 40 
hours to 38 hours between 1987 and 1990 and by com-
paratively little since; 
• Ireland, where a substantial proportion of men and 
women employees, usual weekly hours fell from 40 to 39 
largely between 1990 and 1994 — one of the few coun-
tries where changes were concentrated in this period; 
• the Netherlands, where for a significant proportion of 
men employees working full-time and some women, 
usual hours seem to have increased between 1990 and 
1994 from 38 a week to 40, though this has been coupled 
with some increase in the proportion working part-time 
hours; 
• Portugal, where there was a large reduction in the pro-
portion of men and women working 45 or more hours a 
week, predominantly between 1990 and 1994. 
In the other Member States, though in general there has been 
some shift to shorter working hours, it has been very small. 
The main exceptions are Greece and the UK, where the small 
shift which has occurred has, especially for men, been in the 
opposite direction towards longer working weeks, though as 
noted in Part I, there was an increase in most Member States 
in the proportion of men working long hours, of 50 or more a 
week, despite the tendency towards slightly shorter working 
weeks lower down the distribution curve. 
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The distribution of usual hours worked per week by employees in 
industry and services in Member States, 1987, 1990 and 1994 
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The distribution of usual hours worked per week by employees in 
industry and services in Member States, 1987,1990 and 1994 
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Weekly hours  Weekly hours 
184-Annex 
The distribution of usual hours worked per week by employees in 
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211 Women - Denmark 
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Weekly hours  Weekly hours 
212 Women - Germany 
1 oo r% employees  100 
213 Women - Greece 
1 oo ?" employees  100 
Weekly hours  Weekly hours 
214 Women - Spain 
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215 Women - France 
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185 Annex 
The distribution of usual hours w
Torked per week by employees in 
industry and services in Member States, 1987, 1990 and 1994 
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218 Women - Luxembourg  219 Women - Netherlands 
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186 Annex 
Key employment indicators 
Total 
Total population (000) 
Working-age population (15-64) (000) 
Total employment (000) 
Annual change in employment (%)* 
Employment rate {% working-age population) 
Self-employed (% total employment) 
Employed part-time (% total employment) 
Employed on fixed term contracts (%) 
Employment in agriculture (%) 
Employment in industry (%) 
Employment in services (%) 
Activity rate (% working-age population) 
Total unemployed (000) 
Unemployment rate (%) 
Youth unemployment rate (%) 
Long-term unemployed (% total) 
Men 
Total population (000) 
Working-age population (15-64) (000) 
Total employment (000) 
Annual change in employment (%)* 
Employment rate (% working-age population) 
Self-employed (% total employment) 
Employed part-time (% total employment) 
Employed on fixed term contracts (%) 
Employment in agriculture (%) 
Employment in industry (%) 
Employment in services (%) 
Activity rate (% working-age population) 
Total unemployed (000) 
Unemployment rate (%) 
Youth unemployment rate (%) 
Long-term unemployed (% total) 
Women 
Total population (000) 
Working-age population (15-64) (000) 
Total employment (000) 
Annual change in employment (%)* 
Employment rate (% working-age population) 
Self-employed (% total employment) 
Employed part-time (% total employment) 
Employed on fixed term contracts (%) 
Employment in agriculture (%) 
Employment in industry (%) 
Employment in services (%) 
Activity rate (% working-age population) 
Total unemployed (000) 
Unemployment rate (%) 
Youth unemployment rate (%) 
Long-term unemployed (% total) 
















































Source: Population data are from Eurostat, Demographic 























































































































































total employment is fr 
1985 where Community Labour 








































































































































































































im national accounts for all countries 
Force Survey (LFS) data are used. 
harmonised Eurostat ¡  Hgures; long 
unemployment is from the LFS. Figures for employment structure and unemployment in 1975 are based on OECD data. 
* Annual average change since previous year specified. 
Figures for 1994 include 1993 data for Austria and Sweden. Figures 
-term 
for long-term unemployment exclude Austria and Finland. 
187 Annex 
Key employment indicators in 
Total 
Total population (000) 
Working-age population (15-64) (000) 
Total employment (000) 
Annual change in employment (%)* 
Employment rate (% working-age population) 
Self-employed (% total employment) 
Employed part-time (% total employment) 
Employed on fixed term contracts (%) 
Employment in agriculture (%) 
Employment in industry (%) 
Employment in services (%) 
Activity rate (% working-age population) 
Total unemployed (000) 
Unemployment rate (%) 
Youth unemployment rate (%) 
Long-term unemployed (% total) 
Men 
Total population (000) 
Working-age population (15-64) (000) 
Total employment (000) 
Annual change in employment (%)* 
Employment rate (% working-age population) 
Self-employed (% total employment) 
Employed part-time (% total employment) 
Employed on fixed term contracts (%) 
Employment in agriculture (%) 
Employment in industry (%) 
Employment in services (%) 
Activity rate (% working-age population) 
Total unemployed (000) 
Unemployment rate (%) 
Youth unemployment rate (%) 
Long-term unemployed (% total) 
Women 
Total population (000) 
Working-age population (15-64) (000) 
Total employment (000) 
Annual change in employment (%)* 
Employment rate (% working-age population) 
Self-employed (% total employment) 
Employed part-time (% total employment) 
Employed on fixed term contracts (%) 
Employment in agriculture (%) 
Employment in industry (%) 
Employment in services (%) 
Activity rate (% working-age population) 
Total unemployed (000) 
Unemployment rate (%) 
Youth unemployment rate (%) 
Long-term unemployed (% total) 





















































































































































































































































from national accounts. 
Other employment details are from the Community Labour Force Survey (LFS). Total unemployed 
harmonised Eurostat figures; long-term unemployment is from 
Figures for employment structure and unemployment in 1975 
* Annual average change since previous year specified. 
the LFS. 





































































































Key employment indicators in 
Total 
Total population (000) 
Working-age population (15-64) (000) 
Total employment (000) 
Annual change in employment (%)* 
Employment rate (% working-age population) 
Self-employed (% total employment) 
Employed part-time (% total employment) 
Employed on fixed term contracts (%) 
Employment in agriculture (%) 
Employment in industry (%) 
Employment in services (%) 
Activity rate (% working-age population) 
Total unemployed (000) 
Unemployment rate (%) 
Youth unemployment rate (%) 
Long-term unemployed (% total) 
Men 
Total population (000) 
Working-age population (15-64) (000) 
Total employment (000) 
Annual change in employment (%)* 
Employment rate (% working-age population) 
Self-employed (% total employment) 
Employed part-time (% total employment) 
Employed on fixed term contracts (%) 
Employment in agriculture (%) 
Employment in industry (%) 
Employment in services (%) 
Activity rate '% working-age population) 
Total unemployed (000) 
Unemployment rate (%) 
Youth unemployment rate (%) 
Long-term unemployed (% total) 
Women 
Total population (000) 
Working-age population (15-64) (000) 
Total employment (000) 
Annual change in employment (%)* 
Employment rate (% working-age population) 
Self-employed (% total employment) 
Employed part-time (% total employment) 
Employed on fixed term contracts (%) 
Employment in agriculture (%) 
Employment in industry (%) 
Employment in services (%) 
Activity rate (% working-age population) 
Total unemployed (000) 
Unemployment rate (%) 
Youth unemployment rate (%) 
Long-term unemployed (% total) 








































































































































































































































































































Other employment details are from the Community Labour Force Survey (LFS). Total unemployed and youth unemployed are 
harmonised Eurostat figures; long-term unemployment is from 
Figures for employment structure and unemployment in 1975 
* Annual average change since previous year specified. 
the LFS. 



















































Key employment indicators 
Total 
Total population (000) 
Working-age population (15-64) (%) 
Total employment (000) 
Annual change in employment (%)* 
Employment rate (% working-age pop.) 
Self-employed (% total employment) 
Employed part-time (% total employment) 
Employed on fixed term contract (%) 
Employment in agriculture (%) 
Employment in industry (%) 
Employment in services (%) 
Activity rate (% working-age population) 
Total unemployed (000) 
Unemployment rate (%) 
Youth unemployment rate (%) 
Long-term unemployed (% total) 
Men 
Total population (000) 
Working-age population (15-64) (%) 
Total employment (000) 
Annual change in employment (%)* 
Employment rate (% working-age pop.) 
Self-employed (% total employment) 
Employed part-time (% total employment) 
Employed on fixed term contract 
Employment in agriculture (%) 
Employment in industry (%) 
Employment in services (%) 
Activity rate (% working-age population) 
Total unemployed (000) 
Unemployment rate (%) 
Youth unemployment rate (%) 
Long-term unemployed (% total) 
Women 
Total population (000) 
Working-age population (15-64) (%) 
Total employment (000) 
Annual change in employment (%)* 
Employment rate (% working-age pop.) 
Self-employed (% total employment) 
Employed part-time (% total employment) 
Employed on fixed term contract (%) 
Employment in agriculture (%) 
Employment in industry (%) 
Employment in services (%) 
Activity rate (% working-age population) 
Total unemployed (000) 
Unemployment rate (%) 
Youth unemployment rate (%) 










































































































































































































































































































total employment is from national accounts . 
Other employment details are from the Community Labour Force Survey (LFS). 
harmonised Eurostat figures; long-term unemployment ¡ 
Figures for employment structure and unemployment in 
* Annual average change since previous year specified. 



















































Total unemployed and youth unemployed are 


















































- 190 Annex 
Key employment indicators in 
Total 
Total population (000) 
Working-age population (15-64) (000) 
Total employment (000) 
Annual change in employment (%)* 
Employment rate (% working-age population) 
Self-employed (% total employment) 
Employed part-time (% total employment) 
Employed on fixed term contracts (%) 
Employment in agriculture (%) 
Employment in industry (%) 
Employment in services (%) 
Activity rate (% working-age population) 
Total unemployed (000) 
Unemployment rate (%) 
Youth unemployment rate (%) 
Long-term unemployed (% total) 
Men 
Total population (000) 
Working-age population (15-64) (000) 
Total employment (000) 
Annual change in employment (%)* 
Employment rate (% working-age population) 
Self-employed (% total employment) 
Employed part-time (% total employment) 
Employed on fixed term contracts (%) 
Employment in agriculture (%) 
Employment in industry (%) 
Employment in services (%) 
Activity rate (% working-age population) 
Total unemployed (000) 
Unemployment rate (%) 
Youth unemployment rate (%) 
Long-term unemployed (% total) 
Women 
Total population (000) 
Working-age population (15-64) (000) 
Total employment (000) 
Annual change in employment (%)* 
Employment rate (% working-age population) 
Self-employed (% total employment) 
Employed part-time (% total employment) 
Employed on fixed term contracts (%) 
Employment in agriculture (%) 
Employment in industry (%) 
Employment in services (%) 
Activity rate (% working-age population) 
Total unemployed (000) 
Unemployment rate (%) 
Youth unemployment rate (%) 





















































































































































Other employment details are from the Community Labour Force Survey (LFS). Total 
harmonised Eurostat figures: long-term unemployment is from the LFS. 
Figures for employment stucture and unemployment in 1975 are based on 
* Annual average change since previous year specified.









































































































































































































Key employment indicators 
Total 
Total population (000) 
Working-age population (15-64) (000) 
Total employment (000) 
Annual change in employment (%)* 
Employment rate (% working-age population) 
Self-employed (% total employment) 
Employed part-time (% total employment) 
Employed on fixed term contracts (%) 
Employment in agriculture (%) 
Employment in industry (%) 
Employment in services (%) 
Activity rate (% working-age population) 
Total unemployed (000) 
Unemployment rate (%) 
Youth unemployment rate (%) 
Long-term unemployed (% total) 
Men 
Total population (000) 
Working-age population (15-64) (000) 
Total employment (000) 
Annual change in employment (%)* 
Employment rate (% working-age population) 
Self-employed (% total employment) 
Employed part-time (% total employment) 
Employed on fixed term contracts (%) 
Employment in agriculture (%) 
Employment in industry (%) 
Employment in services (%) 
Activity rate (% working-age population) 
Total unemployed (000) 
Unemployment rate (%) 
Youth unemployment rate (%) 
Long-term unemployed (% total) 
Women 
Total population (000) 
Working-age population (15-64) (000) 
Total employment (000) 
Annual change in employment (%)* 
Employment rate (% working-age population) 
Self-employed (% total employment) 
Employed part-time (% total employment) 
Employed on fixed term contracts (%) 
Employment in agriculture (%) 
Employment in industry (%) 
Employment in services (%) 
Activity rate (% working-age population) 
Total unemployed (000) 
Unemployment rate (%) 
Youth unemployment rate (%) 



























































































































Source: Population data are from Eurostat, Demographic Statistics; total 
Other employment details are from the Community Labour Force Survey 







































































































































































































(LFS). Total unemployed and youth unemployed are 
Figures for employment structure and unemployment in 1975 are based on OECD data. 





















































Key employment indicators in 
Total 
Total population (000) 
Working-age population (15-64) (000) 
Total employment (000) 
Annual change in employment (%)* 
Employment rate (% working-age population) 
Self-employed (% total employment) 
Employed part-time (% total employment) 
Employed on fixed term contracts (%) 
Employment in agriculture (%) 
Employment in industry (%) 
Employment in services (%) 
Activity rate (% working-age population) 
Total unemployed (000) 
Unemployment rate (%) 
Youth unemployment rate (%) 
Long-term unemployed (% total) 
Men 
Total population (000) 
Working-age population (15-64) (000) 
Total employment (000) 
Annual change in employment (%)* 
Employment rate (% working-age population) 
Self-employed (% total empi) 
Employed part-time (% total employment) 
Employed on fixed term contracts (%) 
Employment in agriculture (%) 
Employment in industry (%) 
Employment in services (%) 
Activity rate (% working-age population) 
Total unemployed (000) 
Unemployment rate (%) 
Youth unemployment rate (%) 
Long-term unemployed (% total) 
Women 
Total population (000) 
Working-age population (15-64) (000) 
Total employment (000) 
Annual change in employment (%)* 
Employment rate (% working-age population) 
Self-employed (% total employment) 
Employed part-time (% total employment) 
Employed on fixed term contracts (%) 
Employment in agriculture (%) 
Employment in industry (%) 
Employment in services (%) 
Activity rate {% working-age population) 
Total unemployed (000) 
Unemployment rate (%) 
Youth unemployment rate (%) 








































































































































































































































































































Other employment details are from the Community Labour Force Survey (LFS). Total unemployed and youth unemployed are 
harmonised Eurostat figures; long-term unemployment is from  the LFS. 
Figures for employment structure and unemployment in 1975 are based on OECD data. 



















































Key employment indicators in 
Total 
Total population (000) 
Working-age population (15-64) (000) 
Total employment (000) 
Annual change in employment (%)* 
Employment rate (% working-age population) 
Self-employed (% total employment) 
Employed part-time (% total employment) 
Employed on fixed term contracts (%) 
Employment in agriculture (%) 
Employment in industry (%) 
Employment in services (%) 
Activity rate (% working-age population) 
Total unemployed (000) 
Unemployment rate (%) 
Youth unemployment rate (%) 
Long-term unemployed (% total) 
Men 
Total population (000) 
Working-age population (15-64) (000) 
Total employment (000) 
Annual change in employment (%)* 
Employment rate (% working-age population) 
Self-employed (% total employment) 
Employed part-time (% total employment) 
Employed on fixed term contracts (%) 
Employment in agriculture (%) 
Employment in industry (%) 
Employment in services (%) 
Activity rate (% working-age population) 
Total unemployed (000) 
Unemployment rate (%) 
Youth unemployment rate (%) 
Long-term unemployed (% total) 
Women 
Total population (000) 
Working-age population (15-64) (000) 
Total employment (000) 
Annual change in employment (%)* 
Employment rate (% working-age population) 
Self-employed (% total employment) 
Employed part-time (% total employment) 
Employed on fixed term contracts (%) 
Employment in agriculture (%) 
Employment in industry (%) 
Employment in services (%) 
Activity rate (% working-age population) 
Total unemployed (000) 
Unemployment rate (%) 
Youth unemployment rate (%) 







































































































































































































































































































Other employment details are from the Community Labour Force Survey (LFS). Total unemployed and youth unemployed are 
harmonised Eurostat figures; long-term unemployment is from the LFS. 
Figures for employment structure and unemployment in 1975 are 
* Annual average change since previous year specified. 



















































Key employment indicators in 
Total 
Total population (000) 
Working-age population (15-64) (000 
Total employment (000) 
Annual change in employment (%)* 
Employment rate (% working-age population) 
Self-employed (% total employment) 
Employed part-time (% total employment) 
Employed on fixed term contracts (%) 
Employment in agriculture (%) 
Employment in industry (%) 
Employment in services (%) 
Activity rate (% working-age population) 
Total unemployed (000) 
Unemployment rate (%) 
Youth unemployment rate (%) 
Long-term unemployed (% total) 
Men 
Total population (000) 
Working-age population (15-64) (000 
Total employment (000) 
Annual change in employment (%)* 
Employment rate (% working-age population) 
Self-employed (% total employment) 
Employed part-time (% total employment) 
Employed on fixed term contracts (%) 
Employment in agriculture (%) 
Employment in industry (%) 
Employment in services (%) 
Activity rate (% working-age population) 
Total unemployed (000) 
Unemployment rate (%) 
Youth unemployment rate (%) 
Long-term unemployed (% total) 
Women 
Total population (000) 
Working-age population (15-64) (000 
Total employment (000) 
Annual change in employment (%)* 
Employment rate (% working-age population) 
Self-employed (% total employment) 
Employed part-time (% total employment) 
Employed on fixed term contracts (%) 
Employment in agriculture (%) 
Employment in industry (%) 
Employment in services (%) 
Activity rate (% working-age population) 
Total unemployed (000) 
Unemployment rate (%) 
Youth unemployment rate (%) 

































































































Source: Population data are from Eurostat, Demographic Statistics; total 
average of quarterly figures — and for 1975, based 
Other employment details are from the LFS. Total 
unemployment is from the LFS. 
on national accounts. 























































































































































































































































from Community Labour Force Survey — 
unemployed are harmonised Eurostat 
Figures for employment structure and unemployment in 1975 are based on OECD data 
* Annual average change since previous year specified. 
figures; long  term 
195-Annex 
Key employment indicators in Luxembourg 
Total 
Total population (000) 
Working-age population (15-64) (000) 
Total employment (000) 
Annual change in employment (%)* 
Employment rate (% working-age population) 
Self-employed (% total employment) 
Employed part-time (% total employment) 
Employed on fixed term contracts (%) 
Employment in agriculture (%) 
Employment in industry (%) 
Employment in services (%) 
Activity rate (% working-age population) 
Total unemployed (000) 
Unemployment rate (%) 
Youth unemployment rate (%) 
Long-term unemployed (% total) 
Men 
Total population (000) 
Working-age population (15-64) (000) 
Total employment (000) 
Annual change in employment (%)* 
Employment rate (% working-age population) 
Self-employed (% total employment) 
Employed part-time (% total employment) 
Employed on fixed term contracts (%) 
Employment in agriculture (%) 
Employment in industry (%) 
Employment in services (%) 
Activity rate (% working-age population) 
Total unemployed (000) 
Unemployment rate (%) 
Youth unemployment rate (%) 
Long-term unemployed (% total) 
Women 
Total population (000) 
Working-age population (15-64) (000) 
Total employment (000) 
Annual change in employment (%)* 
Employment rate (% working-age population) 
Self-employed (% total employment) 
Employed part-time (% total employment) 
Employed on fixed term contracts (%) 
Employment in agriculture (%) 
Employment in industry (%) 
Employment in services (%) 
Activity rate (% working-age population) 
Total unemployed (000) 
Unemployment rate (%) 
Youth unemployment rate (%) 




















































































































































































































































from national accounts. 
Other employment details are from the Community Labour Force Survey (LFS). Total unemployed and 
harmonised Eurostat figures; long-term unemployment is from 
Figures for employment structure and unemployment in 19751 
* Annual average change since previous year specified. 
the LFS. 





































































































Key employment indicators in the Netherlands 
Total 
Total population (000) 
Working-age population (15-64) (000) 
Total employment (000) 
Annual change in employment (%)* 
Employment rate (% working-age population) 
Self-employed (% total employment) 
Employed part-time (% total employment) 
Employed on fixed term contracts (%) 
Employment in agriculture (%) 
Employment in industry (%) 
Employment in services (%) 
Activity rate (% working-age population) 
Total unemployed (000) 
Unemployment rate (%) 
Youth unemployment rate (%) 
Long-term unemployed (% total) 
Men 
Total population (000) 
Working-age population (15-64) (000) 
Total employment (000) 
Annual change in employment (%)* 
Employment rate (% working-age population) 
Self-employed (% total employment) 
Employed part-time (% total employment) 
Employed on fixed term contracts (%) 
Employment in agriculture (%) 
Employment in industry (%) 
Employment in services (%) 
Activity rate (% w-a popn) 
Total unemployed (000) 
Unemployment rate (%) 
Youth unemployment rate (%) 
Long-term unemployed (% total) 
Women 
Total population (000) 
Working-age population (15-64) (000) 
Total employment (000) 
Annual change in employment (%)* 
Employment rate (% working-age population) 
Self-employed (% total employment) 
Employed part-time (% total employment) 
Employed on fixed term contracts (%) 
Employment in agriculture (%) 
Employment in industry (%) 
Employment in services (%) 
Activity rate (% working-age population) 
Total unemployed (000) 
Unemployment rate (%) 
Youth unemployment rate (%) 


































































































































































































Source: Population data are from Eurostat, Demographic Statistics; total employment from 1985 
Survey (LFS) and for 1975 is based on national accounts. 
Other employment details are from the LFS. Total unemployed and youth 
unemployment is from the LFS. 
Figures for employment structure and unemployment in 1975 
* Annual average change since previous year specified. 




















































































































































',s from Community Labour Force 




Key employment indicators in 
Total 
Total population (000) 
Working-age population (15-64) (000) 
Total employment (000) 
Annual change in employment (%)* 
Employment rate (% working-age population) 
Self-employed (Vc total employment) 
Employed part-time (% total employment) 
Employed on fixed term contracts (%) 
Employment in agriculture (%) 
Employment in industry (%) 
Employment in services (%) 
Activity rate (% working-age population) 
Total unemployed (000) 
Unemployment rate (%) 
Youth unemployment rate (%) 
Long-term unemployed (% total) 
Men 
Total population (000) 
Working-age population (15-64) (000) 
Total employment (000) 
Annual change in employment (%)* 
Employment rate (% working-age population) 
Self-employed (% total employment) 
Employed part-time (% total employment) 
Employed on fixed term contracts (%) 
Employment in agriculture (%) 
Employment in industry (%) 
Employment in services (%) 
Activity rate (% working-age population) 
Total unemployed (000) 
Unemployment rate (%) 
Youth unemployment rate (%) 
Long-term unemployed (% total) 
Women 
Total population (000) 
Working-age population (15-64) (000) 
Total employment (000) 
Annual change in employment (%)* 
Employment rate (% working-age population) 
Self-employed (% total employment) 
Employed part-time (% total employment) 
Employed on fixed term contracts (%) 
Employment in agriculture (%) 
Employment in industry (%) 
Employment in services (%) 
Activity rate (% working-age population) 
Total unemployed (000) 
Unemployment rate (%) 
Youth unemployment rate (%) 
Long-term unemployed (% total) 


















































































































































, other employment details are from 







































































































































































































Key employment indicators 
Total 
Total population (000) 
Working-age population (15-64) (000 
Total employment (000) 
Annual change in employment (%)* 
Employment rate (% working-age population) 
Self-employed (% total employment) 
Employed part-time (% total employment) 
Employed on fixed term contracts (%) 
Employment in agriculture (%) 
Employment in industry (%) 
Employment in services (%) 
Activity rate (% working-age population) 
Total unemployed (000) 
Unemployment rate (%) 
Youth unemployment rate (%) 
Long-term unemployed (% total) 
Men 
Total population (000) 
Working-age population (15-64) (000) 
Total employment (000) 
Annual change in employment (%)* 
Employment rate (% working-age population) 
Self-employed (% total employment) 
Employed part-time (% total employment) 
Employed on fixed term contracts (%) 
Employment in agriculture (%) 
Employment in industry (%) 
Employment in services (%) 
Activity rate (% w-a popn) 
Total unemployed (000) 
Unemployment rate (%) 
Youth unemployment rate (%) 
Long-term unemployed (% total) 
Women 
Total population (000) 
Working-age population (15-64) (000) 
Total employment (000) 
Annual change in employment (%)* 
Employment rate (% working-age population) 
Self-employed (% total employment) 
Employed part-time (% total employment) 
Employed on fixed term contracts (%) 
Employment in agriculture (%) 
Employment in industry (%) 
Employment in services (%) 
Activity rate (% working-age population) 
Total unemployed (000) 
Unemployment rate (%) 
Youth unemployment rate (%) 
























































































































































































































Source: Population data are from Eurostat, Demographic Statistics; total employment from 1985 
Survey (LFS) — average of quarterly figures —  and for 1975 is based on  national accounts. 
Other employment details are from the (LFS). Total unemployed and youth unemployed 
unemployment is from the LFS. 
Figures for employment structure and unemployment in 1975 are based ι 
* Annual average change since previous year specified. * 1986 




















































































































































s from Community Labour Force 
ire harmonised Eurostat figures; long  term 
199-Annex 
Key employment indicators in 
Total 
Total population (000) 
Working-age population (15-64) (000) 
Total employment (000) 
Annual change in employment (%)* 
Employment rate (% working-age population) 
Self-employed (% total employment) 
Employed part-time (% total employment) 
Employed on fixed term contracts (%) 
Employment in agriculture (%) 
Employment in industry (%) 
Employment in services (%) 
Activity rate (% working-age population) 
Total unemployed (000) 
Unemployment rate (%) 
Youth unemployment rate (%) 
Long-term unemployed (% total) 
Men 
Total population (000) 
Working-age population (15-64) (000) 
Total employment (000) 
Annual change in employment (%)* 
Employment rate (% working-age population) 
Self-employed (% total employment) 
Employed part-time (% total employment) 
Employed on fixed term contracts (%) 
Employment in agriculture (%) 
Employment in industry (%) 
Employment in services (%) 
Activity rate (% working-age population) 
Total unemployed (000) 
Unemployment rate (%) 
Youth unemployment rate (%) 
Long-term unemployed (% total) 
Women 
Total population (000) 
Working-age population (15-64) (000) 
Total employment (000) 
Annual change in employment (%)* 
Employment rate (% working-age population) 
Self-employed (% total employment) 
Employed part-time (% total employment) 
Employed on fixed term contracts (%) 
Employment in agriculture (%) 
Employment in industry (%) 
Employment in services (%) 
Activity rate (% working-age population) 
Total unemployed (000) 
Unemployment rate (%) 
Youth unemployment rate (%) 
Long-term unemployed (% total) 



















































































































































other employment details are from 
Total unemployed and youth unemployed are harmonised Eurostat figures. 






































































































































































































ir Finland and 
-200 Annex 
Key employment indicators in 
Total 
Total population (000) 
Working-age population (15-64) (000) 
Total employment (000) 
Annual change in employment (%)* 
Employment rate (% working-age population) 
Self-employed (% total employment) 
Employed part-time (% total employment) 
Employed on fixed term contracts (%) 
Employment in agriculture (%) 
Employment in industry (%) 
Employment in services (%) 
Activity rate (% working-age population) 
Total unemployed (000) 
Unemployment rate (%) 
Youth unemployment rate (%) 
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, other employment details are from 
Total unemployed and youth unemployed are harmonised Eurostat figures. 
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Other employment details are from the Community Labour Force Survey (LFS). Total unemployed and youth unemployed are 
harmonised Eurostat figures; long-term unemployment is from 
Figures for employment structure and unemployment in 1975 
* Annual average change since previous year specified. 
the LFS. 



















































The main source of data used is the Statistical Office of the 
European Communities (Eurostat) and, in particular, the Com-
munity Labour Force Survey ( LFS I. This is the only source of data 
on employment, unemployment and related variables which is 
comparable and complete for all Member States. Since it is based 
on a survey of households and uses a common coding and metho-
dology, it abstracts from national differences in definitions, 
methods of classification and administrative procedures and regu-
lations. 
Data from national sources may, therefore, differ from the figures 
presented in this report. This is particularly so for unemployment 
statistics, which in individual countries are based largely on 
registrations at labour offices. 
The LFS was carried out once every two years between 1973 and 
1981 and since 1983 has been conducted annually. The results of 
the surveys before 1983, however, are not strictly comparable with 
those conducted since. 
This year's Report includes an analysis of data from the 1994 LFS, 
which are available for all 12 of the former Member States 
whereas in previous reports the LFS of two years before repre-
sented the latest data available. Thanks to the efforts of the 
Statistical Office and Member States, this, therefore, enables a 
more up-to-date review of employment developments to be made 
than has been possible in the past. 
In a great many cases, the data presented have been specifically 
extracted from the LFS and, in some cases, from other databases, 
by statisticians at Eurostat who have given considerable help and 
advice in the preparation of the report. 
Employment data for analysis of year-to-year changes 
The LFS for most countries is not the most reliable source of data 
for examining changes in employment over time, especially over 
short periods, partly because of it is based on a sample survey of 
households. The analysis in Part 1, Sections 1 and 2 which is 
concerned with the growth of employment in recent years is, 
therefore, based largely on National Accounts data, which tend to 
be more comparable over time. However, for a few Member States 
there are problems with the National Accounts data which mean 
that they are less satisfactory than the LFS figures. These are: 
• Italy, where the National Accounts data include an estimate 
for the numbers employed outside the formal economy which 
increases the number by about 10% relative to the LFS fig-
ure and which are likely to be better estimates of job 
numbers than the number of people employed; 
• the Netherlands, for which the National Accounts data are 
for full-time equivalent, rather than actual, numbers em-
ployed (ie part-time workers are counted as less than 
full-time workers), which makes the data not comparable 
with those for other countries; 
• Portugal, where the National Accounts data are substan-
tially different from the LFS figures (15-20% lower), for a 
reason which is unclear, and change in different ways. 
For these three countries, LFS figures have been used for analysis 
of changes in employment over time instead of National Accounts 
figures (quarterly LFS figures in the case of Italy and Portugal, 
where there is some seasonality in employment, and annual LFS 
figures for the Netherlands). This means that the figures for total 
employment in the Union are slightly different, both in terms of 
numbers and in terms of year-to-year changes, than those nor-
mally used. 
Other data 
The short-term forecasts summarised in Part 1, Section 6 relate 
to Spring 1995 and were prepared by the Directorate General for 
Economic and Financial Affairs, which also provided the National 
Accounts data for the analysis in Part 1, Sections 1 and 2 and 
Section 5 (on changes in labour costs). The sources used for each 
of the graphs and the maps are listed below. 
Germany 
The data for Germany used in the Report relate so far as possible, 
and where appropriate, to the country after unification and, 
therefore, include the new Lander. Since data are not available 
for unified Germany before 1991 — and in many cases would be 
difficult to interpret if they were — the analysis for the years 
before 1991 relates to the former West Germany. In the analysis 
of changes over the period between 1990 and 1994, to enable the 
new Länder to be included, the device has been adopted of taking 
the 1991 data for these and combining these with the data for the 
former West Germany in 1990. 
New Member States 
The data for detailed analysis of the structure of the labour force 
and employment in Finland and Sweden come from national 
labour force surveys. Because there is no labour force survey for 
Austria, the data come from national sources (supplied by the 
Central Statistical Office) and for this reason are not directly 
comparable with those for other countries. 
Availability of data 
Most of the data used in the preparation of Employment in Europe 
can be made available in machine-readable form in a number of 
standard file formats. Requests for data should indicate the graph 
or map for which the data are required and should be addressed 
to: 
European Commission — DG V/B/l 
200 rue de la Loi 
B-1049 Brussels 
A small fee will usually be charged to cover the preparation costs. 
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